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THE  
DIALOGUES OF PLATO

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
THE

# DIALOGUES OF PLATO

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

WITH ANALYSES AND INTRODUCTIONS

BY



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
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# SYMPOSIUM.





## INTRODUCTION.

OF all the works of Plato the *Symposium* is the most perfect in form, and may be truly thought to contain more than any commentator has ever dreamed of; or, as Goethe said of one of his own writings, more than the author himself knew. For in philosophy as in prophecy glimpses of the future may often be conveyed in words which could hardly have been understood or interpreted at the time when they were uttered (cp. *Symp.* 210 foll., 223 D). More than any other Platonic work the *Symposium* is Greek both in style and subject, having a beauty 'as of a statue,' while the companion Dialogue of the *Phaedrus* is marked by a sort of Gothic irregularity. More too than in any other part of his writings, Plato is emancipated from former philosophies. The genius of Greek art seems to triumph over the traditions of Pythagorean, Eleatic, or Megarian systems, and 'the old quarrel of poetry and philosophy' has at least a superficial reconciliation. (Rep. x. 607 B.)

An unknown person who had heard of the discourses in praise of love spoken by Socrates and others at the banquet of Agathon, is desirous of having an authentic account of them, which he thinks that he can obtain from Apollodorus, the same excitable, or rather 'mad' friend of Socrates, who has already appeared in the *Phaedo*. He had imagined that the discourses were recent. There he is mistaken: but they are still fresh in the memory of his informant, who had just been repeating them to Glaucon, and is quite prepared to have another rehearsal of them in a walk from the Piraeus to Athens. Although he had not been present himself, he had heard them from the best authority. Aristodemus, who is described as having been in past times a humble but inseparable attendant of Socrates, had reported them to him (cp. Xen. *Mem.* i. 4).

The narrative which he had heard was as follows:—

Aristodemus meeting Socrates in holiday attire, is invited by him to a banquet at the 'house of Agathon, who had been sacrificing in thanksgiving for his tragic victory on the day previous. But no sooner has he entered the house than he finds that he is alone; Socrates has stayed behind in a fit of abstraction, and does not appear until the banquet is half over. On his appearing he and the host jest a little; the question is then asked by Pausanias, one of the guests, 'What shall they do about drinking? as they had been all well drunk on the day before, and drinking on two successive days is a bad thing.' This is confirmed by the authority of Eryximachus the physician, who further proposes that instead of listening to the flute-girl and her 'noise' they shall make speeches in honour of love, one after another, going from left to right as they are sitting at the table. All of them agree to this proposal, and Phaedrus, who is the 'father' of the idea, which he has previously communicated to Eryximachus, begins as follows:—

He descants first of all upon the antiquity of love, which is proved by the authority of the poets, and then upon the benefits which love gives to man. The greatest of these is the sense of honour and dishonour. The lover is ashamed to be seen by the beloved doing or suffering any cowardly or mean act. And a state or army which was made up only of lovers and their loves would be invincible. For love will convert the veriest coward into an inspired hero.

And there have been true loves not only of men but of women also. Such was the love of Alcestis, who dared to die for her husband, and in recompense of her virtue was allowed to come again from the dead. But Orpheus, the miserable harper, who went down to Hades alive, that he might bring back his wife, was mocked with an apparition only, and the gods afterwards contrived his death as the punishment of his cowardliness. The love of Achilles, like that of Alcestis, was courageous and true; for he was willing to avenge his lover Patroclus, although he knew that his own death would immediately follow: and the gods, who honour the love of the beloved above that of the lover, rewarded him, and sent him to the islands of the blest.

Pausanias, who was sitting next, then takes up the tale. He says that Phaedrus should have distinguished the heavenly love from the earthly, before he praised either. For there are two loves, as there are two Aphrodites—one the daughter of Uranus, who has no mother and is the

elder and wiser goddess, and the other, the daughter of Zeus and Dione, who is popular and common. The first of the two loves has a noble purpose, and delights only in the intelligent nature of man, and is faithful to the end, and has no shadow of wantonness or lust. The second is the coarser kind of love, which is a love of the body rather than of the soul, and is of women and boys as well as of men. Now the actions of lovers vary, like every other sort of action, according to the manner of their performance. And in different countries there is a difference of opinion about male loves. Some, like the Boeotians, approve of them; others, like the Ionians, and most of the barbarians, disapprove of them; partly because they are aware of the political dangers which ensue from them, as may be seen in the instance of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. At Athens and Sparta there is an apparent contradiction about them. For at times they are encouraged, and then the lover is allowed to play all sorts of fantastic tricks; he may swear and forswear himself (and ‘at lovers’ perjuries they say Jove laughs’); he may be a servant, and lie on a mat at the door of his love, without any loss of character; but there are also times when elders look grave and guard their young relations, and personal remarks are made. The truth is that some of these loves are disgraceful and others honourable. The vulgar love of the body which takes wing and flies away when the bloom of youth is over, is disgraceful, and so is the interested love of power or wealth; but the love of the noble mind is lasting. The lover should be tested, and the beloved should not be too ready to yield. The rule in our country is that the beloved may do the same service to the lover in the way of virtue which the lover may do to him.

A voluntary service to be rendered for the sake of virtue and wisdom is permitted among us; and when these two customs—one the love of youth, the other the practice of virtue and philosophy—meet in one, then the lovers may lawfully unite. Nor is there any disgrace to a disinterested lover in being deceived: but the interested lover is doubly disgraced, for if he loses his love he loses his character; whereas the noble love of the other remains the same, although the object of his love is unworthy: for nothing can be nobler than love for the sake of virtue. This is that love of the heavenly goddess which is of great price to individuals and cities, making them work together for their improvement.

The turn of Aristophanes comes next; but he has the hiccough, and therefore proposes that Eryximachus the physician shall cure him or

speak in his turn. Eryximachus is ready to do both, and after prescribing for the hiccough, speaks as follows:—

He agrees with Pausanias in maintaining that there are two kinds of love; but his art has led him to the further conclusion that the empire of this double love extends over all things, and is to be found in animals and plants as well as in man. In the human body also there are two loves; and the art of medicine shows which is the good and which is the bad love, and persuades the body to accept the good and reject the bad, and reconciles conflicting elements and makes them friends. Every art, gymnastic and husbandry as well as medicine, is the reconciliation of opposites; and this is what Heracleitus meant, when he spoke of a harmony of opposites: but in strictness he should rather have spoken of a harmony which succeeds opposites, for an agreement of disagreements there cannot be. Music too is concerned with the principles of love in their application to harmony and rhythm. In the abstract, all is simple, and we are not troubled with the twofold love; but when they are applied in education with their accompaniments of song and metre, then the discord begins. Then the old tale has to be repeated of fair Urania and the coarse Polyhymnia, who must be indulged sparingly, just as in my own art of medicine care must be taken that the taste of the epicure be gratified without inflicting upon him the attendant penalty of disease.

There is a similar harmony or disagreement in the course of the seasons and in the relations of moist and dry, hot and cold, hoar frost and blight; and diseases of all sorts spring from the excesses or disorders of the element of love. The knowledge of these elements of love and discord in the heavenly bodies is termed astronomy, in the relations of men towards gods and parents is called divination. For divination is the peacemaker of gods and men, and works by a knowledge of the tendencies of merely human loves to piety and impiety. Such is the power of love; and that love which is just and temperate has the greatest power, and is the source of all our happiness and friendship with the gods and with one another. I dare say that I have omitted to mention many things which you, Aristophanes, may supply, as I perceive that you are cured of the hiccough.

Aristophanes is the next speaker:

He professes to open a new vein of discourse, in which he begins by treating of the origin of human nature. The sexes were originally three,

men, women, and the union of the two ; and they were made round, having four hands, four feet, two faces on a round neck, and the rest to correspond. Terrible was their strength and swiftness ; and they were essaying to scale heaven and attack the gods. Doubt reigned in the celestial councils ; the gods were divided between the desire of quelling the pride of man and the fear of losing the sacrifices. At last Zeus hit upon an expedient. Let us cut them in two, he said ; then they will only have half their strength, and we shall have twice as many sacrifices. He spake, and split them as you might split an egg with a hair ; and when this was done, he told Apollo to give their faces a twist and rearrange their persons, taking out the wrinkles and tying the skin in a knot about the navel. The two halves went about looking for one another, and were ready to die of hunger in one another's arms. Then Zeus invented an adjustment of the sexes, which enabled them to marry and go their way to the business of life. Now the characters of men differ accordingly as they are derived from the original man or the original woman, or the original man-woman. Those who come from the man-woman are lascivious and adulterous ; those who come from the woman form female attachments ; those who are a section of the male follow the male and embrace him, and in him all their desires centre. The pair are inseparable and live together in pure and manly affection ; yet they cannot tell what they want of one another. But if Hephaestus were to come to them with his instruments and propose that they should be melted into one and remain one here and hereafter, they would acknowledge that this was the very expression of their want. For love is the desire of the whole, and the pursuit of the whole is called love. There was a time when the two sexes were only one, but now God has halved them,—much as the Lacedaemonians have cut up the Arcadians,—and if they do not behave themselves he will quarter them, and they will hop about with half a nose and face in basso relievo. Wherefore let us exhort all men to piety, that we may obtain the goods of which love is the author, and be reconciled to God, and find our own true loves, which rarely happens in this world. And now I must beg you not to suppose that I am alluding to Pausanias and Agathon (cp. *Protag.* 315 E), for my words refer to all mankind everywhere.

Some railly ensues first between Aristophanes and Eryximachus, and then between Agathon, who fears a few select friends more than 30,000 spectators, and Socrates, who is disposed to begin an argument. This

is speedily repressed by Phaedrus, who reminds the disputants of their tribute to the god. Agathon's speech follows.

He will speak of the god first and then of his gifts. He is the fairest and blessedest and best of the gods, and also the youngest, having had no existence in the old days of Iapetus and Cronos when the gods were at war. The things that were done then were done of necessity and not of love. For love is young and dwells in soft places,—not like Ate in Homer, walking on the skulls of men, but in their hearts and souls, which are soft enough. He is all flexibility and grace, and his habitation is among the flowers, and he cannot do or suffer wrong; for all men serve and obey him of their own free will, and where there is love there is obedience, and where obedience is, there is justice; for none can be wronged of his own free will. And he is temperate as well as just, for he is the ruler of the desires, and if he rules them he must be temperate. Also he is courageous, for he is the conqueror of the lord of war. And he is wise too; for he is a poet, and the author of poesy in others. He created the animals; he is the inventor of the arts; all the gods are his subjects; he is the fairest and best in himself, and the cause of what is fairest and best in others; he makes men to be of one mind at a banquet, filling them with affection and emptying them of disaffection; the pilot, helper, defender, saviour of men, in whose footsteps let every man follow, chanting a strain of love. Such is the discourse, half playful, half serious, which I dedicate to the god.

The turn of Socrates comes next. He begins by remarking satirically that he has not understood the terms of the original agreement, for he fancied that they meant to speak the true praises of love, but now he finds that they only say what is good of him, whether true or false. He begs to be absolved from speaking falsely, but he is willing to speak the truth, and proposes to begin by questioning Agathon. The result of his questions may be summed up as follows:—

Love is of something, and that which love desires is not that which love is or has; for no man desires that which he is or has. And love is of the beautiful (cp. the speech of Agathon, 196 A, B), and therefore has not the beautiful. And the beautiful is the good, and therefore, in wanting and desiring the beautiful, love also wants and desires the good. Socrates professes to have asked the same questions and to have obtained the same answers from Diotima, a wise woman of Mantinea, who, like Agathon, had spoken first of love and then of his works.

Socrates, like Agathon, had told her that love is a mighty god and also fair, and she had shown him in return that love was neither, but in a mean between fair and foul, good and evil, and not a god at all, but only a great *dæmon* or intermediate power (cp. the speech of Eryximachus, 186 D) who conveys to the gods the prayers of men, and to men the commands of the gods.

Socrates asks: Who are his father and mother? To this Diotima replies that he is the son of Plenty and Poverty, and partakes of the nature of both, and is full and starved by turns. Like his mother he is poor and squalid, lying on mats at doors (cp. the speech of Pausanias, 183 A); like his father he is full of arts and resources, and is in a mean between ignorance and knowledge. And in this he resembles the philosopher who is also in a mean between the wise and the ignorant. Such is the nature of love, who is not to be confused with the beloved.

But love desires the beautiful; and then arises the question, What does he desire of the beautiful? He desires, of course, the possession of the beautiful;—but what is given by that? For the beautiful let us substitute the good, and we have no difficulty in seeing that the possession of the good is happiness, and that love is the desire of happiness, although the meaning of the word has been too often confined to one kind of love. And love desires not only the good, but the everlasting possession of the good. Why then is there all this flutter and excitement about love? Because all men and women at a certain age are desirous of bringing to the birth. And love is not of beauty only, but of birth in beauty; this is the principle of immortality in a mortal creature. When beauty approaches, then the conceiving power is benign and diffuse; when foulness, she is averted and morose.

But why again does this extend not only to men but also to animals? Because they too have an instinct of immortality. Even in the same individual there is a perpetual succession as well of the parts of the material body as of the thoughts and desires of the mind; nay, even knowledge comes and goes. There is no sameness of existence, but the new mortality is always taking the place of the old. This is the reason why parents love their children—for the sake of immortality; and this is why men love the immortality of fame. For the creative soul creates not children, but conceptions of wisdom and virtue, such as poets and other creators have invented. And the noblest creations of all are those of legislators, in honour of whom temples have been raised. Who

would not sooner have these children of the mind than the ordinary human ones?<sup>1</sup>

I will now initiate you, she said, into the greater mysteries; for he who would proceed in due course should leave first one fair form, and then many, and learn the connexion of them; and from beautiful bodies he should proceed to beautiful minds, and the beauty of laws and institutions, until he perceives that all beauty is of one kindred; and from institutions he should go on to the sciences, until at last the vision is revealed to him of a single science of universal beauty, and then he will behold the everlasting nature which is the cause of all, and will be near the end. In the contemplation of that supreme being of love he will be purified of earthly leaven, and will behold beauty, not with the bodily eye, but with the eye of the mind, and will bring forth true creations of virtue and wisdom, and be the friend of God and heir of immortality.

Such, Phaedrus, is the tale which I heard from the stranger of Mantinea, and which you may call the encomium of love, or what you please.

The company applaud the speech of Socrates, and Aristophanes is about to say something, when suddenly a band of revellers breaks into the court, and the voice of Alcibiades is heard asking for Agathon. He is led in drunk, and welcomed by Agathon, whom he has come to crown with a garland. He is placed on a couch at his side, but suddenly, on recognizing Socrates, he starts up, and a sort of conflict is carried on between them, which Agathon is requested to appease. Alcibiades then insists that they shall drink, and has a large wine-cooler filled, which he first empties himself, and then fills again and passes on to Socrates. He is informed of the nature of the entertainment; and is ready to join, if only in the character of a drunken and disappointed lover he may be allowed to sing the praises of Socrates.

He begins by comparing Socrates first to the masks of Silenus, which have images of the gods inside them; and, secondly, to Marsyas the flute-player. For Socrates produces the same effect with the voice which Marsyas did with the flute. He is the great speaker and enchanter who ravishes the souls of men; the convincer of hearts too, as he has convinced Alcibiades, and made him ashamed of his mean and miserable

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Bacon's Essays, §.—'Certainly the best works and of greatest merit for the public have proceeded from the unmarried or childless men; which both in affection and means have married and endowed the public.'

life. Socrates at one time seemed about to fall in love with him ; and he thought that he would thereby gain a wonderful opportunity of receiving lessons of wisdom. He narrates the failure of his design. He has suffered agonies from him, and is at his wits' end. He then proceeds to mention some other particulars of the life of Socrates ; how they were at Potidaea together, where Socrates showed his superior powers of enduring cold and fatigue ; how on one occasion he had stood for an entire day and night absorbed in reflection amid the wonder of the spectators ; how on another occasion he had saved Alcibiades' life ; how at the battle of Delium, after the defeat, he might be seen walking about like a pelican, rolling his eyes as Aristophanes had described him in the *Clouds*. He is the most wonderful of human beings, and absolutely unlike any one but a satyr. Like the satyr in his language too ; for he uses the commonest words as the outward mask of the divinest truths.

When Alcibiades has done speaking, a dispute begins between him and Agathon and Socrates. Socrates piques Alcibiades by a pretended affection for Agathon. Presently another band of revellers appears, who introduce disorder into the feast ; the sober part of the company, Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and others, withdraw ; and Aristodemus, the follower of Socrates, sleeps during the whole of a long winter's night. When he wakes at cockcrow the revellers are nearly all asleep. Only Socrates, Aristophanes, and Agathon hold out ; they are drinking out of a large goblet, which they pass round, and Socrates is explaining to the two others, who are half asleep, that the genius of tragedy is the same as that of comedy, and that the writer of tragedy ought to be a writer of comedy also. And first Aristophanes drops, and then, as the day is dawning, Agathon. Socrates, having laid them to rest, takes a bath and goes to his daily avocations until the evening. Aristodemus follows.

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If it be true that there are more things in the *Symposium* of Plato than any commentator has dreamed of, it is also true that many things have been imagined which are not really to be found there. Some writings hardly admit of a more distinct interpretation than a musical composition ; and every reader may form his own accompaniment of thought or feeling to the strain which he hears. The *Symposium* of Plato is a work of this character, and can with difficulty be rendered in any words but the writer's own. There are so many half-lights and cross-lights, so much of the colour of mythology, and of

the manner of sophistry adhering—rhetoric and poetry, the playful and the serious, are so subtly intermingled in it, and vestiges of old philosophy so curiously blend with germs of future knowledge, that agreement among interpreters is not to be expected. The expression ‘poema magis putandum quam comicorum poetarum,’ which has been applied to all the writings of Plato, is especially applicable to the Symposium.

The power of love is represented in the Symposium as running through all nature and all being: at one end descending to animals and plants, and attaining to the highest vision of truth at the other. In an age when man was seeking for an expression of the world around him, the conception of love greatly affected him. One of the first distinctions of language and of mythology was that of gender; and at a later period the ancient physicist, anticipating modern science, saw, or thought that he saw, a sex in plants; there were elective affinities among the elements, marriages of earth and heaven. (Aesch. Frag. Dan. 38.) Love became a mythic personage, whom philosophy, borrowing from poetry, converted into an efficient cause of creation. As of number and figure, the traces of the existence of love were everywhere discerned; and in the Pythagorean list of opposites male and female were ranged side by side with odd and even, finite and infinite.

But Plato seems also to be aware that there is a mystery of love in man as well as in nature, extending beyond the mere immediate relation of the sexes. He is conscious that the highest and noblest things in the world are not easily severed from the sensual desires, or may even be regarded as a spiritualised form of them. We may observe that Socrates himself is not represented as originally unimpassioned, but as one who has overcome his passions; the secret of his power over others partly lies in his passionate but self-controlled nature. In the Phaedrus and Symposium love is not merely the feeling usually so called, but the mystical contemplation of the beautiful and the good. The same passion which may wallow in the mire is capable of rising to the loftiest heights—of penetrating the inmost secret of philosophy. The highest love is the love not of a person, but of the highest and purest abstraction. This abstraction is the far off heaven on which the eye of the mind is fixed in fond amazement. The unity of truth, the consistency of the warring elements of the world, the enthusiasm for knowledge when first beaming upon mankind, the relativity of ideas to the human mind, and of

the human mind to ideas, the faith in the invisible, the adoration of the eternal nature, are all included, consciously or unconsciously, in Plato's doctrine of love.

The successive speeches in praise of love are characteristic of the speakers, and contribute in various degrees to the final result; they are all designed to prepare the way for Socrates, who gathers up the threads anew, and skims the highest points of each of them. But they are not to be regarded as the stages of an idea, rising above one another to a climax. They are fanciful, partly facetious performances, 'yet also having a certain degree of seriousness,' which the successive speakers dedicate to the god. All of them are rhetorical and poetical rather than dialectical, but glimpses of truth appear in them. When Eryximachus says that the principles of music are simple in themselves, but confused in their application, he touches lightly upon a difficulty which has troubled the moderns as well as the ancients in music, and may be extended to the other applied sciences. That confusion begins in the concrete, was the natural feeling of a mind dwelling in the world of ideas. When Pausanias remarks that personal attachments are inimical to despots, the experience of Greek history confirms the truth of his remark. When Aristophanes declares that love is the desire of the whole, he expresses a feeling not unlike that of the German philosopher, who says that 'philosophy is home sickness.' When Agathon says that no man 'can be wronged of his own free will,' he is alluding playfully to a serious problem of Greek philosophy (cp. Aris. Nic. Ethics, v. 9). So naturally does Plato mingle jest and earnest, truth and opinion in the same work.

The characters—of Phaedrus, who has been the cause of more philosophical discussions than any other man, with the exception of Simmias, the Theban (*Phaedrus* 242 B); of Aristophanes, who disguises under comic imagery a serious purpose; of Agathon, who in later life is satirized by Aristophanes in the *Thesmophoriazusae*, for his effeminate manners and the feeble rhythms of his verse; of Alcibiades, who is the same strange contrast of great powers and great vices, which meets us in history—are drawn to the life; and we may suppose the less-known characters of Pausanias and Eryximachus to be also true to the traditional recollection of them (cp. *Phaed.* 268 A, *Protag.* 315 C, D; and compare *Sympos.* 214 B with *Phaedr.* 227 A). We may also remark that Aristodemus is called 'the little' in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, i. 4 (cp. *Sym.* 173 B).

The speeches have been said to follow each other in pairs : Phaedrus and Pausanias being the ethical, Eryximachus and Aristophanes the physical speakers, while in Agathon and Socrates poetry and philosophy blend together. The speech of Phaedrus is also described as the mythological, that of Pausanias as the political, that of Eryximachus as the scientific, that of Aristophanes as the artistic (!), that of Socrates as the philosophical. But these and similar distinctions are not found in Plato ; —they are the points of view of his critics, and seem rather too general to assist us in understanding him.

When the turn of Socrates comes round he cannot be allowed to disturb the arrangement made at first. With the leave of Phaedrus he asks a few questions, and then he throws his argument into the form of a speech (cp. Gorg. 505 E, Protag. 353 B). But his speech is really the narrative of a dialogue between himself and Diotima. And as at a banquet good manners would not allow him to win a victory either over his host or any of the guests, the superiority which he gains over Agathon is ingeniously represented as having been already gained over himself by her. The artifice has the further advantage of maintaining his accustomed profession of ignorance (cp. Menex. 236 fol.). Even his knowledge of the mysteries of love, to which he lays claim here and elsewhere (Lys. 204 C), is given by Diotima.

The speeches are attested to us by the very best authority. The madman Apollodorus, who for three years past has made a daily study of the actions of Socrates—to whom the world is summed up in the words ‘Great is Socrates’—he has heard them from another ‘madman’ who was the shadow of Socrates in days of old, like him going about barefooted, and who had been present at the time. Would you desire better witness? The extraordinary narrative of Alcibiades is ingeniously represented as admitted by Socrates, whose silence when he is invited to contradict gives consent to the narrator. We may observe, by the way, (1) how the very appearance of Aristodemus by himself is a sufficient indication to Agathon that Socrates has been left behind; also, (2) how the courtesy of Agathon anticipates the excuse which Socrates was to have made on Aristodemus’ behalf for coming uninvited; (3) how the story of the fit or trance of Socrates is confirmed by the mention which Alcibiades makes of a similar fit of abstraction occurring when he was serving with the army at Potidaea; like (4) the drinking powers of Socrates and his love of the fair, which receive a similar attestation in the

concluding scene; or the attachment of Aristodemus, who is not forgotten when Socrates takes his departure. (5) We may notice the manner in which Socrates himself regards the first five speeches, not as true, but as fanciful and exaggerated encomiums of the god Love; (6) the ruling passion of Socrates for dialectics, who will argue with Agathon instead of making a speech, and will only speak at all upon the condition that he is allowed to speak the truth. We may note also the touch of Socratic irony, (7) which admits of a wide application and reveals a deep insight into the world:—that in speaking of holy things and persons there is a general understanding that you should praise them, not that you should speak the truth of them—this is the sort of praise which Socrates is unable to give. Lastly (8) we may remark that the banquet is a real banquet after all, at which love is the theme of discourse, and huge quantities of wine are drunk. (214 A, 223 B.)

The discourse of Phaedrus is half-mythical, half-ethical; and he himself, true to the character which is given him in the Dialogue bearing his name, is half-sophist, half-enthusiast. He is the critic of poetry also, who compares Homer and Aeschylus in the insipid and irrational manner of the schools of the day, characteristically reasoning about the probability of matters which do not admit of reasoning. He starts from a noble text: ‘That without the sense of honour and dishonour neither states nor individuals ever do any good or great work.’ But he soon passes on to more common-place topics. The antiquity of love, the blessing of having a lover, the incentive which love is to daring deeds, the examples of Alcestis and Achilles, are the chief themes of his discourse. The love of women is regarded by him as almost on an equality with that of men; and he makes the singular remark that the gods favour the return of love which is made by the beloved more than the original sentiment, because the lover is of a nobler and diviner nature.

There is something of a sophistical ring in the speech of Phaedrus, which recalls the first speech in imitation of Lysias, occurring in the Dialogue called the Phaedrus. This is still more marked in the speech of Pausanias which follows; and which is at once hyperlogical in form and also extremely confused and pedantic. Plato is attacking the logical feebleness of the sophists and rhetoricians, through their pupils, not forgetting by the way to satirize the monotonous and unmeaning rhythms which Prodicus and others were introducing into Attic prose

(185 D, cp. *Protag.* 337). Of course, he is ‘playing both sides of the game,’ as in the *Phaedrus*; but it is not necessary in order to understand him that we should discuss the fairness of his mode of proceeding. The love of Pausanias for Agathon has already been touched upon in the *Protagoras* (315 D), and is alluded to by Aristophanes (193 B). Hence he is naturally the upholder of male loves, which, like all the other affections or actions of men, he regards as varying according to the manner of their performance. Like the sophists and like Plato himself, though in a different sense, he begins his discussion by an appeal to mythology, and distinguishes between the elder and younger love. The value which he attributes to such loves as motives to virtue and philosophy is greatly at variance with modern and Christian notions, but is in accordance with Hellenic sentiment. For it is impossible to deny that some of the best and greatest of the Greeks indulged in attachments, which Plato in the *Laws*, no less than the universal opinion of Christendom, has stigmatised as unnatural. Pausanias is very earnest in insisting on the innocence of such loves; and he speaks of them as generally approved among Hellenes and disapproved by barbarians. His speech is ‘more words than matter,’ and might have been composed by a pupil of Lysias or of Prodicus, although there is no hint given that Plato is designing to parody them. As Eryximachus says, ‘he makes a fair beginning, but a lame ending.’

Plato transposes the two next speeches, as in the *Republic* he would transpose the virtues (iv. 430 D) and the mathematical sciences (vii. 528 A). This is done partly to avoid monotony, partly for the sake of making Aristophanes ‘the cause of wit in others,’ and also in order to bring the comic and tragic poet into juxtaposition, as if by accident. A suitable ‘expectation’ of Aristophanes is raised by the ludicrous circumstance of his having the hiccough, which is appropriately cured by his substitute, the physician Eryximachus. To Eryximachus Love is the good physician; he sees everything as an intelligent physicist, and, like many professors of his art in modern times, attempts to reduce the moral to the physical; or recognises one law of love which pervades them both. There are loves and strifes of the body as well as of the mind. Like Hippocrates the Asclepiad, he is a disciple of Heracleitus, whose conception of the harmony of opposites he explains in a new way as the harmony after discord; to his common sense, as to that of many moderns as well as ancients, the identity of contradictions is an ab-

surdity. His notion of love may be summed up as the harmony of man with himself in soul as well as body, and of all things in heaven and earth with one another.

Aristophanes is ready to laugh and make laugh before he opens his mouth, just as Socrates, true to his character, is ready to argue before he begins to speak. He expresses the very genius of the old comedy, its coarse and forcible imagery, and the licence of its language in speaking about the gods. He has no sophistical notions about love, which is brought back by him to its common-sense meaning of love between intelligent beings. His account of the origin of the sexes has the greatest (*comic*) probability and verisimilitude. Nothing in Aristophanes is more truly Aristophanic than the description of the human monster whirling round on four arms and four legs, eight in all, with incredible rapidity. Yet there is a mixture of earnestness in this jest; three serious principles seem to be insinuated:—first, that man cannot exist in isolation; he must be reunited if he is to be perfected: secondly, that love is the mediator and reconciler of poor, divided human nature: thirdly, that the loves of this world are an indistinct anticipation of an ideal union which is not yet realised.

The speech of Agathon is conceived in a higher strain, and receives the real, if half-ironical, approval of Socrates. It is the speech of the tragic poet and a sort of poem, like tragedy, moving among the gods of Olympus, and not among the elder or Orphic deities. In the idea of the antiquity of love he cannot agree; love is not of the olden time, but present and youthful ever. The speech may be compared with that speech of Socrates in the Phaedrus, in which he describes himself as talking dithyrambs. It is at once a preparation for Socrates and a foil to him. The rhetoric of Agathon elevates the soul to ‘sunlit heights,’ but at the same time contrasts with the natural and necessary eloquence of Socrates. Agathon contributes the distinction between love and the works of love, and also hints incidentally that love is always of beauty, which Socrates afterwards raises into a principle. While the consciousness of discord is stronger in the comic poet Aristophanes, Agathon, the tragic poet, has a deeper sense of harmony and reconciliation, and speaks of Love as the creator and artist.

All the earlier speeches embody common opinions coloured with a tinge of philosophy. They furnish the material out of which Socrates proceeds to form his discourse, starting, as in other places, from

philosophy and the opinions of men. From Phaedrus he takes the thought that love is stronger than death; from Pausanias, that the true love is akin to intellect and political activity; from Eryximachus, that love is a universal phenomenon and the great power of nature; from Anaxagoras, that love is the child of want, and is not merely the love of the particular or of the whole, but (as he adds) of the good; from Admetus, that love is of beauty, not however of beauty only, but of birth in beauty.

The speech of the day begins with a short argument which overthrows not only Agathon but all of them, by the help of a distinction which has escaped them. Extravagant praises have been ascribed to Love as the author of every good: no sort of encomium was too high for him, whether deserved and true or not. But Socrates has no talent for speaking anything but the truth, and if he is to speak the truth of Love he must honestly confess that he is not a good at all: for love is of the good, and no man can desire that which he has. This piece of dialectics is ascribed to Diotima, who has already urged upon Socrates the argument which he urges against Agathon. That the distinction is a fallacy is obvious. For he who has beauty or good may desire more of them: and he who has beauty or good in himself may desire beauty and good in others. The fallacy seems to arise out of a confusion between the abstract ideas of good and beauty, which do not admit of degrees, and their partial realization in individuals.

But Diotima, the prophetess of Mantinea, whose sacred and super-human character raises her above the ordinary proprieties of women, has taught Socrates far more than this about the art and mystery of love. She has taught him that love is another aspect of philosophy. The same want in the human soul which is satisfied in the vulgar by the procreation of children, may become the highest aspiration of intellectual desire. As the Christian might speak of hungering and thirsting after righteousness: or of divine loves under the figure of human (cp. Eph. v. 32: 'This is a great mystery, but I speak concerning Christ and the church'); as the mediæval saint might speak of the 'fruitio Dei'; as Dante saw all things contained in his love of Beatrice, so Plato would have us absorb all other loves and desires in the love of knowledge. Here is the beginning of Neoplatonism, or rather, perhaps, a proof (of which there are many) that the so-called mysticism of the East was not strange to the Greek of the fifth century before Christ. The first tumult

of the affections was not wholly subdued; there were longings of a creature

Moving about in worlds not realized,

which no art could satisfy. To most men reason and passion appear to be antagonistic both in idea and fact. The union of the greatest comprehension of knowledge and the burning intensity of love is a contradiction in nature, which may have existed in a far-off primeval age in the mind of some Hebrew prophet or other Eastern sage, but has now become an imagination only. Yet this 'passion of the reason' is the theme of the *Symposium* of Plato. And as there is no impossibility in supposing that 'one king, or son of a king, may be a philosopher,' so also there is a probability that there may be some few—perhaps one or two in a whole generation—in whom the light of truth may not lack the warmth of desire. And if there be such natures, no one will be disposed to deny that 'from them flow most of the benefits of individuals and states;' and even from imperfect combinations of the two elements in teachers or statesmen great good may often arise.

Yet there is a higher region in which love is not only felt, but satisfied, in the perfect beauty of eternal knowledge, beginning with the beauty of earthly things, and at last by regular steps reaching a beauty in which all existence is seen harmonious and one. The limited affection is enlarged, and enabled to behold the ideal beauty of all things. This ideal beauty of the *Symposium* is the ideal good of the *Republic*; regarded not with the eye of knowledge, but of faith and desire. The one seems to say to us 'the idea is love,' the other 'the idea is truth.' In both the lover of wisdom is the 'spectator of all time and all existence.' This is a sort of 'mystery' in which Plato also obscurely intimates the interpenetration of the moral and intellectual faculties.

The divine image of beauty which resides within Socrates has been revealed; the Silenus mask, or outward man, has now to be exhibited. The description of Socrates follows immediately after the speech of Socrates; one is the complement of the other. At the height of divine inspiration, when the force of nature can no further go, as if by way of contrast to this extreme idealism or mysticism, Alcibiades, accompanied by a troop of revellers, staggers in, and in his drunken state is able to tell of things which he would have been ashamed to mention if he had been sober. The state of his affections towards Socrates,

unintelligible to us and perverted as they appear, is a perfect illustration of the power ascribed to the loves of men in the speech of Pausanias. Indeed, he is confident that the whole company will sympathise with him; several of them have been in love with Socrates, and, like himself, have been deceived by him. The singular part of this confession is the combination of the most degrading passion with the desire of virtue and improvement. Such an union is not wholly untrue to human nature, which is capable of combining good and evil in a degree beyond the power of imagination to conceive. The Platonic Socrates (for of the real Socrates this may be doubted: cp. Xenophon's Mem. I. 2. 29. 30) does not appear to regard the greatest evil of Greek life as a matter of abhorrence, but as a subject for irony, and is far from resenting the imputation of such attachments. Nor does Plato feel any repugnance, such as would be felt in modern times, at bringing his great master and hero into connexion with nameless crimes. He is contented with representing him as a saint, who has won 'the Olympian victory' over the temptations of human nature. The fault of taste, which to us appears glaring, and which was recognised by the Greeks of a later age (Athenaeus, xi. 114), was not perceived by Plato himself. We are still more surprised to find that the first step in the upward progress of the philosopher (Symp. 210 A) is aroused by the beauty of youth, which alone seems to have been capable of inspiring the modern feeling of romance in the Greek mind. The passion of love took the spurious form of an enthusiasm for the ideal of beauty—a worship as of some godlike image of an Apollo or Antinous. Thus wide is the gulf which separates a portion of Hellenic sentiment in the age of Plato (for about the opinion of Plato himself, as of Socrates, respecting these male loves we are in the same perplexity which he attributes to his countrymen, 182 A, B; cp. Laws viii. 841 foll.) not only from Christian, but from Homeric feeling. Yet we should hesitate in ascribing to these attachments any more than to the attachment of Achilles and Patroclus in Homer an immoral or licentious character. There were some, doubtless, to whom the love of the fair mind was the noblest form of friendship (Rep. iii. 402 D), and the friendship of man with man seemed higher than the love of woman, because altogether separated from the bodily appetites.

The character of Alcibiades in the Symposium is hardly less remarkable than that of Socrates, and agrees with the picture given of him in the first of the two Dialogues which are called by his name, and also with

the slight sketch of him in the *Protagoras*. He is the impersonation of lawlessness—‘the lion’s whelp, who ought not to be reared in the city,’ yet not without a certain generosity which gained the hearts of men,—strangely fascinated by Socrates, and possessed of a genius which might have been either the destruction or salvation of Athens. The dramatic interest of the character is heightened by the recollection of his after history. He seems to have been present to the mind of Plato in the description of the democratic man of the *Republic* (viii. 560).

There is no criterion of the date of the *Symposium*, except that which is furnished by the allusion to the division of Arcadia after the destruction of Mantinea. This took place in the year b. c. 384, which is the forty-fourth year of Plato’s life. The *Symposium* cannot therefore be regarded as a youthful work. As Mantinea was restored in the year 369, the composition of the Dialogue will probably fall between 384 and 369. Whether the recollection of the event is more likely to have been renewed at the destruction or restoration of the city, rather than at some intermediate period, is a consideration not worth raising.

The *Symposium* is connected with the *Phaedrus* both in style and subject; they are the only Dialogues of Plato in which the theme of love is discussed at length. In both of them philosophy is regarded as a sort of enthusiasm or madness, and Socrates is like ‘a prophet new inspired’ with Bacchanalian revelry, which he characteristically pretends to have derived not from himself but from others. The *Phaedo* also presents some points of comparison with the *Symposium*. For there, too, philosophy might be described as ‘dying for love;’ and there are not wanting many touches of humour and fancy, which remind us of the *Symposium* (64 B, 85 B, 99 A). But while the *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus* look backwards and forwards to past and future states of existence, in the *Symposium* there is no break between this world and another; and we rise from one to the other by a regular series of steps or stages, proceeding from the particulars of sense to the universal of reason, and from one universal to many, which are finally reunited in a single science (cp. *Rep.* vi. 511 B). At first immortality means only the succession of existences; even knowledge comes and goes. Then follows, in the language of the mysteries, a higher and a higher degree of initiation; at last we arrive at the perfect vision of beauty, not relative or changing, but eternal and absolute; not bounded by this world, or in or out of this world, but an aspect of the divine,

extending over all things, and having no limit of space or time : this is the highest knowledge of which the human mind is capable. Plato does not go on to ask whether the individual is absorbed in the sea of light and beauty or retains his personality. Enough for him to have attained the true beauty or good, without enquiring precisely into the relation in which human beings stood to it. That the soul has such a reach of thought, and is capable of partaking of the eternal nature, seems to imply that she too is eternal (cp. *Phaedrus*, 245 foll.). But Plato does not distinguish the eternal in man from the eternal in the world or in God. He is willing to rest in the contemplation of the idea, which to him is the cause of all things (*Rep.* 508 E), and has no strength to go further.

The *Symposium* of Xenophon, in which Socrates describes himself as a pander, and also discourses of the difference between sensual and sentimental love, likewise offers several interesting points of comparison. But the suspicion which hangs over other writings of Xenophon, and the numerous minute references to the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*, as well as to some of the other writings of Plato, throw a doubt on the genuineness of the work. The *Symposium* of Xenophon, if written by him at all, would certainly show that he wrote against Plato, and was acquainted with his works. Of this there is no trace in the *Memorabilia*. Such a rivalry is more characteristic of an imitator than of an original writer. This (so-called) *Symposium* of Xenophon may therefore have no more title to be regarded as genuine than the confessedly spurious *Apology*.

There are no means of determining the relative order in time of the *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*. The order which has been adopted in this translation rests on no other principle than the desire to bring together in a series the memorials of the life of Socrates.



## SYMPOSIUM.

### PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

APOLLODORUS, *who repeats to his companion the dialogue which he had heard from Aristodemus, and had already once narrated to Glaucon.*

PHAEDRUS.

PAUSANIAS.

ERYXIMACHUS.

ARISTOPHANES.

AGATHON.

SOCRATES.

ALCIBIADES.

A TROOP OF REVELLERS.

SCENE:—The House of Agathon.

Steph. I BELIEVE that I have an answer prepared. For the day  
172 before yesterday I was coming from my own home at Phalerum to the city, and one of my acquaintance, who had caught a sight of me from behind, calling out playfully in the distance, said: Apollodorus, O thou man of Phalerum, halt! So I did as I was bid; and then he said, I was looking for you, Apollodorus, only just now, that I might hear about the speeches in praise of love, which were delivered by Socrates, Alcibiades, and others, at Agathon's supper. Phoenix, the son of Philip, told another person who told me of them; his narrative was very indistinct, but he said that you knew, and I wish that you would give me an account of them. Who, if not you, should be the reporter of the words of your friend? And first tell me, he said, were you present at this meeting?

Your informant, Glaucon, I said, must have been very indistinct indeed, if you imagine that the occasion was recent; or that I could have been present.

Why, yes, he replied, I thought so.

But how is that possible? I said. Are you ignorant that for many years Agathon has not resided at Athens; and not three have elapsed since I became acquainted with Socrates, of whose every word and action I now make a continual study.<sup>173</sup> In former days I was running about the world, fancying that I was doing something, when I was really a wretched being, no less so than you are now, who would do anything rather than be a philosopher.

Well, he said, jesting apart, tell me when the meeting occurred.

In our boyhood, I replied, when Agathon won the prize with his first tragedy, on the day after that on which he and his chorus offered the sacrifice of victory.

That is a long while ago, he said; and who told you—did Socrates?

No indeed, I replied, but the same person who told Phoenix; —he was a little fellow, who never wore any shoes, Aristodemus, of the deme of Cydathenaeum. He had been at Agathon's feast; and I think that there was no one in those days who was a more devoted admirer of Socrates. Moreover, I have asked Socrates about the truth of some parts of his narrative, and he confirmed them. Then, said Glaucon, let us have the tale over again; is not the road to Athens made for conversation? And so we walked, and talked of the discourses on love; and therefore, as I said at first, I have an answer prepared, and will have another rehearsal of them if you like. For to speak or to hear others speak of philosophy always gives me the greatest pleasure, to say nothing of the profit. But when I hear another strain, especially that of you rich men and traders, such conversation displeases me; and I pity you who are my companions, because you think that you are doing something when in reality you are doing nothing. And I dare say that you pity me in return, whom you regard as an unhappy creature, and very probably you are right. But I certainly know of you what you only think of me—there is the difference.

*Companion.* I see, Apollodorus, that you are just the same—always speaking evil of yourself, and of others ; and I do believe that you pity all mankind, with the exception of Socrates, yourself first of all, true in this to your old name, which, however deserved, I know not how you acquired, of Apollodorus the madman ; for you are always raging against yourself and everybody but Socrates.

*Apollodorus.* Yes, friend, and I am proved to be mad, and out of my wits, because I have these notions of myself and you ; no other evidence is required.

*Com.* I have no wish to dispute about that, Apollodorus ; but let me renew my request that you would repeat the tale of love.

*Apoll.* Well, the tale of love was on this wise :—But perhaps 174 I had better begin at the beginning, and endeavour to repeat to you the very words of Aristodemus :

He said that he met Socrates fresh from the bath and sandalled ; and as the sight of the sandals was unusual, he asked him whither he was going so finely dressed :—

To a banquet at Agathon's, he replied, whose invitation to his sacrifice of victory I refused yesterday, fearing that there would be a crowd, but promising that I would come to-day instead ; and I have put on my finery because he is a fine man. What say you to going with me unasked ?

Yes, I replied, I will go with you, if you like.

Follow then, he said, and let us demolish the Homeric proverb that

‘To the feasts of lesser men the good unbidden go,’

instead of which our proverb will run that

‘To the feasts of the good the good unbidden go,’

and this alteration may be supported by the authority of Homer himself, who not only demolishes but literally outrages his own proverb. For, after picturing Agamemnon as the most valiant of men, he makes Menelaus, who is but a faint-hearted warrior, come unbidden<sup>1</sup> to the sacrificial feast of Agamemnon, not the better to the worse, but the worse to the better.

<sup>1</sup> Iliad xvii. 588.

I am afraid, Socrates, said Aristodemus, that I may be the inferior person, who, like Menelaus in Homer,

‘To the feasts of the wise unbidden goes.’

But I shall say that I was bidden of you, and then you will have to make the excuse.

‘Two going together,’

he replied, in Homeric fashion, may invent an excuse by the way<sup>1</sup>.

This was the style of their conversation as they went along on the way. Socrates stayed behind in a fit of abstraction, and desired Aristodemus, who was waiting, to go on before him. When he reached the house of Agathon he found the doors wide open, and a comical thing happened. A servant coming out met him, and led him at once into the banqueting-hall in which the guests were reclining, for the banquet was about to begin. Welcome, Aristodemus, said Agathon, you are just in time to sup with us; if you come on any other business put that off, and make one of us, as I was looking for you yesterday and meant to have asked you, if I could have found you. But what have you done with Socrates?

I turned round and saw that Socrates was missing, and I had to explain that he had been with me a moment before, and that I came by his invitation.

You were quite right in coming, said Agathon; but where is he himself?

He was behind me just now, as I entered, he said, and I 175 cannot think what has become of him.

Go and look for him, boy, said Agathon, and bring him in; and do you, Aristodemus, meanwhile take the place by Eryximachus.

The attendant then assisted him to wash, and he lay down, and presently another servant came in and said that our friend Socrates had retired into the portico of the neighbouring house. ‘There he is fixed, and when I call to him,’ said the servant, ‘he will not stir.’

How strange, said Agathon; then you must call him again, and keep calling him.

<sup>1</sup> Iliad x. 224.

Let him alone, said my informant ; he has a way of stopping anywhere and losing himself without any reason ; do not disturb him, as I believe he will soon appear.

Well, if you think so, I will leave him, said Agathon. And then, turning to the servants, he added, ‘Let us have supper without waiting for him. Put on the table whatever you like, as usual when there is no one to give you orders, which I never do. Imagine that you are our hosts, and that I and the company are your guests ; and treat us well, and then we shall commend you.’ After this they had supper, but still no Socrates ; and during the meal Agathon several times expressed a wish to send for him, but Aristodemus objected ; and at last when the feast was about half over—for the fit, as usual, was not of long duration—Socrates entered. Agathon, who was reclining alone at the end of the table, begged that he would take the place next to him ; that I may touch the sage, he said, and have the benefit of that wise thought which came into your mind in the portico, and is now in your possession ; for I am certain that you would not have come away until you had found what you sought.

How I wish, said Socrates, taking his place as he was desired, that wisdom could be infused by touch, out of the fuller into the emptier man, like water which is poured through wool out of a fuller cup into an emptier one ; in that case how much I should prize sitting by you ! For you would have filled me full of much and beautiful wisdom, in comparison of which my own is of a very mean and questionable sort, no better than a dream ; but yours is bright and only beginning, and was manifested forth in all the splendour of youth the day before yesterday, in the presence of more than thirty thousand Hellenes.

You are mocking, Socrates, said Agathon, and ere long you and I will have to settle who bears off the palm of wisdom—of this Dionysus shall be the judge ; but at present you will be better occupied with the banquet.

176 Socrates took his place on the couch, and supped with the rest ; and then libations were offered, and after a hymn had been sung to the god, and there had been the usual ceremonies, they were about to commence drinking, when Pausanias said, And now, my friends, how can we drink with least injury to ourselves ? I can assure you that I feel severely the effect of

yesterday's potations, and must have time to recover; and I suspect that most of you are in the same predicament, for you were of the party yesterday. Consider then: How can the drinking be made easiest?

I entirely agree, said Aristophanes, that we should, by all means, avoid hard drinking, for I was myself one of those who were yesterday drowned in drink.

I think that you are right, said Eryximachus, the son of Acumenus; but I should still like to hear one other person speak. What are the inclinations of our host?

I am not able to drink either, said Agathon.

Then, said Eryximachus, the weak heads like myself, Aristodemus, Phaedrus, and others who never can drink, are fortunate in finding that the stronger ones are not in a drinking mood. (I do not include Socrates, who is able either to drink or to abstain, and will not mind, whichever we do.) Well, as none of the company seem disposed to drink much, I may be forgiven for saying, as a physician, that drinking deep is a bad practice, which I never follow, if I can help, and certainly do not recommend to another, least of all to any one who still feels the effects of yesterday's carouse.

I always do what you advise, and especially what you prescribe as a physician, rejoined Phaedrus the Myrrhinusian, and the rest of the company, if they are wise, will do the same.

All agreed that drinking was not to be the order of the day. Then, said Eryximachus, as you are all agreed that drinking is to be voluntary, and that there is to be no compulsion, I move, in the next place, that the flute-girl, who has just made her appearance, be told to go away and play to herself, or, if she likes, to the women who are within. To-day let us have conversation instead; and, if you will allow me, I will tell you what sort of conversation. This proposal having been accepted, <sup>177</sup> Eryximachus proceeded as follows:—

I will begin, he said, after the manner of Melanippe in Euripides,

‘Not mine the word’

which I am about to speak, but that of Phaedrus. For he is in the habit of complaining that, whereas other gods have poems

and hymns made in their honour, the great and glorious god, Love, has no encomiast among all the poets who are so many. There are the worthy sophists too—the excellent Prodicus for example, who have descanted in prose on the virtues of Heracles and other heroes ; and, what is still more extraordinary, I have met with a philosophical work in which the utility of salt has been made the theme of an eloquent discourse ; and many other like things have had a like honour bestowed upon them. And only to think that there should have been an eager interest created about them, and yet that to this day, as Phaedrus well and truly says, no one has ever dared worthily to hymn Love's praises ! So entirely has so great a deity been neglected. Now I want to offer Phaedrus a contribution ; and also I think that at the present moment we who are here assembled cannot do better than honour the god Love. If you agree with me, there will be no lack of conversation ; for I mean to propose that each of us in turn shall make a speech in honour of Love. Let us have the best which he can make ; and Phaedrus, who is sitting first on the left hand, and is the father of the thought, shall begin.

No one will vote against you, Eryximachus, said Socrates ; on the only subject of which I profess to have any knowledge I certainly cannot refuse to speak, nor, I presume, Agathon and Pausanias ; and there can be no doubt of Aristophanes, who is the constant servant of Dionysus and Aphrodite ; nor will any one disagree of those whom I see around me. The proposal, as I am aware, may seem hard upon us whose place is last ; but we shall be contented if we hear some good speeches first. Let Phaedrus begin the praise of Love, and good luck to him. All the company expressed their assent, and desired him to do as  
178 Socrates bade him.

Aristodemus did not recollect all that was said, nor do I recollect all that he related to me ; but I will tell you what I thought most worthy of remembrance, and what the chief speakers said.

Phaedrus began by affirming that Love is a mighty god, and wonderful among gods and men, but especially wonderful in his birth. For that he is the eldest of the gods is an honour to him ; and a proof of this is, that of his parents there is no

memorial ; neither poet nor prose-writer has ever affirmed that he had any. As Hesiod says :—

‘ First Chaos came, and then broad-bosomed Earth,  
The everlasting seat of all that is,  
And Love.’

In other words, after Chaos the Earth and Love, these two, came into being. Also Parmenides sings of the generation of the gods :

‘ First in the train of gods, he fashioned Love.’

And Acusilaus agrees with Hesiod. Thus numerous are the witnesses who acknowledge Love to be the eldest of the gods. And not only is he the eldest, he is also the source of the greatest benefits to us. For I know not any greater blessing to a young man beginning life than a virtuous lover, or to the lover than a beloved youth. For the principle which ought to be the guide of men who would nobly live—that principle, I say, neither kindred, nor honour, nor wealth, nor any other motive is able to implant so well as love. Of what am I speaking? Of the sense of honour and dishonour, without which neither states nor individuals ever do any good or great work. And I say that a lover who is detected in doing any dishonourable act, or submitting through cowardice when any dishonour is done to him by another, will be more pained at being detected by his beloved than at being seen by his father, or by his companions, or by any one else. The beloved too, when he is seen in any disgraceful situation, has the same feeling about his lover. And if there were only some way of contriving that a state or an army should be made up of lovers and their loves, they would be the very best governors of their own city, abstaining from all dis-honour, and emulating one another in honour ; and when fighting at one another’s side, although a mere handful, they would overcome the world. For what lover would not choose rather to be seen by all mankind than by his beloved, either when abandoning his post or throwing away his arms? He would be ready to die a thousand deaths rather than endure this. Or who would desert his beloved or fail him in the hour of danger? The veriest coward would become an inspired hero, equal to the bravest, at such a time ; Love would inspire him.

That courage which, as Homer says, the god breathes into the soul of heroes, Love of his own nature infuses into the lover.

Love will make men dare to die for their beloved—love alone; and women as well as men. Of this, Alcestis, the daughter of Pelias, is a monument to all Hellas; for she was willing to lay down her life on behalf of her husband, when no one else would, although he had a father and mother; but the tenderness of her love so far exceeded theirs, that she made them seem to be strangers in blood to their own son, and in name only related to him; and so noble did this action of hers appear to the gods, as well as to men, that among the many who have done virtuously she is one of the very few to whom they have granted the privilege of returning to earth, in admiration of her virtue; such exceeding honour is paid by them to the devotion and virtue of love. But Orpheus, the son of Oeagrus, the harper, they sent empty away, and showed him an apparition only of her whom he sought, but herself they would not give up; because he appeared to them to be enervated by his art, and not daring like Alcestis to die for love, to have been contriving how he might enter Hades alive; moreover, they afterwards caused him to suffer death at the hands of women, as the punishment of his cowardliness. Far other was the reward of the true love of Achilles towards his lover Patroclus—his lover and not his love (the notion that Patroclus was the beloved one is a foolish error into which Aeschylus has fallen, for Achilles was 180 surely the fairer of the two, fairer also than all the other heroes; and, as Homer informs us, he was still beardless, and younger far). And greatly as the gods honour the virtue of love, still the return of love on the part of the beloved to the lover is more admired and valued and rewarded by them, for the lover has a nature more divine and more worthy of worship. Now Achilles was quite aware, for he had been told by his mother, that he might avoid death and return home, and live to a good old age, if he abstained from slaying Hector. Nevertheless he gave his life to revenge his friend, and dared to die, not only on his behalf, but after his death. Wherefore the gods honoured him even above Alcestis, and sent him to the Islands of the Blest. These are my reasons for affirming that Love is the eldest and

noblest and mightiest of the gods, and the chiefest author and giver of virtue in life, and of happiness after death.

This, or something like this, was the speech of Phaedrus ; and some other speeches followed which Aristodemus did not remember ; the next which he repeated was that of Pausanias, who observed that the proposal of Phaedrus was too indiscriminate, and that we should not be called upon to praise Love in this unqualified manner. If there were only one Love, then what he said would be well enough ; but since there are more Loves than one, he should have begun by determining which of them was to be the theme of our praises. I will amend this defect, he said ; and first of all I will tell you which Love is deserving of praise, and then try to hymn the praiseworthy one in a manner worthy of him. For we all know that Love is inseparable from Aphrodite, and if there were only one Aphrodite there would be only one Love ; but as there are two goddesses there must be two Loves. And am I not right in asserting that there are two goddesses ? The elder one, having no mother, who is called the heavenly Aphrodite—she is the daughter of Uranus ; the younger, who is the daughter of Zeus and Dione—her we call common ; and the Love who is her fellow-worker may and must also have the name of common, as the other love is called heavenly. All the gods ought to have praise given to them. But still I must try to distinguish the characters of the two Loves : For actions vary according to the manner of their performance. Take for example, that which we are now doing, drinking, singing and talking—these actions are not in themselves either good or evil, but turn out in this or that way according to the mode of performing them ; and when well done they are good, and when wrongly done they are evil ; and in like manner not every love, but only that which has a noble purpose, is noblē and worthy of praise. Now the Love who is the offspring of the common Aphrodite is essentially common, and has no discrimination, being such as the meaner sort of men feel, and is apt to be of women as well as of youths, and is of the body rather than of the soul—the most foolish beings are the objects of this love which desires only to gain an end, but never thinks of accomplishing the end nobly, and therefore does good and evil quite indiscrimi-

nately. The goddess who is his mother is far younger than the other, and she was born of the union of the male and female, and partakes of both. But the offspring of the heavenly Aphrodite is derived from a mother in whose birth the female has no part,—she is from the male only; this is that love which is of youths, and the goddess being older has nothing of wantonness. Those who are inspired by this love turn to the male, and delight in him who is the more valiant and intelligent nature; any one may recognise the pure enthusiasts in the very character of their attachments. For they love not boys, but intelligent beings whose reason is beginning to be developed, much about the time at which their beards begin to grow. And in choosing them as their companions, they mean to be faithful to them, and pass their whole life in company with them, not to take them in their inexperience, and deceive them, and play the fool with them, or run away from one to another of them. But the love of young boys should be forbidden by law, because their future is uncertain; they may turn out good or bad, either in body or soul, and much noble enthusiasm may be thrown away upon them; in this matter the good are a law to themselves, and the coarser sort of lovers ought to be restrained by force, as we restrain or attempt to  
182 restrain them from fixing their affections on women of free birth. For the abuse of a thing brings discredit on the lawful use, and some have been ready to deny the lawfulness of love when they see the impropriety and evil of attachments of this sort; for surely nothing that is decorously and lawfully done can justly be censured. Now here and in Lacedaemon the rules about love are perplexing, but in most cities they are simple and easily intelligible; in Elis and Boeotia, and in countries having no gifts of eloquence, they are very straightforward; the established feeling is simply in favour of these connexions, and no one, whether young or old, has anything to say to their discredit, the reason being, as I suppose, that they are men of few words in those parts, and therefore the lovers do not like the trouble of pleading their suit. In Ionia and other places, and generally in countries which are subject to the barbarians, the custom is held to be dishonourable; loves of youths share the evil repute of philosophy and gymnastics, because they are inimical to

tyranny ; for the interests of rulers require that their subjects should be poor in spirit, and that there should be no strong bond of friendship or society among them, which love, above all other motives, is likely to inspire, as our Athenian tyrants learned by experience ; for the love of Aristogeiton and the constancy of Harmodius had a strength which undid their power. And, therefore, the ill-repute into which these attachments have fallen is to be ascribed to the evil condition of those who make them to be ill-reputed ; that is to say, to the self-seeking of the governors and the cowardice of the governed ; on the other hand, the indiscriminate honour which is given to them in some countries is attributable to the laziness of those who hold this opinion of them. There is yet a more excellent way of legislating about them, which is our own way ; but this, as I was saying, is rather perplexing. For, observe that open loves are held to be more honourable than secret ones, and that the love of the noblest and highest, even if their persons are less beautiful than others, is especially honourable. Consider, too, how great is the encouragement which all the world gives to the lover ; neither is he supposed to be doing anything dishonourable ; but if he succeeds he is praised, and if he fail he is blamed. And in the pursuit of his love the custom of mankind allows him to do many strange things, which philosophy would bitterly censure if they were done from any <sup>183</sup> motive of interest, or wish for office or power. He may pray, and entreat, and supplicate, and swear, and be a servant of servants, and lie on a mat at the door ; in any other case friends and enemies would be equally ready to prevent him, but now there is no friend who will be ashamed of him and admonish him, and no enemy will charge him with meanness or flattery ; the actions of a lover have a grace which ennobles them ; and custom has decided that they are highly commendable and that there is no loss of character in them ; and, what is strangest of all, he only may swear and forswear himself (this is what the world says), and the gods will forgive his transgression, for there is no such thing as a lover's oath. Such is the entire liberty which gods and men have allowed the lover, according to the custom which prevails in our part of the world. From this point of view a man fairly argues that in Athens to

love and to be loved is held to be a very honourable thing. But when there is another regime, and parents forbid their sons to talk with their lovers, and place them under a tutor's care, and their companions and equals cast in their teeth anything of this sort which they may observe, and their elders refuse to silence the reproofers and do not rebuke them—any one who reflects on all this will, on the contrary, think that we hold these practices to be most disgraceful. But the truth, as I imagine, and as I said at first, is, that whether such practices are honourable or whether they are dishonourable is not a simple question ; they are honourable to him who follows them honourably, dishonourable to him who follows them dishonourably. There is dishonour in yielding to the evil, or in an evil manner ; but there is honour in yielding to the good, or in an honourable manner. Evil is the vulgar lover who loves the body rather than the soul, and who is inconstant because he is a lover of the inconstant, and therefore when the bloom of youth which he was desiring is over, takes wing and flies away, in spite of all his words and promises ; whereas the love of the noble mind, which is one with the unchanging, is life-long. The custom of

184 our country would have them both proven well and truly, and would have us yield to the one sort of lover and avoid the other, and therefore encourages some to pursue, and others to fly ; testing both the lover and beloved in contests and trials, which will show to which of the two classes they respectively belong. And this is the reason why, in the first place, a hasty attachment is held to be dishonourable, because time is the true test of this as of most other things ; and then again there is a dishonour in being overcome by the love of money, or of wealth, or of political power, whether a man is frightened into surrender by the loss of them, or is unable to rise above the advantages of them. For none of these things are of a permanent or lasting nature ; not to mention that no generous friendship ever sprang from them. There remains, then, only one way of honourable attachment which custom allows in the beloved, and this is the way of virtue ; for as we admitted that any service which the lover does to him is not to be accounted flattery or dishonour, so the beloved has also one way of voluntary service which is not dishonourable, and this is virtuous service.

For we have a custom, and according to our custom any one who does service to another under the idea that he will be improved by him either in wisdom, or in some other particular of virtue—such a voluntary service, I say, is not to be regarded as a dishonour, and is not open to the charge of flattery. And these two customs, one the love of youth, and the other the practice of philosophy and virtue in general, ought to meet in one, and then the beloved may honourably indulge the lover. For when the lover and beloved come together, having each of them a law, and the lover thinks that he is right in doing any service which he can to his gracious loving one; and the other that he is right in showing any kindness which he can to him who is making him wise and good; the one capable of communicating wisdom and virtue, the other seeking to acquire them with a view to education and wisdom; when the two laws of love are fulfilled and meet in one—then, and then only, may the beloved yield with honour to the lover. Nor when love is of this disinterested sort is there any disgrace in being deceived, but in every other case there is equal disgrace in being or not being deceived. For he who is gracious to his lover under the 185 impression that he is rich, and is disappointed of his gains because he turns out to be poor, is disgraced all the same: for he has done his best to show that he would turn himself to any one's base uses for the sake of money; and this is not honourable. But on the same principle he who lives for the sake of virtue, and in the hope that he will be improved by his lover's company, shows himself to be virtuous, even though the object of his affection be proved to be a villain, and to have no virtue; and if he is deceived he has committed a noble error. For he has proved that for his part he will do anything for anybody for the sake of virtue and improvement, than which there can be nothing nobler. Thus noble in every case is the acceptance of another for the sake of virtue. This is that love which is the love of the heavenly goddess, and is heavenly, and of great price to individuals and cities, making the lover and the beloved alike eager in the work of their own improvement. But all other loves are the offspring of the other, who is the common goddess. To you, Phaedrus, I offer this my contribu-

tion in praise of love, which is as good as I could make on the sudden.

Pāusāniās cāme tō ā pāuse—this is the balanced way in which I have been taught by the wise to speak; and Aristodemus said that the turn of Aristophanes was next, but either he had eaten too much, or from some other cause he had the hiccough, and was obliged to change with Eryximachus the physician, who was reclining on the couch below him. Eryximachus, he said, you ought either to stop my hiccough, or to speak in my turn until I am better.

I will do both, said Eryximachus: I will speak in your turn, and do you speak in mine; and while I am speaking let me recommend you to hold your breath, and if this fails, then to gargle with a little water; and if the hiccough still continues, tickle your nose with something and sneeze; and if you sneeze once or twice, even the most violent hiccough is sure to go. I will do as you prescribe, said Aristophanes, and now get on.

Eryximachus spoke as follows: Seeing that Pausanias made 186 a fair beginning, and but a lame ending, I must endeavour to supply his deficiency. I think that he has rightly distinguished two kinds of love. But my art further informs me that a double love is to be found in all animals and plants, and I may say in all that is; and is not merely an affection of the soul of man towards the fair, or towards anything; this, I say, is a view of the subject which I seem to have gathered from my own art of medicine, which shows me how great and wonderful and universal is the deity of love, whose empire extends over all that is, divine as well as human. And from medicine I will begin that I may do honour to my art. For there are in the human body two loves, which are confessedly different and unlike, and being unlike, have loves and desires which are unlike; and the desire of the healthy is one, and the desire of the diseased is another; and as Pausanias says, to indulge good men is honourable, and bad men dishonourable; so too in the body the good and healthy elements are to be indulged, and the bad elements and the elements of desire are not to be indulged, but discouraged. And this is what the physician has to do, and in this the art of medicine consists: for medicine may be regarded generally as the knowledge of the loves and desires of the

body, and how to satisfy them or not ; and the good physician is he who is able to separate fair love from foul, or to convert one into the other ; and he who knows how to eradicate and how to implant love, whichever is required, and can reconcile the most hostile elements in the constitution and make them friends, is a skilful practitioner. Now the most hostile are the most opposite, such as hot and cold, moist and dry, bitter and sweet, and the like. And my ancestor, Asclepius, knowing how to implant friendship and accord in these elements, was the creator of our art, as our friends the poets here tell us, and I believe them ; and not only medicine in every branch, but the arts of gymnastic and husbandry are under his dominion. Any 187 one who pays the least attention will also perceive that in music there is the same reconciliation of opposites ; and I suppose that this must have been the meaning of Heracleitus, although his words are not accurate ; for he says that The One is united by disunion, like the harmony of the bow and the lyre. Now there is an absurdity in saying that harmony is discord or is composed of elements which are still in a state of discord. But perhaps what he really meant to say was that harmony is composed of differing notes of higher or lower pitch which disagreed once, and are now reconciled by the art of music ; for if the higher and lower notes still disagreed, there could be no harmony, as is indeed evident. For harmony is a symphony, and symphony is an agreement ; but an agreement of disagreements while they disagree there cannot be ; you cannot harmonize that which disagrees. This may be illustrated by rhythm, which is composed of elements short and long, once differing and now in accord ; which accordance, as in the former instance, medicine, so in this, music implants, making love and unison to grow up among them : and thus music, too, is concerned with the principles of love in their application to harmony and rhythm. Again in the essential nature of harmony and rhythm there is no difficulty in discerning love which has not yet become double. But when you want to use them in actual life, either in the composition of music or in the correct performance of airs or metres composed already, which latter is called education, then the difficulty begins, and the good artist is needed.

Then the old tale has to be repeated of fair and heavenly love—the love of Urania the fair and heavenly muse, and of the duty of accepting the temperate, and those who are as yet intemperate only that they may become temperate, and of preserving their love; and again, of the vulgar Polyhymnia, who must be used with circumspection that the pleasure may not generate licentiousness; just as in my own art it is a great matter so to regulate the desires of the epicure that he may gratify his tastes without the attendant evil of disease. The conclusion is that in music, in medicine, in all other things human as well as divine, both loves ought to be noted as far as may be, for

188 they are both present.

The course of the seasons is also full of both principles; and when, as I was saying, the elements of hot and cold, moist and dry, attain the harmonious love of one another and blend in temperance and harmony, they bring to men, animals, and vegetables health and plenty, and do them no harm; whereas the wanton love, getting the upper hand and affecting the seasons of the year, is very injurious and destructive, and is the source of pestilence, and brings many different sorts of diseases on animals and plants; for hoar-frost and hail and blight spring from the excesses and disorders of these elements of love, the knowledge of which in relation to the revolutions of the heavenly bodies and the seasons of the year is termed astronomy. Furthermore all sacrifices and the whole province of divination, which is the art of communion between gods and men—these, I say, are concerned only with the preservation of the good and the cure of the evil love. For all impiety is likely to ensue if, instead of accepting and honouring and reverencing the harmonious love in all his actions, a man honours the other love, whether in his feelings towards gods or parents, towards the living or the dead. Wherefore the business of divination is to see to these loves and to heal them, and divination is the peacemaker of gods and men, working by a knowledge of the religious or irreligious tendencies which exist in human loves. Such is the great and mighty, or rather omnipotent force of love in general. And this love, especially, which is concerned with the good, and which is perfected in company with temperance and justice, whether among gods or

men, has the greatest power, and is the source of all our happiness and harmony, and makes us friends with the gods who are above us, and with one another. I dare say that I too have omitted several things which might be said in praise of Love, but this was not intentional, and you, Aristophanes, may now supply the omission or take some other line of commendation ; as I perceive that you are cured of the hiccough.

Yes, said Aristophanes, who followed, the hiccough is gone ; 189 not, however, until I applied the sneezing ; and I wonder whether the harmony of the body has a love of such noises and ticklings, for I no sooner applied the sneezing than I was cured.

Eryximachus said : Take care, friend Aristophanes, you are making a jest of me, although you are going to speak ; and I shall have to watch and see whether I cannot have a laugh at something which you say, when you might speak in peace.

You are quite right, said Aristophanes, laughing, and I will retract what I said ; and do you please not to watch me, as I fear that in what I am going to say, instead of others laughing with me, which is to the manner born of our muse and would be all the better, I shall only be laughed at by them.

Do you expect to shoot your bolt and escape, Aristophanes ? Well, perhaps if you are very careful and have a due sense of responsibility, I may be induced to let you off.

Aristophanes professed to open another vein of discourse ; he had a mind to praise Love in another way, not like that either of Pausanias or Eryximachus. Mankind, he said, judging by their neglect of him, have never, as I think, at all understood the power of Love. For if they had understood him they would surely have built noble temples and altars, and offered solemn sacrifices in his honour ; but this is not done, and certainly ought to be done : since of all the gods he is the best friend of men, the helper and the healer of the ills which are the great obstruction to the happiness of the race. I will describe to you his power, and you may repeat what I say to the rest of the world. And first let me treat of the nature and state of man ; for the original human nature was not like the present, but different. In the first place, the sexes were originally three in number, not two as they are now ; there

was man, woman, and the union of the two, having a name corresponding to this double nature, which had once a real existence, but is now lost, and the name is only preserved as a term of reproach. In the second place, the primeval man was round, his back and sides forming a circle; and he had four hands and four feet, one head with two faces, looking  
190 opposite ways, set on a round neck and precisely alike; also four ears, two privy members, and the remainder to correspond. He could walk upright as men now do, backwards or forwards as he pleased, and he could also roll over and over at a great rate, turning on his four hands and four feet, eight in all, like tumblers going over and over with their legs in the air; this was when he wanted to run fast. Now there were these three sexes, because the sun, moon, and earth are three; and the man was originally the child of the sun, the woman of the earth, and the man-woman of the moon, which is made up of sun and earth, and they were all round and moved round and round like their parents. Terrible was their might and strength, and the thoughts of their hearts were great, and they made an attack upon the gods; of them is told the tale of Otys and Ephialtes who, as Homer says, dared to scale heaven, and would have laid hands upon the gods. Doubt reigned in the celestial councils. Should they kill them and annihilate the race with thunderbolts, as they had done the giants, then there would be an end of the sacrifices and worship which men offered to them; but, on the other hand, the gods could not suffer their insolence to be unrestrained. At last, after a good deal of reflection, Zeus discovered a way. He said: 'Methinks I have a plan which will humble their pride and mend their manners; they shall continue to exist, but I will cut them in two and then they will be diminished in strength and increased in numbers; this will have the advantage of making them more profitable to us. They shall walk upright on two legs, and if they continue insolent and will not be quiet, I will split them again and they shall hop about on a single leg.' He spoke and cut men in two, like a sorb-apple which is halved for pickling, or as you might divide an egg with a hair; and as he cut them one after another, he bade Apollo give the face and the half of the neck a turn in order that the man might

contemplate the section of himself: this would teach him a lesson of humility. He was also bidden to heal their wounds and compose their forms. Apollo twisted the face and pulled the skin all round over that which in our language is called the belly, like the purses which draw in, and he made one mouth at the centre, which he fastened in a knot (this is called the navel); he also moulded the breast and took out 191 most of the wrinkles, much as a shoemaker might smooth leather upon a last; he left a few, however, in the region of the belly and navel, as a memorial of the primeval change. After the division the two parts of man, each desiring his other half, came together, and throwing their arms about one another clung, and in their eagerness to grow into one were perishing from hunger without ever making an effort, because they did not like to do anything apart; and when one of the halves died and the other survived, the survivor sought another mate, man or woman as we call them,—being the sections of entire men or women,—and clung to that. They were being destroyed, when Zeus in pity of them invented a new plan: he turned the parts of generation round to the front, for this had not been always their position, and they sowed the seed no longer as hitherto like grasshoppers in the ground, but in one another; and after the transposition the male generated in the female in order that by the mutual embraces of man and woman they might breed, and the race might continue; or if man came to man they might be satisfied, and rest, and go their ways to the business of life: so ancient is the desire of one another which is implanted in us, reuniting our original nature, making one of two, and healing the state of man. Each of us when separated is but the indenture of a man, having one side only, like a flat fish, and he is always looking for his other half. Men who are a section of that double nature which was once called Androgynous are lascivious; adulterers are generally of this breed, and also adulterous and lascivious women: the women who are a section of the woman do not care for men, but have female attachments; the female companions are of this sort. But they who are a section of the male follow the male, and while they are young, being slices of the original man, they hang about men and 192 embrace them, and they are themselves the best of boys and

youths, because they have the most manly nature. Some indeed assert that they are shameless, but this is not true; for they do not act thus from any want of shame, but because they are valiant and manly, and have a manly countenance, and they embrace that which is like them. And these when they grow up are our statesmen, and these only, which is a great proof of the truth of what I am saying. And when they reach manhood they are lovers of youth, and are not naturally inclined to marry or beget children, which they do, if at all, only in obedience to the law, but they are satisfied if they may be allowed to live with one another unwedded; and such a nature is prone to love and ready to return love, always embracing that which is akin to him. And when one of them finds his other half, whether he be a lover of youth or a lover of another sort, the pair are lost in an amazement of love and friendship and intimacy, and one will not be out of the other's sight, as I may say, even for a moment: they will pass their whole lives together; yet they could not explain what they desire of one another. For the intense yearning which each of them has towards the other does not appear to be the desire of lover's intercourse, but of something else which the soul of either evidently desires and cannot tell, and of which she has only a dark and doubtful presentiment. Suppose Hephaestus, with his instruments, to come to the pair who are lying side by side and say to them, 'What do you people want of one another?' they would be unable to explain. And suppose further, that when he saw their perplexity he said: 'Do you desire to be wholly one; always day and night to be in one another's company? for if this is what you desire, I am ready to melt you into one and let you grow together, so that being two you shall become one, and while you live live a common life as if you were a single man, and after your death in the world below still be one departed soul instead of two—I ask whether this is what you lovingly desire, and whether you are satisfied to attain this?'—there is not a man of them who when he heard the proposal would deny or would not acknowledge that this meeting and melting in one another's arms, this becoming one instead of two, was the very expression of his ancient need. And the reason is that human nature was originally one and we were a whole, and the desire and pursuit

of the whole is called love. There was a time, I say, when the <sup>193</sup> two were one, but now because of the wickedness of mankind God has dispersed us, as the Arcadians were dispersed into villages by the Lacedaemonians. And if we are not obedient to the gods there is a danger that we shall be split up again and go about in basso-relievo, like the figures having only half a nose which are sculptured on columns, and that we shall be like tallies. Wherefore let us exhort all men to piety, that we may avoid evil, and obtain the good, of which Love is to us the lord and minister; and let no one oppose him—he is the enemy of the gods who opposes him. For if we are friends of God and reconciled to him we shall find our own true loves, which rarely happens in this world at present. I am serious, and therefore I must beg Eryximachus not to make fun or to find any allusion to Pausanias and Agathon, who, as I suspect, belong to the class which I have been describing, and are both of the manly sort. But my words have a wider application—they include men and women everywhere; and I believe that if our loves were perfectly accomplished, and each one returning to his primeval nature had his original true love, then our race would be happy. And if this would be best of all, the best in the next degree and under present circumstances must be the nearest approach to such an union; and that will be the attainment of a congenial love. Therefore, if we would praise him who has given to us the benefit, we must praise the god Love, who is our greatest benefactor, both leading us in this life back to our own nature, and giving us high hopes for the future, that if we are pious, he will restore us to our original state, and heal us and make us happy and blessed. This, Eryximachus, is my discourse of love, which, although different to yours, I must beg you to leave unassailed by the shafts of your ridicule, in order that each may have his turn; each, or rather either, for Agathon and Socrates are the only ones left.

Indeed, I am not going to attack you, said Eryximachus, for I thought your speech charming, and did I not know that Agathon and Socrates are masters in the art of love, I should be really afraid that they would have nothing to say, after the world of things which have been said already. But, for all that, I am not without hopes.

194 Socrates said : You did your part well, Eryximachus ; but if you were as I am now, or rather as I shall be when Agathon has spoken, you would, indeed, be in a great strait.

You want to cast a spell over me, Socrates, said Agathon, in the hope that I may be disconcerted at the expectation raised among the audience that I shall speak well.

I should be strangely forgetful, Agathon, replied Socrates, of the courage and magnanimity which you showed when your own compositions were about to be exhibited, coming upon the stage with the actors and facing the vast theatre altogether undismayed, if I thought that your nerves could be fluttered at a small party of friends.

Do you think, Socrates, said Agathon, that my head is so full of the theatre as not to know how much more formidable to a man of sense a few good judges are than many fools?

Nay, replied Socrates, I should be very wrong in attributing to you, Agathon, that or any other want of refinement. And I am quite aware that if you happened to meet with any whom you thought wise, you would care for their opinion much more than for that of the many. But then we, having been a part of the foolish many in the theatre, cannot be regarded as the select wise ; though I know that if you chanced to light upon a really wise man, you would be ashamed of disgracing yourself before him—would you not ?

Yes, said Agathon.

And would you not be ashamed of disgracing yourself before the many ?

Here Phaedrus interrupted them, saying : Do not answer him, my dear Agathon ; for if he can only get a partner with whom he can talk, especially a good-looking one, he will no longer care about the completion of our plan. Now I love to hear him talk ; but just at present I must not forget the encomium on Love which I ought to receive from him and every one. When you and he have paid your tribute to the god, then you may talk.

Very good, Phaedrus, said Agathon ; I see no reason why I should not proceed with my speech, as I shall have many other opportunities of conversing with Socrates. Let me say first how I ought to speak, and then speak :

The previous speakers, instead of praising the god Love, or unfolding his nature, appear to have congratulated mankind on the benefits which he confers upon them. But I would rather 195 praise the god first, and then speak of his gifts; this is always the right way of praising everything. May I say without impiety or offence, that of all the blessed gods he is the blessedest because he is the fairest and best? And he is the fairest: because, in the first place, Phaedrus, he is the youngest, and of his youth he is himself the witness, fleeing out of the way of age, who is swift enough surely, swifter than most of us like:—love hates him and will not come near him; but youth and love live and move together—like to like, as the proverb says. There are many things which Phaedrus said about Love in which I agree with him; but I cannot agree that he is older than Iapetus and Kronos—that is not the truth: as I maintain, he is the youngest of the gods, and youthful ever. The ancient things of which Hesiod and Parmenides speak, if they were done at all, were done of Necessity and not of Love: had Love been in those days, there would have been no chaining or mutilation of the gods, or other violence, but peace and sweetness, as there is now in heaven, since the rule of Love began. Love is young and also tender: he ought to have a poet like Homer to describe his tenderness, as Homer says of Ate, that she is a goddess and tender:—

‘Her feet are tender, for she sets her steps,  
Not on the ground but on the heads of men:’

which is an excellent proof of her tenderness, because she walks not upon the hard but upon the soft. Let us adduce a similar proof of the tenderness of Love: for he walks not upon the earth, nor yet upon the skulls of men, which are not so very soft, but in the hearts and souls of men: in them he walks and dwells and has his home. Not in every soul without exception, for where there is hardness he departs, where there is softness there he dwells; and nestling always with his feet and in all manner of ways in the softest of soft places, how can he be other than the softest of all things? And therefore he is the tenderest as well as the youngest, and 196 also he is of flexible form: for if he were hard and without flexure he could not enfold all things, or wind his way into and

out of every soul of man undiscovered. And a proof of his flexibility and symmetry of form is his grace, which is universally admitted to be in an especial manner the attribute of Love; ungrace and love are always at war with one another. The fairness of his complexion is revealed by his habitation among the flowers; for he dwells not amid bloomless or fading beauties, whether of body or soul or aught else, but in the place of flowers and scents, there he sits and abides. Enough of his beauty--of which, however, there is more to tell. But I must now speak of his virtue: his greatest glory is that he can neither do nor suffer wrong to or from any god or any man; for he suffers not by force if he suffers; force comes not near him, neither does he act by force. For all men in all things serve him of their own free will, and where there is voluntary agreement, there, as the laws which are the lords of the city say, is justice. And not only is he just but exceedingly temperate, for Temperance is the acknowledged ruler of the pleasures and desires, and no pleasure ever masters Love; he is their master and they are his servants; and if he conquers them he must be temperate indeed. As to courage, even the God of War is no match for him; he is the captive and Love is the lord, for love, the love of Aphrodite, masters him, as the tale runs; and the master is stronger than the servant. And if he conquers the bravest of all others he must be himself the bravest. Of his courage and justice and temperance I have spoken; but I have yet to speak of his wisdom, and I must try to do my best, according to the measure of my ability. For in the first place he is a poet (and here, like Eryximachus, I magnify my art), and he is also the source of poesy in others, which he could not be if he were not himself a poet. And at the touch of him every one becomes a poet, even though he had no music in him before; this also is a proof that Love is a good poet and accomplished in all the fine arts; for no one can give to another that which he has not himself, or teach that of which he has no knowledge. Who will deny that the creation of  
197 the animals is his doing? Are they not all the works of his wisdom, born and begotten of him? And as to the artists, do we not know that he only of them whom love inspires has the

light of fame?—he whom love touches not walks in darkness. The arts of medicine and archery and divination were discovered by Apollo, under the guidance of love and desire, so that he too is a disciple of love. Also the melody of the Muses, the metallurgy of Hephaestus, the weaving of Athene, the empire of Zeus over gods and men, are all due to love, who was the inventor of them. Love set in order the empire of the gods—the love of beauty, as is evident, for of deformity there is no love. And formerly, as I was saying, dreadful deeds were done among the gods, because of the rule of Necessity, but now since the birth of Love, and from the Love of the beautiful, has sprung every good in heaven and earth. Therefore, Phaedrus, I say of Love that he is the fairest and best in himself, and the cause of what is fairest and best in all other things. And I have a mind to say of him in verse that he is the god who

‘Gives peace on earth and calms the stormy deep,  
Who stills the waves and bids the sufferer sleep.’

He fills men with affection, and takes away their disaffection, making them meet together at such banquets as these. In sacrifices, feasts, dances, he is our lord—supplying kindness and banishing unkindness, giving friendship and forgiving enmity, the joy of the good, the wonder of the wise, the amazement of the gods: desired by those who have no part in him, and precious to those who have the better part in him: parent of delicacy, luxury, desire, fondness, softness, grace; regardful of the good, regardless of the evil. In every word, work, wish, fear—pilot, comrade, helper, saviour; glory of gods and men, leader best and brightest: in whose footsteps let every man follow, sweetly singing in his honour that sweet strain with which love charms the souls of gods and men. Such is the speech, Phaedrus, half playful, yet having a certain measure of seriousness, which, according to my ability, I dedicate to the god.

When Agathon had done speaking, Aristodemus said that 198 there was a general cheer; the fair youth was thought to have spoken in a manner worthy of himself, and of the god. And Socrates, looking at Eryximachus, said: Tell me, son of Acumenus, were my fears groundless? was I not a prophet when I

said that Agathon would make a wonderful oration, and that I should be in a strait?

One part of the prophecy, replied Eryximachus—that about Agathon, appears to me to be true; but not the other part—that you will be in a strait.

Why, my dear friend, said Socrates, must not I or any one be in a strait who has to speak after he has heard such a rich and varied discourse? I am especially struck with the beauty of the concluding words—who could listen to them without amazement? When I reflected on the immeasurable inferiority of my own powers, I was ready to run away for shame, if there had been any escape. For I was reminded of Gorgias, and at the end of his speech I fancied that Agathon was shaking at me the Gorgian or Gorgonian head of the great master of rhetoric, which was simply to turn me and my speech into stone, as Homer says, and strike me dumb. And then I perceived how foolish I had been in consenting to take my turn with you in praising love, and saying that I too was a master of the art, when I really had no conception how anything ought to be praised. For in my simplicity I imagined that the topics of praise should be true, and that this being presupposed, out of the true the speaker was to choose the best and arrange them in the best order. And I felt quite proud, thinking that I knew the nature of true praise, and should speak well. Whereas I now see that the intention was to attribute to love every species of greatness and glory, whether really belonging to him or not, without regard to truth or falsehood—that was no matter; for the original proposal seems to have been not that each of you should praise love, but only that you should appear to praise him. And so you attribute to love every imaginable form of praise, and say that ‘he is all this,’ ‘the cause of 199 all that,’ making him appear the fairest and best of all to those who know him not, for you cannot impose on those who know him. And a noble and solemn hymn of praise have you rehearsed. But as I misunderstood the nature of the praise when I said that I would take my turn, I must beg to be absolved from the promise which (as Euripides would say) was a promise of the lips and not of the mind. Farewell then to such a strain: for I do not praise in that way; no, indeed, I cannot. But if

you like to hear the truth about love, I am ready to speak in my own manner, though I will not make myself ridiculous by entering into any rivalry with you. Say then, Phaedrus, whether you would like to have the truth about love, spoken in any words and in any order which may happen to come into my mind at the time. Will that be agreeable to you?

Aristodemus said that Phaedrus and the company bid him take his own course. Then, he added, let me have your permission first to ask Agathon a few more questions, in order that I may take his admissions as the premisses of my discourse.

I grant the permission, said Phaedrus: put your questions. Socrates then proceeded as follows:—

In the magnificent oration which you have uttered, I think that you were right, my dear Agathon, when you said that you would begin with the nature of love and afterwards speak of his works—that is a way of beginning which I very much approve. And as you have spoken thus eloquently of the nature of love, may I ask you further, Whether love is the love of something or of nothing? And here I must explain myself: I do not want you to say that love is the love of a father or the love of a mother—that would be ridiculous; but to answer as you would, if I asked is a father a father of something? to which you would find no difficulty in replying, of a son or daughter: and that would be right.

Very true, said Agathon.

And you would say the same of a mother?

He assented.

Yet let me ask you one more question in order to illustrate my meaning. Is not a brother to be regarded essentially as a brother of something?

Certainly, he replied.

That is, of a brother or sister?

Yes, he said.

And now, said Socrates, I will ask about love:—Is love of something or of nothing?

Of something, surely, he replied.

Keep in mind what this is, and tell me what I want to know—whether love desires that of which love is.

Yes, surely.

And does he possess, or does he not possess, that which he loves and desires?

Probably not, I should say.

Nay, replied Socrates, I would have you consider whether ‘necessarily’ is not rather the word. The inference that he who desires something is in want of something, and that he who desires nothing is in want of nothing, is in my judgment, Agathon, absolutely and necessarily true. What do you think?

I agree with you, said Agathon.

Very good. And would he who is great desire to be great, or he who is strong desire to be strong?

That would be inconsistent with our previous admissions.

True. For he who is anything cannot want to be that which he is?

Very true.

And yet, added Socrates, if a man being strong desired to be strong, or being swift desired to be swift, or being healthy desired to be healthy, in that case he might be thought to desire a quality which he already has. I give the example in order that we may avoid misconception. For the possessors of these qualities, Agathon, must be supposed to have their respective advantages at the time, whether they choose or not; and who can desire that which he has? Therefore, when a person says, I am well and wish to be well, or I am rich and wish to be rich, and I desire simply to have what I have—to him we shall reply: ‘You, my friend, having wealth and health and strength, want to have the continuance of them; for at this moment, whether you choose or no, you have them. And when you say, I desire that which I have and nothing else, is not your meaning that you want to have what you now have in the future?’ He must agree with us—must he not?

He must, said Agathon.

Then, said Socrates, this is equivalent, not to desiring what he has or possesses already, but to desiring that what he has may be preserved to him in the future?

Very true, he said.

Then he and every one who desires, desires that which he has not already, and which is future and not present, and which

he has not, and is not, and of which he is in want ;—these are the sort of things which love and desire seek ?

Very true, he said.

Then now, said Socrates, let us recapitulate the argument. First, is not love of something, and of something too which is wanting to a man ?

Yes, he replied.

Remember further what you said in your speech, or if you do not remember I will remind you : you said that the love of the beautiful set in order the empire of the gods, for that of deformed things there is no love—did you not say something like that ?

Yes, said Agathon.

Yes, my friend, and the remark was a just one. And if this is true, love is the love of beauty and not of deformity ?

He assented.

And the admission has been already made that love is of that which a man wants and has not ?

True, he said.

Then love wants and has not beauty ? ,

Certainly, he replied.

And would you call that beautiful which wants and does not possess beauty ?

Certainly not.

Then would you still say that love is beautiful ?

Agathon replied : I fear that I did not understand what I was saying.

Yet you made a fair speech, Agathon, replied Socrates ; but once more say :—Is not the good also the beautiful ?

Yes.

Then in wanting the beautiful, love wants also the good ?

I cannot refute you, Socrates, said Agathon. And let us suppose that what you say is true.

Say rather, dear Agathon, that you cannot refute the truth ; for Socrates is easily refuted.

And now I will take my leave of you, and rehearse the tale of love which I heard from Diotima of Mantinea, a woman wise in this and many other kinds of knowledge, who in the days of old, when the Athenians offered sacrifice before the coming of the plague, delayed the disease ten years. She was

my instructress in the art of love, and I shall repeat to you what she said to me, beginning with the admissions made by Agathon, which are nearly if not quite the same which I made to the wise woman when she questioned me: I think that this will be the easiest way, and I shall take both parts myself as well as I can. Like Agathon, she spoke first of the being and nature of love, and then of his works. And I said to her in nearly the same words which he used to me, that love was a mighty god, and likewise fair; and she proved to me as I proved to him that, by my own showing, love was neither fair nor good. ‘What do you mean, Diotima,’ I said, ‘is love then evil and foul?’ ‘Hush,’ she cried; ‘is that to be deemed foul  
202 which is not fair?’ ‘Certainly,’ I said. ‘And is that which is not wise, ignorant? do you not see that there is a mean between wisdom and ignorance?’ ‘And what may that be?’ I said. ‘Right opinion,’ she replied; ‘which, as you know, being incapable of giving a reason, is not knowledge (for how can knowledge be devoid of reason? nor again, ignorance, for neither can ignorance attain the truth), but is clearly something which is a mean between ignorance and wisdom.’ ‘Quite true,’ I replied. ‘Do not then insist,’ she said, ‘that what is not fair is of necessity foul, or what is not good evil; or infer that because love is not fair and good he is therefore foul and evil; for he is in a mean between them.’ ‘Well,’ I said, ‘love is surely admitted by all to be a great god.’ ‘By those who know or by those who do not know?’ ‘By all.’ ‘And how, Socrates,’ she said with a smile, ‘can love be acknowledged to be a great god by those who say that he is not a god at all?’ ‘And who are they?’ I said. ‘You and I are two of them,’ she replied. ‘How can that be?’ I said. ‘That is very intelligible,’ she replied; ‘for you yourself would acknowledge that the gods are happy and fair—of course you would—would you dare to say that any god was not?’ ‘Certainly not,’ I replied. ‘And you mean by the happy, those who are the possessors of things good or fair?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘And you admitted that Love, because he was in want, desires those good and fair things of which he is in want?’ ‘Yes, I admitted that.’ ‘But how can he be a god who has no share in the good or the fair?’ ‘That is not to be supposed.’ ‘Then you see that you also deny the divinity of Love.’

'What then is love?' I asked ; 'Is he mortal?' 'No.' 'What then?' 'As in the former instance, he is neither mortal nor immortal, but in a mean between the two.' 'What is he then, Diotima?' 'He is a great spirit (*δαίμων*), and like all spirits he is intermediate between the divine and the mortal.' 'And what,' I said, 'is his power?' 'He interprets,' she replied, 'between gods and men, conveying to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and replies of the gods ; he is the mediator who spans the chasm which divides them, and in him all is bound together, and through him the arts of the prophet and the priest, their sacrifices and mysteries and charms, 203 and all prophecy and incantation, find their way. For God mingles not with man ; but through Love all the intercourse and speech of God with man, whether awake or asleep, is carried on. The wisdom which understands this is spiritual ; all other wisdom, such as that of arts and handicrafts, is mean and vulgar. Now these spirits or intermediate powers are many and diverse, and one of them is Love.' 'And who,' I said, 'was his father, and who his mother?' 'The tale,' she said, 'will take time ; nevertheless I will tell you. On the birthday of Aphrodite there was a feast of the gods, at which the god Poros or Plenty, who is the son of Metis or Discretion, was one of the guests. When the feast was over, Penia or Poverty, as the manner is on such occasions, came about the doors to beg. Now Plenty, who was the worse for nectar (there was no wine in those days), went into the garden of Zeus and fell into a heavy sleep ; and Poverty considering her own straitened circumstances, plotted to have a child by him, and accordingly she lay down at his side and conceived Love, who partly because he is naturally a lover of the beautiful, and because Aphrodite is herself beautiful, and also because he was born on her birthday, is her follower and attendant. And as his parentage is, so also are his fortunes. In the first place he is always poor, and anything but tender and fair, as the many imagine him ; and he is hard-featured and squalid, and has no shoes, nor a house to dwell in ; on the bare earth exposed he lies under the open heaven, in the streets, or at the doors of houses, taking his rest ; and like his mother he is always in distress. Like his father too, whom he also partly resembles, he is always plotting against the fair and good ; he

is bold, enterprising, strong, a hunter of men, always weaving some intrigue or other, keen in the pursuit of wisdom, and never wanting resources; a philosopher at all times, terrible as an enchanter, sorcerer, sophist; for as he is neither mortal nor immortal, he is alive and flourishing at one moment when he is in plenty, and dead at another moment, and again alive by reason of his father's nature. But that which is always flowing in is always flowing out, and so he is never in want and never in wealth; and, further, he is in a mean between ignorance and knowledge. The truth of the matter is as follows: No god is a philosopher or seeker after wisdom, for he is wise already; nor does any man who is wise seek after wisdom. Neither  
204 do the ignorant seek after wisdom. For herein is the evil of ignorance, that he who is neither good nor wise is nevertheless satisfied: he has no desire for that of which he feels no want.' 'But who then, Diotima,' I said, 'are the lovers of wisdom, if they are neither the wise nor the foolish?' 'A child may answer that question,' she replied; 'they are those who, like love, are in a mean between the two. For wisdom is a most beautiful thing, and love is of the beautiful; and therefore love is also a philosopher or lover of wisdom, and being a lover of wisdom is in a mean between the wise and the ignorant. And this again is a quality which Love inherits from his parents; for his father is wealthy and wise, and his mother poor and foolish. Such, my dear Socrates, is the nature of the spirit Love. The error in your conception of him was very natural, and as I imagine from what you say, has arisen out of a confusion of love and the beloved, which made you think that love was all beautiful. For the beloved is the truly beautiful, and delicate, and perfect, and blessed; but the principle of love is of another nature, and is such as I have described.'

I said: 'O thou stranger woman, thou sayest well, and now, assuming love to be such as you say, what is the use of him to us men?' 'That, Socrates,' she replied, 'I will proceed to unfold: of his nature and birth I have already spoken; and you acknowledge that love is of the beautiful. But some one will say: Of the beautiful in what, Socrates and Diotima?—or rather let me put the question more clearly, and ask: When a man loves the beautiful, what does he desire?' I answered

her 'That the beautiful may be his.' 'Still,' she said, 'the answer suggests a further question: What is given by the possession of beauty?' 'To what you have asked,' I replied, 'I have no answer ready.' 'Then,' she said, 'let me put the word "good" in the place of the beautiful, and repeat the question once more: He who loves the good loves; what does he love?' 'The possession of the good,' I said. 'And what does he gain who possesses the good?' 'Happiness,' I replied; 'there is no difficulty in answering that.' 'Yes,' she said, 'the happy are <sup>205</sup> made happy by the acquisition of good things. Nor is there any need to ask why a man desires happiness; the answer is already final.' 'You are right,' I said. 'And is this wish and this desire common to all? and do all men always desire their own good, or only some men?—what say you?' 'All men,' I replied; 'the desire is common to all.' 'Why, then,' she rejoined, 'are not all men, Socrates, said to love, but only some of them? whereas you say that all men are always loving the same things.' 'I myself wonder,' I said, 'why that is.' 'There is nothing to wonder at,' she replied; 'the reason is that one part of love is separated off and receives the name of the whole, but the other parts have other names.' 'Give an illustration,' I said. She answered me as follows: 'There is poetry, which, as you know, is complex and manifold. All creation or passage of non-being into being is poetry or making, and the processes of all art are creative; and the masters of arts are all poets or makers.' 'Very true.' 'Still,' she said, 'you know that they are not called poets, but have other names; the specific term, poetry, is confined to that portion of the art which is separated off from the rest of poetry, and is concerned with music and metre; and this is what is called poetry, and they who possess this kind of poetry are called poets.' 'Very true,' I said. 'And the same holds of love. For you may say generally that all desire of good and happiness is only the great and subtle power of love; but those who turn towards him by any other path, whether the path of money-making or gymnastics or philosophy, are not called lovers—the name of the genus is reserved for those whose affection takes one form only—they alone are said to love, or to be lovers.' 'I dare say,' I replied, 'that you are right.' 'Yes,' she added, 'and you hear people say that lovers are seeking for their other half;

but I say that they are seeking neither for the half of themselves, nor for the whole, unless the half or the whole be also a good. And they will cut off their own hands and feet and cast them away, if they are evil; for they love not what is their own, but what is another's, unless indeed by the words "good" and "their own" and "bad" and "another's" they mean the same thing.

206 For there is nothing which men love but the good. Do you think that there is?' 'Certainly, I should say, that there is nothing.' 'Then,' she said, 'the conclusion of the whole matter is, that men love the good.' 'Yes,' I said. 'To which may be added that they love the possession of the good?' 'Yes, that may be added.' 'And not only the possession, but the everlasting possession of the good?' 'That may be added too.' 'Then love,' she said, 'may be described generally as the love of the everlasting possession of the good?' 'That is most true.'

'Then if this be the nature of love, can you tell me further,' she said, 'what is the manner of the pursuit? what are they doing who show all this eagerness and heat which is called love? Answer me.' 'Nay, Diotima,' I replied, 'if I had known, I should not have wondered at your wisdom, neither should I have come to you to learn about this very matter.' 'Well,' she said, 'I will teach you;—love is only birth in beauty, whether of body or soul.' 'The oracle requires an explanation,' I said; 'I do not understand you.' 'I will make my meaning clearer,' she replied. 'I mean to say, that all men are bringing to the birth in their bodies and in their souls. There is a certain age at which human nature is desirous of procreation—procreation which must be in beauty and not in deformity; and this procreation is the union of man and woman, and is a divine thing; for conception and generation are an immortal principle in the mortal creature, and in the inharmonious they can never be. But the deformed is always inharmonious with the divine, and the beautiful harmonious. Beauty, then, is the destiny or goddess of parturition who presides at birth, and therefore when approaching beauty the conceiving power is propitious, and diffuse, and benign, and begets and bears fruit: at the sight of ugliness it frowns and contracts in pain, and is averted and morose, and shrinks up, and not without a pang refrains from conception. And this is the reason why, when the hour of conception arrives,

and the toiling nature is full there is such a flutter and ecstasy about beauty whose approach is the alleviation of the pain of toil. For love, Socrates, is not, as you imagine, the love of the beautiful only. 'What then?' 'The love of generation and of birth in beauty.' 'Yes' I said. 'Yes, indeed,' she replied. 'But why of generation?' I said. 'Because to the mortal, generation is a sort of eternity and immortality,' she replied; 'and it, as has been already admitted, love is of the everlasting possession of the good, all men will necessarily desire immortality together with good. Wherefore love is of immortality.'

All this she taught me at various times when she spoke of love. And I remember that she once said to me, 'What is the cause, Socrates, of love, and the attendant desire? See you not how all animals, birds as well as beasts, in their desire of procreation, are in agony when they take the infection of love, which begins with the desire of union; whereof is added the care of offspring, on behalf of whom the weakest are ready to battle against the strongest even to the uttermost, and to die for them, and will let themselves be tormented with hunger or suffer anything in order to maintain their offspring. Man may be supposed to act thus from reason, but why should animals have these passionate feelings? Can you tell me why?' Again I replied, that I did not know. She said to me: 'And do you expect ever to become a master in the art of love, if you do not know this?' 'But that, Diotima, is the reason why I come to you: as I have told you already, I am aware that I want a teacher, and I wish that you would explain to me the cause of this and of the other mysteries of love.' 'Marvel not,' she said, 'if you believe that love is of the immortal, as we have already several times acknowledged, for here again, and on the same principle too, the mortal nature is seeking as far as is possible to be everlasting and immortal; and this is only to be attained by generation because generation always leaves behind a new existence in the place of the old. Nay even in the life of the same individual there is succession and not absolute unity: a man is called the same, and yet in the short interval which elapses between youth and age, and in which every animal is said to have life and identity, he is undergoing a perpetual process of

loss and reparation—hair, flesh, bones, blood, and the whole body are always changing. Which is true not only of the body, but also of the soul, whose habits, tempers, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, fears, never remain the same in any one of us, but are always coming and going; and equally true of knowledge, which is still more surprising—for not only do the 208 sciences in general come and go, so that in respect of them we are never the same; but each of them individually experiences a like change. For what is implied in the word “recollection,” but the departure of knowledge, which is ever being forgotten and is renewed and preserved by recollection, and appears to be the same although in reality new, according to that law of succession by which all mortal things are preserved, not absolutely the same, but by substitution, the old worn-out mortality leaving another new and similar existence behind—unlike the divine, which is always the same and not another? And in this way, Socrates, the mortal body, or mortal anything, partakes of immortality; but the immortal in another way. Marvel not then at the love which all men have of their offspring; for that universal love and interest is for the sake of immortality.'

I was astonished at her words, and said: ‘Is this really true, O thou wise Diotima?’ And she answered with all the authority of a sophist: ‘Of that, Socrates, you may be assured;—think only of the ambition of men, and you will wonder at the senselessness of their ways, unless you consider how they are stirred by the love of an immortality of fame. They are ready to run risks greater far than they would have run for their children, and to spend money and undergo any sort of toil, and even to die for the sake of leaving behind them a name which shall be eternal. Do you imagine that Alcestis would have died to save Admetus, or Achilles to avenge Patroclus, or your own Codrus in order to preserve the kingdom for his sons, if they had not imagined that the memory of their virtues, which is still retained among us, would be immortal? Nay,’ she said, ‘I am persuaded that all men do all things, and the better they are the more they do them, in hope of the glorious fame of immortal virtue; for they desire the immortal.

‘They whose bodies only are creative, betake themselves to women and beget children—this is the character of their love;

their offspring, as they hope, will preserve their memory and give them the blessedness and immortality which they desire in the future. But creative souls—for there certainly are men who <sup>209</sup> are more creative in their souls than in their bodies—conceive that which is proper for the soul to conceive or retain. And what are these conceptions?—wisdom and virtue in general. And such creators are poets and all artists who are deserving of the name inventor. But the greatest and fairest sort of wisdom by far is that which is concerned with the ordering of states and families, and which is called temperance and justice. And he who in youth has the seed of these implanted in him and is himself inspired, when he comes to maturity desires to beget and generate. He wanders about seeking beauty that he may beget offspring—for in deformity he will beget nothing—and naturally embraces the beautiful rather than the deformed body; above all when he finds a fair and noble and well-nurtured soul, he embraces the two in one person, and to such an one he is full of speech about virtue and the nature and pursuits of a good man; and he tries to educate him; and at the touch of the beautiful which is ever present to his memory, even when absent, he brings forth that which he had conceived long before, and in company with him tends that which he brings forth; and they are married by a far nearer tie and have a closer friendship than those who beget mortal children, for the children who are their common offspring are fairer and more immortal. Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets, would not rather have their children than ordinary human ones? Who would not emulate them in the creation of children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and given them everlasting glory? Or who would not have such children as Lycurgus left behind him to be the saviours, not only of Lacedaemon, but of Hellas, as one may say? There is Solon, too, who is the revered father of Athenian laws; and many others there are in many other places, both among Hellenes and barbarians. All of them have given to the world many noble works, and have been the parents of virtue of every kind, and many temples have been raised in their honour for the sake of their children; which were never raised in honour of any one, for the sake of his mortal children.

210 'These are the lesser mysteries of love, into which even you, Socrates, may enter ; to the greater and more hidden ones which are the crown of these, and to which, if you pursue them in a right spirit, they will lead, I know not whether you will be able to attain. But I will do my utmost to inform you, and do you follow if you can. For he who would proceed aright in this matter should begin in youth to visit beautiful forms ; and first, if he be guided by his instructor aright, to love one such form only—out of that he should create fair thoughts ; and soon he will of himself perceive that the beauty of one form is akin to the beauty of another ; and then if beauty of form in general is his pursuit, how foolish would he be not to recognize that the beauty in every form is one and the same ! And when he perceives this he will abate his violent love of the one, which he will despise and deem a small thing, and will become a lover of all beautiful forms ; in the next stage he will consider that the beauty of the mind is more honourable than the beauty of the outward form. So that if a virtuous soul have but a little comeliness, he will be content to love and tend him, and will search out and bring to the birth thoughts which may improve the young, until he is compelled to contemplate and see the beauty of institutions and laws, and to understand that the beauty of them all is of one family, and that personal beauty is a trifle ; and after laws and institutions he will go on to the sciences, that he may see their beauty, being not like a servant in love with the beauty of one youth or man or institution, himself a slave mean and narrow-minded, but drawing towards and contemplating the vast sea of beauty, he will create many fair and noble thoughts and notions in boundless love of wisdom ; until on that shore he grows and waxes strong, and at last the vision is revealed to him of a single science, which is the science of beauty everywhere. To this I will proceed ; please to give me your very best attention.

211 'He who has been instructed thus far in the things of love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in due order and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty (and this, Socrates, is the final cause of all our former toils)—a nature which in the first place is everlasting, not growing and decaying, or waxing and waning ;

in the next place not fair in one point of view and foul in another, or at one time or in one relation or at one place fair, at another time or in another relation or at another place foul, as if fair to some and foul to others, or in the likeness of a face or hands or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech or knowledge, or existing in any other being; as for example, in an animal, or in heaven, or in earth, or in any other place, but beauty only, absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting, which without diminution and without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things. He who under the influence of true love rising upward from these begins to see that beauty, is not far from the end. And the true order of going or being led by another to the things of love, is to use the beauties of earth as steps along which he mounts upwards for the sake of that other beauty, going from one to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty; and at last knows what the essence of beauty is. This, my dear Socrates,' said the stranger of Mantinea, 'is that life above all others which man should live, in the contemplation of beauty absolute; a beauty which if you once beheld, you would see not to be after the measure of gold, and garments, and fair boys and youths, whose presence now entrances you; and you and many a one would be content to live seeing only and conversing with them without meat or drink, if that were possible—you only want to be with them and to look at them. But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty—the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality, and all the colours and vanities of human life—thither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty divine and simple? Do you not see that in that communion only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities (for he has hold not of an image but of a reality), and bringing forth and nourishing true virtue to become the friend of God and be immortal, if mortal man may. Would that be an ignoble life?'<sup>212</sup>

Such, Phaedrus—and I speak not only to you, but to all of

you — were the words of Diotima ; and I am persuaded of their truth. And being persuaded of them, I try to persuade others, that in the attainment of this end human nature will not easily find a better helper than love. And therefore, also, I say that every man ought to honour him as I myself honour him, and walk in his ways, and exhort others to do the same, and praise the power and spirit of love according to the measure of my ability now and ever.

The words which I have spoken, you, Phaedrus, may call an encomium of love, or anything else which you please.

When Socrates had done speaking, the company applauded, and Aristophanes was beginning to say something in answer to the allusion to his own speech which Socrates had made<sup>1</sup>, when suddenly there was a great knocking at the door of the house, as of revellers, and the sound of a flute-girl was heard. Agathon told the attendants to go and see who were the intruders. ‘If they are friends of ours,’ he said, ‘invite them in, but if not, say that the drinking is over.’ A little while afterwards they heard the voice of Alcibiades resounding in the court ; he was in a great state of intoxication, and kept roaring and shouting ‘Where is Agathon? Lead me to Agathon,’ and at length, supported by the flute-girl and some of his companions, he found his way to them. ‘Hail, friends,’ he said, appearing at the door crowned with a massive garland of ivy and flowers, his head flowing with ribands. ‘Will you have a very drunken man as a companion of your revels? Or shall I crown Agathon, which was my intention in coming, and go away? For I was unable to come yesterday, and therefore I come today, carrying on my head these ribands, that taking them from my own head, I may crown the head of this fairest and wisest of men, as I may be allowed to call him. Will you laugh at me because I am drunk? Yet I know very well that I am speaking the truth, although you may laugh. But first tell me; if I come in shall we have an understanding? Will you drink with me or not?’

The company were vociferous in begging that he would take his place among them, and Agathon specially invited him. Thereupon he was led in by the people who were with him;

<sup>1</sup> p. 205.

and as he was being led he took the crown and ribands from his head, offering the crown Agathon, and had them before his eyes; this prevented him from seeing Socrates, who made way for him, and Alcibiades took the vacant place between Agathon and Socrates, and in taking the place he embraced Agathon and crowned him. Take off his sandals, said Agathon, and let him make a third on the same couch.

By all means, but who makes the third partner in our revels? said Alcibiades, turning round and starting up as he caught sight of Socrates. By Heracles, he said, what is this? here is Socrates always lying in wait for me, and always, as his way is, coming out at all sorts of unsuspected places; and now, what have you to say for yourself, and why are you lying here, where I perceive that you have contrived to find a place, not by a joker or lover of jokes, like Aristophanes, but by the fairest of the company?

Socrates turned to Agathon and said: I must ask you to protect me, Agathon; for this passion of his has grown quite a serious matter. Since I became his admirer I have never been allowed to speak to any other fair one, or so much as to look at them. If I do, he goes wild with envy and jealousy, and not only abuses me but can hardly keep his hands off me, and at this moment he may do me some harm. Please to see to this, and either reconcile me to him, or, if he attempts violence, protect me, as I am in bodily fear of his mad and passionate attempts.

There can never be reconciliation between you and me, said Alcibiades, but for the present I will defer your chastisement. And I must beg you, Agathon, to give me back some of the ribands that I may crown the marvellous head of this universal despot—I would not have him complain of me for crowning you, and neglecting him, who in conversation is the conqueror of all mankind; and this not only once, as you were the day before yesterday, but always. Whereupon, taking some of the ribands, he crowned Socrates, and again reclined.

Then he said: You seem, my friends, to be sober, which is a thing not to be endorsed; you must drink—for that was the agreement which I made with you—and I elect myself master of the feast until you are well drunk. Let us have a large

goblet, Agathon, or rather, he said, addressing the attendant, bring me that wine-cooler. The wine-cooler which had caught 214 his eye was a vessel holding more than two quarts—this he filled and emptied, and bade the attendant fill it again for Socrates. Observe, my friends, said Alcibiades, that my ingenious device will have no effect on Socrates, for he can drink any quantity of wine and not be at all nearer being drunk. Socrates drank the cup which the attendant filled for him.

Eryximachus said: What is this, Alcibiades? Are we to have neither conversation nor singing over our cups; but simply to drink as if we were thirsty?

Alcibiades replied: Hail, worthy son of a most wise and worthy sire.

The same to you, said Eryximachus; but what shall we do?

That I leave to you, said Alcibiades.

‘The wise physician skilled our wounds to heal’

shall prescribe and we will obey. What do you want?

Well, said Eryximachus, before you appeared a resolution was agreed to by us that each one in turn should make a speech in praise of love, and as good a one as he could: the turn was passed round from left to right; and as all of us have spoken, and you have not spoken but have well drunken, you ought to speak, and then impose upon Socrates any task which you please, and he on his right hand neighbour, and so on.

That is good, Eryximachus, said Alcibiades; and yet the comparison of a drunken man’s speech with those of sober men is hardly fair; and I should like to know, sweet friend, whether you really believe what Socrates was just now saying; for I can assure you that the very reverse is the fact, and that if I praise any one but himself in his presence, whether God or man, he will hardly keep his hands off me.

For shame, said Socrates.

Hold your tongue, said Alcibiades, for by Poseidon, there is no one else whom I will praise in your presence.

Well then, said Eryximachus, if you like praise Socrates.

What do you think, Eryximachus? said Alcibiades; shall I attack him and inflict the punishment in your presence?

What are you about? said Socrates, are you going to make a laugh at my expense? Is that the meaning of your praise? I am going to speak the truth if you will permit me. I not only permit but entreat you to speak the truth.

Then I will begin at once, said Alcibiades, and if I say anything that is not true, you may interrupt me if you will, and see that I speak falsely; though my intention is to speak the truth. But you must not wonder if I speak any how as things come into my mind; for the fluent and orderly enumeration of all your singularities is not a task which is easy to a man in my condition.

I shall praise Socrates in a figure which will appear to him 215 to be a caricature, and yet I do not mean to laugh at him, but only to speak the truth. I say then, that he is exactly like the masks of Silenus, which may be seen in the statuaries' shops, sitting with pipes and flutes in their mouths, and they are made to open in the middle, and have images of gods inside them. I say also that he is like Marsyas the satyr. You yourself will not deny, Socrates, that your face is like that of a satyr. Aye, and there is a resemblance in other points too. For example, you are a bully, as I can prove by witnesses, if you will not confess. And are you not a flute-player? That you are, and a far more wonderful performer than Marsyas. He indeed with instruments used to charm the souls of men by the power of his breath, and the performers of his music do so still; for the melodies of Olympus are derived from Marsyas who taught them, and these whether they are played by a great master or by a miserable flute-girl, have a power which no others have; they alone possess the soul and reveal the wants of those who have need of gods and mysteries, because they are inspired. But you produce the same effect with your voice only, and do not require the flute; that is the difference between you and him. When we hear any other speaker, even a very good one, his words produce absolutely no effect upon us in comparison, whereas the very fragments of you and your words, even at second-hand, and however imperfectly repeated, amaze and possess the souls of every man, woman, and child who comes within hearing of them. And if I were not afraid that you would think me hopelessly drunk, I would have sworn as well

as spoken to the influence which they have always had and still have over me. For my heart leaps within me more than that of any Corybantian reveller, and my eyes rain tears when I hear them. And I observe that many others are affected in the same way. I have heard Pericles and other great orators, but though I thought that they spoke well, I never had any similar feeling; my soul was not stirred by them, nor was I angry at the thought of my own slavish state. But this Marsyas has  
216 often brought me to such a pass, that I have felt as if I could hardly endure the life which I am leading (this, Socrates, you admit); and I am conscious that if I did not shut my ears against him, and fly from the voice of the siren, he would detain me until I grew old sitting at his feet. For he makes me confess that I ought not to live as I do, neglecting the wants of my own soul, and busying myself with the concerns of the Athenians; therefore I hold my ears and tear myself away from him. And he is the only person who ever made me ashamed, which you might think not to be in my nature, and there is no one else who does the same. For I know that I cannot answer him or say that I ought not to do as he bids, but when I leave his presence the love of popularity gets the better of me. And therefore I run away and fly from him, and when I see him I am ashamed of what I have confessed to him. Many a time have I wished that he were dead, and yet I know that I should be much more sorry than glad, if he were to die: so that I am at my wit's end.

And this is what I and many others have suffered from the flute-playing of this satyr. Yet hear me once more while I show you how exact the image is, and how marvellous his power. For I am sure that none of you know him; but I know him and will describe him, as I have begun. See you how fond he is of the fair? He is always with them and is always being smitten by them, and then again he knows nothing and is ignorant of all things—that is the appearance which he puts on. Is he not like a Silenus in this? Yes, surely: his outer mask is the carved head of the Silenus; but, O my companions in drink, when he is opened, what temperance there is residing within. Know you that beauty and wealth and honour, at which the many wonder, are of no account with him, and are

and he deserved by name, he regards not at all the persons who are grieved with them, and of the nothing to him, all his life's sport is passing and leaving all others. But when I espied him, and looked with intent to his serious purpose, I saw in him certain great qualities of such fascinating beauty that I was ready to become a mortal victim. Socrates commanded they may have escaped the observation of others, but I saw them. Now I knew that he was serious - charmed of my beauty, and I thought that I should therefore have a grand opportunity of hearing him tell what he knew, so I had a - secret concert of the attractions of my youth. In the prosecution of this design, when I next went to him, I sent away the attendant who usually accompanied me. I then related the whole truth, and begged you to listen, and if I speak false, do you, Socrates, excuse me also. When he and I were alone together, and I thought that when there was nobody with us, I should hear him speak the language of love as lovers do, and I was desirous. Not a word, he conversed as usual, and spent the day with me and then went home. At intervals I encouraged him to the parlour, and he resisted and clung with me several times alone. I knew of that I might succeed in this way. Not a day, there was no use in that. Lastly, as I had failed hitherto, I thought that I must use stronger measures and attack him boldly, and as I had begun, not give him up yet, I saw how the matter stood. So I invited him to supper just as if he were a fair youth, and I was designing love. He was not easily persuaded to come; he did, however, after a while accept the invitation, and when he came the first time, he wanted to go away at once as soon as supper was over, and I had not the face to detain him. The second time, still in possession of my design, after we had supped, I went on conversing with him the night, and when he wanted to go away I pretended that one hour was late and that he had better remain. So he lay down on the next couch to me, the same on which he had supped, and there was no one else sleeping in the apartment. All this may be told without shame to any one. But what follows I could hardly tell you if I were sober. Yet as the proverb says, *flavore veritas*, where there is no boys or men, and therefore I must

<sup>1</sup> In allusion to the proverb, *time and nature divide*.

speak. Nor, again, should I be justified in concealing the lofty actions of Socrates when I come to praise him. Moreover I have felt the serpent's sting; and he who has suffered, as they say, is willing to tell his fellow-sufferers only, as they alone will  
218 be likely to understand him, and will not be extreme in judging of the sayings or doings which have been wrung from his agony. For I have been bitten by the viper too; I have known in my soul, or in my heart, or in some other part, that worst of pangs, more violent in ingenuous youth than any serpent's tooth, the pang of philosophy, which will make a man say or do anything. And you whom I see around me, Phaedrus and Agathon and Eryximachus and Pausanias and Aristodemus and Aristophanes, all of you, and I need not say Socrates himself, have all had experience of the same madness and passion of philosophy. Therefore listen and excuse my doings then and my sayings now. But let the attendants and other profane and unmannered persons close the doors of their ears.

When the lamp was put out and the servants had gone away, I thought that I must be plain with him and have no more ambiguity. So I gave him a shake, and I said: 'Socrates, are you asleep?' 'No,' he said. 'Do you know what I am meditating?' 'What is that?' he said. 'I think,' I replied, 'that of all the lovers whom I have ever had you are the only one who is worthy of me, and you appear to be too modest to speak. Now I feel that I should be a fool to refuse you this or any other favour, and therefore I come to lay at your feet all that I have and all that my friends have, in the hope that you will assist me in the way of virtue, which I desire above all things, and in which I believe that you can help me better than any one else. And I should certainly have more reason to be ashamed of what wise men would say if I were to refuse a favour to such as you, than of what fools would say if I granted it.' When he heard this, he said in his usual ironical manner: 'Alcibiades, my friend, you have indeed an elevated aim if what you say is true, and if there really is in me any power by which you may become better; truly you must see in me some rare beauty of a kind infinitely higher than that which I see in you. And therefore, if you mean to share with me and to exchange beauty for beauty, you will have greatly the advantage of me; you will gain true beauty in

return for appearance—like Diomede, gold in exchange for brass. 210  
But look again, sweet friend, and see whether you are not deceived in me. The mind begins to grow critical when the bodily eye fails, and you have not come to that yet.' Hearing this, I said, 'I have told you my purpose, which is quite serious, and do you consider what you think best for you and me?' 'That is good,' he said; 'at some other time then we will consider and act as seems best about this and about other matters.' Whereupon, I fancied that he was smitten, and that my arrows had wounded him, and so without waiting to hear more I got up, and throwing my coat about him crept under his threadbare cloak, as the time of year was winter, and there I lay during the whole night having this wonderful monster in my arms. You will not deny it, Socrates. And yet, notwithstanding all, he was so superior to my solicitations, so contemptuous and despising and disdainful of my beauty—which really, as I believe, had some attractions—hear, O judges; for judges you shall be of the haughty virtue of Socrates—that in the morning when I awoke let all the gods and goddesses be my witnesses I arose as from the couch of a father or an elder brother.

What do you suppose must have been my feelings, after this rejection, at the thought of my own dishonour? And yet I could not help wondering at his natural temperance and self-restraint and courage. I never could have thought that I should have met with a man like him in wisdom and endurance. Neither could I be angry with him or renounce his company, any more than I could hope to win him. For I well knew that if Ajax could not be wounded by steel, much less he by money; and in my only chance of captivating him I had failed. So I wandered about and was at my wit's end; no one was ever more hopelessly enslaved by another. All this, as I should explain, happened before he and I went on the expedition to Potidaea; there we messed together, and I had the opportunity of observing his extraordinary power of sustaining fatigue and going without food when our supplies were intercepted at any place, as 220 will happen with an army. In the faculty of endurance he was superior not only to me but to everybody; there was no one to be compared to him. Yet at a festival he was the only person who had any real powers of enjoyment; though not willing

to drink, he could if compelled beat us all at that, and the most wonderful thing was that no human being had ever seen Socrates drunk ; and his powers, if I am not mistaken, will be tested before long. His endurance of cold was also surprising. There was a severe frost, for the winter in that region is really tremendous, and everybody else either remained indoors, or if they went out had on a wonderful quantity of clothes, and were well shod, and had their feet swathed in felt and fleeces : in the midst of this, Socrates, with his bare feet on the ice, and in his ordinary dress, marched better than the other soldiers who had shoes, and they looked daggers at him because he seemed to despise them.

I have told you one tale, and now I must tell you another, which is worth hearing, of the doings and sufferings of this enduring man while he was on the expedition. One morning he was thinking about something which he could not resolve ; he would not give it up, but continued thinking from early dawn until noon—there he stood fixed in thought ; and at noon attention was drawn to him, and the rumour ran through the wondering crowd that Socrates had been standing and thinking about something ever since the break of day. At last, in the evening after supper, some Ionians out of curiosity (I should explain that this was not in winter but in summer), brought out their mats and slept in the open air that they might watch him and see whether he would stand all night. There he stood all night until the following morning ; and with the return of light he offered up a prayer to the sun, and went his way. I will also tell, if you please—and indeed I am bound to tell—of his courage in battle ; for who but he saved my life ? Now this was the engagement in which I received the prize of valour : for I was wounded and he would not leave me, but he rescued me and my arms ; and he ought to have received the prize of valour which the generals wanted to confer on me partly on account of my rank, and I told them so (this Socrates will not impeach or deny), but he was more eager than the generals that I and not he should have the prize. There was another occasion on which his behaviour was very noticeable—in the flight of the army after the battle of Delium, where he served among the heavy-armed, and I had a better opportunity of seeing him than at Potidaea, as I was myself on horseback, and therefore com-

part of his life longer. He and Laches were retreating as the troops were in flight, and I met them and told them not to be disconsolate, and promised to remain with them, and there you might see him like a stately hero, as you describe just as he is in the streets of Athens standing like a peacock, and rolling his eyes, calmly contemplating enemies as well as friends, and making every body afraid to approach even from a distance, that whoever approached him would be likely to meet with a stout resistance, and in this way he and his companion escaped—for persons of this class are never touched in war; these only are invincible who are strong arrayed. I particularly observed how superior he was to Laches in presence of mind. Many are the virtues of Socrates which I might narrate in his praise; most of his ways might perhaps be paralleled in another man, but his absolute & excess to any human being that is or ever has been is perfectly astonishing. You may imagine Brasidas and others to have been like Achilles, or you may imagine Nestor and Antenor to have been like Pericles, and the same may be said of other famous men, but of this strange being you will never be able to find any likeness however you compare him with men who now are or who ever have been, except that which I have already suggested of Socrates and the satyrs, and other personages in a figure not only himself but also his words. For although I forgot to mention this to you before, his words are like the images of Socrates which open, they are ridiculous when you first hear them; he clothes himself in language that is as the skin of the common scut—*for his talk is of pack-asses and smiths and cobblers and carriers*, and he is always repeating the same things in the same words, so that an ignorant man who did not know him might feel disposed to laugh at him; *but he who opens the mask and sees what is within will find that they are the only words which have a meaning in them*, and also the most true, according in fact examples of virtue, and of the wisest comprehension, or rather extending to the whole body of a good and benevolent man.

This friends, is my praise of Socrates. I have added my blame of him for his ill-treatment of me, and he has ill-treated not only me, but Charmides the son of Glaucon, and Euthynous the son of Dionys, and many others in the same way—beginning

as their lover he has ended by making them pay their addresses to him. Wherefore I say to you, Agathon, 'Be not deceived by him; learn from me and take warning, and do not be a fool and learn by experience,' as the proverb says.

When Alcibiades had done speaking, there was a laugh at his plainness of speech, for he seemed to be still in love with Socrates. You are sober, Alcibiades, said Socrates, or you would never have gone about to hide the purpose of your satyr's praises, for all this long story is only an ingenious circumlocution, the point of which comes in by the way at the end; you want to get up a quarrel between me and Agathon, and your notion is that I ought to love you and nobody else, and that you and you only ought to love Agathon. But the plot of this Satyric or Silenic drama has been detected, and you must not allow him, Agathon, to set us at variance.

I believe you are right, said Agathon, and I am disposed to think that his intention in placing himself between you and me was only to divide us; but he shall gain nothing by that move, as I will go and lie on the couch next to you.

Yes, yes, replied Socrates, by all means come here and lie on the couch below me.

Alas, said Alcibiades, how I am fooled by this man; he is determined to get the better of me at every turn. I do beseech you, allow Agathon to lie between us.

Impossible, said Socrates, as you praised me, and I ought to praise my neighbour on the right, he will be out of order in praising me again when he ought rather to be praised by me, and I must entreat you to consent to this, and not be jealous,  
223 for I have a great desire to praise the youth.

Hurrah! cried Agathon, I will rise instantly, that I may be praised by Socrates.

The usual way, said Alcibiades; where Socrates is, no one else has any chance with the fair, and now how readily has he invented a specious reason for attracting Agathon to himself.

Agathon arose in order that he might take his place on the couch by Socrates, when suddenly a band of revellers entered, and spoiled the order of the banquet. Some one who was going out having left the door open, they had found their way in, and made themselves at home; great confusion ensued, and every

one was compelled to drink large quantities of wine. Aristodemus said that Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and others went away—he himself fell asleep, and as the nights were long took a good rest: he was awakened towards daybreak by a crowing of cocks, and when he awoke, the others were either asleep, or had gone away; there remained awake only Socrates, Aristophanes, and Agathon, who were drinking out of a large goblet which they passed round, and Socrates was discoursing to them. Aristodemus did not hear the beginning of the discourse, and he was only half awake, but the chief thing which he remembered was Socrates compelling the other two to acknowledge that the genius of comedy was the same as that of tragedy, and that the true artist in tragedy was an artist in comedy also. To this they assented, being drowsy, and not quite following the argument. And first of all Aristophanes dropped off, then, when the day was already dawning, Agathon. Socrates, when he had laid them to sleep, rose to depart; Aristodemus, as his manner was, following him. At the Lyceum he took a bath, and passed the day as usual. In the evening he retired to rest at his own home.

PHAEDRUS.



## INTRODUCTION.

THE Phaedrus is closely connected with the Symposium, and may be regarded either as introducing or following it. The two Dialogues together contain the whole philosophy of Plato on the nature of love, which in the Republic and in the later writings of Plato is only introduced playfully or as a figure of speech. But in the Phaedrus and Symposium love and philosophy join hands, and one is an aspect of the other. The spiritual and emotional part is elevated into the ideal, to which in the Symposium mankind are described as looking forward, and which in the Phaedrus, as well as in the Phaedo, they are seeking to recover from a former state of existence. Whether the subject of the Dialogue is love or rhetoric, or the union of the two, or the relation of philosophy to love and to art in general, will appear hereafter.

Phaedrus has been passing the morning with Lysias, the celebrated rhetorician, and is going to refresh himself by taking a walk outside the wall, when he is met by Socrates, who professes that he will not leave him until he has delivered up the speech with which Lysias has regaled him, and which he is carrying about in his mind, or more probably in a book hidden under his cloak, and is intending to study as he walks. The imputation is not denied, and the two agree to direct their steps out of the public way along the stream of the Ilissus towards a plane-tree which is seen in the distance. There, lying down amidst pleasant sounds and scents, they will read the speech of Lysias. The country is a novelty to Socrates, who never goes out of the town; and hence he is full of admiration for the beauties of nature, of which he seems for the first time to be conscious.

As they are on their way, Phaedrus asks the opinion of Socrates respecting the local tradition of Boreas and Oreithyia. Socrates, after a satirical allusion to the 'rationalizers' of his day, replies that he has

no time for these ‘nice’ interpretations of mythology, and he pities any one who has. For when you once begin there is no end of them, and they spring from an uncritical philosophy after all. ‘The proper study of mankind is man;’ and he is a far more complex and wonderful being than the serpent Typho. Socrates as yet does not know himself; and why should he care to know about unearthly monsters? Engaged in such conversation, they reach the plane-tree; Phaedrus pulls out the speech and reads.

The speech consists of a foolish paradox which is to the effect that the non-lover ought to be accepted rather than the lover—because he is more rational, more agreeable, more enduring, less suspicious, less hurtful, less boastful, less engrossing, and because there are more of them, and for a great many other reasons which are equally unmeaning. Phaedrus is captivated with the beauty of the periods, and wants to make Socrates say that nothing was or ever could be better written. Socrates does not think much of the matter, but then he has only attended to the form, and in the form he has detected repetitions and other marks of haste. He cannot agree with Phaedrus in the extreme value which he sets upon this performance, because he is afraid of doing injustice to Anacreon and Sappho and other great writers, and is almost inclined to think that he himself, or rather some power residing within him, could make a speech better than that of Lysias on the same theme, and also different from his, if he may be allowed the use of a few commonplaces which all speakers must equally employ.

Phaedrus is delighted at the prospect of having another speech, and promises that he will set up a golden statue of Socrates at Delphi, if he keeps his word. Some raillery ensues, and at length Socrates, conquered by the threat that he shall never hear a speech of Lysias again unless he fulfils his promise, veils his face and begins.

First, invoking the Muses and assuming ironically the person of the non-lover (who is a lover all the same), he will enquire into the nature and power of love. For this is a necessary preliminary to the other question: How is the non-lover to be distinguished from the lover? In all of us there are two principles—a better and a worse—reason and desire, which are generally at war with one another; and the victory of the rational is called temperance, and the victory of the irrational intemperance or excess. The latter takes many forms and has many bad names—gluttony, drunkenness, and the like. But of all the irrational

desires or excesses the greatest is that which is led away by kindred desires to the enjoyment of personal beauty; this is the master power of love.

Here Socrates fancies that he detects in himself an unusual flow of eloquence—this he can only attribute to the inspiration of the place, which appears to be dedicated to the nymphs. Starting again from the philosophical basis which has been laid down, he proceeds to show how many advantages the non-lover has over the lover. The one encourages softness and effeminacy and exclusiveness; he cannot endure any superiority in his beloved; he will train him in luxury, he will keep him out of society, he will deprive him of parents, friends, money, knowledge, and of every other good, that he may have him all to himself. Then again his ways are not ways of pleasantness; he is mighty disagreeable; ‘crabbed age and youth cannot live together.’ At every hour of the night and day he is intruding upon him; there is the same old withered face and the remainder to match—and he is always repeating, in season or out of season, the praises or dispraises of his beloved, which are bad enough when he is sober, and published all over the world when he is drunk. At length his love ceases; he is converted into an enemy, and the spectacle may be seen of the lover running away from the beloved, who pursues him with vain reproaches, and demands his reward which the other refuses to pay. Too late the beloved learns, after all his pains and disagreeables, that ‘As wolves love lambs so lovers love their loves.’ (Cp. Char. 155 D.) Here is the end; the ‘other’ or ‘non-lover’ part of the speech had better be understood, for if in the censure of the lover Socrates has broken out in verse, what will he do in his praise of the non-lover? He has said his say and is preparing to go away.

Phaedrus begs him to remain, at any rate until the heat of noon has passed; he would like to have a little more conversation before they go. Socrates, who has risen, recognises the oracular sign which forbids him to depart until he has done penance. His conscience has been awakened, and like Stesichorus over Helen he will sing a palinode for having blasphemed the majesty of love. His palinode takes the form of a myth.

Socrates begins his tale with a glorification of madness, which he divides into four kinds: first, there is the art of divination or prophecy—this, in a vein similar to that of the Cratylus, he connects with mad-

ness by an etymological explanation (*μαντική*, *μανική*—compare *οἰωνοτεική*, *οἰωνιστική*, ‘tis all one reckoning, save the phrase is a little variations’); secondly, there is the art of purification by mysteries; thirdly, poetry or the inspiration of the Muses (cp. Ion, 533 foll.), without which no man can enter their temple. All this shows that madness is one of heaven’s blessings, and may sometimes be a great deal better than sense. There is also a fourth kind of madness—that of love—which cannot be explained without enquiring into the nature of the soul.

The soul is immortal, for she is the source of all motion both in herself and in others. Her form may be described in a figure as a composite nature made up of a charioteer and a pair of winged steeds. The steeds of the gods are immortal, but ours are one mortal and the other immortal. The immortal soul soars upwards into the heavens, but the mortal drops her plumes and settles upon the earth.

Now the use of the wing is to rise and carry the downward element into the upper world—there to behold beauty, wisdom, goodness, and the other things of God by which the soul is nourished. On a certain day Zeus the lord of heaven goes forth in a winged chariot; and an array of gods and demi-gods and of human souls in their train, follows him. There are glorious and blessed sights in the interior of heaven, and he who will may freely behold them. The great vision of all is seen at the feast of the gods, when they ascend the heights of the empyrean—all but Hestia, who is left at home to keep house. The chariots of the gods glide readily upwards and stand upon the outside, and are carried round in the revolutions of the spheres in view of the world beyond; but the others labour in vain; for the mortal steed, if he has not been properly trained, keeps them down and sinks them towards the earth. Of the world which is beyond the heavens, who can tell? There is an essence formless, colourless, intangible, perceived by the mind only, dwelling in the region of true knowledge. The divine mind in her revolution enjoys this fair prospect, and beholds justice, temperance, and knowledge in their everlasting essence. When fulfilled with the sight of them she returns home, and the charioteer puts up the horses in their stable, and gives them ambrosia to eat and nectar to drink. This is the life of the gods; the human soul tries to reach the same heights, but hardly succeeds; and sometimes the head of the charioteer rises above, and sometimes sinks below, the fair vision, and

is at last obliged, after much contention, to turn away and leave the plain of truth. Yet if she has followed in the train of her god and once beheld truth she is preserved harmless, and is carried round in the next revolution of the spheres; and if always following, and always seeing the truth, then for ever harmless. But if she drops her wings and falls to the earth, then she takes the form of man, and the soul which has seen most of the truth passes into a philosopher or lover; that which has seen truth in the second degree, into a king or warrior; the third, into a householder or money-maker: the fourth, into a gymnast; the fifth, into a prophet or mystic; the sixth, into a poet or imitator; the seventh, into a husbandman or craftsman; the eighth, into a sophist or demagogue; the ninth, into a tyrant. In all these conditions the lot of him who lives righteously is improved, and the lot of him who lives unrighteously deteriorates. At the end of every thousand years the soul has another choice, and may go upwards or downwards. And the soul of a man may descend into a beast, and return again into the form of man. But the form of man can only be acquired at all by those who have once beheld truth, for the soul of man alone apprehends the universal; and this is the recollection of that knowledge which she attained when in the company of the god. Ten thousand years elapse before the souls of men in general can regain their first lot, and have their wings restored to them. But the soul of a philosopher or lover who has three times in succession chosen the better life may receive wings and go her way in three thousand years.

For the soul in her own nature having the vision of true being remembers in her condition here those glorious sights of justice and temperance and wisdom and truth which she once gazed upon when in company with the heavenly choir. Then she celebrated holy mysteries and beheld blessed apparitions shining in pure light, herself pure and not as yet entombed in the oyster-shell of the body. And still she is eager to depart, and like a bird is fluttering and looking upwards, and is therefore esteemed mad. Such a recollection of other days is spread over her when she receives through sight, the purest of the senses, the copy of that beauty which alone of the ideas has any representation on earth. For wisdom has no outward form, and is ‘too dazzling bright for mortal eye.’ Now the corrupted nature, when blindly excited by the vision of beauty, rushes on to enjoy, and would fain wallow like a quadruped in sensual pleasures. But the true

where, where the eyes are ready sights of love, when he beholds a gentle form or face so adorned with beauty, and if he were not afraid of

the world, he would kiss her and kiss her. Then the soul of the world, which begins to relax and grow again, desire which has been unexpressed years over the soul of the lover; the germ of the young and old, and strong and young as death, like the cutting of teeth, are everywhere lost. O! Sweet, too cold! Father and mother, and goods and laws and respects are nothing to him, his beloved is his person, who can alone cure his pain. An expectant sacred voice says that she never knew that words in her is by mortals called love, but

world, and they choose their loves in this world accordingly. The followers of Jesus are honest and violent; those of Zeus seek out some

lover; and in like manner the followers of every god sees a love who is in his likeness and they contumacious to him the nature which they

call a lie. —

but the answerer was beyond the beyond with two, this back

and consequent increase of the moral Assembly members. And if they choose the lower life or continue long they will have a happy destiny; then, if not, because they have got the approval of the whole world. At last they leave the body and proceed on their pilgrimage, progressive, and those who have come before them have gone back. Those who have come back, return again, and the greater have the better backs.

Socrates concludes:—

These are the theories of Herodotus and Thucydides. I could say more, but in finer language than before. I will not trouble you further. If I said what was owing at first, please let me do so. My master in Lycia, who used to make paroxysms, would say, ‘I am well, and that you will not mislead his disciple Phaedrus.’

Phaedrus is struck that he and his master of Lycia, and the Lycians will be out of count with himself, and that all existing masters, all the politicians, have been deriding him. Therefore is of opinion that there is small danger of this. The politicians are persons of no great thicknesses of the soul, who desire to seem commanding by the authority of laws. And therefore there can be no disgrace according with which anybody could represent Lycia as being a master, but there may be disgrace in being a bad one.

And what is good or bad saying or speaking? When we run a hot in the sky above us, let us see that speech is won by rational conviction more than, and not by the consciousness of bodily pleasure. And the grandfathers who are clattering around may carry our words to the Minos, who are their persecutors, for the grandfathers were human beings from men in a world before the Minos, and when the Minos came very fond of hunger for the love of song. And they carry to them in heaven the report of those who honour them on earth.

The first rule of good speaking is to know and speak truth, true art is truth, says a Spartan proverb, whereas rhetoric is a mode of enchanting the soul, which makes things appear good and evil, like and unlike, according to the fancy of the speaker. But even in rhetoric an element of truth is required. For mankind are deceived, not all at once, but by degrees, and therefore he who would either impose on others or escape imposition must know the truth.

Socrates then proposes that they shall use the two speeches as illustrations of the art of rhetoric; first distinguishing between the debatable and undisputed class of subjects. In the debatable class there ought to

be a definition of all disputed matters. But there was no such definition in the speech of Lysias; nor is there any order or connection in his words any more than in a nursery rhyme. With this he compares the regular divisions of the other speech, which was his own (and yet not his own, for the local deities must have inspired him). This ‘fancy’ of his will be found to embody two principles: first, that of synthesis or the comprehension of parts in a whole; secondly, analysis, or the resolution of the whole into parts. These are the processes of division and generalization which are so dear to the dialectician, that king of men. But this is dialectic, and not rhetoric, of which the remains are but scanty after order and arrangement have been subtracted. There is nothing left but a heap of ‘ologies’ and other technical terms invented by Polus Theodorus, Evenus, Tisias, Gorgias, and others who have rules for everything, and who teach how to be short or long at pleasure. Prodicus showed his good sense in saying that there was a better thing than either being short or long, which was to be of convenient length.

Still, notwithstanding the absurdities of Polus and others, rhetoric has great power in public assemblies. This power, however, is not given by any technical rules, but is the gift of genius. The real art is always being confused by rhetoricians with the preliminaries of the art. The perfection of oratory is the perfection of all things; but for this rhetoric can do little. Pericles, the most accomplished of all speakers, derived his eloquence not from rhetoric but from the philosophy of nature which he learnt of Anaxagoras.

Even the little which rhetoric can teach is not taught by the art now in vogue. True rhetoric is like medicine, and the rhetorician has to consider the natures of men’s souls as the physician considers the natures of their bodies. Such and such persons are to be affected in this way, such and such others in that; he must know the times and the seasons for saying this or that. This is not an easy task, and this, if there be such an art, is the art of rhetoric.

I know that there are some professors of the art who maintain that probability is stronger than truth. But we maintain that probability is engendered by likeness of the truth which can only be attained by knowledge of the truth, and that the aim of the good man should not be to please or persuade his fellow-servants, but to please his good masters who are the gods. Rhetoric has a fair beginning in this.

Enough of the art of speaking: let us now proceed to consider the

true use of writing. There is an old Egyptian tale of Theuth, the inventor of writing, showing his invention to the god Thamuz, who told him that he would only spoil men's memories and take away their understandings. From this tale, which young Athens will probably scorn, may be gathered the lesson that writing is inferior to speech. For writing is like a picture, which can give no answer to a question, and has only a deceitful likeness of a living creature. It has no power of adaptation, but uses the same words for all. It is a sort of bastard and not a legitimate son of knowledge, and when an attack is made upon this illegitimate progeny neither the parent nor any one else is there to defend it. The husbandman will not seriously incline to sow his seed in such a hot-bed or garden of Adonis; he will rather sow in the natural soil of the human soul which has depth of earth; and he will anticipate this natural process by writing, if at all, only as a remedy against old age. The natural growth will be far nobler, and bring forth fruit not only in his own but in other minds.

The conclusion of the whole matter is just this,—that until a man knows the truth, and the manner of adapting the truth to the natures of other men, he cannot be a good orator; also, that the living is better than the written word, and that the principles of justice and truth when delivered by word of mouth are the legitimate offspring of a man's own bosom, and their lawful descendants take up their abode in others. Such an orator as he is who has them, you and I would fain become. And to all composers in the world, poets, orators, legislators, we hereby announce that if their compositions are based upon these principles then they are not only poets, orators, legislators, but philosophers. All others are mere flatterers and putters together of words. This is the message which Phaedrus undertakes to carry to Lysias from the local deities, and Socrates himself will carry a similar message to his favourite Isocrates, whose future distinction as a great rhetorician he prophesies. The heat of the day has passed, and after offering up a prayer to Pan and the nymphs, Socrates and Phaedrus depart.

There are two principal controversies which have been raised about the Phaedrus; the first relates to the subject, the second to the date of the Dialogue.

There seems to be a notion that the work of a great artist like Plato could not fail in unity, and that the unity of a dialogue requires a single subject. But the conception of unity really applies in very

different degrees and ways to different kinds of art; to a statue, for example, far more than to any kind of literary composition, and to some species of literature far more than to others. Nor does the dialogue appear to be a style of composition in which the requirement of unity is most stringent; nor should the idea of unity derived from one sort of art be hastily transferred to another. The double titles of several of the Platonic Dialogues seem to indicate that the severer rule was not observed by Plato. The Republic is divided between the search after justice and the construction of the ideal state; the Parmenides between the criticism of the Platonic ideas and of the Eleatic one or being; the Gorgias between the art of speaking and the nature of the good; the Sophist between the detection of the Sophist and the correlation of ideas. The Theaetetus, the Politicus, and the Philebus, have also digressions which are but remotely connected with the main subject.

Thus the comparison of Plato's other writings, as well as the reason of the thing, lead us to the conclusion that we must not expect to find one idea pervading a whole work, but one, two, or more, as the invention of the writer may suggest or his fancy wander. If each dialogue were confined to the development of a single idea, this would appear on the face of the dialogue, nor could any controversy be raised as to whether the Phaedrus treated of love or rhetoric. But the truth is that Plato subjects himself to no rule of this sort. Like every great artist he gives unity of form to the different and apparently distracting topics which he brings together. He works freely and is not to be supposed to have arranged every part of the dialogue before he begins to write. He fastens or weaves together the frame of his discourse loosely and imperfectly, and which is the warp and which is the woof cannot always be determined.

The subjects of the Phaedrus (exclusive of the short introductory passage about mythology which is suggested by the local tradition) are first the false or conventional art of rhetoric; secondly, love or the inspiration of beauty and knowledge, which is described as madness; thirdly, dialectic or the art of composition and division; fourthly, the true rhetoric, which is based upon dialectic, and is neither the art of persuasion nor knowledge of the truth alone, but the art of persuasion founded on knowledge of truth and knowledge of character; fifthly, the superiority of the spoken over the written word. The continuous thread which appears and reappears throughout is rhetoric; this is the ground

into which the rest of the Dialogue is inlaid, in parts embroidered with fine words which are not in Socrates' manner, as he says, 'in order to please Phaedrus.' The speech of Lysias which has thrown Phaedrus into an ecstasy is adduced as an example of the false rhetoric; the first speech of Socrates, though an improvement, partakes of the same character; his second speech, which is full of that higher element said to have been learned of Anaxagoras by Pericles, and in the midst of poetry does not forget order, is an illustration of the higher or true rhetoric. This higher rhetoric is based upon dialectic, and dialectic is a sort of inspiration akin to love (cp. *Symp.* 210 foll.); in these two aspects of philosophy the technicalities of rhetoric are absorbed. And so the example becomes also the deeper theme of discourse. The true knowledge of things in heaven and earth is based upon enthusiasm or love of the ideas going before us and ever present to us in this world and in another; and the true order of speech or writing proceeds accordingly. Love, again, has three degrees: first, of interested love corresponding to the conventionalities of rhetoric; secondly, of disinterested or mad love, fixed on objects of sense, and answering, perhaps, to poetry; thirdly, of disinterested love directed towards the unseen, answering to dialectic or the science of the ideas. Lastly, the art of rhetoric in the lower sense is found to rest on a knowledge of the natures and characters of men, which Socrates at the commencement of the Dialogue has described as his own peculiar study.

Thus amid discord a harmony begins to appear; there are many links of connection which are not visible at first sight. At the same time the Phaedrus, although one of the most beautiful of the Platonic Dialogues, is also more irregular than any other. For insight into the world, for sustained irony, for depth of thought, there is no Dialogue superior, or perhaps equal to it. Nevertheless the form of the work has tended to obscure some of Plato's higher aims.

The first speech is composed 'in that balanced style in which the wise love to talk.' (*Symp.* 185 C.) The characteristics of rhetoric are insipidity, mannerism, and monotonous parallelism of clauses. There is more rhythm than reason; the creative power of imagination is wanting.

'"Tis Greece, but living Greece no more.'

Plato has seized by anticipation the spirit which hung over Greek literature for a thousand years afterwards. Yet doubtless there were some

who, like Phaedrus, felt a delight in the harmonious cadence and the pedantic reasoning of the rhetoricians newly imported from Sicily, which had ceased to be awakened in them by really great works, such as the odes of Anacreon or Sappho or the orations of Pericles. That the first speech was really written by Lysias is improbable. Like the poem of Solon, or the story of Thamuz and Theuth, or the funeral oration of Aspasia (if genuine), or the pretence of Socrates in the *Cratylus* that his knowledge of philology is derived from Euthyphro, the invention is really due to the imagination of Plato, and may be compared to the parodies of the Sophists in the *Protagoras*. Numerous fictions of this sort occur in the Dialogues, and the gravity of Plato has sometimes imposed upon his commentators. The introduction of a considerable writing of another would seem not to be in keeping with a great work of art, and has no parallel elsewhere.

In the second speech Socrates is exhibited as beating the rhetoricians at their own weapons; he ‘an unpractised man and they masters of the art.’ True to his character he must, however, profess that the speech which he makes is not his own, for he knows nothing of himself. (Cp. *Symp.* 201 D.) Regarded as a rhetorical exercise, the superiority of his speech seems to consist chiefly in a better arrangement of the topics; he begins with a definition of love, and he gives weight to his words by going back to general maxims; a lesser merit is the greater liveliness of Socrates, which hurries him into verse and relieves the monotony of the style.

But Plato had doubtless a higher purpose than to exhibit Socrates as the rival or superior of the Athenian rhetoricians. Even in the speech of Lysias there is a germ of truth, and this is further developed in the parallel oration of Socrates. First, passionate love is overthrown by the sophistical or interested, and then both yield to that higher view of love which is afterwards revealed to us. The extreme of commonplace is contrasted with the most ideal and imaginative of speculations. Socrates, half in jest and to satisfy his own wild humour, takes the disguise of Lysias, but he is also in profound earnest and in a deeper vein of irony than usual. Having improvised his own speech, which is based upon the model of the preceding, he condemns them both. Yet the condemnation is not to be taken seriously, for he is evidently trying to express an aspect of the truth. To understand him, we must make abstraction of morality and of the Greek manner of regarding the rela-

tion of the sexes. In this, as in his other discussions about love, what Plato says of the loves of men must be transferred to the loves of women before we can attach any serious meaning to his words. Had he lived in our times he would have made the transposition himself. But seeing in his own age the impossibility of woman being the intellectual helpmate or friend of man (except in the rare instances of a Diotima or an Aspasia), seeing that, even as to personal beauty, her place was taken by young mankind instead of woman-kind, he tries to work out the problem of love without regard to the distinctions of nature. And full of the evils which he recognised as flowing from the spurious form of love, he proceeds with a deep meaning, though partly in joke, to show that the ‘non-lover’s’ love is better than the ‘lover’s.’

We may raise the same question in another form: Is marriage preferable with or without love? ‘Among ourselves,’ as we may say, a little parodying the words of Pausanias in the Symposium, ‘there would be one answer to this question: the practice and feeling of some foreign countries appears to be more doubtful.’ Suppose a modern Socrates, in defiance of the received notions of society and the sentimental literature of the day, alone against all the writers and readers of novels, to suggest this enquiry, would not the younger ‘part of the world be ready to take off its coat and run at him might and main?’ (Rep. v. 474.) Yet, if like Peithetaerus in Aristophanes, he could persuade the ‘birds’ to hear him, retiring a little behind a rampart, not of pots and dishes, but of unreadable books, he might have something to say for himself. Might he not argue, ‘that a rational being should not follow the dictates of passion in the most important act of his or her life?’ Who would willingly enter into a contract at first sight, almost without thought, against the advice and opinion of his friends, at a time when he acknowledges that he is not in his right mind? And yet they are praised by the authors of romances, who reject the warnings of their friends or parents, rather than those who listen to them in such matters. Two inexperienced persons, ignorant of the world and of one another, how can they be said to choose?—they draw lots, whence also the saying, ‘marriage is a lottery.’ Then he would describe their way of life after marriage; how they monopolize one another’s affections to the exclusion of friends and relations: how they pass their days in unmeaning fondness or trivial conversation; how the inferior of the two drags the other down to his or her level; how the cares of a family ‘breed

meanness in their souls.' In the fulfilment of military or public duties, they are not helpers but hinderers of one another : they cannot undertake any noble enterprise, such as makes the names of men and women famous, from domestic considerations. Too late their eyes are opened ; they were taken unawares and desire to part company. Better, he would say, a 'little love at the beginning,' for heaven might have increased it ; but now their foolish fondness has changed into mutual dislike. In the days of their honeymoon they never understood that they must provide against offences, that they must have interests, that they must learn the art of living as well as loving. Our misogamist will not appeal to Anacreon or Sappho for a confirmation of his view, but to the universal experience of mankind. How much nobler, in conclusion, he will say, is friendship, which does not receive unmeaning praises from novelists and poets, is not exacting or exclusive, is not impaired by familiarity, is much less expensive, is not so likely to take offence, seldom changes, and may be dissolved from time to time without the assistance of the courts. Besides, he will remark that there is a much greater choice of friends than of wives—you may have more of them and they will be far more improving to your mind. They will not keep you dawdling at home, or dancing attendance upon them ; or withdraw you from the great world and stirring scenes of life and action which would make a man of you.

In such a manner, turning the seamy side outwards, a modern Socrates might describe the evils of married and domestic life. They are evils which mankind in general have agreed to conceal, partly because they are compensated by greater goods. Socrates or Archilochus would soon have to sing a palinode for the injustice done to lovely Helen, or some misfortune worse than blindness might befall them. Then they would take up their parable again and say :—that there were two loves, a higher and a lower, holy and unholy, a love of the mind and a love of the body.

'Let me not to the marriage of true minds  
Admit impediments. Love is not love  
Which alters when it alteration finds.

\* . \* \* \* \*

Love's not time's fool, though rosy lips and cheeks  
Within his bending sickle's compass come ;  
Love alters not with his brief hours and weeks,  
But bears it out even to the edge of doom.'

But this true love of the mind cannot exist between two souls, until they are purified from the grossness of earthly passion: they must pass through a time of trial and conflict first; in the language of religion they must be converted or born again. Then they would see the world transformed into a scene of heavenly beauty; a divine idea would accompany them in all their thoughts and actions. Something too of the recollections of childhood might float about them still; they might regain that old simplicity which had been theirs in other days at their first entrance on life. And although their love of one another was ever present to them, they would acknowledge also a higher love of duty and of God, which united them. And their happiness would depend upon their preserving in them this principle—not losing the ideals of justice and holiness and truth, but renewing them at the fountain of light. When they have attained to this exalted state, let them marry (something too may be conceded to the animal nature of man): or live together in holy and innocent friendship. The poet might describe in eloquent words the nature of such a union; how after many struggles the true love was found: how the two passed their lives together in the service of God and man; how their characters were reflected upon one another, and seemed to grow more like year by year; how they read in one another's eyes the thoughts, wishes, actions of the other; how they saw each other in God; how in a figure they grew wings like doves, and were 'ready to fly away together and be at rest.' And lastly, he might tell how, after a time at no long intervals, first one and then the other fell asleep, and 'appeared to the unwise' to die, but were reunited in another state of being, in which they saw justice and holiness and truth, not according to the imperfect copies of them which are found in this world, but justice absolute in existence absolute, and so of the rest. And they would hold converse not only with each other, but with blessed souls everywhere; and would be employed in the service of God, every soul fulfilling his own nature and character, and would see into the wonders of earth and heaven, and trace the works of creation to their author.

So, partly in jest but also with a certain degree of seriousness, we may appropriate to ourselves the words of Plato. The use of such a parody, though very imperfect, is to transfer his thoughts to our sphere of religion and feeling, to bring him nearer to us and us to him. Like the Scriptures, Plato admits of endless applications, if we allow for the

difference of times and manners ; and we lose the better half of him when we regard his Dialogues merely as literary compositions. Any ancient work which is worth reading has a practical and speculative as well as a literary interest.' And in Plato, more than in any other Greek writer, the local and transitory is inextricably blended with what is spiritual and eternal. Socrates is necessarily ironical; for he has to withdraw from the received opinions and beliefs of mankind. We cannot separate the transitory from the permanent; nor can we translate the language of irony into that of plain reflection and common sense. But we can imagine the mind of Socrates in another age and country ; and we can interpret him by analogy with reference to the errors and prejudices which prevail among ourselves. To return to the Phaedrus :—

Both speeches are strongly condemned by Socrates as sinful and blasphemous towards the god Love, and as worthy only of some haunt of sailors to which good manners were unknown. The meaning of this and other wild language to the same effect, which is introduced by way of contrast to the formality of the two speeches (Socrates has a sense of relief when he has escaped from the trammels of rhetoric) seems to be that the two speeches proceed upon the supposition that love is and ought to be interested, and that no such thing as a real or disinterested passion, which would be at the same time lasting, could be conceived. 'But did I call this "love"? O God, forgive my blasphemy. This is not love. Rather it is the love of the world. But there is another kingdom of love, a kingdom not of this world, divine, eternal. And this other love I will now show you in a mystery.'

Then follows the famous myth, which is a sort of parable, and like other parables ought not to receive too minute an interpretation. In all such allegorics there is a great deal which is merely ornamental, and the interpreter has to separate the important from the unimportant. Socrates himself has given the right clue when, in using his own discourse afterwards as the text for his examination of rhetoric, he characterizes it as a 'partly true and tolerably credible mythus,' in which amid poetical figures, order and arrangement were not forgotten.

The soul is described in magnificent language as the self-moved and the source of motion in all other things. This is the philosophical theme or proem of the whole. But ideas must be given through something, and under the pretext that to realize the true nature of the soul would be not only tedious but impossible, we at once pass on to

describe the souls of gods as well as men under the figure of two winged steeds and a charioteer. No connection is traced between the soul as the great motive power and the triple soul which is thus imaged. There is no difficulty in seeing that the charioteer represents the reason, or that the black horse is the symbol of the sensual or concupiscent element of human nature. The white horse also represents rational impulse, but the description in 253, 'a lover of honour and modesty and temperance, and a follower of true glory,' though similar, does not at once recall the 'spirit' ( $\theta\mu\delta\sigma$ ) of the Republic. The two steeds really correspond in a figure more nearly to the appetitive and moral or semi-rational soul of Aristotle. And thus, for the first time perhaps in the history of philosophy, we have represented to us the threefold division of psychology. The image of the charioteer and the steeds has been compared with a similar image which occurs in the verses of Parmenides; but it is important to remark that the horses of Parmenides have no allegorical meaning, and that the poet is only describing his own approach in a chariot to the regions of light and the house of the goddess of truth.

The triple soul has had a previous existence, in which following in the train of some god, from whom she derived her character, she beheld partially and imperfectly the vision of absolute truth. All her after existence, passed in many forms of men and animals, is spent in regaining this. In the various stages of this long struggle she is sorely let and hindered by the animal desires of the inferior or concupiscent steed. Again and again she beholds the flashing beauty of the beloved. But before that vision can be finally enjoyed the animal desires must be subjected.

The moral or spiritual element in man is represented by the immortal steed which, like  $\theta\mu\delta\sigma$  in the Republic, always sides with the reason. Both are dragged out of their course by the furious impulses of desire. In the end something is conceded to the desires, after they have been finally humbled and overpowered. And yet the way of philosophy, or perfect love of the unseen is total abstinence from bodily delights. 'But all men cannot receive this saying': in the lower life of ambition they may be taken off their guard and stoop to folly unawares, and then, although they do not attain to the highest bliss, yet if they have once conquered they may be happy enough.

The language of the Meno and the Phaedo as well as of the Phaedrus,

seems to show that at one time of his life Plato was quite serious in maintaining a former state of existence. His mission was to realize the abstract; in that, all good and truth, all the hopes of this and another life seemed to centre. To him abstractions, as we call them, were another kind of knowledge—an inner and unseen world, which seemed to exist far more truly than the fleeting objects of sense which were without him. When we are once able to imagine the intense power which abstract ideas exercised over the mind of Plato, we see that there was no more difficulty to him in realizing the eternal existence of them and of the human minds which were associated with them, in the past and future than in the present. The difficulty was not how they could exist, but how they could fail to exist. In the attempt to regain this 'saving' knowledge of the ideas, the sense was found to be as great an enemy as the desires; and hence two things which to us seem quite distinct are inextricably blended in the representation of Plato.

Thus far we may believe that Plato was serious in his conception of the soul as a motive power, in his reminiscence of a former state of being, in his elevation of the reason over sense and passion, and perhaps in his doctrine of transmigration. Was he equally serious in the rest? For example, are we to attribute his tripartite division of the soul to the gods? Or is this merely assigned to them by way of parallelism with men? The latter is the more probable; for the horses of the gods are both white, i. e. their every impulse is in harmony with reason; their dualism, on the other hand, only carries out the figure of the chariot. Is he serious, again, in regarding love as 'a madness'? That seems to arise out of the antithesis to the former conception of love. At the same time he appears to intimate here, as in the Ion, Apology, Meno, and elsewhere, that there is a faculty in man, whether to be termed in modern language genius, or inspiration, or imagination, or idealism, or communion with God, which cannot be reduced to rule and measure. Perhaps, too, he is ironically repeating the common language of mankind about philosophy, and is turning their jest into a sort of earnest. (Cp. Phaedr. 61 B; Symp. 218 B.) Or is he serious in holding that each soul bears the character of a god? Perhaps he had no other account to give of the differences of human characters to which he afterwards refers. Or, again, in his absurd derivation of *μαντική* and *οἰωνιστική* and *ἱμερός* (cp. Cratylus)? It seems to be characteristic of the irony of Socrates to mix up sense and nonsense in such a way that no exact line

can be drawn between them. And allegory helps to increase this sort of confusion.

As is often the case in the parables and prophecies of Scripture, the meaning is allowed to break through the figure, and the details are not always consistent. When the charioeers and their steeds stand upon the dome of heaven they behold the intangible invisible essences which are not objects of sight. This is because the force of language can no further go. Nor can we dwell much on the circumstance, that at the completion of ten thousand years all are to return to the place from whence they came; because he represents their return as dependent on their own good conduct in the successive stages of existence. Nor again can we attribute anything to the accidental inference which would also follow, that even a tyrant may live righteously in the condition of life to which fate has called him ('he aiblins might, I dinna ken'). But to suppose this would be at variance with Plato himself and with Greek notions generally. He is much more serious in distinguishing men from animals by their recognition of the universal which they have known in a former state, and in denying that this gift of reason can ever be obliterated or lost. In the language of some modern theologians he might be said to maintain the 'final perseverance' of those who have entered on their pilgrim's progress. Other intimations of a 'metaphysic' or 'theology' of the future may also be discerned in him: (1) The moderate predestinarianism which here, as in the Republic, acknowledges the element of chance in human life, and yet asserts the freedom and responsibility of man; (2) The recognition of a moral as well as an intellectual principle in man under the image of an immortal steed; (3) The notion that the divine nature exists by the contemplation of ideas of virtue and justice—or, in other words, the assertion of the essentially moral nature of God; (4) Again, there is the hint that human life is a life of aspiration only, and that the true ideal is not to be found in art; (5) There occurs the first trace of the distinction between certain and contingent matter; (6) The conception of the soul itself as the motive power and reason of the universe.

The conception of the philosopher, or the philosopher and lover in one, as a sort of madman, may be compared with the Republic and Theaetetus, in both of which the philosopher is regarded as a stranger and monster upon the earth. The whole myth, like the other myths of Plato, describes in a figure things which are beyond the range of

human faculties, or inaccessible to the knowledge of the age. That philosophy should be represented as the inspiration of love is a conception that has already become familiar to us in the *Symposium*, and is the expression partly of Plato's enthusiasm for the idea, and is also an indication of the real power exercised by the passion of friendship over the mind of the Greek. The master in the art of love knew that there was a mystery in these feelings and their associations, and especially in the contrast of the sensible and permanent which is afforded by them; and he sought to explain this, as he explained universal ideas, by a reference to a former state of existence. The capriciousness of love is also derived by him from an attachment to some god in a former world. The singular remark that the beloved is more affected than the lover at the final consummation of their love, seems likewise to have a psychological truth.

We may now pass on to the second part of the Dialogue, which is a criticism on the first. Rhetoric is assailed on various grounds: first, as desiring to persuade, without a knowledge of the truth; and secondly, as ignoring the distinction between certain and probable matter. The three speeches are then passed in review: the first of them has no definition of the nature of love, and no order in the topics (being in these respects far inferior to the second); while the third of them is found (though a fancy of the hour) to be framed upon real dialectical principles. But dialectic is not rhetoric; nothing on that subject is to be found in the endless treatises of rhetoric, however prolific in hard names. When Plato has sufficiently put them to the test of ridicule he touches, as with the point of a needle, the real error, which is the confusion of preliminary knowledge with creative power. No attainments will provide the speaker with genius; and the sort of attainments which can alone be of any value are the higher philosophy and the power of psychological analysis, which is given by dialectic, not by the rules of the rhetoricians.

In this latter portion of the Dialogue there are many texts which may help us to speak and to think. The names dialectic and rhetoric are passing out of use; we hardly examine seriously into their nature and limits, and probably the cultivation of the art of speaking has been unduly neglected by us. But the mind of Socrates pierces through the differences of times and countries into the essential nature of man; and his words apply equally to the modern world and to the Athenians of

old. Would he not have asked of us, or rather is he not asking of us, Whether we have ceased to prefer appearances to reality? Let us take a survey of the professions to which he refers and try them by his standard. Is not all literature passing into criticism, just as Athenian literature in the age of Plato was degenerating into sophistry and rhetoric? We can converse and write about poems and paintings, but we seem to have lost the gift of creating them. Can we wonder that few of them 'come sweetly from nature,' while ten thousand reviewers (*μάλα μέριοι*) are engaged in dissecting them? Young men, like Phaedrus, are enamoured of their own literary clique and have but a feeble sympathy with the master-minds of former ages. They recognize 'a *practical!* necessity in the writings of their favourite author, even when he boldly wrote off just what came in his head.' They are beginning to think that Art is enough, just at the time when Art is about to disappear from the world. And would not a great painter, such as Michael Angelo, or a great poet, such as Shakespeare, returning to earth, 'courteously rebuke' us--would he not say that we are putting 'in the place of Art the preliminaries of Art,' confusing Art the expression of mind and truth with Art the composition of colours and forms; and perhaps he might more severely chastise some of us for trying to invent 'a new shudder' instead of bringing to the birth living and healthy creations? These he would regard as the signs of an age wanting in original power.

Turning from literature and the arts to law and politics, again we fall under the lash of Socrates. For do we not often make 'the worse appear the better cause;' and do not 'both parties sometimes agree to tell lies'? Is not pleading 'an art of speaking unconnected with the truth'? There is another text of Socrates which must not be forgotten in relation to this subject. In the endless maze of English law is there any 'dividing the whole into parts or reuniting the parts into a whole'—any semblance of an organized being 'having hands and feet and other members'? Instead of a code there is the Chaos of Anaxagoras (*όμοῦ πάντα χρήματα*) and no Mind or Order. Then again in the noble art of politics, who thinks of first principles and of true ideas? We avowedly follow not the truth but the will of the many (cp. Rep. 493). Is not legislation too a sort of literary effort, and might not statesmanship be described as the 'art of enchanting' the house? While there are some politicians who have no knowledge of

the truth, but only of what is likely to be approved by ‘the many who sit in judgment,’ there are others who can give no form to their ideal, neither having learned ‘the art of persuasion,’ nor having any insight into the ‘characters of men.’ Once more, has not medical science become a professional routine, which many ‘practise without being able to say who were their instructors’—the application of a few drugs taken from a book instead of a life-long study of the natures and constitutions of human beings? Do we see as clearly as Hippocrates ‘that the nature of the body can only be understood as a whole?’ (270 C; cp. Charm. 156 E.) And are not they held to be the wisest physicians who have the greatest distrust of their art? What would Socrates think of our newspapers, of our theology? Perhaps he would be afraid to speak of them;—the one *vox populi*, the other *vox Dei*; he might hesitate to attack them; or he might trace a fanciful connexion between them, and ask doubtfully, whether they are not equally inspired? He would remark that we are always searching for a belief and deplored our unbelief, seeming to prefer popular opinions unverified and contradictory to unpopular truths which are assured to us by the most certain proofs: that our preachers are in the habit of praising God ‘without regard to truth and falsehood, attributing to Him every species of greatness and glory, saying that He is all this and the cause of all that, in order that we may exhibit Him as the fairest and best of all’ (Symp. 198), without any consideration of His real nature and character or of the laws by which He governs the world—seeking for a ‘private judgment’ and not for the truth or ‘God’s judgment.’ What would he say of the Church, which we praise in like manner, ‘meaning ourselves’ (258 A), without regard to history or experience? Might he not ask, whether we ‘care more for the truth of religion, or for the speaker and the country from which the truth comes?’ or, whether the ‘select wise’ are not ‘the many’ after all? (Symp. 194 C.) So we may fill up the sketch of Socrates, lest, as Phaedrus says, the argument should be too ‘abstract and barren of illustrations.’ (Cp. Symp. Apol. Euthyphro.)

He next proceeds with enthusiasm to define the royal art of dialectic as the power of dividing a whole into parts, and of uniting the parts in a whole, and which may also be regarded (cp. Soph.) as the process of the mind talking with herself. The latter view has probably led Plato to the paradox that speech is superior to writing, in which he may seem also to be doing an injustice to himself. For the two cannot be fairly

compared in the manner which Plato suggests. The contrast of the living and dead word, and the example of Socrates, which he has represented in the form of the Dialogue, seem to have misled him. For speech and writing have really different functions; the one is more transitory, more diffuse, more elastic and capable of adaptation to moods and times; the other is more permanent, more concentrated, and is uttered not to this or that person or audience, but to all the world. In the *Politicus* (294 foll.) the paradox is carried further; the mind or will of the king is preferred to the written law; he is supposed to be the Law personified, the ideal made Life.

Yet in both these statements there is also contained a truth; they may be compared with one another, and also with the other famous paradox, that 'knowledge cannot be taught.' Socrates means to say, that what is truly written is written in the soul, just as what is truly taught grows up in the soul from within and is not forced upon it from without. When planted in a congenial soil the little seed becomes a tree, and 'the birds of the air build their nests in the branches.' There is an echo of this in the prayer at the end of the Dialogue, 'Give me beauty in the inward soul, and may the inward and outward man be at one.' We may further compare the words of St. Paul, 'Written not on tables of stone, but on fleshly tables of the heart;' and again, 'Ye are my epistles known and read of all men.' There may be a use in writing as a preservative against the forgetfulness of old age, but to live is higher far, to be ourselves the book, or the epistle, the truth embodied in a person, the Word made flesh. Something like this we may believe to have passed before Plato's mind when he affirmed that speech was superior to writing. So in other ages, weary of literature and criticism, of making many books, of writing articles in reviews, some have desired to live more closely in communion with their fellow men, to speak heart to heart, to speak and act only, and not to write, following the example of Socrates and of Christ. Some other touches of inimitable grace and art and of the deepest wisdom may be also noted; such as the prayer or 'collect' which has just been cited, 'Give me beauty,' &c.; or 'the great name which belongs to God alone' (278); or 'the saying of wiser men than ourselves that a man of sense should try to please not his fellow servants, but his good and noble masters' (274), like St. Paul again; or the description of the 'heavenly originals' at p. 250.

The chief criteria for determining the date of the Dialogue are (1) the ages of Lysias and Isocrates; (2) the character of the work.

Lysias was born in the year 458; Isocrates in the year 436, about seven years before the birth of Plato. The first of the two great rhetoricians is described as in the zenith of his fame; the second is still young and full of promise. Now it is argued that this must have been written in the youth of Isocrates, when the promise was not yet fulfilled. And thus we should have to assign the Dialogue to a year not later than 406, when Isocrates was thirty and Plato twenty-three years of age, and while Socrates himself was still alive.

Those who argue in this way seem not to reflect how easily Plato can ‘invent Egyptians or anything else,’ and how careless he is of historical truth or probability. Who would suspect that the wise Critias, the virtuous Charmides, had ended their lives among the thirty tyrants? Who would imagine that Lysias, who is here assailed by Socrates, is the son of his old friend Cephalus? or that Isocrates himself is the enemy of Plato and his school? No arguments can be drawn from the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the characters of Plato. (Else, perhaps, it might be further argued that, judging from their extant remains, insipid rhetoric is far more characteristic of Isocrates than of Lysias.) But Plato makes use of names which have often hardly any connection with the historical characters to whom they belong. In this instance the comparative favour shown to Isocrates may possibly be accounted for by the circumstance of his belonging to the aristocratical, as Lysias to the democratical party.

Few persons will be inclined to suppose, in the superficial manner of some ancient critics, that a dialogue which treats of love must necessarily have been written in youth. As little weight can be attached to the argument that he had probably visited Egypt before he wrote the story of Theuth and Thamuz. For there is no real proof that he ever was in Egypt; and even if he was, he might have known or invented Egyptian traditions before he went there. The late date of the Phaedrus will have to be established by other arguments than these: the maturity of the thought, the perfection of the style, the insight, the relation to the other Platonic Dialogues, seem to contradict the notion that it could have been the work of a youth of twenty or twenty-three years of age. The cosmological notion of the mind as the *primum mobile*, and the admission of impulse into the immortal nature, afford

grounds for assigning a much later date. (Cp. Tim., Soph., Laws.) Add to this that the picture of Socrates, though in some lesser particulars,—e. g. his going without sandals, his habit of remaining within the walls, his emphatic declaration that his study is human nature, an exact resemblance, is in the main the Platonic and not the real Socrates. Can we suppose ‘the young man to have told such lies’ about his master while he was still alive? Moreover, when two Dialogues are so closely connected as the Phaedrus and Symposium, there is great improbability in supposing that one of them was written at least twenty years after the other. The conclusion seems to be, that the Dialogue was written at some comparatively late but unknown period of Plato’s life, after he had deserted the purely Socratic point of view, but before he had entered on the more abstract speculations of the Sophist or the Philebus. Taking into account the divisions of the soul, the doctrine of transmigration, the isolation of the philosophic life, and the general character of the style, we shall not be far wrong in placing the Phaedrus in the neighbourhood of the Republic; remarking only that allowance must be made for the poetical element in the Phaedrus, which, while falling short of the Republic in definite philosophic results, seems to have glimpses of a truth beyond.

Two short passages, which are unconnected with the main subject of the Dialogue, may seem to merit a more particular notice: (1) the *locus classicus* about mythology; (2) the tale of the grasshoppers.

The first passage is remarkable as showing that Plato was entirely free from what may be termed the Euhemerism of his age. (For there were Euhemerists in Greece before Euhemerus.) Other philosophers, like Anaxagoras and Metrodorus, had found in Homer and mythology hidden meanings. Plato, with a truer instinct, rejects these attractive interpretations; he regards the inventor of them as ‘unfortunate,’ and they draw a man off from the knowledge of himself. There is a latent criticism, and also a poetical sense in Plato, which enable him to discard them, and yet in another way to make use of poetry and mythology as a vehicle of thought and feeling. What would he have said of the discovery of Christian doctrines in these old Greek legends? While acknowledging that such interpretations are ‘very nice’; would he not have remarked that they are found in all sacred literatures? They cannot be tested by any criterion of truth, or used to establish any truth; they add nothing to the sum of human knowledge;

they are—what we please, and if employed as ‘peacemakers’ between the new and old are liable to serious misconstruction, as he elsewhere remarks (*Rep.* 378 E). And therefore he would have ‘bid Farewell to them; the study of them would take up too much of his time; and he has not as yet learned the true nature of religion.’ The ‘sophistical’ interest of Phaedrus, the little touch about the two versions of the story, the ironical manner in which these explanations are set aside—‘the common opinion about them is enough for me’—the allusion to the serpent Typho, may be noted in passing; also the general agreement between the tone of this speech and the remark of Socrates which follows afterwards, ‘I am a diviner, but a poor one.’

The tale of the grasshoppers is naturally suggested by the surrounding scene. Yet we must not forget also that they are the representatives of the Athenians as children of the soil. Under the image of the lively chirruping grasshoppers who inform the Muses in heaven who honours them on earth, Plato intends to represent an Athenian audience (*τεττιγεστην ἑοικότες*). The story is introduced, apparently, to mark a change of subject, and also, like several other allusions which occur in the course of the Dialogue, in order to preserve the scene in the recollection of the reader.

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No one can duly appreciate the dialogues of Plato, especially the *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, and portions of the *Republic*, who has not a sympathy with mysticism. To the uninitiated, as he would himself have acknowledged, they will appear to be the dreams of a poet who is disguised as a philosopher. There is a twofold difficulty in apprehending this aspect of the Platonic writings. First, we do not immediately realize that under the marble exterior of Greek literature was concealed a soul thrilling with spiritual emotion. Secondly, the forms or figures which the Platonic philosophy assumes, are not like the images of the prophet Isaiah, or of the *Apocalypse*, familiar to us in the days of our youth. By mysticism we mean, not the extravagance of an erring fancy, but the concentration of reason in feeling, the enthusiastic love of the good, the true, the one, the sense of the infinity of knowledge and of the marvel of the human faculties. When feeding upon such thoughts the ‘wing of the soul’ is renewed and gains strength; she is raised above ‘the mannikins of earth’ and their opinions, waiting in wonder to know, and working with reverence to find out what God in this or in another life may reveal to her.

# PHAEDRUS.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES.      PHAEDRUS.

SCENE:—Under a plane-tree, by the banks of the Ilissus.

Steph. *Socrates*. My dear Phaedrus, whence come you, and whither  
<sup>227</sup> are you going?

*Phaedrus*. I have come from Lysias the son of Cephalus, and  
I am going to take a walk outside the wall, for I have been  
sitting with him the whole morning; and our common friend  
Acumenus advises me to walk in the country, which he says  
is more invigorating than to walk in the courts.

*Soc.* There he is right. Lysias then, I suppose, was in the  
town?

*Phae dr.* Yes, he was with Epicrates, at the house of Mory-  
chus; that house which is near the temple of Olympian Zeus.

*Soc.* And how did he entertain you? Can I be wrong in  
supposing that Lysias gave you a feast of discourse?

*Phae dr.* You shall hear, if you can spare time to accompany  
me.

*Soc.* And would I not deem the conversation of you and  
Lysias ‘a thing of higher import,’ as I may say in the words of  
Pindar, ‘than any business’?

*Phae dr.* Will you go on?

*Soc.* And will you go on with the narration?

*Phae dr.* My tale, Socrates, is one of your sort, for the theme  
which occupied us was love—after a fashion: Lysias has been

writing about a fair youth who was being tempted, but not by a lover; and this was the point: he ingeniously proved that the non-lover should be accepted rather than the lover.

*Soc.* O that is noble of him. I wish that he would say the poor man rather than the rich, and the old man rather than the young one; he should meet the case of me, and all of us—his words would then be charming, and a public good; and I am so eager to hear them that if you walk all the way to Megara, and when you have reached the wall come back, as Herodicus recommends, without going in, I will keep you company.

*Phaedr.* What do you mean, Socrates? How can you imagine that my unpractised memory can do justice to an elaborate work, which the greatest rhetorician of the day spent a long time in composing. Indeed, I cannot; I would give a great deal if I could.

*Soc.* I believe that I know Phaedrus about as well as I know myself, and I am very sure that a speech of Lysias was heard by him, not once only, but again and again he asked him to repeat his words, and Lysias was very willing to gratify him; at last, when nothing else would satisfy him, he got hold of the book, and looked at what he wanted—this occupied him during the whole morning:—and then when he was tired with sitting, he went out to take a walk, not until, as I believe, he had simply learned by heart the entire discourse, unless it was unusually long; and as he was going outside the wall to practise his lesson, he saw a certain lover of discourse who had the same complaint as himself;—he saw and rejoiced; now thought he, ‘I shall have a partner in my revels.’ And he invited him to come with him. But when the lover of discourse asked to hear the tale, he gave himself airs and said, ‘No I cannot,’ as if he were indisposed; although, if the hearer had refused, he would sooner or later have compelled him to listen whether he would or no. Therefore, Phaedrus, as he will speak in any case, beg him to speak at once.

*Phaedr.* I suppose that you will not let me off until I speak in some way; and therefore my best plan is to speak as I best may.

*Soc.* That is a very true supposition of yours.

*Phaedr.* I will do my best; for believe me, Socrates, I did not

learn the very words—O no; nevertheless I have a general notion of what he said, and will give you in a short summary the successive arguments by which the case of the non-lover was proved to be superior to that of the lover. Let me begin at the beginning.

*Soc.* Yes, my friend; but you must first of all show what you have got in your left hand under your cloak, for that roll, as I suspect, is the actual discourse. Now, much as I love you, I would not have you suppose that I am going to have your memory exercised at my expense, if you have Lysias himself here.

*Phaedr.* Enough; I see that I have no hope of practising upon you. But if I am to read, where would you please to sit?

*Soc.* Turn this way; let us go to the Ilissus, and sit down at some quiet spot.

*Phaedr.* I am fortunate in not having my sandals, and as you never have any, I think that we may go along the brook and cool our feet in the water; this is the easiest way, and at mid-day and in the summer is far from being unpleasant.

*Soc.* Lead on, and look out for a place in which we can sit down.

*Phaedr.* Do you see that tallest plane-tree in the distance?

*Soc.* Yes.

*Phaedr.* There are shade and gentle breezes, and grass on which we may either sit or lie down.

*Soc.* Move on.

*Phaedr.* I should like to know, Socrates, whether the place is not somewhere here at which Boreas is said to have carried off Orithyia from the banks of the Ilissus?

*Soc.* That is the tradition.

*Phaedr.* And is this the exact spot? The little stream is delightfully clear and bright; I can fancy that there might be maidens playing near.

*Soc.* I believe that the spot is not exactly here, but about a quarter of a mile lower down, where you cross to the temple of Artemis, and I think that there is some sort of an altar of Boreas at the place.

*Phaedr.* I do not recollect; but I beseech you to tell me, Socrates, do you believe this tale?

*Soc.* The wise are doubtful, and I should not be singular if, like them, I also doubted. I might have a rational explanation that Orithyia was playing with Pharmacia, when a northern gust carried her over the neighbouring rocks; and this being the manner of her death, she was said to have been carried away by Boreas. There is a discrepancy, however, about the locality; according to another version of the story she was taken from the Areopagus, and not from this place. Now I quite acknowledge that these allegories are very nice, but he is not to be envied who has to invent them; much labour and ingenuity will be required of him; and when he has once begun, he must go on and rehabilitate centaurs and chimeras dire. Gorgons and winged steeds flow in apace, and numberless other inconceivable and portentous monsters. And if he is sceptical about them, and would fain reduce them one after another to the rules of probability, this sort of crude philosophy will take up all his time. Now I have certainly not time for such enquiries; shall I tell you why? I must first know myself, as the Delphian inscription says; to be curious about that which is 230 not my business, while I am still in ignorance of my own self, would be ridiculous. And therefore I say farewell to all this; the common opinion is enough for me. For, as I was saying, I want to know not about this, but about myself. Am I indeed a wonder more complicated and swollen with passion than the serpent Typho, or a creature of a gentler and simpler sort, to whom Nature has given a diviner and lowlier destiny? But let me ask you, friend: have we not reached the plane-tree to which you were conducting us?

*Phaedr.* Yes, here is the tree.

*Soc.* Yes, indeed, and a fair and shady resting-place, full of summer sounds and scents. There is the lofty and spreading plane-tree, and the agnus castus high and clustering, in the fullest blossom and the greatest fragrance; and the stream which flows beneath the plane-tree is deliciously cold to the feet. Judging from the ornaments and images, this must be a spot sacred to Achelous and the Nymphs; moreover, there is a sweet breeze, and the grasshoppers chirrup; and the greatest charm of all is the grass like a pillow gently sloping to the head. My dear Phaedrus, you have been an admirable guide.

*Phaedr.* I always wonder at you, Socrates; for when you are in the country, you really are like a stranger who is being led about by a guide. Do you ever cross the border? I rather think that you never venture even outside the gates.

*Soc.* Very true, my good friend; and I hope that you will excuse me when you hear the reason, which is, that I am a lover of knowledge, and the men who dwell in the city are my teachers, and not the trees, or the country. Though I do indeed believe that you have found a spell with which to draw me out of the city into the country, as hungry cows are led by waving before them a bough or a fruit. For only hold up in like manner a book before me, and you may lead me all round Attica, and over the wide world. And now having arrived, I intend to lie down, and do you choose any posture in which you can read best. Begin.

*Phaedr.* Listen. 'You know my views of our common interest, and I do not think that I ought to fail in the object of my suit, because I am not your lover: for lovers repent of the kindnesses which they have shown when their passion ceases, but non-lovers have no time of repentance, because they are free and not subject to necessity, and they confer their benefits according to the measure of their ability, in the way which is most conducive to their own interest. Then again, lovers remember how they have neglected their interests, for the sake of their loves; they consider the benefits which they have conferred on them; and when to these they add the troubles which they have endured, they think that they have long ago paid all that is due to them. But the non-lover has no such tormenting recollections; he has never neglected his affairs or quarrelled with his relations; he has no troubles to reckon up or excuses to allege; he is well rid of all these evils. What remains, then, but that he should freely do what will gratify the beloved? Still you will say that the lover is more to be esteemed, because his love is thought to be greater; for he is willing to say and do what is hateful to other men, in order to please his beloved; well, that, if true, is only a proof that he will prefer any future love to his present, and will injure his old love at the pleasure of the new. And how can a man reasonably sacrifice himself to one who is possessed with a malady which no experienced

person would attempt to cure, for the patient himself admits that he is not in his right mind, and acknowledges that he is wrong in his mind, but is unable, as he says, to control himself. How, if he came to his right mind, could he imagine that the desires were good which he conceived when in his wrong mind? Then again, there are many more non-lovers than lovers; and, therefore, you will have a larger choice, and are far more likely to find among them a desirable friend. And if you fear common opinion, and would avoid publicity and reproach, the lover, who is always thinking that other men are as emulous of him as he <sup>232</sup> is of them, will be sure to boast of his successes, and make a show of them openly in the pride of his heart;—he wants others to know that his labour has not been lost: but the non-lover is more his own master, and is desirous of solid good, and not of the opinion of mankind. Again, the lover may be generally seen and known following the beloved (this is his regular occupation), and when they are observed to exchange two words they are supposed to meet about some affair of love either past or in contemplation; but when non-lovers meet, no one asks the reason why, because people know that talking is natural, whether friendship or mere pleasure is the motive. And, again, if you fear the fickleness of friendship, consider that in any other case a quarrel might be a mutual calamity; but now, when you have given up what is most precious to you, you will be the greater loser, and therefore, you will have more reason in being afraid of the lover, for his vexations are many, and he is always fancying that every one is leagued against him. Wherefore also he debars his beloved from society; he will not have you intimate with the wealthy, lest they should exceed him in wealth, or with men of education, lest they should be his superiors in understanding; and he is equally afraid of those who have any other advantage. If he can persuade you to break with them, he leaves you without a friend in the world; or if, out of a regard to your own interest, you have more sense than to comply with his desire, he will quarrel with you. But those who are non-lovers, and whose success in love is the reward of their merit, will not be jealous of the companions of their beloved, and will rather hate those who refuse to be his companions, thinking that they are slighted by

the latter and benefited by the former; for more love than hatred may be expected to come of his friendship with others. Many lovers also have loved the person of a youth before they knew his character or his relations; so that when their passion has passed away, there is no knowing whether they will continue  
233 to be his friends; whereas, in the case of non-lovers who were always friends, the friendship is not lessened by the favours granted; but the recollection of these remains with them, and is an earnest of good things to come. Further, I say that you are likely to be improved by me, whereas the lover will spoil you. For they praise your words and actions in a bad way; partly, they are afraid of offending you, and partly, their judgment is weakened by their passion: for love has a wonderful way of making that painful to the disappointed which is not painful to others, and of compelling those who succeed to praise that which ought not to give them pleasure: so that the beloved is more to be pitied than envied. But if you listen to me, in the first place, I, in my intercourse with you, shall not regard present enjoyment, but future advantage, being not conquered by love, but conquering myself; nor for small causes taking violent offences, but even when the cause is great, slowly laying up little wrath—unintentional offences I shall forgive, and intentional ones I shall try to prevent; and these are the marks of a friendship which will last. Do you think that only a lover can be a firm friend? reflect:—if this were true, we should set small value on sons, or fathers, or mothers; nor should we ever have loyal friends, for our love of them arises not from passion, but from other associations. Further, if we ought to confer favours on those who are the most eager suitors, we ought to confer them not on the most virtuous, but on the most needy; for they are the persons who will be most relieved, and will therefore be the most grateful; and, in general, when you make a feast invite not your friend, but the beggar and the empty soul, for they will love you, and attend you, and come about your doors, and will be the best pleased, and the most grateful, and will invoke blessings on your head. Yet surely you ought not to be granting favours to those who besiege you with prayer, but to those who are best able to reward you; nor to the lover only, but to those who are worthy of love; nor to those who will

enjoy the charm of your youth, but to those who will share <sup>234</sup> their goods with you in age; nor to those who, having succeeded, will glory in their success to others, but to those who will be modest and hold their peace; nor to those who care about you for a moment only, but to those who will continue your friends through life; nor to those who, when their passion is over, will pick a quarrel with you, but rather to those who, when the bloom of youth has left you, will show their own virtue. Remember what I have said; and consider this further point; that friends admonish the lover under the idea that his way of life is bad, but no one of his kindred ever yet censured the non-lover, or thought that he was ill-advised about his own interests.

'Perhaps you will ask me whether I propose that you should indulge every non-lover. To which I reply that not even the lover would advise you to indulge all lovers, for the indiscriminate favour is less esteemed by the rational recipient, and less easily hidden by him who would escape the world. Now love ought to be for the advantage of both parties, and for the injury of neither.'

'I believe that I have said enough; but if there is anything more which you desire or which needs to be supplied, ask and I will answer.'

Now, Socrates, what do you think? Is not the discourse excellent, especially the language?

*Soc.* Yes, indeed, admirable; the effect on me was ravishing. And this I owe to you, Phaedrus, for I observed you while reading to be in an ecstasy, and thinking that you are more experienced in these matters than I am, I followed your example, and, like you, became inspired with a divine phrenzy.

*Phaedr.* Indeed, you are pleased to be merry.

*Soc.* Do you mean that I am not in earnest?

*Phaedr.* Now don't talk in that way, Socrates, but let me have your real opinion; I adjure you, by the god of friendship, to tell me whether you think that any Hellene could have said more or spoken better on the same subject.

*Soc.* Well, but are you and I expected to praise the sentiments of the author, or only the clearness, and roundness, and finish, and tournure of the language? As to the first I willingly submit to your better judgment, for I am unworthy to form <sup>235</sup>

an opinion, having only attended to the rhetorical manner; and I was doubting whether Lysias himself would be able to defend that; I thought, though I speak under correction, that he repeated himself two or three times, either from want of words or from want of pains; and also, he appeared to me wantonly ambitious of showing how well he could say the same thing in two or three ways.

*Phaedr.* Nonsense, Socrates; what you call repetition was the especial merit of the speech; for he omitted no topic of which the subject rightly allowed, and I do not think that any one could have spoken better or more exhaustively.

*Soc.* I cannot go so far as that with you. Ancient sages, men and women, who have spoken and written of these things, would rise up in judgment against me, if I lightly assented to you.

*Phaedr.* Who are they, and where did you hear anything better than this?

*Soc.* I am sure that I must have heard; but I do not remember at this moment from whom; perhaps from Sappho the fair, Anacreon the wise; or, possibly, from a prose writer. Why do I say so? Why, because I perceive that my bosom is full, and that I could make another speech as good as that of Lysias, and different. Now I am certain that this is not an invention of my own, for I am conscious that I know nothing, and therefore I can only infer that I have been filled through the ears, like a pitcher from the waters of another, though I have actually forgotten in my stupidity who was my informant.

*Phaedr.* That is grand. But never mind where you heard the discourse or of whom; let that, if you will, be a mystery not to be divulged even at my earnest desire. Only, as you say, promise to make another and better oration of equal length on the same subject, with other arguments; and I, like the nine Archons, will promise to set up a golden image at Delphi, not only of myself, but of you, and as large as life.

*Soc.* You are a dear golden simpleton if you suppose me to mean that Lysias has altogether missed the mark, and that I can make a speech from which all his arguments are to be excluded. The worst of authors will say something which is to the point. Who, for example, could speak on this thesis

blaming the folly of the lover? These are the commonplaces which must come in (for what else is there to be said?) and must be allowed and excused; the only merit is in the arrangement of them, for there can be none in the invention; but when you leave the commonplaces, then there may be some originality.

*Phaedr.* I admit that there is reason in what you say, and I will be reasonable, and will allow you to start with the premiss that the lover is more disordered in his wits than the non-lover; if you go on after that and make a longer and better speech than Lysias, and use other arguments, then I say again, that a statue you shall have of beaten gold, and take your place by the colossal offerings of the Cypselids at Olympia.

*Soc.* Is not the lover serious, because only in fun I lay a finger upon his love? And so, Phaedrus, you really imagine that I am going to improve upon his ingenuity?

*Phaedr.* There I have you as you had me, and you must just speak 'as you best can.' Do not let us exchange 'tu quoque' as in a farce, or compel me to say to you as you said to me, 'I know Socrates as well as I know myself, and he was wanting to speak, but he gave himself airs.' Rather I would have you consider that from this place we stir not until you have unbosomed yourself of the speech; for here are we all alone, and I am stronger, remember, and younger than you; therefore perpend, and do not compel me to use violence.

*Soc.* But, my sweet Phaedrus, how can I ever compete with Lysias in an extempore speech? He is a master in his art and I am an untaught man.

*Phaedr.* You see how matters stand; and therefore let there be no more pretences; for, indeed, I know the word that is irresistible.

*Soc.* Then don't say it.

*Phaedr.* Yes, but I will; and my word shall be an oath. 'I say, or rather swear'—but what god will be the witness of my oath?—'I swear by this plane-tree, that unless you repeat the discourse here in the face of the plane-tree, I will never tell you another; never let you have word of another!'

*Soc.* Villain! I am conquered; the poor lover of discourse has no more to say.

*Phaedr.* Then why are you still at your tricks?

*Soc.* I am not going to play tricks now that you have taken the oath, for I cannot allow myself to be starved.

*Phaedr.* Proceed.

237 *Soc.* Shall I tell you what I will do?

*Phaedr.* What?

*Soc.* I will veil my face and gallop through the discourse as fast as I can, for if I see you I shall feel ashamed and not know what to say.

*Phaedr.* Only go on and you may do as you please.

*Soc.* Come, O ye Muses, melodious (*λιγεῖαι*), as ye are called, whether you have received this name from the character of your strains, or because the Melians<sup>1</sup> are a musical race, help, O help me in the tale which my good friend desires me to rehearse, for the good of his friend whom he always deemed wise and will now deem wiser than ever.

Once upon a time there was a fair boy, or, more properly speaking, a youth; he was very fair and had a great many lovers; and there was one special cunning one, who had persuaded the youth that he did not love him, but he really loved him all the same; and one day when he was paying his addresses to him, he used this very argument—that he ought to accept the non-lover rather than the lover; his words were as follows:—

‘All good counsel begins in the same way; a man should know what he is advising about, or his counsel will come to nought. But people imagine that they know about the nature of things, when they don’t know about them, and, not agreeing at the beginning, they end, as might be expected, in contradicting one another and themselves. Now you and I must not be guilty of the error which we condemn in others; but as our question is whether the lover or non-lover is to be preferred, let us first of all agree in defining the nature and power of love, and then, keeping our eyes upon the definition and to this appealing, let us further enquire whether love brings advantage or disadvantage.

‘Every one sees that love is a desire, and we know also that

<sup>1</sup> In the original, *λιγυραὶ Λιγύες*.

non-lovers desire the beautiful and good. Now in what way is the lover to be distinguished from the non-lover? Let us note that in every one of us there are two guiding and ruling principles which lead us whither they will; one is the natural desire of pleasure, the other is an acquired opinion which aspires after the best; and these two are sometimes in harmony and then again at war, and sometimes the one, sometimes the other conquers. When opinion conquers, and by the help of reason leads us to the best, the conquering principle is called temperance; but when desire, which is devoid of reason, rules in us and drags us to pleasure, that power of misrule is called excess. Now excess has many names, and many<sup>238</sup> members, and many forms, and any of these forms when very marked gives a name to the bearer of the name, neither honourable nor desirable. The desire of eating, which gets the better of the higher reason and the other desires, is called gluttony, and he who is possessed by this is called a glutton; the tyrannical desire of drink, which inclines the possessor of the desire to drink, has a name which is only too obvious; and the same may be said of the whole family of desires and their names, whichever of them happens to be dominant. And now I think that you will perceive the drift of my discourse; but as every spoken word is in a manner plainer than the unspoken, I had better say further that the irrational desire which overcomes the tendency of opinion towards right, and is led away to the enjoyment of beauty, and especially of personal beauty, by the desires which are her kindred—that desire, I say, the conqueror and leader of the rest, strengthened from having this very power, is called the power of love (*ερωτικός έρως*).<sup>239</sup>

And now, dear Phaedrus, I shall pause for an instant to ask whether you do not think me, as I appear to myself, inspired?

*Phaedr.* Yes, Socrates, you seem to have a very unusual flow of words.

*Soc.* Listen to me, then, in silence; for surely the place is holy; so that you must not wonder, if, as I proceed, I appear to be in a divine fury, for already I am getting into dithyrambics.

*Phaedr.* That is quite true.

Soc. And that I attribute to you. But hear what follows, and perhaps the fit may be averted; all is in their hands above. I will go on talking to my youth. Listen:—

Thus, my friend, we have declared and defined the nature of love. Keeping the definition in view, let us now enquire what advantage or disadvantage is likely to ensue from the lover or the non-lover to him who accepts their advances.

He who is the victim of his passions and the slave of pleasure will of course desire to make his beloved as agreeable to himself as possible. Now to him who is not in his right senses that is agreeable which is not opposed to him, but that which is equal or superior is hateful to him, and therefore the lover will not brook any superiority or equality on the part of his

239 beloved; he is always employed in reducing him to inferiority. And the ignorant is the inferior of the wise, the coward of the brave, the slow of speech of the speaker, the dull of the clever. These are the sort of natural and inherent defects in the mind of the beloved which enhance the delight of the lover; and there are acquired defects which he must produce in him, or he will be deprived of his fleeting joy. And therefore he cannot help being jealous, and will debar him from the advantages of society which would make a man of him, and especially from that society which would have given him wisdom. That is to say, in his excessive fear lest he should come to be despised in his eyes he will be compelled to banish from him divine philosophy; and there is no greater injury which he can inflict upon him than this. Moreover, he will contrive that he shall be wholly ignorant, and in everything dependent on himself; he is to be the delight of his lover's heart, and a curse to himself. Verily, a lover is a profitable guardian and associate for him in all that relates to his mind.

Let us next see how his master, whose law of life is pleasure and not good, will keep and train the body of his servant. Will he not choose a beloved who is delicate rather than sturdy and strong? One brought up in shady bowers and not in the bright sun, a stranger to manly exercises and the sweat of toil, accustomed only to a soft and luxurious diet, instead of the hues of health having the colours of paint and ornament and the rest of a piece?—such a life as any one can imagine

and which I need not detail at length. But I may sum up all that I have to say in a word, and pass on. Such a person in war, or in any of the great crises of life, will be the anxiety of his friends' and also of his lover, and certainly not the terror of his enemies; which nobody can deny.

And now let us tell what advantage or disadvantage the beloved will receive from the guardianship and society of his lover in the matter of his possessions; that is the next point to consider. The lover will be the first to see what, indeed, will be sufficiently evident to all men, that he above all desires to deprive his beloved of his dearest and best and most sacred possessions, father, mother, kindred, friends, all whom he thinks 240 may be hinderers or reprovers of their sweet converse; he will even cast a jealous eye upon his gold and silver or other property, because these make him a less easy prey, and when caught less manageable; hence he is of necessity displeased at his possession of them and rejoices at their loss; and he would like him to be wifeless, childless, homeless, as well; and the longer the better, for the longer he is all this, the longer he will enjoy him.

There are some sort of animals, such as flatterers, which are dangerous and mischievous enough, and yet nature has mingled a temporary pleasure and grace in their composition. You may say that a courtesan is hurtful, and disapprove of such creatures and their practices, and yet for the time they are very pleasant. But the lover is not only mischievous to his love, he is also extremely unpleasant to live with. The old proverb says, that equals delight in equals; equality of years inclines them to the same pleasures, and similarity begets friendship, and yet you may have more than enough even of this; and verily compulsion is always said to be grievous. Now the lover is not only unlike his beloved, but he forces himself upon him. For he is old and his love is young, and neither day nor night will he leave him if he can help; necessity and the sting of desire drive him on, and allure him with the pleasure which he receives from seeing, hearing, touching, perceiving him in every way. And therefore he is delighted to fasten upon him and to minister to him. But what pleasure or consolation can the beloved be receiving all this time? Must he not feel the extremity of disgust when

he looks at an old withered face and the remainder to match, which even in a description is disagreeable, and quite detestable when he is forced into daily contact with his lover; moreover he is jealously watched and guarded against everything and everybody, and has to hear misplaced and exaggerated praises of himself, and censures as inappropriate, which are intolerable when the man is sober, and, besides being intolerable, are published all over the world in all their indelicacy and weariness when he is drunk.

And not only while his love continues is he mischievous and unpleasant, but when his love ceases he becomes a perfidious enemy of him on whom he showered his oaths and prayers and promises, and yet could hardly prevail upon him to tolerate the tedium of his company even from motives of interest. The time of payment arrives, and now he is the servant of another master; instead of love and infatuation, wisdom and temperance are his bosom's lords; the man has changed, but the beloved is not aware of this; he asks for a return and recalls to his recollection former acts and words, under the idea that he is talking to the same person, and the other, being ashamed and not having the courage to tell him that he has changed, and not knowing how to fulfil the oaths and promises which he made when under the dominion of folly, has now grown wise and temperate; he does not want to do as he did or to be as he was before. Therefore he runs away and is constrained to be a defaulter; the oyster-shell<sup>1</sup> has the other side uppermost—he changes pursuit into flight, while the other is compelled to follow him with passion and imprecation, not knowing that he ought never from the first to have accepted a demented lover instead of a sensible non-lover; and that in making such a choice he was yielding to a faithless, morose, envious, disagreeable being, hurtful to his estate, hurtful to his bodily health, and still more hurtful to the cultivation of his mind, which is and ever will be the most honourable possession both of gods and men. Consider this, fair youth, and know that

<sup>1</sup> In allusion to a game in which two parties fled or pursued according as an oyster-shell which was thrown into the air fell with the dark or light side uppermost.

in the friendship of the lover there is no real kindness; he has an appetite and wants to feed upon you.

'As wolves love lambs so lovers love their loves.'

But I told you so, I am speaking in verse, and therefore I had better make an end; enough.

*Phaedr.* I thought that you were only half-way and were going to make a similar speech about all the advantages of accepting the non-lover. Why do you not proceed?

*Soc.* Does not your simplicity observe that I have got out of dithyrambics into epics; and if my censure was in verse, what will my praise be? Do you not perceive that I am already overtaken by the Nymphs to whom you have mischievously exposed me? And therefore I will only add that the non-lover has all the advantages in which the lover is charged with being deficient. And now I will say no more; there has been enough said of both of them. Leaving the tale to its fate, I will cross the river and make the best of my way home, lest a worse thing be inflicted upon me by you.

*Phaedr.* Not yet, Socrates; not until the heat of the day has passed; do you not see that the hour is almost noon? there is the sun standing over our heads. Let us rather stay and talk over what has been said, and then return in the cool.

*Soc.* Your love of discourse, Phaedrus, is superhuman, simply marvellous, and I do not believe that there is any one of your contemporaries who has either made or in one way or another has been the cause of others making an equal number of speeches. I would except Simmias the Theban, but all the rest are far behind you. And now I do verily believe that you have been the cause of another.

*Phaedr.* That is good news. But what do you mean?

*Soc.* I mean to say that as I was about to cross the stream the usual sign was given to me; that is the sign which never bids but always forbids me to do what I am going to do; and I thought that I heard a voice saying in my ear that I had been guilty of impiety, and that I must not go away until I had made an atonement. Now I am a diviner, though not a very good one, but I have enough religion for my own needs, as you might say of a bad writer—his writing is good

enough for him, and I am beginning to see that I was in error. O my friend, how singularly prophetic is the soul! For at the time I had a sort of misgiving, and, like Ibycus, 'I was troubled,' and I suspected that I might be buying honour from men at the price of sinning against the gods. Now I am aware of my error.

*Phaedr.* What error?

*Soc.* That was a dreadful speech which you brought with you, and you made me utter one as bad.

*Phaedr.* How was that?

*Soc.* Foolish, I say, and in a degree impious; and what can be more dreadful than this?

*Phaedr.* Nothing, if the speech was really such as you describe.

*Soc.* Well, and is not Eros the son of Aphrodite, and a god?

*Phaedr.* That is the language of mankind about him.

*Soc.* But that was not the language of Lysias' speech any more than of that other speech uttered through my lips when under the influence of your enchantments, and which I may call yours and not mine. For if love be, as he surely is, a god or divine, he cannot be evil. Yet this was the error of both our speeches. There was also a simplicity about them which was refreshing; having no truth or honesty in them, nevertheless they pretended to be something, hoping to succeed in deceiving the manikins of earth and be famous among them. Wherefore I must have a purgation. And I bethink me of an ancient purgation of mythological error which was devised, not by Homer, for he never had the wit to discover why he was blind, but by Stesichorus, who was a philosopher and knew the reason why; and therefore, when he lost his eyes, for that was the penalty which was inflicted upon him for reviling the lovely Helen, he at once purged himself. And the purgation was a recantation, which began thus:—

'I told a lie when I said that thou never embarkedst on the swift ships, or wentest to the walls of Troy.'

and when he had completed his poem, which is called 'the recantation,' immediately his sight returned to him. Now I will be wiser than either Stesichorus or Homer, in that I am going

to make my recantation for reviling love before I suffer; and this I will attempt, not as before, veiled and ashamed, but with forehead bold and bare.

*Phaedr.* Nothing could be more agreeable to me than to listen to you.

*Soc.* Only think, my good Phaedrus, what an utter want of delicacy was shown in the two discourses; I mean, in my own and in the one which you recited out of the book. Would not any one who was himself of a noble and gentle nature, and who loved or ever had loved a nature like his own, when he heard us speaking of the petty causes of lovers' jealousies, and of their exceeding animosities, and the injuries which they do to their beloved, have imagined that our ideas of love were taken from some haunt of sailors to which good manners were unknown—he would certainly never have admitted the justice of our censure?

*Phaedr.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Therefore, because I blush at the thought of this person, and also because I am afraid of the god Love, I desire to wash the brine out of my ears with water from the spring; and I would counsel Lysias not to delay, but to write another discourse, which shall prove that ‘*ceteris paribus*’ the lover ought to be accepted rather than the non-lover.

*Phaedr.* Be assured that he shall. You shall speak the praises of the lover, and Lysias shall be made to write them in another discourse. I will compel him to do so.

*Soc.* You will be true to your nature in that, and therefore I believe you.

*Phaedr.* Speak, and fear not.

*Soc.* But where is the fair youth whom I was addressing, and who ought to listen, in order that he may not be misled by one side before he has heard the other?

*Phaedr.* He is close at hand, and always at your service.

*Soc.* Know then, fair youth, that the former discourse was that of Phaedrus, the son of Vain Man, who dwells in the <sup>244</sup> city of Myrrhina (Myrrhinusius). And this is the recantation of Stesichorus the son of Godly Man (Euphemus), who comes from the town of Desire (Himera), and is to the following effect: That was a lie in which I said that the beloved ought to accept

the non-lover and reject the lover, because the one is sane, and the other mad. For that might have been truly said if madness were simply an evil; but there is also a madness which is the special gift of heaven, and the source of the chiefest blessings among men. For prophecy is a madness, and the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona when out of their senses have conferred great benefits on Hellas, both in public and private life, but when in their senses few or none. And I might also tell you how the Sibyl and other persons, who have had the gift of prophecy, have told the future of many an one and guided them aright; but that is obvious, and would be tedious.

There will be more reason in appealing to the ancient inventors of names, who, if they had thought madness a disgrace or dishonour, would never have called prophecy (*μαντική*), which is the noblest of arts, by the very same name as madness (*μανική*), thus inseparably connecting them; but they must have thought that there was an inspired madness which was ‘no disgrace; for the two words, *μαντική* and *μανική*, are really the same, and the letter *τ* is only a modern and tasteless insertion. And this is confirmed by the name which they gave to the rational investigation of futurity, whether made by the help of birds or of other signs; this because supplying from the reasoning faculty insight (*ροῦς*) and information (*ἰστορία*) to human thought (*οἴησις*), they originally termed *οἰωνοιστική*, but the word has been lately altered and made sonorous by the modern introduction of the letter Omega (*οἰωνοιστική* and *οἰωνιστική*), and in proportion as prophecy (*μαντική*) is higher and more perfect than divination both in name and reality, in the same proportion, as the ancients testify, is madness superior to a sane mind (*σωφροσύνη*), for the one is only of human, but the other of divine origin. Again, where plagues and mightiest woes have bred in a race, owing to some ancient wrath, there madness enters with holy prayers and rites, and by inspired utterances finds a way of deliverance for those who are in need; and he who has part in this gift, and is truly possessed and duly out of his mind, is by the use of purifications and mysteries made whole and exempt from evil, future as well as present, and has a release from

madness, of those who are possessed by the Muses ; which enters into a delicate and virgin soul, and there inspiring frenzy, awakens lyrical and all other numbers ; with these adorning the myriad actions of ancient heroes for the instruction of posterity. But he who, having no touch of the Muses' madness in his soul, comes to the door and thinks that he will get into the temple by the help of art—he, I say, and his poetry are not admitted ; the sane man is nowhere at all when he enters into rivalry with the madman.

I might tell of many other noble deeds which have sprung from inspired madness. And therefore, let no one frighten or flutter us by saying that temperate love is preferable to mad love, but let him further show, if he would carry off the palm, that love is not sent by the gods for any good to lover or beloved. And we, on our part, will prove in answer to him that the madness of love is the greatest of heaven's blessings, and the proof shall be one which the wise will receive, and the willing disbelieve. And, first of all, let us inquire what is the truth about the affections and actions of the soul divine and human. And thus we begin our proof :

The soul is immortal, for that is immortal which is ever in motion ; but that which moves another and is moved by another, in ceasing to move ceases also to live. Therefore, only that which is self-moving, never leaving self, never ceases to move, and is the fountain and beginning of motion to all that moves besides. Now, the beginning is unbegotten, for that which is begotten has a beginning ; but the beginning itself has no beginning, for if a beginning were begotten of something, that something would not be a beginning. But that which is unbegotten must also be indestructible ; for if beginning were destroyed, there could be no beginning out of anything, nor anything out of a beginning ; and all things must have a beginning. And therefore the self-moving is the beginning of motion ; and this can neither be destroyed nor begotten, else the whole heavens and all creation would collapse and stand still, and never again have motion or birth. But if the self-moving is immortal, he who affirms that self-motion is the very idea and essence of the soul will not be put to confusion. For the body which is moved from without is soulless ; but that which is

moved from within has a soul, for such is the nature of the soul.  
246 But if the soul be truly affirmed to be the self-moving, then must she also be without beginning, and immortal. Enough of the soul's immortality.

Her form is a theme of divine and large discourse ; the tongue of man may, however, speak of this briefly, and in a figure. Let our figure be a composite nature—a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. Now the winged horses and the charioteer of the gods are all of them noble, and of noble breed, but our horses are mixed ; moreover, our charioteer drives them in a pair ; and one of them is noble and of noble origin, and the other is ignoble and of ignoble origin ; and the driving, as might be expected, is no easy matter with us. I will endeavour to explain to you in what way the mortal differs from the immortal creature. The soul has the care of inanimate being everywhere, and traverses the whole heaven in divers forms appearing ;—when perfect and fully winged she soars upward, and is the ruler of the universe ; while the imperfect soul loses her feathers, and drooping in her flight at last settles on the solid ground—there, finding a home, she receives an earthly frame which appears to be self-moved, but is really moved by her power ; and this composition of soul and body is called a living and mortal creature. For immortal no such union can be reasonably believed to be ; although fancy, not having seen nor surely known the nature of God, may imagine an immortal creature having a body, and having also a soul which are united throughout all time. Let that, however, be as God wills, and be spoken of acceptably to him. And now let us ask the reason why the soul loses her feathers.

The wing is that corporeal element which is most akin to the divine, and is intended to soar aloft and carry that which gravitates downwards into the upper region, where dwell the gods. Now the divine is beauty, wisdom, goodness, and the like ; and by these the wing of the soul is nourished, and grows apace ; but when fed upon evil and foulness, and the like, wastes and falls away. Zeus, the mighty lord holding the reins of a winged chariot, leads the way in heaven, ordering all and caring for all ; and there follows him the array of gods and demi-gods, marshalled in eleven bands ; for Hestia only abides at home in the house of heaven ; of the rest they who are reckoned among the

princely twelve march in their order. They see many blessed sights in the inner heaven, and there are many ways to and fro, along which the happy gods are passing, each one fulfilling his own work ; and he who will and can may follow, for jealousy has no place in the celestial choir. But when they go to feast and festival, then they mount to the top of the dome of heaven up the steep. Now the chariots of the gods in even poise, obeying the rein glide rapidly ; but the others labour, for the steed who has evil in him, sinking heavily to the earth, keeps them down, when he has not been rightly trained by the charioteer :— and this is the hour of agony and extremest conflict for the soul. For the immortals, when they are at the end of their course, go out and stand upon the back of heaven, and the revolution of the spheres carries them round, and they behold the world beyond. Now of the heaven which is above the heavens, no earthly poet has ever sung or will sing worthily. But I must tell, for I am bound to speak truly when speaking of the truth. The colourless and formless and intangible essence and only reality dwells encircled by true knowledge in this home, visible to the mind alone who is the lord of the soul. And the divine intelligence, feeding upon mind and pure knowledge, the proper food of every soul, rejoices at beholding reality, and once more gazing upon truth, is replenished and made glad, until the revolution of the worlds bring, her round again to the same place. In the revolution she beholds justice, and temperance, and knowledge absolute, not in the form of created things or of things relative, which men call existence, but knowledge absolute in existence absolute ; and beholding the other true existences in like manner, and feasting upon them, she passes down into the interior of the heavens and returns home, and there the charioteer putting up his horses at the stall, gives them ambrosia to eat and nectar to drink.

This is the life of the gods ; but of other souls, that which follows God best and is likest to him lifts the head of the charioteer into the outer world, and is carried round in the revolution, troubled indeed by the steeds, and with difficulty beholding true being ; while another rises and falls, and sees, and again fails to see by reason of the unruliness of the steeds. The rest of the souls are also longing after the upper world and

they all follow, but not being strong enough they are carried round in the deep below, plunging, treading on one another, striving to be first; and there is confusion and the extremity of effort, and many of them are lamed or have their wings broken through the ill-driving of the charioteers; and all of them after a fruitless toil depart, without being initiated into the mysteries of true being, and departing feed upon opinion. The reason of their great desire to behold the plain of truth is that the food which is suited to the highest part of the soul comes out of that meadow; and the wing on which the soul soars is nourished with this. And there is a law of Destiny, that the soul which attains any vision of truth in company with the god is preserved from harm until the next period, and if attaining always is always unharmed. But when she is unable to follow, and fails to behold the vision of truth, and through some ill hap sinks beneath the double load of forgetfulness and vice, and her feathers fall from her and she drops to earth, then the law ordains that this soul shall at her first birth pass, not into any other animal, but only into man; and the soul which has seen most of truth shall come to the birth as a philosopher, or artist, or some musical and loving nature; that which has seen truth in the second degree shall be a righteous king or lordly warrior; the soul which is of the third class shall be a politician, or economist, or trader; the fourth shall be a lover of gymnastic toils, or a physician; the fifth a prophet or hierophant; to the sixth a poet or some other imitative artist will be appropriate; to the seventh the life of an artisan or husbandman; to the eighth that of a sophist or demagogue; to the ninth that of a tyrant;—all these are states of probation, in which he who lives righteously improves, and he who lives unrighteously deteriorates his lot.

Ten thousand years must elapse before the soul can return to the place from whence she came, for she cannot grow her wings 249 in less; only the soul of a philosopher, guileless and true, or the soul of a lover, who is not without philosophy, may acquire wings in the third recurring period of a thousand years: and if they choose this life three times in succession, then they have their wings given them, and go away at the end of three thousand years. But the others receive judgment when they

have completed their first life, and after the judgment they go, some of them to the houses of correction which are under the earth, and are punished; others to some place in heaven whither they are lightly borne by justice, and there they live in a manner worthy of the life which they led here when in the form of men. And at the end of the first thousand years the good souls and also the evil souls both come to draw lots and choose their second life, and they may take any which they like. The soul of a man may pass into the life of a beast, or from the beast return again into the man. But the soul of him who has never seen the truth will not pass into the human form, for man ought to have general notions, proceeding from many particulars of sense to one conception of reason; and this is the recollection of those things which our soul once saw while following God—when regardless of that which we now call being she raised her head up towards the true being. And therefore the mind of the philosopher alone has wings; and this is just, for he is always, according to the measure of his abilities, clinging in recollection to those things in which God abides, and in beholding which He is what he is. And he who employs aright these memories is ever being initiated into perfect mysteries and alone becomes truly perfect. But, as he forgets earthly interests and is rapt in the divine, the vulgar deem him mad, and rebuke him; they do not see that he is inspired.

Thus far I have been speaking of the fourth and last kind of madness, which is imputed to him who, when he sees the beauty of earth, is transported with the recollection of the true beauty; he would like to fly away, but he cannot; he is like a bird fluttering and looking upward and careless of the world below; and he is therefore esteemed mad. And I have shown this of all inspirations to be the noblest and highest and the offspring of the highest, and that he who loves the beautiful is called a lover because he partakes of it. For, as has been already said, every soul of man has in the way of nature beheld true being; this was the condition of her passing into the form of man. But all souls do not easily recal the things of the other world; 250 they may have seen them for a short time only, or they may have been unfortunate in their earthly lot, and may have lost

the memory of the holy things which they saw there through some evil and corrupting association. Few only retain an adequate remembrance of them ; and they, when they behold any image of that other world, are rapt in amazement ; but they are ignorant of what this rapture means, because they do not clearly perceive. For there is no light in the earthly copies of justice or temperance or any of the higher qualities which are precious to souls : they are seen through a glass dimly ; and there are few who, going to the images, behold in them the realities, and they only with difficulty. They might have seen beauty shining in brightness, when, with the happy band following in the train of Zeus, as we philosophers, or of other gods as others did, they saw a vision and were initiated into mysteries which may be truly called most blessed, and which we celebrated in our state of innocence ; having no experience of evils as yet to come ; admitted to the sight of apparitions innocent and simple and calm and happy, shining in pure light, pure ourselves and not yet enshrined in that living tomb which we carry about, now that we are imprisoned in the body, like an oyster in his shell. Let me linger thus long over the memory of scenes which have passed away.

But of beauty, I repeat again that we saw her there shining in company with the celestial forms ; and coming to earth we find her here too, shining in clearness through the clearest aperture of sense. For sight is the keenest of our bodily senses ; though not by that is wisdom seen ; her loveliness would have been transporting if there had been a visible image of her, and the same is true of the loveliness of the other ideas as well. But this is the privilege of beauty, that she is the loveliest and also the most palpable to sight. Now he who is not newly initiated or who has become corrupted, does not easily rise out of this world to the sight of true beauty in the other ; he looks only at her earthly namesake, and instead of being awed at the sight of her, like a brutish beast he rushes on to 251 enjoy and beget ; he consorts with wantonness, and is not afraid or ashamed of pursuing pleasure in violation of nature. But he whose initiation is recent, and who has been the spectator of many glories in the other world, is amazed when he sees any one having a godlike face or form, which is

the expression of divine beauty ; and at first a shudder runs through him, and again the old awe steals over him ; then looking upon the face of his beloved as of a god he reverences him, and if were not afraid of being thought a downright madman, he would sacrifice to his beloved as to the image of a god ; then as he gazes on him there is a sort of reaction, and the shudder naturally passes into an unusual heat and perspiration ; for, as he receives the effluence of beauty through the eyes, the wing moistens and he warms. And as he warms, the parts out of which the wing grew, and which had been hitherto closed and rigid, and had prevented the wing from shooting forth, are melted, and as nourishment streams upon him, the lower end of the wing begins to swell and grow from the root upwards ; and the growth extends under the whole soul—for once the whole was winged. During this process the whole soul is in a state of effervescence and irritation, like the state of irritation and pain in the gums at the time of cutting teeth ; in like manner the soul when beginning to grow wings has inflammation and pains and ticklings, and when looking at the beauty of youth she receives the sensible warm motion of particles which flow towards her, therefore called emotion (*īμερος*), and is refreshed and warmed by them, and then she ceases from her pain with joy. But when she is separated and her moisture fails, then the orifices of the passage out of which the wing shoots dry up and close, and intercept the germ of the wing ; which, being shut up with the emotion, throbbing as with the pulsations of an artery, pricks the aperture which is nearest, until at length the entire soul is pierced and maddened and pained, and at the recollection of beauty is again delighted. And from both of them together the soul is oppressed at the strangeness of her condition, and is in a great strait and excitement, and in her madness can neither sleep by night nor abide in her place by day. And wherever she thinks that she will behold the beautiful one, thither in her desire she runs. And when she has seen him, and bathed herself with the waters of desire, her constraint is loosened, and she is refreshed, and has no more pangs and pains ; and this is the sweetest of all pleasures at the time, and is the reason why the soul of the lover will never forsake his beautiful one, whom he esteems

above all; he has forgotten mother and brethren and companions, and he thinks nothing of the neglect and loss of his property; the rules and proprieties of life, on which he formerly prided himself, he now despises, and is ready to sleep like a servant, wherever he is allowed, as near as he can to his beautiful one, who is not only the object of his worship, but the only physician who can heal him in his extreme agony. And this state, my dear imaginary youth, is by men called love, and among the gods has a name which you, in your simplicity, may be inclined to mock; there are two lines in the apocryphal writings of Homer in which the name occurs. One of them is rather outrageous, and not altogether metrical. They are as follows:—

‘Mortals call him Eros (love),  
But the immortals call him Pteros (feathered dove),  
Because the growing of feathers is a necessity to him.’

You may believe this or not as you like. At any rate the loves of lovers and their causes are such as I have described.

Now the lover who is the attendant of Zeus is better able to bear the winged god, and can endure a heavier burden; but the attendants and companions of Ares, when under the influence of love, if they fancy that they have been at all wronged, are ready to kill and put an end to themselves and their beloved. And in like manner he who follows in the train of any other god honours and imitates him, as far as he is able, while he is unspoiled and the impression lasts; and his way of life and behaviour to his beloved and to every other in the first period of his earthly existence is in harmony. Every one chooses the object of his affections according to his character, and this he makes his god, and fashions and adorns as a sort of image which he is to fall down and worship. The followers of Zeus desire that their beloved should have a soul like him; and therefore they seek some one of a philosophical and imperial nature, and when they have found him and loved him, they do all they can to confirm such a nature in him, and if they have no experience hitherto, they learn of any one who can teach them, and themselves follow in the same way. And

253 they have the less difficulty in finding the nature of their own

god in themselves, because they have been compelled to gaze intensely on him; their recollection clings to him, and they become possessed of him, and receive his character and ways, as far as man can participate in God. The qualities of their god they attribute to the beloved, wherefore they love him all the more, and if they draw inspiration from Zeus, like the Bacchic Nymphs, they pour out their own fountain upon him in order to make him as like their god as possible. But those who are the followers of Hera seek a royal love, and when they have found him they do the same with him; and in like manner the followers of Apollo, and of every other god walking in the ways of their god, seek a love who is to be like their god, and when they have found him, they themselves imitate their god, and persuade their love to do the same, and bring him into harmony with the form and ways of the god as far as they can: for they have no feelings of envy or jealousy towards their beloved, but they do their utmost to create in him the greatest likeness of themselves and of the god whom they honour. Thus fair and blissful to the beloved when he is taken, is the desire of the inspired lover, and the initiation of which I speak into the mysteries of true love, if their purpose is effected. Now the beloved is taken captive in the following manner:—

As I said at the beginning of this tale, I divided each soul into three—two horses and a charioteer; and one of the horses was good and the other bad: the division may remain, but I have not yet explained in what the goodness or badness of either consists, and to that I will now proceed. The right hand horse is upright and cleanly made; he has a lofty neck and an aquiline nose: his colour is white, and he has dark eyes and is a lover of honour and modesty and temperance, and the follower of true glory; he needs not the touch of the whip, but is guided by word and admonition only. Whereas the other is a crooked lumbering animal, put together anyhow; he has a short thick neck; he is flat-faced and of a dark colour, with grey and blood-shot eyes; the mate of insolence and pride, shag-eared and deaf, hardly yielding to whip and spur. Now when the charioteer beholds the vision of love, and has his whole soul warmed through sense, and is full of the prickings and ticklings of

254 desire, the obedient steed, then as always under the government of shame, refrains from leaping on the beloved; but the other, without heeding the blows of the whip, plunges and runs away, giving all manner of trouble to his companion and the charioteer, whom he forces to approach the beloved and to remember the joys of love. They at first indignantly oppose him and will not be urged on to do terrible and unlawful deeds; but at last, when he persists in plaguing them, they yield and agree to do as he bids them. And now they are at the spot and behold the flashing beauty of the beloved: which when the charioteer sees, his memory is carried to the true beauty, whom he beholds in company with Modesty set in her holy place. He sees her, but he is afraid and falls backwards in adoration, and by his fall is compelled to pull back the reins with such violence as to bring both the steeds on their haunches, the one willing and unresisting, the unruly one very unwilling; and when they have gone back a little, the one is overcome with shame and wonder, and the perspiration streams from his whole soul; the other, when the pain is over which the bridle and the fall had given him, having with difficulty taken breath, is full of wrath and reproaches, which he heaps upon the charioteer and his fellow-steed, for want of courage and manhood, declaring that they have been false to their agreement and guilty of desertion. Again they refuse, and again he urges them on, and will scarce yield to their prayer that he would wait until another time. When the appointed hour comes, they make as if they had forgotten, and he reminds them, fighting and neighing and dragging them on, until at length he on the same thoughts intent, forces them to draw near. And when they are near he stoops his head and puts up his tail, and takes the bit in his teeth and pulls shamelessly. Then the charioteer is worse off than ever; he falls back like racers at the barrier, and with a still more violent wrench drags the bit out of the teeth of the wild steed and covers his abusive tongue and jaws with blood, and forces his legs and haunches to the ground and punishes him sorely. And when this has happened several times and the villain has ceased from his wanton way, he is tamed and humbled, and follows the will of the charioteer, and when he sees the beautiful one he is ready to die of fear. And from that time forward

the soul of the lover follows the beloved in modesty and holy fear.

And so the beloved who, like a god, has received every true and loyal service from his lover, not in pretence but in reality, being also himself of a nature friendly to his admirer, if in former days he has blushed to own his passion and turned away his lover, because his youthful companions or others slanderously told him that he would be disgraced, now as years advance, at the appointed age and time, is led to receive him into communion. For fate which has ordained that there shall be no friendship among the evil has also ordained that there shall ever be friendship among the good. And when he has received him into communion and intimacy, then the beloved is amazed at the good-will of the lover; he recognises that the inspired friend is worth all other friendships or kinships, which have nothing of friendship in them in comparison. And when this feeling continues and he is nearer to him and embraces him, in gymnastic exercises and at other times of meeting, then does the fountain of that stream, which Zeus when he was in love with Ganymede named desire, overflow upon the lover, and some enters into his soul, and some when he is filled flows out again; and as a breeze or an echo rebounds from the smooth rocks and returns whence it came, so does the stream of beauty, passing the eyes which are the natural doors and windows of the soul, return again to the beautiful one; there arriving and quickening the passages of the wings, watering them and inclining them to grow, and filling the soul of the beloved also with love. And thus he loves, but he knows not what; he does not understand and cannot explain his own state; he appears to have caught the infection of blindness from another; the lover is his mirror in whom he is beholding himself, but he is not aware of this. When he is with the lover, both cease from their pain, but when he is away then he longs as he is longed for, and has love's image, love for love (*Anteros*) lodging in his breast, which he calls and deems not love but friendship only, and his desire is as the desire of the other, but weaker; he wants to see him, touch him, kiss, embrace him, and probably not long afterwards his desire is accomplished. When they meet, the wanton steed of the lover has a word to say to the charioteer; he would like

256 to have a little pleasure as a return for many pains, but the wanton steed of the beloved says not a word, for he is bursting with passion which he understands not, but he throws his arms round the lover and embraces him as his dearest friend ; and, when they are side by side, he is not in a state in which he can refuse the lover anything, if he ask him, while his fellow-steed and the charioteer oppose him with the arguments of shame and reason. After this their happiness depends upon their self-control ; if the better elements of the mind which lead to order and philosophy prevail, then they pass their life in this world in happiness and harmony—masters of themselves and orderly—enslaving the vicious and emancipating the virtuous elements ; and when the end comes, they are light and ready to fly away, having conquered in one of the three heavenly or truly Olympian victories ; nor can human discipline or divine inspiration confer any greater blessing on man than this. If, on the other hand, they leave philosophy and lead the lower life of ambition, then probably, after wine or in some other careless hour, the two wanton animals take the two souls when off their guard and bring them together, and they accomplish that desire of their hearts which to the many is bliss ; and this having once enjoyed they continue to enjoy, yet rarely because they have not the approval of the whole soul. They too are dear, but not so dear to one another as the others, either at the time of their love or afterwards. They consider that they have given and taken from each other the most sacred pledges, and they may not break them and fall into enmity. At last they pass out of the body, unwinged, but eager to soar, and thus obtain no mean reward of love and madness. For those who have once begun the heavenward pilgrimage may not go down again to darkness and the journey beneath the earth, but they live in light always ; happy companions in their pilgrimage, and when the time comes at which they receive their wings they have the same plumage because of their love.

Thus great are the heavenly blessings which the friendship of a lover will confer on you, my youth. Whereas the attachment of the non-lover, which is just a vulgar compound of temperance and niggardly earthly ways and motives, will breed meanness in your inmost soul, which is praised by the vulgar as virtue,

will send you bowling round the earth during a period of nine <sup>257</sup> thousand years, and leave you a fool in the world below.

And thus, dear Eros, I have made and paid my recantation, as well as I could and as fairly as I could ; the poetical figures I was compelled to use, because Phaedrus would have them. And now forgive the past and accept the present, and be gracious and merciful to me, and do not deprive me of sight or take from me the art of love which thou hast given me, but grant that I may be yet more esteemed in the eyes of the fair. And if Phaedrus or I myself said anything rude in our first speeches, blame Lysias, who is the father of the brat, and let us have no more of his progeny ; bid him study philosophy, like his brother Polemarchus ; and then his lover Phaedrus will no longer halt divided between two, but will dedicate himself wholly to love and philosophical discourses.

*Phaedr.* I say with you, Socrates, if this be for my good, may this come true. But why did you make your second oration so much finer than the first ? I wonder at that. And I begin to be afraid that I shall lose conceit of Lysias, even if he be willing to make another as long as yours, which I doubt. For quite lately one of your politicians took to abusing him on this very account ; and called him a speech-writer again and again. So that a feeling of pride may probably induce him to give up writing.

*Soc.* That is an amusing notion ; but I think that you are a little mistaken in your friend if you imagine that he is frightened at every noise ; and, possibly, you think that his assailant was in earnest ?

*Phaedr.* I thought, Socrates, that he was. And you are aware that the greatest and most influential statesmen are ashamed of writing speeches and leaving them in a written form because they are afraid of posterity, and do not like to be called sophists.

*Soc.* I do not know whether you are aware, Phaedrus, that the ‘sweet elbow’ of which the proverb speaks is really derived from the long arm of the Nile. And you appear to be equally

<sup>1</sup> A proverb, like ‘the grapes are sour,’ applied to pleasures which cannot be had, meaning sweet things which are out of the reach of the mouth.

unaware of the fact that this sweet elbow of theirs is also a long arm. For there is nothing of which great politicians are so fond as of writing speeches and bequeathing them to posterity. And they add their admirers' names at the top of the writing, out of gratitude to them.

258 *Phaedr.* What do you mean? I do not understand.

*Soc.* Why, do you not know that when a politician writes, he begins with the names of his approvers?

*Phaedr.* How is that?

*Soc.* Why, he begins thus: 'Be it enacted by the senate, the people, or both, on the motion of a certain person,' who is our author; and then he makes a flourish about himself, and proceeds to display his own wisdom to his admirers in what is often a long and tedious composition. Now what is that sort of thing but a regular piece of authorship?

*Phaedr.* True.

*Soc.* And if the law is finally approved, then the author leaves the theatre in high delight; but if the law is rejected and he is done out of his speech-making, and not thought good enough to write, then he and his party are in mourning.

*Phaedr.* Very true.

*Soc.* So far are they from despising, or rather so highly do they value the practice of writing.

*Phaedr.* No doubt.

*Soc.* And when the king or orator has the power, as Lycurgus or Solon or Darius had, of attaining an immortality of authorship in a state, is he not thought by posterity, when they see his writings, and does he not think himself, while he is yet alive, to be a god?

*Phaedr.* That is true.

*Soc.* Then do you think that any one of this class, however ill-disposed, would reproach Lysias with being an author?

*Phaedr.* Not upon your view; for according to you he would be casting a slur upon his own favourite pursuit.

*Soc.* Any one may see that there is no disgrace in the mere fact of writing.

*Phaedr.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* There may however be a disgrace in writing, not well, but badly.

*Phaedr.* That is true.

*Soc.* And what is well and what is badly—need we ask Lysias, or any other poet or orator, who ever wrote or will write either a political or any other work, in metre or out of metre, poet or prose writer, to teach us this?

*Phaedr.* Need we? What motive has a man to live if not for the pleasures of discourse? Surely he would not live for the sake of bodily pleasures, which almost always have previous pain as a condition of them, and therefore are rightly called slavish.

*Soc.* There is time yet. And I can fancy that the grasshoppers 259 who are still chirruping in the sun over our heads are talking to one another and looking at us. What would they say if they saw that we also, like the many, are not talking, but slumbering at mid-day, lulled by their voices, too indolent to think? They would have a right to laugh at us, and might imagine that we were slaves coming to our place of resort, who like sheep lie asleep at noon about the fountain. But if they see us discoursing, and like Odysseus sailing on deaf to their siren voices, they may perhaps, out of respect, give us of the gifts which they receive of the gods and impart to men.

*Phaedr.* What gifts do you mean? I never heard of any.

*Soc.* A lover of music-like yourself ought surely to have heard the story of the grasshoppers, who are said to have been human beings in an age before the Muses. And when the Muses came and song appeared they were ravished with delight; and singing always, never thought of eating and drinking, until at last in their forgetfulness they died. And now they live again in the grasshoppers; and this is the return which the Muses make to them—they hunger no more, neither thirst any more, but are always singing from the moment that they are born, and never eating or drinking; and when they die they go and inform the Muses in heaven who honours them on earth. They win the love of Terpsichore for the dancers by their report of them; of Erato for the lovers, and of the other Muses for those who do them honour, according to the several ways of honouring them;—of Calliope the eldest Muse, and of Urania who is next to her for the votaries of philosophy; for these are the Muses who are chiefly concerned with heaven and thought, divine as

well as human, and they have the sweetest utterance. For many reasons, then, we ought always to talk and not to sleep at mid-day.

*Phaedr.* Let us talk.

*Soc.* Shall we discuss the rules of writing and speech as we were proposing?

*Phaedr.* Very good.

*Soc.* In good speaking should not the mind of the speaker know the truth of what he is going to speak about?

260 *Phaedr.* And yet, Socrates, I have heard that he who would be an orator has nothing to do with true justice, but only with that which is likely to be approved by the many who sit in judgment; nor with the truly good or honourable, but only with opinion about them, and that from opinion comes persuasion, and not from the truth.

*Soc.* Any words of the wise ought to be regarded and not trampled under foot, for they have probably something in them, and perhaps there may be something in this saying which is worthy of attention.

*Phaedr.* Very true.

*Soc.* Let us put the matter thus:—Suppose that I persuaded you to buy a horse and go to the wars. Neither of us knew what a horse was like, but I knew that you believed a horse to be the longest-eared of domestic animals.

*Phaedr.* That would be ridiculous.

*Soc.* There is something more ridiculous coming:—Suppose, further, that I was in earnest and went and composed a speech in honour of an ass, whom I entitled a horse, beginning: ‘A noble animal and a most useful possession, especially in war, and you may get on his back and fight, and he will carry baggage or anything.’

*Phaedr.* That would be most ridiculous.

*Soc.* Ridiculous! Yes; but is not even a ridiculous friend better than a cunning enemy?

*Phaedr.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And when the orator instead of putting an ass in the place of a horse, puts good for evil, being himself as ignorant of their true nature as the city on which he imposes is ignorant; and having studied the notions of the multitude, per-

suades them to do evil instead of good,—what will be the harvest which rhetoric will be likely to gather after the sowing of that fruit?

*Phaedr.* Anything but good.

*Soc.* Perhaps, however, rhetoric has been getting too roughly handled by us, and she might answer: What amazing nonsense is this! As if I forced any man to learn to speak in ignorance of the truth! Whatever my advice may be worth, I should have told him to arrive at the truth first, and then come to me. At the same time I boldly assert that mere knowledge of the truth will not give you the art of persuasion.

*Phaedr.* There is reason in the lady's defence of herself.

*Soc.* Yes, I admit that, if the arguments which she has yet in store bear witness that she is an art at all. But I seem to hear them arraying themselves on the opposite side, declaring that she speaks falsely, and that rhetoric is only a dilettante amusement and not an art. Lo! a Spartan appears, and says that there never is nor ever will be a real art of speaking which is divorced from the truth.

*Phaedr.* And what are these arguments, Socrates? Bring <sup>261</sup> them out that we may examine them.

*Soc.* Come out, fair children, and convince Phaedrus, who is the father of similar beauties, that he will never know how to speak about anything unless he know philosophy. And let Phaedrus answer you.

*Phaedr.* Put the question.

*Soc.* Is not rhetoric, taken generally, a universal art of enchanting the mind by arguments; which is practised not only in courts and public assemblies, but in private houses also, having to do with all matters, great as well as small, good and bad alike, and is in all equally right, and equally to be esteemed—that is what you have heard?

*Phaedr.* Nay, not exactly that; I should rather say that I have heard the art confined to speaking and writing in law-suits, and to speaking in public assemblies—not extended farther.

*Soc.* Then I suppose that you have only heard of the rhetoric of Nestor and Odysseus, which they composed in their leisure hours when at Troy, and never of Palamedes?

*Phaedr.* No more than of Nestor and Odysseus, unless Gorgias is your Nestor, and Thrasymachus or Theodorus your Odysseus.

*Soc.* Perhaps that is my meaning. But let us leave them. And do you tell me, instead, what are plaintiff and defendant doing in a law-court—are they not contending?

*Phaedr.* Exactly.

*Soc.* About the just and unjust—that is the matter in dispute?

*Phaedr.* Yes.

*Soc.* And he who is practised in the art, if he has a mind, will make the same thing appear to the same persons to be at one time just, at another time unjust?

*Phaedr.* Exactly.

*Soc.* And when he speaks in the assembly, he will make the same things seem good to the city at one time, and at another time the reverse of good?

*Phaedr.* That is true.

*Soc.* Have we not heard of the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeno), who has an art of speaking which makes the same things appear to his hearers like and unlike, one and many, at rest and in motion too?

*Phaedr.* Very true.

*Soc.* The art of disputation, then, is not confined to the courts and the assembly, but is one and the same in every use of language; this is that art, if such an art there be, which finds a likeness of everything to which a likeness can be found, and draws into the light of day the likenesses and disguises which are used by others?

*Phaedr.* How do you mean?

*Soc.* Let me put the matter thus: When will there be more chance of deception—when the difference is large or small?

262 *Phaedr.* When the difference is small.

*Soc.* And you will be less likely to be discovered in passing by degrees into the other extreme than when you go all at once?

*Phaedr.* Of course.

*Soc.* He, then, who would deceive others, and not be deceived, must exactly know the real likenesses and differences of things?

*Phaedr.* Yes, he must.

S.  
And if he is ignorant of the true nature of anything, how can he ever distinguish the greater or less degree of likeness to other things of that which he does not know?

Phaedr. He cannot.

S.  
And when men are deceived and their notions are at variance with realities, it is clear that the error slips in through resemblances?

Phaedr. Yes, that is the way.

S.  
Then he who would be a master of the art must know the real nature of everything, or he will never know either how to make the gradual departure from truth into the opposite of truth which is effected by the help of resemblances, or how to avoid it?

Phaedr. He will not.

S.  
He then, who being ignorant of the truth aims at appearances, will only attain an art of rhetoric which is ridiculous and is not an art at all?

Phaedr. That may be expected.

S.  
Shall I propose that we look for examples of art and want of art according to our notion of them, in the speech of Lysias which you have in your hand, and in my own speech?

Phaedr. Nothing could be better; and indeed I think that our previous argument has been too abstract and wanting in illustrations.

S.  
Yes, and the two speeches afford a very good illustration of the way in which the speaker who knows the truth may, without any serious purpose, steal away the hearts of his hearers. This piece of good fortune I attribute to the local deities; and, perhaps, the prophets of the Muses who are singing over our heads may have imparted their inspiration to me. For I do not imagine that I have any rhetorical art myself.

Phaedr. I will not dispute that; only please to go forward.

S.  
Suppose that you read me the first words of Lysias' speech.

Phaedr. 'You knew my views of our common interest, and I do not think that I ought to fall in the object of my suit because I am not your lover. For lovers repent when—'

S.  
Enough. Now, shall I point out the rhetorical error of 203 those words?

*Phaedr.* Yes.

*Soc.* Every one is aware that about some things we are agreed, whereas about other things we differ.

*Phaedr.* I think that I understand you; but will you explain yourself?

*Soc.* When any one speaks of iron and silver, is not the same thing present in the minds of all?

*Phaedr.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But when any one speaks of justice and goodness we part company and are at odds with one another and with ourselves?

*Phaedr.* Precisely.

*Soc.* Then in some things we agree, but not in others?

*Phaedr.* That is true.

*Soc.* In which are we more likely to be deceived, and in which has rhetoric the greater power?

*Phaedr.* Clearly, in the uncertain class.

*Soc.* Then the rhetorician ought to make a regular division, and acquire a distinct notion of both classes, as well of that in which the many err, as of that in which they do not err?

*Phaedr.* He who made such a distinction would have an excellent principle.

*Soc.* Yes; and in the next place he must have a keen eye for the observation of particulars in speaking, and not make a mistake about the class to which they are to be referred.

*Phaedr.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Now to which class does love belong—to the debatable or to the undisputed class?

*Phaedr.* To the debatable class surely; for if not, do you think that love would have allowed you to say as you did, that he is an evil both to the lover and the beloved, and also the greatest possible good?

*Soc.* Capital. But will you tell me whether I defined love at the beginning of my speech? for, having been in an ecstasy, I cannot well remember.

*Phaedr.* Yes, indeed; that you did, and no mistake.

*Soc.* Then I perceive that the Nymphs of Achelous and Pan the son of Hermes, who inspired me, were far better rhetoricians than Lysias the son of Cephalus. Alas! how inferior

to them he is! But perhaps I am mistaken; and Lysias at the commencement of his lover's speech did insist on our supposing love to be something or other which he fancied him to be, and according to this model he fashioned and framed the remainder of his discourse. Suppose we read his beginning over again.

*Phaedr.* If you please; but you will not find what you want.

*Soc.* Read, that I may have his exact words.

*Phaedr.* You know my views of our common interest; and I do not think that I ought to fail in the object of my suit because I am not your lover, for lovers repent of the kindnesses which they have shown, when their love is over.<sup>264</sup>

*Soc.* Here he appears to have done just the reverse of what he ought; for he has begun at the end, and is swimming on his back through the flood to the place of starting. His address to the fair youth begins where the lover would have ended. Am I not right, sweet Phaedrus?

*Phaedr.* Yes, indeed, Socrates; he does begin at the end.

*Soc.* Then as to the other topics—are they not thrown down anyhow? Is there any principle in them? Why should the next topic follow in that order, or any other topic? I cannot help fancying in my ignorance that he wrote boldly off just what came into his head, but I dare say that you would recognize a rhetorical necessity in the succession of the several parts of the composition?

*Phaedr.* You have too good an opinion of me if you think that I have any such insight into his principles of composition.

*Soc.* At any rate, you will allow that every discourse ought to be a living creature, having its own body and head and feet; there ought to be a middle, beginning, and end, which accord with one another and the whole?

*Phaedr.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Can this be said of the discourse of Lysias? See whether you can find any more connexion in his words than in the epitaph which is said by some to have been inscribed on the grave of Midas the Phrygian.

*Phaedr.* What is there remarkable in the epitaph?

*Soc.* The epitaph is as follows:

'I am a maiden of brass,  
I lie on the tomb of Midas;  
While waters flow and tall trees grow,  
On Midas' tearful tomb I lie;  
I say to every passer by  
Here Midas sleeps in earth below.'

Now in this rhyme whether a line comes first or comes last, that, as you will perceive, makes no difference.

*Phaedr.* You are making fun of that oration of ours.

*Soc.* Well, I will say no more about your friend lest I should give offence to you; although I think that he might furnish many other examples of what a man ought to avoid. But I 265 will proceed to the other speech, which, as I think, is also suggestive to students of rhetoric.

*Phaedr.* In what way?

*Soc.* The two speeches, as you may remember, were of an opposite character, the one argued that the lover and the other that the non-lover ought to be accepted.

*Phaedr.* And right manfully.

*Soc.* You should rather say 'madly'; and madness was the argument of them, for, as I said, 'love is a madness.'

*Phaedr.* Yes.

*Soc.* And there were two kinds of madness; one produced by human infirmity, the other by a divine release from the ordinary ways of men.

*Phaedr.* True.

*Soc.* The divine madness was subdivided into four kinds, prophetic, initiatory, poetic, erotic, having four gods presiding over them; the first was the inspiration of Apollo, the second that of Dionysus, the third that of the Muses, the fourth that of Aphrodite and Eros. In the description of the last kind of madness, which was also the best, being a figure of love, we introduced a tolerably credible and possibly true though partly erring myth, which was also a hymn in honour of Eros, who is your lord and also mine, Phaedrus, and the guardian of fair children, and to him we sung the hymn in measured and solemn strain.

*Phaedr.* I know that I had great pleasure in listening to you.

*Soc.* Let us take this instance and examine how the transition was made from blame to praise.

*Phaedr.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* I mean to say that the composition was mostly playful. Yet in these chance fancies of the hour were involved two principles which would be charming if they could be fixed by art.

*Phaedr.* What are they?

*Soc.* First, the comprehension of scattered particulars in one idea ;—the speaker defines his several notions in order that he may make his meaning clear, as in our definition of love, which whether true or false certainly gave clearness and consistency to the discourse.

*Phaedr.* What is the other principle, Socrates ?

*Soc.* The second principle is that of division into species according to the natural formation, where the joint is, not breaking any part as a bad carver might. In the two discourses 266 there was assumed, first of all, one idea of unreason, and then, as the body which is one may be divided into a left side and right side, each having parts right and left, one of the two proceeded to divide the parts of the left side and did not desist until the speaker found in them an evil or left-handed love which he justly reviled ; and the other leading us to the madness which lay on the right side, found another love, having the same name, but yet divine, which he held up before us and applauded as the author of the greatest benefits.

*Phaedr.* That is most true.

*Soc.* I am a great lover of these processes of division and generalization ; they help me to speak and think. And if I find any man who is able to see a One and Many in nature, him I follow, and walk in his steps as if he were a god. And those who have this art, I have hitherto been in the habit of calling dialecticians ; but God knows whether the name is right or not. And I should like to know what name you would give to your or Lysias' disciples, and whether this may not be that famous art of rhetoric which Thrasymachus and others practise? Skilful speakers they are, and impart their skill to any who will consent to worship them as kings and to bring them gifts.

*Phaedr.* Yes, they are royal men ; but their art is not the same with the art of those whom you call, and rightly, in my opinion, dialecticians. Still we are in the dark about rhetoric.

*Soc.* What do you mean? The remains of the art, when all

this has been taken away, must be of rare value; and are not at all to be despised by you and me. But what are the remains? —tell me that.

*Phaedr.* There is a great deal surely to be found in books of rhetoric?

*Soc.* Yes; thank you for reminding me of that, there is the exordium, if I remember rightly—that is what you mean—the niceties of the art?

*Phaedr.* Yes.

*Soc.* There follows the statement of facts, and upon that witnesses; thirdly, proofs; fourthly, probabilities are to come; the great Byzantian artist also speaks, if I am not mistaken, of confirmation and further confirmation.

*Phaedr.* You mean the excellent Theodorus.

267 *Soc.* Yes; and he tells how refutation or further refutation is to be managed, whether in accusation or defence. I need hardly mention the illustrious Parian Evenus, who first invented insinuations and indirect praises, and censures, of which last this wise man made a *memoria technica* in verse. But shall I

‘To dumb forgetfulness consign’

Tisias and Gorgias, who are not ignorant that probability is superior to truth, and who by force of argument make the little appear great and the great little, disguise the new in old fashions and the old in new fashions, and have discovered forms for everything, either short or going on to infinity. I remember Prodicus laughing when I told him of this; he said that he had himself discovered the true rule of art, which was to be neither long nor short, but of a convenient length.

*Phaedr.* Well done, Prodicus!

*Soc.* Then there is Hippias of Elis, who probably agrees with him.

*Phaedr.* Yes.

*Soc.* And there is also Polus, who has schools of diplasiology, and gnomology, and eikonology, and who teaches in them the words of which Lycymnus made him a present; they were to give a polish.

*Phaedr.* Had not Protagoras something of the same sort?

*Soc.* Yes, rules of correct diction and many other fine pre-

cepts; for the sorrows of a poor old man, or any other pathetic case, no one is better than the Chaecidian giant; he can put a whole company of people into a passion and out of one again by his mighty magic, and is first-rate at inventing or disposing of any sort of calumny on any grounds or none. All of them agree in asserting that a speech should end in a recapitulation, though they do not all agree in the use of this word.

*Socr.* You mean that there should be a summing up of the arguments in order to remind the hearers of them.

*Socr.* I have now said all that I have to say of the art of rhetoric: have you anything to add?

*Phaedr.* Not much; nothing very important.

*Socr.* Leave the unimportant and let us bring the really important question into the light of day, which is: What power has this art of rhetoric, and when? 268

*Phaedr.* A very great power in public meetings.

*Socr.* Yes, that is true. But I should like to know whether you have the same feeling as I have about the rhetoricians? To me there seem to be a great many holes in their web.

*Phaedr.* Give an example.

*Socr.* I will. Suppose a person to come to your friend Eryximachus, or to his father Acumenus, and to say to him: 'I know how to apply drugs which shall have either a heating or a cooling effect, and I can give a vomit and also a purge, and all that sort of thing; and knowing all this, as I do, I claim to be a physician and to make physicians'—what do you suppose that they would say?

*Phaedr.* They would be sure to ask him whether he knew 'to whom' he would give his medicines, and 'when,' and 'how much.'

*Socr.* And suppose that he were to reply: 'No: I know nothing of that: I expect the patient who consults me to be able to do all that for himself'?

*Phaedr.* They would reply that he is a madman or a pedant who fancies that he is a physician because he has read something in a book, or has stumbled on a prescription or two, although he has no real understanding of the art of medicine.

*Socr.* And suppose a person were to come to Sophocles or Euripides and say that he knows how to make a long speech

about a small matter, and a short speech about a great matter, and also a sorrowful speech, or a terrible, or threatening speech, or any other kind of speech, and in teaching this fancies that he is teaching the art of tragedy?

*Phaedr.* They too would surely laugh at him if he fancies that tragedy is anything but the arranging of these elements in a manner suitable to one another and to the whole.

*Soc.* But I do not suppose that they would be rude to him or revile him. Would they not treat him as a musician would treat a man who thinks that he is a harmonist because he knows how to pitch the highest and lowest note; happening to meet such an one he would not say to him savagely, 'Fool, you are mad!' Oh, no; he would rather say to him in a gentle and musical tone of voice: 'My good friend, he who would be a harmonist must certainly know this, and yet he may understand nothing of harmony if he has not got beyond your stage of knowledge, for you only know the preliminaries of harmony and not harmony.'

*Phaedr.* Very true.

269 *Soc.* And would not Sophocles say to the display of the would-be tragedian, that this was not tragedy but the preliminaries of tragedy? and would not Acumenus say to the would-be doctor that this was not medicine but the preliminaries of medicine?

*Phaedr.* Very true.

*Soc.* And if Adrastus the mellifluous or Pericles heard of these wonderful arts, brachylogies and eikonologies and all the hard names which we have been endeavouring to draw into the light of day, what would they say? Instead of losing temper and applying uncomplimentary epithets, as you and I have been doing to the authors of such an imaginary art, their superior wisdom would rather censure us, as well as them. Have a little patience, Phaedrus and Socrates, they would say, and do not be angry with those who from some want of dialectical skill are unable to define the nature of rhetoric, and consequently suppose that they have found the art in the preliminary conditions of the art, and when they have taught these to others, fancy that they have been teaching the whole art of rhetoric; but as to using the several instruments of the art effectively, or making

the composition a whole, that they regard as an easy thing with which their disciples may supply themselves.

*Phaedr.* I quite admit, Socrates, that the art of rhetoric which these men teach and of which they write is such as you describe—in that I agree with you. But I still want to know where and how the true art of rhetoric and persuasion is to be acquired.

*Soc.* The perfection of oratory is, or rather must be, like the perfection of all things, partly given by nature, but may be assisted by art. If you have the natural power and add thereto knowledge and practice, you will be a distinguished speaker; if you fall short in either of these, you will be to that extent defective. But the art, as far as there is an art, of rhetoric does not lie in the direction of Tisias or Thrasymachus.

*Phaedr.* But in what direction then?

*Soc.* I should conceive that Pericles was the most accomplished of rhetoricians.

*Phaedr.* What of that?

*Soc.* All the superior arts require many words and much discussion of the higher truths of nature; hence comes all loftiness <sup>270</sup> of thought and perfectness of execution. And this, as I conceive, was the quality which, in addition to his natural gifts, Pericles acquired from Anaxagoras whom he happened to know. He was thus imbued with the higher philosophy, and attained the knowledge of Mind, which was the favourite theme of Anaxagoras, and applied what he learnt to the art of speaking.

*Phaedr.* Explain.

*Soc.* Rhetoric is like medicine.

*Phaedr.* How is that?

*Soc.* Why, because medicine has to define the nature of the body and rhetoric of the soul—if we would proceed, not empirically but scientifically, in the one case to impart health and strength by giving medicine and food, in the other to implant the principle or virtue which you require by the right application of words and training.

*Phaedr.* There, Socrates, I suspect that you are right.

*Soc.* And do you think that you can know the nature of the soul intelligently without knowing the nature of the whole?

*Phaedr.* Hippocrates the Asclepiad says that the nature even of the body can only be understood as a whole.

Soc. Yes, friend, and he says truly. Still, we ought not to be content with the name of Hippocrates, but to examine and see whether he has reason on his side.

Phaedr. True.

Soc. Then consider what right reason as well as Hippocrates says about this or any other nature. Ought we not to consider first whether that which we wish to learn and to teach is a simple or multiform thing, and if simple, then to enquire what power it has of acting or being acted upon in relation to other things, and if multiform, then to number the forms; and see first in the case of one of them, and then in the case of all of them, wherein resides the power which they by nature have of acting or being acted upon.

Phaedr. That will be the way.

Soc. The method which proceeds without analysis is like the groping of a blind man. Yet, surely, he who is an artist ought not to admit of a comparison with the blind, or deaf. The rhetorician, who teaches his pupil to speak scientifically, will particularly set forth the nature of that to which he addresses his speeches; and that is, as I suppose, the soul.

Phaedr. Certainly.

271 Soc. His whole effort is directed to the soul; for in that he seeks to produce conviction.

Phaedr. Yes.

Soc. Then clearly, Thrasymachus or any one else who teaches rhetoric in earnest, will give an exact description of the nature of the soul; so that we shall see whether she be single and same, or, like the body, multiform. That is what we should call showing the nature of the soul.

Phaedr. Exactly.

Soc. He will next proceed to say wherein resides the power which the soul has of acting or being acted upon.

Phaedr. True.

Soc. Thirdly, having classified men and speeches, and their modes and affections, and adapted them to one another, he will explain the reasons of his arrangement, and show why one soul is naturally persuaded by a particular form of argument, and another not.

Phaedr. That will certainly be a very good way.

*Soc.* Yes, that is the true and only way in which any subject can be set forth or treated by rules of art, whether in speaking or writing. But the writers of the present day, at whose feet you have sat, improperly conceal the nature of the soul which they know quite well. Nor, until they adopt our method of reading and writing, can we admit that they write by rules of art.

*Phaedr.* What is our method?

*Soc.* I cannot give you the exact details; but I should like to tell you generally, as far as I can, how a man ought to proceed according to rules of art.

*Phaedr.* Let me hear.

*Soc.* Oratory is the art of enchanting the soul, and therefore he who would be an orator has to learn the differences of human souls—they are so many and of such a nature, and from them come the differences between man and man—he will then proceed to divide speeches into their different classes. Such and such persons, he will say, are affected by this or that kind of speech in this or that way, and he will tell you why; the pupil must have a theoretical notion of them first, and then he must have experience of them in actual life, and be able to follow them with all his senses about him, or he will never get beyond the precepts of his masters. But when he is able to say what persons are persuaded by what arguments, and recognize the individual about whom he used to theorize as actually present to him, and say to himself, ‘This is the man or the character who ought to have that argument applied to him in order to convince him of a certain opinion;’—when he has attained the knowledge of all this, and knows also when he should speak and when he should abstain from speaking, and when he should make use of pithy sayings, pathetic appeals, sensational effects, and all the other arts of speech which he has learned;—when, I say, he knows the times and seasons of all these things, then, and not till then, he is a perfect master of his art; but if he fail in any of these points, whether in speaking or teaching or writing them, and says that he speaks by rules of art, he who says the opposite has the better of him. Well, the teacher will say, is this, Phaedrus and Socrates, your account of the art of rhetoric, or am I to look for another?

*Phaedr.* He must take this, Socrates, for there is no possibility of another, and yet the creation of such an art is not easy.

*Soc.* That is true: and therefore let us turn the matter up and down, and see whether there may not be a shorter and easier road; there is no use in taking the longer and more difficult way when there is a shorter and easier one. And I wish that you would try and remember whether you have heard from Lysias or any one else anything which might be of service to us.

*Phaedr.* If trying would avail, then I might; but I fear that I cannot remember anything at the moment.

*Soc.* Suppose I tell you something which somebody who knows told me.

*Phaedr.* Certainly.

*Soc.* May not 'the wolf,' as the proverb says, 'claim a hearing'?

*Phaedr.* Do you say what can be said for him.

*Soc.* Well, they say that there is no use in putting a solemn face on a matter, or in going round and round, until you arrive at the beginning of all things; for that when the question is of justice and good, as I said at first, or a question in which men are concerned who are just and good, either by nature or habit, he who would be a skilful rhetorician has no need of truth—for that in courts of law men literally care nothing about truth, but only about conviction: and this is based on probability, to which he who would be a skilful orator should therefore give his whole attention. And they say also that there are cases in which the actual facts ought to be withheld, and only the probabilities should be told either in accusation or defence, and that always in speaking the orator should keep probability in view, and say 273 good bye to the truth. And the observance of this principle throughout a speech furnishes the whole art.

*Phaedr.* That is what the professors of rhetoric do actually say, Socrates. I remember that we have touched lightly<sup>1</sup> upon this matter already, but with them the point is all-important.

*Soc.* I dare say that you are familiar with Tisias. Does he not define probability to be that which the many think?

*Phaedr.* Certainly, he does.

*Soc.* I believe that he has a clever and ingenious case of this

<sup>1</sup> Cp. 259 E.

sort:—He supposes a feeble and valiant man to have assaulted a strong and cowardly one, and to have robbed him of his coat or of something or other; he is brought into court, and then Tisias says that both parties should tell lies: the coward should say that he was assaulted by more men than one; the other should prove that they were alone, and should use this argument: ‘How could a man like me have assaulted a man like him?’ The complainant will not like to confess his own cowardice, and will therefore invent some other lie which his adversary will thus gain an opportunity of refuting. And there are other devices of the same kind which have a place in the system. Am I not right, Phaedrus?

*Phaedr.* Certainly.

*Soc.* I cannot help feeling that this is a wonderfully mysterious art which Tisias or some other gentleman, in whatever name or country he rejoices, has discovered. Shall we say a word to him or not?

*Phaedr.* What shall we say to him?

*Soc.* Let us tell him that, before he appeared, you and I were saying that probability was engendered in the minds of the many by the likeness of the truth, and had just been asserting that he who knew the truth would always know best how to discover the resemblances of the truth. If he has anything further to say about the art of speaking we should like to hear him; but if not, we are satisfied with our own view, that unless a man estimates the various characters of his hearers and is able to divide all things into classes and to comprehend them under single ideas, he will never be a skilful rhetorician even within the limits of human power. And this art he will not attain without a great deal of trouble, which a good man ought to undergo, not for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but in order that he may be able to say what is acceptable to God and always to act acceptably to Him as far as in him lies; for there is a saying of wiser men than ourselves, that a man of sense should 274 not try to please his fellow-servants (at least this should not be his first object) but his good and noble masters; and therefore if the way is long and circuitous, marvel not at this, for, where the end is great, there we may take the longer road, but not for lesser ends such as yours. Truly, the argument may say, Tisias,

that if you do not mind going so far, rhetoric has a fair beginning here.

*Phaedr.* I think, Socrates, that this is admirable, if only practicable.

*Soc.* But even to fail in an honourable object is honourable.

*Phaedr.* True.

*Soc.* Enough appears to have been said by us of a true and false art of speaking.

*Phaedr.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But there is something yet to be said of propriety and impropriety of writing.

*Phaedr.* Yes.

*Soc.* Do you know how you can speak or act about rhetoric in a manner which will be acceptable to God?

*Phaedr.* No, indeed. Do you?

*Soc.* I have heard a tradition of antiquity, whether true or not antiquity only knows; although if we had the truth ourselves, do you think that we should care much about the opinions of men?

*Phaedr.* That is a question which needs no answer; but I wish that you would tell me what you say that you have heard.

*Soc.* At the Egyptian city of Naucratis, there was a famous old god, whose name was Theuth; the bird which is called the Ibis was sacred to him, and he was the inventor of many arts, such as arithmetic and calculation and geometry and astronomy and draughts and dice, but his great discovery was the use of letters. Now in those days Thamus was the king of the whole of Upper Egypt, which is the district surrounding that great city called by the Hellenes Egyptian Thebes, and they call the god himself Ammon. To him came Theuth and showed his inventions, desiring that the other Egyptians might be allowed to have the benefit of them; he went through them, and Thamus enquired about their several uses, and praised some of them and censured others, as he approved or disapproved of them. There would be no use in repeating all that Thamus said to Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts. But when they came to letters, This, said Theuth, will make the Egyptians wiser and give them better memories; for this is the cure of forgetfulness and of folly. Thamus replied: O most ingenious Theuth, he

who has the gift of invention is not always the best judge of the utility or inutility of his own inventions to the users of them. And in this instance a paternal love of your own child has <sup>275</sup> led you to say what is not the fact ; for this invention of yours will create forgetfulness in the learners' souls, because they will not use their memories ; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves. You have found a specific, not for memory but for reminiscence, and you give your disciples only the pretence of wisdom ; they will be hearers of many things and will have learned nothing ; they will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing ; they will be tiresome company, having the show of wisdom without the reality.

*Phaedr.* Yes, Socrates, you can easily invent tales of Egypt, or of any other country.

*Soc.* There was a tradition in the temple of Dodona that oaks first gave prophetic utterances. The men of that day, unlike in their simplicity to young philosophy, deemed that if they heard the truth even from 'oak or rock,' that was enough for them ; whereas you seem to think not of the truth but of the speaker, and of the country from which the truth comes.

*Phaedr.* I acknowledge the justice of your rebuke ; and I think that the Theban is right in his view about letters.

*Soc.* He would be a simple person, and quite a stranger to the oracles of Theuth or Ammon, who should leave in writing or receive in writing any art under the idea that the written word would be intelligible or certain ; or who deemed that writing was at all better than knowledge and recollection of the same matters.

*Phaedr.* That is most true.

*Soc.* I cannot help feeling, Phaedrus, that writing is unfortunately like painting ; for the creations of the painter have the attitude of life, and yet if you ask them a question they preserve a solemn silence. And the same may be said of speeches. You would imagine that they had intelligence, but if you want to know anything and put a question to one of them, the speaker always gives one unvarying answer. And when they have been once written down they are tumbled about anywhere among those who do and among those who do not understand them.

And they have no reticences or proprieties towards different classes of persons; and, if they are unjustly assailed or abused, their parent is needed to protect his offspring, for they cannot protect or defend themselves.

*Phaedr.* That again is most true.

*Soc.* May we not imagine another kind of writing or speaking far better than this is, and having far greater power—which is 276 one of the same family, but lawfully begotten? Let us see what his origin is.

*Phaedr.* Who is he, and what do you mean about his origin?

*Soc.* I am speaking of an intelligent writing which is graven in the soul of him who has learned, and can defend itself, and knows to whom to speak and to whom to be silent.

*Phaedr.* You mean the word of knowledge which has a living soul, and of which the written word is properly no more than an image?

*Soc.* Yes, of course that is what I mean. And I wish that you would let me ask you a question: Would a husbandman, who is a man of sense, take the seeds, which he values and which he wishes to be fruitful, and in sober earnest plant them during the heat of summer, in some garden of Adonis, that he may rejoice when he sees them in eight days appearing in beauty? would he not do that, if at all, to please the spectators at a festival? But the seeds about which he is in earnest he sows in fitting soil, and practises husbandry, and is satisfied if in eight months they arrive at perfection?

*Phaedr.* Yes, Socrates, that will be his way when he is in earnest; he will do the other, as you say, only in play.

*Soc.* And can we suppose that he who knows the just and good and honourable has less understanding about his own seeds than the husbandman?

*Phaedr.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Then he will not seriously incline to write his thoughts in water with pen and ink, tracing dumb characters which have not a word to say for themselves and cannot adequately express the truth?

*Phaedr.* No, that is not likely.

*Soc.* No, that is not likely—in the garden of letters he will .

indeed plant them, but only as an amusement ; or he will write them down as memorials against the forgetfulness of old age, to be treasured by him and his equals when they, like him, have one foot in the grave ; and he will rejoice in beholding their tender growth ; and they will be his pastime while others are refreshing their souls with banqueting and the like.

*Phaedr.* A pastime, Socrates, as noble as the other is ignoble, when a man is able to pass time merrily in conversing about justice and the like.

*Soc.* True, Phaedrus. But nobler far is the serious pursuit of the dialectician, who finds a congenial soul, and then with knowledge engraves and sows words which are able to help themselves and him who planted them, and are not unfruitful, but 277 have in them seeds which may bear fruit in other natures, nurtured in other ways—making the seed everlasting and the possessors happy to the utmost extent of human happiness.

*Phaedr.* Yes, indeed, that is far nobler.

*Soc.* And now, Phaedrus, having agreed upon the premises we may decide about the conclusion.

*Phaedr.* About what conclusion ?

*Soc.* About Lysias, whom we censured, and his art of writing, and his discourses, and the rhetorical skill or want of skill which was shown in them ; for he brought us to this point. And I think that we are now pretty well informed about the nature of art and its opposite.

*Phaedr.* Yes, I think with you ; but I wish that you would repeat what was said.

*Soc.* Until a man knows the truth of the several particulars of which he is writing or speaking, and is able to define them as they are, and having defined them again to divide them until they can be no longer divided, and until in like manner he is able to discern the nature of the soul and discover the different modes of discourse which are adapted to different natures, and to arrange and dispose them in such a way that the simple form of speech may be addressed to the simpler nature, and the complex and composite to the more complex nature—until he has accomplished all this, he will be unable to handle arguments according to rules of art, as far as their nature allows them to

be subjected to art, either for the purpose of teaching or persuading ;—such is the view which is implied in the whole preceding argument.

*Phaedr.* Yes, that was our view, certainly.

*Soc.* Secondly, as to the justice of the censure which was passed on speaking or writing discourses--did not our previous argument show—?

*Phaedr.* Show what ?

*Soc.* That whether Lysias or any other writer that ever was or will be, whether private man or statesman, tries his hand at authorship in making laws, and fancies that there is a great certainty and clearness in his performance, the fact of his writing as he does is only a disgrace to him, whatever men may say. For entire ignorance about the nature of justice and injustice, and good and evil, and the inability to distinguish the dream from the reality, cannot in truth be otherwise than disgraceful to him, even though he have the applause of the whole world.

*Phaedr.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But he who thinks that in the written word there is necessarily much which is not serious, and that neither poetry 278 nor prose, spoken or written, are of any great value, if, like the compositions of the rhapsodes, they are only recited in order to be believed, and not with any view to criticism or instruction ; and who thinks that even the best of them are but a reminiscence of what we know, and that only in principles of justice and goodness and nobility taught and communicated orally and written in the soul, which is the true way of writing, is there clearness and perfection and seriousness, and that such principles are like legitimate offspring ;—being, in the first place, that which the man finds in his own bosom ; secondly, the brethren and descendants and relations of his idea which have been duly implanted by him in the souls of others ;—and who cares for them and no others—this is the right sort of man ; and you and I, Phaedrus, would pray that we may become like him.

*Phaedr.* That is most assuredly my desire and prayer.

*Soc.* And now the play is played out ; and of rhetoric enough. Go and tell Lysias that to the fountain and school of the Nymphs we went down, and were bidden by them to convey a message to him and to other composers of speeches—to Homer

and other writers of poems, whether set to music or not ; and to Solon and others who have composed writings which they term laws—to all of them we are to say that if their compositions are based on knowledge of the truth, and they can defend or prove them, when they are put to the test, by spoken arguments, which leave their writings poor in comparison of them, then they are not only poets, orators, legislators, but worthy of a higher name.

*Phaedr.* What name is that ?

*Soc.* Wise, I may not call them ; for that is a great name which belongs to God alone,—lovers of wisdom or philosophers is their modest and befitting title.

*Phaedr.* Very good.

*Soc.* And he who cannot rise above his own compilations and compositions, which he has been long patching and piecing, adding some and taking away some, may be justly called poet or speech-maker or law-maker.

*Phaedr.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Now go and tell this to your companion.

*Phaedr.* But there is also a friend of yours who ought not to be forgotten.

*Soc.* Who is he ?

*Phaedr.* Isocrates the fair.

*Soc.* What of him ?

*Phaedr.* What message shall we send to him ?

*Soc.* Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus ; but I am willing to risk a prophecy concerning him.

*Phaedr.* What would you prophesy ?

*Soc.* I think that he has a genius which soars above the orations of Lysias, and that he has a character of a finer mould. My impression of him is that he will marvellously improve as he grows older, and that all former rhetoricians will be as children in comparison of him. And I believe that he will not be satisfied with rhetoric, but that some divine impulse will lead him to things higher still. For there is an element of philosophy in his nature. This is the message which comes from the gods dwelling in this place, and which I will myself deliver to Isocrates, who is my delight ; and do you give the other to Lysias who is yours.

*Phaedr.* I will ; and now as the heat is abated let us depart.

*Soc.* Should we not offer up a prayer first of all to the local deities?

*Phaedr.* By all means.

*Soc.* Beloved Pan, and all ye other gods who haunt this place, give me beauty in the inward soul; and may the outward and inward man be at one. May I reckon the wise to be the wealthy, and may I have such a quantity of gold as none but the temperate can bear and carry. Anything more? That prayer, I think, is enough for me.

*Phaedr.* Ask the same for me, for friends should have all things in common.

*Soc.* Let us go.





# CRATYLUS.

VOL. II.

M



## INTRODUCTION.

THE Cratylus has always been a source of perplexity to the student of Plato. While in fancy and humour, and perfection of style and metaphysical originality, this dialogue may be ranked with the best of the Platonic writings, there has been an uncertainty about the motive of the piece, which interpreters have hitherto not succeeded in dispelling. We need not suppose that Plato used words in order to conceal his thoughts, or that he would have been unintelligible to an educated contemporary. In the Phaedrus and Euthydemus we also found a difficulty in determining the precise aim of the author. Plato wrote satires in the form of dialogues, and his meaning, like that of other satirical writers, has often slept in the ear of posterity. Two causes may be assigned for this obscurity : 1st, the subtlety and allusiveness of this species of composition ; 2nd, the difficulty of reproducing a state of life and literature which has passed away. A satire is unmeaning unless we can place ourselves back among the persons and thoughts of the age in which it was written. Had the treatise of Antisthenes upon words, or the speculations of Cratylus, or some other Heracleitean of the fourth century b.c., on the nature of language been preserved to us ; or if we had lived at the time, and been rich enough to attend 'the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus,' we should have understood Plato better, and many points which are now attributed to the extravagance of Socrates' humour would have been found, like the allusions of Aristophanes in the Clouds, to have gone home to the sophists and grammarians of the day.

For the age was very busy with philological speculation ; and many

questions were beginning to be asked about language which were parallel to other questions about justice, virtue, knowledge, and were illustrated in a similar manner by the analogy of the arts. Was there a correctness in words, and were they given by nature or convention? In the presocratic philosophy mankind had been striving to attain an expression of their ideas; and now they were beginning to ask themselves whether the expression might not be distinguished from the idea? These were some of the problems which were occupying the minds of speculative men in the age of Plato. But of these beginnings of the study of language we know little, and there necessarily arises an obscurity when the surroundings of such a work as the *Cratylus* are taken away. Moreover, in this, as in most of the dialogues of Plato, allowance has to be made for the character of Socrates. For the theory of language can only be propounded by him in a manner which is consistent with his own profession of ignorance. Hence his ridicule of the new school of etymology is interspersed with many declarations, 'that he knows nothing,' 'that he has learned from Euthyphro,' and the like. Even the truest things which he says are depreciated by himself. He professes to be guessing, but the guesses of Plato are better than all the other theories of the ancients respecting language put together.

The dialogue hardly derives any light from Plato's other writings, and still less from Scholiasts and Neoplatonist writers. Socrates must be interpreted from himself, and on first reading we certainly have a difficulty in understanding his drift, or his relation to the two other interlocutors in the dialogue. Does he agree with Cratylus or with Hermogenes, and is he serious in those fanciful etymologies, extending over more than half the dialogue, which he seems so greatly to relish? Or is he serious in part only; and can we separate his jest from his earnest?—*Sunt bona, sunt quaedam medicaria, sunt mala plura.* Most of them are ridiculously bad, and yet among them are found, as if by accident, principles of philology which are unsurpassed in any ancient writer, and even in advance of any philologer of the last century. May we suppose that Plato, like Lucian, has been amusing his fancy by writing a comedy in the form of a prose dialogue? And what is the final result of the enquiry? Is Plato an upholder of the conventional theory of language, which he acknowledges to be imperfect? or does he mean to imply that a perfect language can only be based on his own theory of ideas? Or if this latter explanation is refuted by his silence, then in what relation does

his account of language stand to the rest of his philosophy? Or may we be so bold as to deny the connexion between them? [For the allusion to the ideas at the end of the dialogue (439 C) is merely intended to show that we must not put words in the place of things or realities, which is a thesis strongly insisted on by Plato in many other passages]... These are some of the first thoughts which arise in the mind of the reader of the Cratylus. And the consideration of them may form a convenient introduction to the general subject of the dialogue.

We have already seen in the case of the Phaedrus, that we must not expect all the parts of a dialogue of Plato to tend equally to some clearly-defined end. His idea of literary art is not the absolute proportion of the whole, such as we appear to find in a Greek temple or statue; nor should his works be tried by any such standard. They have often the beauty of poetry, but they have also the freedom of conversation. ‘Words are more plastic than wax’ (Rep. 588 D), and may be moulded into any form. He wanders on from one topic to another, careless of the unity of his work, not fearing any ‘judge, or spectator, who may recall him to the point’ (Theat. 173 C), ‘whither the argument blows we follow’ (Rep. 394 D). To have determined beforehand, as in a modern didactic treatise, the nature and limits of the subject, would have been fatal to the spirit of enquiry or discovery, which is the soul of the dialogue.

There is another aspect under which some of the dialogues of Plato may be more truly viewed:—they are dramatic sketches of an argument. We have found that in the Lysis, Charmides, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, we arrived at no conclusion—the different sides of the argument were personified in the different speakers; but the victory was not distinctly attributed to any of them, nor the truth wholly the property of any. And in the Cratylus we have no reason to assume that Socrates is either wholly right or wholly wrong, or that Plato, though he evidently inclines to him, had any other aim than that of personifying, in the characters of Hermogenes, Socrates, and Cratylus, the three theories of language which are respectively maintained by them.

The two subordinate persons of the dialogue, Hermogenes and Cratylus, are at the opposite poles of the argument. But after a while the disciple of the Sophist and the follower of Heracleitus are found to be not so far removed from one another as at first sight appeared; and both show an inclination to accept the third view which Socrates inter-

poses between them. First, Hermogenes, the poor brother of the rich Callias, expounds the doctrine that names are conventional; like the names of slaves, they may be given and altered at pleasure. This is one of those principles which, whether applied to society or language, explains everything and nothing. For in all things there is an element of convention; but the admission of this does not help us to understand the rational ground or basis in human nature on which the convention proceeds. Socrates first of all intimates to Hermogenes, that his view of language is only a part of a sophistical whole, and ultimately tends to abolish the distinction between truth and falsehood. Hermogenes is very ready to throw aside the sophistical tenet, and listens with a sort of half admiration, half belief, to the speculations of Socrates.

Cratylus is of opinion that a name is either a true name or not a name at all. He is unable to conceive of degrees of imitation; a word is either the perfect expression of a thing, or a mere inarticulate sound (a fallacy which is still prevalent among theorizers about the origin of language). He is at once a philosopher and a sophist; for while wanting to rest language on an immutable basis, he would deny the possibility of falsehood. He is inclined to derive all truth from language, and in language he sees reflected the philosophy of Heracleitus. His views are not like those of Hermogenes, hastily taken up, but are said to be the result of mature consideration, although he is described as still a young man. With a tenacity characteristic of the Heracleitean philosophers, he clings to the doctrine of the flux. (Cp. *Theaet.* 180.) Of the real Cratylus we know nothing, except that he is recorded by Aristotle to have been the friend or teacher of Plato; nor have we any proof that he resembled the likeness of him in Plato any more than the Critias of Plato is like the real Critias, or the Euthyphro in this dialogue like the other Euthyphro, the diviner, in the dialogue which is called after him.

Between these two extremes, which have both of them a sophistical character, the view of Socrates is introduced, which is in a manner the union of the two. Language is conventional and also natural, and the true conventional-natural is the rational. It is a work not of chance, but of art; the dialectician is the artificer of words, and the legislator gives authority to them. They are the expressions or imitations in sound of things. In a sense, Cratylus is right in saying that things have by nature names (p. 390); for nature is not opposed either to art or to law. But vocal imitation, like any other copy, may be imperfectly executed; and

in this way an element of chance or convention enters in. There is much which is accidental or exceptional in language. Some words have had their original meaning so obscured, that they require to be helped out by convention.' But still the true name is that which has a natural meaning. Thus nature, art, chance, all combine in the formation of language. And the three views respectively propounded by Hermogenes, Socrates, Cratylus, may be described as the conventional, the artificial or rational, and the natural. The view of Socrates is the meeting-point of the other two, just as conceptualism is the meeting-point of nominalism and realism.

We can hardly say that Plato was aware of the truth, that 'languages are not made, but grow.' But still, when he says that 'the legislator made language with the dialectician standing on his right hand,' we need not infer from this that he conceived words, like coins, to be issued from the mint of the State. The creator of laws and of social life is naturally regarded as the creator of language, according to Hellenic notions, and the philosopher is his natural adviser. We are not to suppose that the legislator is performing any extraordinary function; he is merely the Eponymus of the State, who prescribes rules for the dialectician and for all other artists. According to a truly Platonic mode of approaching the subject, language, like virtue in the Republic, is examined by the analogy of the arts. Words are works of art which may be equally made in different materials, and are well made when they have a meaning. Of the process which he thus describes, Plato had probably no very definite notion. But he means to express generally that language is the product of intelligence, and that languages belong to States and not to individuals.

A better conception of language could not have been formed in Plato's age, than that which he attributes to Socrates. Yet many persons have thought that the mind of Plato is more truly seen in the vague realism of Cratylus. This misconception has probably arisen from two causes: first, the desire to bring Plato's theory of language into accordance with the received doctrine of the Platonic ideas; secondly, the impression created by Socrates himself, that he is not in earnest, and is only indulging the fancy of the hour.

i. We shall have occasion to show more at length, in the Introduction to future dialogues, that the so-called Platonic ideas are only a semi-mythical form, in which he attempts to realize abstractions, and

that they are replaced in his later writings by a rational theory of psychology. (See, especially, Introduction to the Sophist.) And in the Cratylus he gives a general account of the nature and origin of language, in which Adam Smith, Rousseau, and other writers of the last century, would have substantially agreed. At the end of the dialogue, he speaks as in the Symposium and Republic of absolute beauty and good ; but he never supposed that they were capable of being embodied in words. Of the names of the ideas, he would have said, as he says of the names of the Gods, that we know nothing. Even the realism of Cratylus is not based upon the ideas of Plato, but upon the flux of Heraclitus. Here, as in the Sophist and Politicus, Plato expressly draws attention to the want of correspondence of words and things. Hence we are led to infer, that the view of Socrates is not the less Plato's own, because not based upon the ideas ; 2nd, that Plato's theory of language is not inconsistent with the rest of his philosophy.

2. We do not deny that Socrates is partly in jest and partly in earnest. He is discoursing in a high-flown vein, which may be compared to the dithyrambics of the Phaedrus. They are mysteries of which he is speaking, and he professes a kind of ludicrous fear of his imaginary wisdom. When he is arguing out of Homer, about the names of Hector's son, or when he describes himself as inspired or maddened by Euthyphro, with whom he has been sitting from the early dawn (compare again Phaedrus and Lysias), and expresses his intention of yielding to the illusion to-day, and to-morrow he will go to a priest and be purified, we easily see that his words are not to be taken seriously. In this part of the dialogue his dread of committing impiety, the pretended derivation of his wisdom from another, the extravagance of some of his etymologies, and, in general, the manner in which the fun, fast and furious, *vires acquirit eundo*, remind us strongly of the Phaedrus. The jest is a long one, extending over more than half the dialogue. But then, we remember that the Euthydemus is a still longer jest, in which the irony is preserved to the very end. There he is parodying the ingenious follies of early logic ; in the Cratylus he is ridiculing the fancies of a new school of sophists and grammarians. The fallacies of the Euthydemus are still retained at the end of our logic books ; and the etymologies of the Cratylus have also found their way into later writers. Some of these are not much worse than the conjectures of Hemsterhuis, and other critics of the last century ; but this does not prove that they

are serious. For Plato is in advance of his age in his conception of language, as much as he is in his conception of mythology. (Cp. *Phaedrus sub initio.*)

When the fervour of his etymological enthusiasm has abated, Socrates ends, as he has begun, with a rational explanation of language. Still he preserves his ‘know nothing’ disguise, and himself declares his first notions about names to be reckless and ridiculous. Having explained compound words by resolving them into their original elements, he now proceeds to analyse simple words into the letters of which they are composed. The Socrates who ‘knows nothing,’ here passes into the teacher, the dialectician, the arranger of species. There is nothing in this part of the dialogue which is either weak or extravagant. Plato is a supporter of the Onomatopoetic theory of language ; that is to say, he supposes words to be formed by the imitation of ideas in sounds ; he also recognises the effect of time, the influence of foreign languages, the desire of euphony, to be formative principles ; and he admits a certain element of chance. But he gives no intimation in all this, that he is preparing the way for the construction of an ideal language, or that he has any Eleatic speculation to oppose to the Heracleiteanism of Cratylus.

The theory of language which is propounded in the *Cratylus*, is in accordance with the later phase of the philosophy of Plato, and would have been regarded by him as in the main true. The dialogue is also a satire on the philological fancies of the day. Socrates in pursuit of his vocation as a detector of false knowledge, lights by accident on the truth. He is guessing, he is dreaming ; he has heard, as he says in the *Phaedrus*, from another : no one is more surprised than himself at his own discoveries. And yet some of his best remarks, as for example his view of the derivation of Greek words from other languages, or of the permutations of letters, or again, his observation that in speaking of the Gods we are only speaking of our names of them, occur among these flights of humour.

We can imagine a character having a profound insight into the nature of men and things, and yet hardly dwelling upon them seriously ; blending inextricably sense and nonsense ; sometimes enveloping in a blaze of jests the most serious matters, and then again allowing the truth to peer through ; enjoying the flow of his own humour, and puzzling mankind by an ironical exaggeration of their absurdities. Such were

Anaxagoras and Socrates, and, in a still ruder style, were Sterne, Jean Paul, Voltaire, & others who sought to render uninterpretable through the extravagance of their fancies. Such is the character which Plato gives to the language of his dialogues as the Socratic Socrates; and through this medium we have to receive our theory of language.

There remains a difficulty which seems to demand a more exact solution. In what sense does the Socratic etymological portion of the dialogue resemble the Socratism? Nothing at least can be said about the etymologies of Socrates, when the period of Hesiod, or even of Solon, is past. But there lies the long catalogue of etymologies which occupies the greater part of the dialogue of Cratylus, which is evidently intended to represent the language of Socrates. What is the truth, or correctness, of these etymologies?

It is clear that the notion of correctness is the analogy of the arts, and here it is that Socrates appears appealing to the authority of the Homeric gods. So Socrates says of truth or correctness of names that they are to be referred to etymology. The truth of names is to be found in the causes of their formations. But why does he admit such a wide range of absurd, based on Homeric fancies, fourfold etymologies?—as to the successive unities and separations of syllables and letters?

The answer to this difficulty has been already anticipated in part: Socrates is not a dogmatic teacher and therefore he puts on this wild and狂妄的 (mad) appearance so that the truth may be permitted to appear: as in Socrates' etymologies, an notorious example may illustrate a principle of Socratism as well as a rule for many of these etymologies, as, for instance, the etymology of *timetos*, or the manner in which Socrates speaks of it, may have been pursued in his own age. 4. The philosophy of Socrates had made some progress as would have justified Plato in giving him this name. Like his master, Socrates, he saw through the specious pretensions of the sophists of the day, and tries to move in a field where he can find a living truth in the conceptions under which they are able to sustain themselves in the vacuous, evanescent and tentative, when he is addressing them as phenomena. To have made etymologies such as those of the Socratisms of the interpretation of the myths of the Homeric gods was the task of a very fortunate individual, who had a knowledge of the Homeric fancies. See p. 209. The irony of Socrates places him above and beyond the errors of his contemporaries.

The Cratylus is full of humour and satirical touches: the inspiration which comes from Euthyphro, and his prancing steeds, the light admixture of quotations from Homer, and the spurious dialectic which is applied to them; the jest about the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus, which is declared on the best authority, viz. his own, to be a complete education in grammar and rhetoric; the double explanation of the name Hermogenes, either as ‘not being in luck,’ or ‘being no speaker;’ the dearly-bought wisdom of Callias, the Lacedaemonian whose name was ‘Rush,’ and, above all, the pleasure which Socrates expresses in his own dangerous discoveries, which ‘to-morrow he will purge away,’ are truly humorous. While delivering a lecture on the philosophy of language, Socrates is also satirising the endless fertility of the human mind in spinning arguments out of nothing, and employing the most trifling and fanciful analogies in support of a theory. Etymology in ancient as in modern times was a favourite recreation; and Socrates makes merry at the expense of the etymologists. The simplicity of Hermogenes, who is ready to believe anything that he is told, heightens the effect. (See especially 392 E; 395 A; 397 D.) Socrates in his genial and ironical mood hits right and left at his adversaries: οὐρανὸς is so called ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄραν τὰ ἄνω, which, as some philosophers say, is the way to have a pure mind; the sophists are by a fanciful explanation converted into heroes; ‘the givers of names were like some philosophers who fancy that the earth goes round because their heads are always going round.’ There is a great deal of ‘mischief’ lurking in the following: ‘I found myself in greater perplexity about justice than I was before I began to learn;’ ‘The  $\delta$  in κάτοπτρον must be the addition of some one who cares nothing about truth, but thinks only of putting the mouth into shape;’ ‘Tales and falsehoods have generally to do with the Tragic and goatish life, and tragedy is the place of them.’ Several philosophers and sophists are mentioned by name: first, Protagoras and Euthydemus are assailed; then the interpreters of Homer, οἱ παλαιοὶ Ὄμηρικοί (cp. Arist. Met. xiii. 6. 7) and the Orphic poets are alluded to by the way; then he discovers a hive of wisdom in the philosophy of Heracleitus;—the doctrine of the flux is contained in the word *oύσια* (= *ώσια* the pushing principle), an anticipation of Anaxagoras is found in *ψυχή* and *σελήνη*. Again, he ridicules the arbitrary methods of pulling out and putting in letters which were in vogue among the philologists of his time; or slightly scoffs at contemporary religious beliefs. Lastly, he is impatient of hearing from

the half-converted Cratylus, the doctrine that falsehood can neither be spoken, nor uttered, nor addressed; a piece of sophistry attributed to Gorgias, which reappears in the Sophist. And he proceeds to demolish, with no less delight than he had set up, the Heracleitean theory of language.

In the latter part of the dialogue Socrates becomes more serious, though he does not lay aside but rather aggravates his banter of the Heracleiteans, whom here, as in the Theaetetus, he delights to ridicule. What was the origin of this enmity we can hardly determine:—was it due to the natural dislike which may be supposed to exist between the ‘patrons of the flux’ and the ‘friends of the ideas’? or is it to be attributed to the indignation which Plato felt at having wasted his time upon ‘Cratylus and the doctrines of Heracleitus’ in the days of his youth? Socrates, touching on some of the characteristic difficulties of early Greek philosophy, endeavours to show Cratylus that imitation may be partial or imperfect, that a knowledge of things is higher than a knowledge of names, and that there can be no knowledge if all things are in a state of transition. But Cratylus, who does not easily apprehend the argument from common sense, remains unconvinc'd, and on the whole inclines to his former opinion. Some profound philosophical remarks are scattered up and down, admitting of an application not only to language but to knowledge generally; such as the assertion that ‘consistency is no test of truth’ (436 D, foll.): or again, ‘If we are over-precise about words, truth will say “too late” to us as to the belated traveller in Ægina’ (433 E). ’

The place of the dialogue in the series cannot be determined with certainty. The style and subject, and the treatment of the character of Socrates, have a close resemblance to the earlier dialogues, especially to the Phaedrus and Euthydemus. The manner in which the ideas are spoken of at the end of the dialogue, also indicates a comparatively early date. The imaginative element is still in full vigour; the Socrates of the Cratylus is the Socrates of the *Apology* and *Symposium*, not yet Platonized; and he describes, as in the *Theaetetus*, the philosophy of Heraclitus by ‘unsavoury’ similes—he cannot believe that the world is like ‘a leaky vessel,’ or ‘a man who has a running at the nose’; he attributes the flux of the world to the swimming in some folks’ heads. On the other hand, the relation of thought to language is omitted here, but is treated of in the *Sophist*. These grounds are not sufficient

to enable us to arrive at a precise conclusion. But we shall not be far wrong in placing the Cratylus about the middle, or at any rate in the first half, of the series.

Cratylus, the Heracleitean philosopher, and Hermogenes, the brother of Callias, have been arguing about names; the former maintaining that they are natural, the latter that they are conventional. Cratylus affirms that his own is a true name, but will not allow that the name of Hermogenes is equally true. Hermogenes is mystified by this, and asks Socrates to explain to him what Cratylus means; and he would like to know, What Socrates himself thinks about the truth or correctness of names? Socrates replies, that hard is knowledge, and the nature of names is a considerable part of knowledge: he has never been to hear the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus; and having only attended the single-drachma course, he is not competent to give an opinion on such matters. When Cratylus denies that Hermogenes is a true name, he supposes him to mean that he is not a true son of Hermes, because he is never in luck. But he would like to have an open council and to hear both sides.

Hermogenes has often considered the question, and is of opinion that there is no principle in names; they may be changed, as we change the names of slaves, whenever we please, and the altered name is as good as the original one.

You mean to say, rejoins Socrates, who re-states the proposition of Hermogenes, that if I agree to call a man a horse, then a man will be rightly called a horse by me, and a man by the rest of the world? But to this he proceeds to object, that there is in words a true and a false, which is contained in propositions; and if a whole proposition be true or false, then the parts of a proposition may be true or false, and the least parts as well as the greatest; and the least parts are names, and therefore names may be true or false. And would Hermogenes maintain that anybody may give a name to anything, and as many names as he pleases; and would all these names be always true at the time of giving them? Hermogenes replies that this is the only consistent account of the correctness of names; and he appeals to the practice of different nations, and of the different Hellenic tribes, in confirmation of his view. Socrates asks, whether the things differ as the words which represent them differ:—Are we to maintain with Protagoras, that what appears is?

Hermogenes has considered this question and is puzzled at first, but acknowledges, when he is pressed by Socrates, that there are a few very good men in the world, and a great many very bad; and the very good are the wise, and the very bad are the foolish; and this is not mere appearance but reality. Nor is he disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all things equally and always belong to all men; in that case, again, there would be no distinction between bad and good men. But if Protagoras and Euthydemus are both admitted to be wrong, then the only remaining possibility is, that all things have their several distinct natures, and are independent of our notions about them. And not only things, but actions, have distinct natures, and are done by different processes. There is a natural way of cutting or burning, and a natural instrument with which men cut or burn, and any other way will fail;—this is true of all actions. And speaking is a kind of action, and naming is a kind of speaking, and we must name according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument. We cut with a knife, we pierce with an awl, we weave with a shuttle, we name with a name. And as a shuttle divides the warp and the woof, so a name distinguishes the natures of things. And the weaver will use the shuttle well,—that is, like a weaver; and the teacher will use the name well,—that is, like a teacher. The shuttle will be made by the carpenter; the awl by the smith or skilled person. But who makes a name? Does not the law give names, and does not the teacher receive them from the legislator? He is the skilled person who makes them, and of all skilled workmen he is the rarest. But how does the carpenter make or repair the shuttle, and to what will he look? Will he not look at the ideal which he has in his mind? And as the different kinds of work differ, so ought the instruments which make them to differ. The several kinds of shuttles ought to answer in material and form to the several kinds of webs. And the legislator ought to know the different materials and forms of which names are made in Hellas and other countries. But who is to be the judge of the proper form? The judge of shuttles is the weaver who uses them; the judge of lyres is the player of the lyre; the judge of ships is the pilot who sails in them. And will not the judge who is able to direct the legislator in his work of naming, be he who knows how to use the names—he who can ask and answer questions—in short, the dialectician? The pilot directs the carpenter how to make the rudder, and the dialectician directs the legislator how he is to impose names; for to express

the ideal forms of things in syllables and letters is no easy task, Hermogenes—of that I can assure you.

'I wish you would explain to me the natural correctness of names.'

Indeed I cannot; but I see that you have advanced; for you now admit that there is a correctness of names, and that not every one can give a name. But what is the nature of this correctness or truth, you must learn from the Sophists, of whom your brother Callias has bought his reputation for wisdom rather dearly; and since they require to be paid, you, having no money, had better learn from him at second-hand. 'Well, but I have just given up Protagoras, and I should be inconsistent in going to learn of him.' Then if you reject him you may learn of the poets, and in particular of Homer, who distinguishes the names given by Gods and men to the same things, as in the verse about the river God who fought with Achilles, 'whom the Gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander;' or in the lines in which he mentions the bird which the Gods call 'Chalcis,' and men 'Cymindis;' or the hill which men call 'Batieia,' and the Gods call 'Myrinna's Tomb.' Now here is a mysterious lesson which we may take to heart; for the Gods must of course be right in their use of names. And this is not the only truth about philology which may be learnt from Homer. For does he not say that the women called Hector's son Scamandrius, and the men called him Astyanax? And which are more likely to be right—the wiser or the less wise, the men or the women? Homer evidently thought that the men were likely to be right; and of the name given by the men he offers an explanation;—he was called Astyanax because his father saved the city. Hence you may properly call his son 'the king of the city;' and the names of Astyanax and Hector are really the same, for the one means a king, and the other is 'a holder or possessor;' 'tis all one meaning, save the phrase is a little variatious.' As the lion's whelp may be called a lion, so the son of a king may be called a king. But if the lion had produced a foal, then the offspring of the lion would be called a foal. Whether the syllables of a name are the same or not makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained. For example; the names of letters, whether vowels or consonants, do not correspond to their sounds, with the exception of  $\epsilon$ ,  $v$ ,  $o$ ,  $\omega$ . The name Beta has three letters added to the sound—and yet this does not alter the sense of the word, or prevent the whole name having the value which the legislator intended. And the same may be said of a king and the son of a king,

and like other words resemble each other in the course of time; the words he spoke, for instance, may be forgotten, and yet find themselves repeated by others, and though the same no longer has the meaning it had before, yet the power of the same things under different discourses of colour and smell. Hector and Ascanian have got the same name, but they did not have the same meaning, and Agamemnon is no longer Agamemnon, though he still bears his name. This is a good argument that the last word is present the same after so long an interval, that the words Hector and Agamemnon are which really bear a relation. The son succeeds the father as the son succeeds the king, and when out of the course of nature a young person uses a name belonging to a dog, this is to say, when the offspring no longer resembles the parent, then the names no longer agree. This may be illustrated by the case of Agamemnon and Orestes, at whom the former has a name significant of his paternal virtue, the scope of Troy, while the name of the son indicates no strength, manliness, or virtue. Orestes again bears his mother's name of Clytemnestra, and his name is Orestes, signifying Xeres, which is the eye of the sun, ergo, as I suppose, his name is made up of the sun, he who is less than the sun, &c. Telephus is Telephus, but he also sees what is not seen, because in his blindness he can't distinguish the consequences of his former consequences which the number of Myrmidons would open upon his face. The name Thessalus, if I rightly understand, others give etymologies either from this and his numerous, or from his indolence, thus signifying at once the reason where he brought upon his country, and the hanging of the scene over his head in the world below. And the name of his father, Peleus and Thetis, has no exceeding meaning, though hard to be understood, because really a sentence which is divided into two parts, Peleus, and Thetis. Yet he, being the last and king of all, is the author of our being, and in him the two, this is implied in the double name, and Thetis, which being you together and interpreted is he in Grecian. There may, at first sight, appear to be a want of reverence in calling him the son of Cronus, who is a greater let suspition, but the meaning, I suspect, is that Zeus himself is the son of a mighty intellect, known as Zeus, more, not in the sense of a great lord Zeus, or *supercal megarum* but rather the pure and unimpassioned mind, which in him is beginning of Uranus, who is so called from his not being from looking upwards, which, as philosophers say, is the way to have a pure mind. The latter portion of

Hesiod's genealogy has escaped my memory, or I could try more conclusions of the same sort. 'You talk like an oracle! I caught the infection from Euthyphro, who gave me a long lecture which began at dawn, and has not only entered into my ears, but filled my soul, and my intention is, to yield to the inspiration to-day; and to-morrow I will be exorcised by a priest or sophist.' 'Go on; I am anxious to hear the rest.' Now that we have a general notion, how shall we proceed? What names will afford the most crucial test of natural fitness? Those of heroes are often deceptive, because they are patronymic, or expression of a cult, let us try gods and demi-gods. Gods are so called, *ἀνταύγειν*, from the verb "to run"; because the sun, moon, and stars run about the heavens; and they being the original gods of the Hellenes, as they are of the Barbarians, their name is given to all Gods. The demons are the golden race of Herodotus, and by golden he means, not literally golden, but good; and they are called demons, quasi *δαιμόνες*, which in the old language was *δαιμόνες*; good men are well said by Herodotus to become *δαιμόνες* when they die, because they are knowing. 'Hermes is the same word as Σφράστης; the sons of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair;' perhaps also they are a kind of sophists, who are likewise of heroic breed, and called *φράσταις*: *ἀνταύγειν*, or *ἀπαντάνειν*, from their habit of spinning questions; for *ἀπαντάνειν* is equivalent to *λέγειν*. I get all this from Euthyphro; and now I bethink me of a very new and ingenious notion which occurs to me; and, if I do not mind, I shall be wiser than I ought to be by to-morrow's dawn. My notion is, that we may put in and pull out letters at pleasure and alter the accent (as, for example, *Διφίλος* may be turned into *Διφολός*), and we may make words into sentences and sentences into words. The name *ἄνθρωπος* is a case in point, for a letter has been omitted and the accent changed; the original meaning being ὁ ἀναθράντος ἡ πονητής—he who looks up at what he sees. *Ψυχή* may be thought to be the cooling, or refreshing, or animating principle—ἡ ἀναψύχουσα τὸ σῶμα; but I am afraid that Euthyphro and his disciples will scorn this derivation, and I must find another: shall we say with Anaxagoras, that *ψυχή* is the *κοσμίσσα δύναμις*, quasi *ψυσέχη* ἡ φύσις ἔχα or ὥχει—this by a refinement may be called *ψυχή*. 'That is a better and more artistic etymology.'

After *ψυχή* follows *σῶμα*; this, by a change of a letter, is converted into *σῆμα*—the grave in which the soul is buried, or the sign of the

soul through which her will is signified; or without changing even a letter may be thought to mean the place of ward in which the soul is safely kept and endures punishment—*ἐν φροντίσει*. ‘I should like to hear some more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that excellent one of Zeus.’ The truest names of the Gods are those which they give themselves; but these are unknown to us. Less true are those by which we propitiate them, as men say in prayers, ‘May he graciously receive any name by which I call him.’ And to avoid offence, I should like to let them know beforehand that we are not enquiring about them—that would be a piece of impertinence on our part; but we are enquiring about the names which men give to them. Let us begin with Hestia. What did he mean who gave the name Hestia? ‘That is a very difficult question to answer.’ O, my dear Hermogenes, I believe that there was a power of philosophy and talk among the first inventors of names, both in our own and in other languages; for even in foreign words a principle is discernible. Hestia is the same with *έστια*, which is an old form of *οὐσία*, and means the first principle of things: this agrees with the fact that to Hestia the first sacrifices are offered. There is also another reading — *ωσία*, which implies that ‘pushing’ is the first principle of all things. And here I seem to discover a delicate allusion to the flux of Heracleitus—that antediluvian philosopher who cannot walk twice in the same stream; and this flux of his may accomplish yet greater marvels. For the names Cronos and Rhea cannot have been accidental; the giver of them must have known something about the doctrine of Heracleitus. Moreover, there is a remarkable coincidence in the words of Hesiod, when he speaks of Oceanus, ‘the origin of Gods;’ or in the verse of Orpheus, in which he describes Oceanus espousing his sister Tethys. Tethys is nothing more than the name of a spring—*τὸ θεούμενον καὶ διαττάγμενον*. Poseidon is *ποσιδεσμός*, the chain of the feet, because you cannot walk on the sea—the *ε* is inserted by way of ornament; or perhaps the name may have been originally *πολλεΐδων*, meaning, that the God knew many things (*πολλὰ εἰδῶς*): he may also be the shaker, *ἀπὸ τοῦ σείειν*. Pluto is connected with *πλοῦτος*, because wealth comes out of the earth; or because there are riches in the world below; or the word may be a euphemism for Hades. And Hades is so called, not *ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀειδοῦς*, but *ἀπὸ τοῦ πάντα τὰ καλὰ εἰδέναι*—from knowing all good and beautiful things. Hades binds men by the strongest of chains, and the love of the beautiful is the

strongest ; the men who are bound by this chain never want to come back, and indeed, when they have once been laid under his spell, they cannot. He is the perfect and accomplished sophist, and the great benefactor of the world below ; for he has much more than he wants there, and this is why he is called Pluto, or the rich. He will have nothing to do with the souls of men while in the body, because he cannot bind them with the desire of virtue until they are liberated from their earthly tenement. Demeter is the mother and giver of food—*ἡ διδοῖσα μήτηρ τῆς ἐξωδῆς*. Herē is *ἐρατή τις*, or perhaps, the legislator may have been thinking of the weather, and has merely transposed the letters of the word *ἀέρ*. You will see the truth of this when you say the letters over fast. Pherephatta, that awful name, is *φερεπάφα*—and means only *ἡ τοῦ φερομένου ἐφαπτομένη*—all things in the world are in motion, and she in her wisdom moves with them, and Hades consorts with her—there is nothing very terrible in this. Apollo is another name, which is supposed to have some dreadful meaning, but is susceptible, if I am not mistaken, of at least four perfectly innocent explanations, which agree marvellously with his four attributes of musician, diviner, doctor, archer. First, he is the purifier or purger or fumigator (*ἀπολούων*) ; secondly, he is the true diviner (*ἀπλῶς*), as he is called in the Thessalian dialect ; thirdly, he is the archer (*ἀεὶ βάλλων*), always shooting ; or again, supposing *a* to mean *ἄμα* or *ὅμοι*, Apollo becomes equivalent to *ἄμα πολῶν*, which is significant both of his musical and of his heavenly attributes ; for he is the God of music, and also of the movement of the spheres. The second *λ* is inserted in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction. The Muses are so called—*ἀπὸ τοῦ μώσθαι*. Leto or Letho means, forget and forgive ; she is such a gentle deity. Artemis is named from her healthy happy nature *διὰ τὸ ἀρτεμές*, or as *ἀρετῆς ἵστωρ* ; or as a lover of virginity, *ἀροτον μισήσασα τοῦ ἀνδρός*. One, if not all of these explanations, is probably true. Dionysus is *ὁ διδοὺς τὸν οἶνον*, and *οἶνος* is quasi *οἴόνος* because wine gives a mind to those who have not got one. The established derivation of *Ἀφροδίτη* *διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀφροῦ γένεσιν*, may be accepted on the authority of Hesiod. Again, there is the name of Pallas, or Athene, which you, who are an Athenian, must not forget. Pallas is derived from armed dances—*ἀπὸ τοῦ παλλειν τὰ ὅπλα*. For Athene we must have recourse to the allegorical interpreters of Homer, who make the name equivalent to *θεονόη* or *ἡθονόη* ; this has been beautified into Athene. Hephaestus, again, is the lord of light—*ὁ τοῦ φάεος ἵστωρ*. This is a

good notion; and, to prevent any other getting into our heads, let us go on to Ares. He is the manly one (*ἀρρέν*), or the unbroken one (*ἀρράτος*). Enough of the Gods; for, by the Gods, I am afraid of them; but if you suggest other words, you will see how the horses of Euthyphro prance. ‘Only one more God; tell me about my godfather Hermes.’ He is *έρμηνεύς*, the messenger or cheater or thief or bargainer; or *ό εἰρειν μώμενος*, that is, *εἰρέμης* or *έρμης*—the speaker or contriver of speeches. ‘Well said Cratylus, then, that I am no son of Hermes.’ Pan, the son of Hermes, is *λόγος*, and is called Pan because he indicates everything—*ό πᾶν μηρύων*. He has two forms, a true and a false; and is in the upper part smooth, and in the lower part shaggy. He is the goat of Tragedy, in which there are plenty of falsehoods.

Enough of the names of the Gods. Shall I go on to the elements—sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, air, fire, water, seasons, years? And which shall I take first? Let us begin with *ἥλιος*, or the sun. The origin of *ἥλιος* will be clearer in the Doric form *ἄλιος*, which is so called *κατὰ τὸ ἀλίξειν εἰς ταῦτα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπειδὰν ἀνατεῖλη*, because at his rising he gathers men together; or, *διὰ τὸ περὶ τὴν γῆν εἰλεῖν*, because he goes round the earth; or, *διὰ τὸ αἰολεῖν*, the meaning of which is *ποικίλλειν*, because he variegates the earth. Selene is an anticipation of Anaxagoras, being a contraction of *σελαενοεοέα*, the light which is ever old and new, and which, as Anaxagoras says, is borrowed from the sun; the name was beaten into shape and called *σελαναία*. ‘That is a name of the true dithyrambic sort.’ *Μέις* is so called *ἀπὸ τοῦ μειοῦσθαι*, from suffering diminution, and *ἄστρον* is from *ἀστραπή*, which is an improvement of *ἀναστρωπή*, that which turns the eyes inside out. ‘How do you explain *πῦρ* and *ῦδωρ*?’ I suspect *πῦρ*, like *ῦδωρ* and *κύων*, which are found in the Phoenician language, to be a word of which the origin must be sought in some other language; for the Hellenes borrowed many words from the barbarians, and I always have recourse to them when I am at a loss. ‘Αἴρη may be explained, *ὅτι αἴρει τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς*; or, *ὅτι ἀεὶ ρέει*; or, *ὅτι πνεῦμα ἔξ αὐτοῦ γίνεται* (compare the poetic word *άῆται*). So *αἰθήρ* quasi *ἀειθήρ* *ὅτι ἀεὶ θεῖ*: *γῆ*, *γαῖα* quasi *γεννήτειρα* (compare the Homeric form *γεγάσσι*); *ὥρα*, or, according to the old Attic form, *ὅρα*, is derived *ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄριζειν*, because it divides the year; *ἐναυτὸς* and *ἔτος* are the same thought—*ό ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐτάξων*, cut into two parts, *ἐν ἑαυτῷ* and *ἐτάξων*, like *δι’ ὅν ζῆ* into *Διός* and *Ζηνός*.

‘You make surprising progress.’ True; I am run away with, and am not even yet at my utmost speed. ‘I should like very much to hear your

account of the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in all those charming words, wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of them?' To explain all that will be a serious business; still, as I have put on the lion's skin, appearances must be maintained. My opinion is, that primitive men were like some modern philosophers, who, by always going round in their search after the nature of things, become dizzy; and this latter phenomenon, which was really in themselves, they imagined to take place in the external world. You have no doubt remarked, that the doctrine of the universal flux, or generation of things, is indicated in names. 'No, I never did.' *Φρόνησις* is only *φορᾶς καὶ ροῦ νόησις*, or perhaps *δημητρίς φορᾶς*, and in any case is connected with *φέρεσθαι*; *γνώμη* is *γονῆς σκέψις καὶ νώμησις*; *νόησις* is *νέου* or *γιγνομένου ἔσις*; the word *νέος* implies that creation is always going on—the original form was *νεόεστις*; *σωφροσύνη* is *σωτηρία φρονήσεως*; *ἐπιστήμη* is *ἡ ἐπομένη τοῖς πράγμασιν*—the faculty which keeps close, neither anticipating nor lagging behind; *σύνεσις* is equivalent to *συνιέναι*, *συμπορεύεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν*, and is a kind of conclusion—*συλλογισμός τις*, akin therefore in idea to *ἐπιστήμη*; *σοφία* is very difficult, and has a foreign look—the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things, and may be illustrated by the poetical *ἔσύθη* and the Lacedaemonian proper name *Σοῦς*, or Rush; *ἀγαθὸν* is *τὸ ἀγαστὸν ἐν τῇ ταχύτητι*,—for all things are in motion, and some are swifter than others: *δικαιοσύνη* is clearly *ἡ τοῦ δικαίου σύνεσις*. The word *δίκαιον* is more difficult, and appears to mean the subtle penetrating power which, as the lovers of motion say, preserves all things, and is the cause of all things, quasi *διαιῶν* going through—the letter *κ* being inserted for the sake of euphony. This is a great mystery which has been confided to me; but when I ask for an explanation of the mystery, I am thought irreverent, and another derivation is proposed to me. Justice is said to be *ὁ καίων*, or the sun; and when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I am answered, 'What, is there no justice when the sun is down?' And when I entreat my questioner to tell me his own opinion, he replies, that justice is fire in the abstract, or heat in the abstract; which is not very intelligible. Others laugh at all this, and say with Anaxagoras, that justice is the ordering mind. 'I think that some one must have told you this.' And not the rest? Let me proceed then, in the hope of proving to you my originality. *Ἀνδρεία* is quasi *ἀνρεία* quasi *ἡ ἄνω ροὴ*, the stream which flows upwards, and is opposed to injustice, which clearly hinders the principle of penetration; *γυνὴ* is the same as *γονή*; *θῆλυ* is derived *ἀπὸ τῆς θηλῆς*, of

$\delta\pi\dot{\tau}\tau\bar{\nu}$   $\theta\bar{\alpha}\bar{\lambda}\lambda\epsilon\bar{\iota}\nu$ , and implies increase of youth, which is swift and sudden ever ( $\theta\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\iota}\nu$  and  $\bar{\alpha}\bar{\lambda}\lambda\epsilon\bar{\sigma}\theta\bar{\iota}\iota\bar{\iota}\iota$ ). Observe how I run away when I am on smooth ground!  $\tau\acute{e}x\eta\eta$ , by an aphaeresis of  $\tau$  and an epenthesis of  $\sigma$  in two places, may be identified with  $\acute{e}x\eta\eta\bar{\nu}\eta$ .

'That is a very poor etymology.' Yes; but you must remember that all language is in a process of disguise or transition; and letters are taken in and put out at pleasure, and twisted and twirled about in the lapse of ages—sometimes for the sake of euphony. For example, what business has the letter  $\rho$  in the word  $\kappa\acute{a}\tau\bar{o}\pi\tau\rho\bar{o}\nu$ , or the letter  $\sigma$  in the word  $\sigma\bar{\phi}\bar{i}\gamma\xi$ ? The additions are often such that no human being can by any possibility make out the original word. 'True.' And yet, if you may put in and pull out, as you like, any name is equally good for any object ('les consonants ne sont pas grand chose et les voyelles rien.') 'That is true.' The fact is, that great dictators of literature like yourself should observe the rules of moderation. 'I will do my best.' But do not be too much of a precisian, or you will paralyse me. If you will let me add  $\mu\bar{\eta}\chi\bar{a}\bar{n}\bar{\eta}$ ,  $\delta\pi\dot{\tau}\tau\bar{\nu}$   $\mu\bar{\eta}\kappa\bar{o}\nu\bar{s}$ , which means  $\pi\bar{o}\lambda\bar{\nu}$ , and  $\bar{\alpha}\bar{\nu}\bar{\iota}\nu\bar{i}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}$ , I shall be at the summit of my powers, from which elevation I will examine the two words  $\kappa\acute{a}\kappa\acute{a}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}$  and  $\acute{a}\bar{\rho}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\tau}\bar{\eta}$ . The explanation of the first is obvious, and in accordance with what has preceded; for all things being in a flux,  $\kappa\acute{a}\kappa\acute{a}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}$  is  $\tau\bar{o}$   $\kappa\acute{a}\kappa\acute{a}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}$   $\bar{\iota}\bar{\o}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}$ . This is evident, and is further confirmed by the poor forgotten word  $\delta\bar{\epsilon}\bar{i}\bar{l}\bar{\alpha}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}$ , which ought to have come after  $\bar{\alpha}\bar{\nu}\bar{\delta}\bar{\rho}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}$ , and may be regarded as  $\bar{\delta}\bar{\lambda}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\delta}\bar{\sigma}\bar{\mu}\bar{\delta}\bar{\delta}$ , just as  $\bar{\alpha}\bar{\pi}\bar{\rho}\bar{\delta}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}$  is  $\tau\bar{o}$   $\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\mu}\bar{\rho}\bar{\delta}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}$   $\tau\bar{\bar{\omega}}$   $\bar{\pi}\bar{\rho}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\nu}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}$ , and  $\acute{a}\bar{\rho}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\tau}\bar{\eta}$  is  $\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\nu}\bar{\pi}\bar{\rho}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}$ , which is the opposite of this—the overflowing ( $\bar{\delta}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{l}\bar{\bar{\rho}}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}$  or  $\bar{\delta}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\rho}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}$ ), or the eligible, quasi  $\bar{a}\bar{\iota}\bar{\rho}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\tau}\bar{\eta}$ —this has been contracted into  $\acute{a}\bar{\rho}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\tau}\bar{\eta}$ . You will, perhaps, say that I am inventing, but I say that if  $\kappa\acute{a}\kappa\acute{a}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}$  is right, then  $\acute{a}\bar{\rho}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\tau}\bar{\eta}$  is also right. But what is  $\kappa\acute{a}\kappa\acute{a}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}$ ? That is a very obscure word, to which I can only apply my old notion. 'What is that?' I shall say, that  $\kappa\acute{a}\kappa\acute{a}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}$  is a foreign word. Next, let us proceed to  $\kappa\acute{a}\bar{\lambda}\bar{\delta}\bar{\bar{\nu}}$ ,  $\bar{a}\bar{\iota}\bar{\sigma}\bar{\chi}\bar{\rho}\bar{\delta}\bar{\nu}$ . About  $\bar{a}\bar{\iota}\bar{\sigma}\bar{\chi}\bar{\rho}\bar{\delta}\bar{\nu}$  I have no doubt— $\tau\bar{o}$   $\bar{\iota}\bar{\sigma}\bar{\chi}\bar{\nu}\bar{\tau}\bar{\bar{\nu}}$   $\bar{\rho}\bar{\bar{\eta}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}}$   $\tau\bar{a}$   $\bar{\delta}\bar{\nu}\bar{\tau}\bar{\bar{\nu}}$  or  $\bar{\alpha}\bar{\iota}\bar{\sigma}\bar{\chi}\bar{\rho}\bar{\delta}\bar{\nu}\bar{\bar{\nu}}$ ; which has been contracted into  $\bar{a}\bar{\iota}\bar{\sigma}\bar{\chi}\bar{\rho}\bar{\delta}\bar{\nu}$ . The inventor of words being a patron of the flux, was an enemy to stagnation of all sorts.  $\kappa\acute{a}\bar{\lambda}\bar{\delta}\bar{\bar{\nu}}$  is  $\tau\bar{o}$   $\kappa\acute{a}\bar{\lambda}\bar{\delta}\bar{\bar{\nu}}$   $\tau\bar{a}$   $\pi\bar{\rho}\bar{\acute{a}\bar{\gamma}\bar{\mu}\bar{\alpha}\bar{\tau}\bar{\alpha}}$ —that which gives expression to  $\nu\bar{\bar{\nu}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}}$  or  $\delta\bar{\iota}\bar{\alpha}\bar{\nu}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}$ ; this is the principle of beauty; and mind, which does the work of beauty, is rightly called the beautiful. The meaning of  $\sigma\bar{\nu}\bar{\mu}\bar{\bar{\rho}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\rho}\bar{\nu}}$  is explained by previous examples;—like  $\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\pi}\bar{\iota}\bar{\sigma}\bar{\bar{\tau}\bar{\eta}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}}$ , signifying that the soul moves in harmony with the world.  $\kappa\acute{e}\bar{\rho}\bar{\delta}\bar{\bar{\nu}}$  is  $\tau\bar{o}$   $\pi\bar{\bar{\alpha}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}}$   $\kappa\acute{e}\bar{\rho}\bar{\bar{\nu}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}}$ —that which mingles with all things:  $\lambda\bar{\nu}\bar{\iota}\bar{\tau}\bar{\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\lambda}\bar{\delta}\bar{\nu}}$  is equivalent to  $\tau\bar{o}$   $\bar{\tau}\bar{\bar{\nu}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}}$   $\bar{\phi}\bar{\rho}\bar{\bar{\nu}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}}$   $\lambda\bar{\nu}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}\bar{\iota}$   $\tau\bar{o}$   $\tau\acute{e}\bar{\lambda}\bar{\bar{\nu}}$ , and is not to

be taken in the vulgar sense of gainful, but rather in that of swift, using the principle which makes motion immortal and unceasing: ἀφέλειν is ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅφελλεω— that which gives increase: this word, which is Homeric, is of foreign origin. Βλάστερν is τὸ βλάστην or βουλήμενον ἀπτεῖν τοι βοι—that which injures or seeks to bind the stream. The proper word would be βουλαπτεῖν, but this is too much of a mouthful—like a prelude on the flute in honour of Athene. The word ξυμάθεις is difficult; great changes, as I was saying, have been made in words, and even a small change will alter their meaning very much. The word δέον is one of these disguised words. You know that according to the old pronunciation, which is especially affected by the women, who are great conservatives, *i* and *ð* were used where we should now use *η* and *ζ*: for example, what we now call *ἡμέρα* was formerly called *ἱμέρα*; and this shows the meaning of the word to have been ‘the desired one after night.’ Ζυγόν is δυογόν, meaning δέσις διέν εἰς ἀγωγὴν—the binding of two together for the purpose of drawing. The word δέον has also the meaning of obligation, but when taken in this sense should be written δέων; for the cessation of motion implies censure and evil. Thus ξυμάθεις is really δημιώδης, and means that which binds motion: ιέσιν is ἡ πρὸς τὴν ὄντων τείνουσα πρᾶξις: λύπη appears to be derived ἀπὸ τῆς ὀντίσεως τοῦ σώματος: ἀνία is from *a* and *λέναι*, to go: ἀλγηθῶν is a foreign word, and is so called ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀλγεινοῦ: δέννη is ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνόίσεως τῆς λίπης: ἀχθήσων is a word of which the very sound is a burden: χαρὰ is expressive of the flow of soul: τερπνὸς is ἀπὸ τοῦ τερπνοῦ, and τερπνὸν is properly ἔρπνον: εὐφροσύνη and ἔπιθυμία explain themselves: θυμός is ἀπὸ τῆς θύσεως τῆς ψυχῆς: ἴμερος—ὅτι ιέμενος ρέι: πόθος, the desire which is in another place, ἀλλοθι πον: ἔρως was anciently ἔσπος ὅτι ἔστει: δύξα is ἡ ἔλαξις τοῦ εἰσέναι, or ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ τόξου βολή. Βολὴ is the shooting of a bow: ἀβολία is the missing. ‘You are quickening your pace now, Socrates.’ Why, yes, because I wish to make an end. But I must first explain ἔκούσιον and ἀνάγκη. ‘Ἐκούσιον is τὸ εἶκον—the yielding—ἀνάγκη is ἡ κατὰ τὰ ἄγκη πορεία, the passage through ravines which impede motion: ἀληθεία is θεία ἄλη, divine motion. Ψείσος is the opposite of this, implying the constraining and reposing principle, which is expressed under the figure of sleep, τὸ εὖδον; this is disguised by the addition of *ψ*. “Ονομα, a name, affirms the real existence of that which is sought after—ον οὐ μάστιγα ἔστιν. ‘Ον is ίόν, agreeably to our theory, and οὐκ ίόν is οὐκ ίόν. ‘And what are ίόν, ρέον, δοίν?’ One way of explaining them has been already suggested—they may be of foreign

origin; and this is very likely the true answer. Mere antiquity may often prevent our recognising words, after all their complications; and we must remember that however far we carry back the analysis of nouns or verbs, there must be some ultimate elements or roots which can be no further analysed. For example; the word *ἀγαθὸς* was supposed by us to be a compound of *ἀγαστὸς* and *θόος*, and probably *θόος* may be further resolvable. But when we have arrived at the letter *θ*, then there is no further resolution; and possibly the words about which you are asking are like letters, original elements, and their truth or law will have to be examined according to some new method. In the attempt to find this method, I shall ask for your assistance.

All names, whether primary or secondary, are intended to show the nature of things; and the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from the primary. But then, how do the primary names indicate anything? And here I will ask a further question,—If we had no faculty of speech, how should we communicate with one another? Should we not use signs, like the deaf and dumb? The elevation of our hands to heaven would mean lightness—heaviness would be expressed by letting them drop to the ground. The running of a horse, or any other animal, would be described by a similar movement of our own frames. The only way in which the body can express anything, is by imitation; and the tongue or mouth can imitate as well as the rest of the body. But this imitation of the tongue or voice is not yet a name, because people may imitate sheep or goats without naming them. What, then, is a name? In the first place, a name is not a musical, or, secondly, a pictorial imitation, but an imitation of that kind which expresses the nature of a thing; and is the invention not of a musician, or of a painter, but of a namer.

And now, I think that we may consider the names *ῥόη*, stream—*ἰέναι*, to go. The way to analyse them will be by going back to the letters, or primary elements of which they are composed. First, we separate the alphabet into classes of letters, distinguishing the consonants, vowels, and semivowels; and when we have learnt them singly, we shall learn to know them in their various combinations of two or more letters; just as the painter knows how to use either a single colour, which may be purple or some other colour, or a combination of them. And like the painter, we may apply letters to the expression of objects, and form them into syllables; and these again into words, until the picture or figure, large and fair—that is, language—is completed. Not that I am literally

speaking of ourselves, but I mean to say that this was the way in which the ancients framed language. And this leads me to consider whether the primary as well as the secondary elements are rightly given. I may remark, as I was saying about the Gods, that we can only attain to conjecture about them. But still we insist that this which we are pursuing is the true and only method of discovery; and not having this, we must have recourse, like the tragic poets, to a *Deus ex machina*, and say that God gave the first names, and therefore they are right. And this will perhaps be our best device: unless indeed we say that the barbarians are older than we are, and that we learnt of them, or that antiquity has cast a veil over the truth. Yet all these are not reasons; they are only ingenious excuses for having no reasons.

I will freely impart to you my own notions, though they are somewhat crude:—The letter  $\rho$  appears to me to be the general instrument expressing all motion or *κίνησις*. I ought to explain that this word *κίνησις* was just *τέσσις*, for the letter  $\eta$  was unknown to the ancients; and the root, *κίειν*, is a dialectical variety of *λέγειν*: of *κίνησις* or *εῖσις*, the opposite is *στάσις*. The letter  $\rho$  appeared to the legislator an excellent instrument for expressing motion, as is evident in the words tremble, break, crush, crumble, and the like; he perceived that the tongue is most agitated in the pronunciation of this letter, just as he used *i* to express the subtle penetrating power which passes through all things. The letters  $\phi$ ,  $\psi$ ,  $\sigma$ ,  $\zeta$ , which require a great deal of wind, are employed in the imitation of such notions as shivering, seething, and in general of what is windy. The letters  $\delta$  and  $\tau$  have a notion of binding and rest in a place: the limpid movement of  $\lambda$  expresses smoothness, as in the words slip, sleek, sleep, and the like. But when the slipping tongue is detained by the heavier sound of  $\gamma$ , then arises the notion of a glutinous clammy nature:  $\nu$  is sounded from within, and has a notion of inwardness:  $a$  is the expression of size;  $\eta$  of length;  $\circ$  of roundness, and therefore there is plenty of  $\circ$  in the word *γόγγυλον*. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the correctness of names; and I should like to hear what Cratylus would say. ‘But, Socrates, as I was telling you, Cratylus mystifies me; I should like to ask him, in your presence, what he means by the fitness of names?’ To this appeal, Cratylus replies ‘that he cannot explain that or any other subject all in a moment.’ ‘No, but you may “add little to little,” as Hesiod says.’ Socrates here interposes his own request, that Cratylus will tell him the nature of his theory. Hermogenes and himself are

mere sciolists, but Cratylus has reflected on these matters, and has had teachers. Cratylus replies in the words which Achilles uses to Ajax: ‘“ Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, you have spoken in all things very much to my mind,” whether Euthyphro, or some Muse inhabiting your own breast, was the inspirer.’ Socrates replies, that he is afraid of being self-deceived; there is nothing worse than self-deception, and therefore he must ‘look fore and aft,’ as the aforesaid Homer remarks; and proceeds to confirm his own opinion by that of Cratylus. Names teach us the nature of things. ‘Yes.’ And naming is an art, and the artists are legislators, and like artists in general, some of them are better and some of them are worse than others, and give better or worse laws, and make better or worse names. Cratylus is not disposed to admit that one name is better than another; they are either true names, or they are not names at all; and when he is asked about the name of Hermogenes, who is acknowledged to have no luck in him, he affirms this to be the name of somebody else. Socrates supposes him to mean that falsehood is impossible, to which he himself is disposed to reply, that there have been liars in all ages. But Cratylus presses him with the old sophistical argument, that falsehood is saying that which is not, and therefore saying nothing;—you can neither speak, say, utter, or address the word which is not. Socrates complains that this argument is too subtle for an old man like himself to understand: Suppose a person addressing Cratylus were to say, Hail, Athenian Stranger, Hermogenes! Would these words be true or false? ‘I should say that they would be a succession of unmeaning sounds, like the hammering of a brass pot.’ But you would acknowledge that names, as well as pictures, are imitations; and also that pictures may give a right or wrong representation of a man or woman, and that names may equally give a representation true and right or false and wrong. Cratylus admits that pictures may give a true or false representation, but denies that names can. Socrates argues, that he may go up to a man and say ‘this is your picture,’ and again, he may go and say to him ‘this is your name’—in the one case appealing to his sense of sight, and in the other to his sense of hearing; you admit that? ‘Yes.’ Then you must admit that there is a right or a wrong assignment of names, and if of names, then of verbs and nouns; and if of verbs and nouns, then of the sentences which are made up of them; and comparing nouns to pictures, you may give them all the appropriate sounds, or only some of them. And as he who gives all the colours makes a good picture,

and he who gives only some of them, a bad or imperfect one, but still a picture; so he who gives all the sounds makes a good name, and he who gives only some of them, a bad or imperfect one, but a name still. The artist of names, that is, the legislator, may be a good or he may be a bad artist. ‘Yes, Socrates, but the cases are not altogether parallel; for if you subtract or misplace a letter, the name ceases to be a name.’ Socrates admits that the number 10, if an unit is subtracted, would cease to be 10, but denies that names are of this purely quantitative nature. Let me suppose two objects: there is Cratylus and the image of Cratylus; and we will further imagine that some God makes them perfectly alike, not only in their outward form, but also in their inner nature and qualities: then there will be two Cratyluses, and not merely Cratylus and the image of Cratylus. But do you not see that an image always falls short in some degree of the original, and if images are very far from being exact counterparts, why should names be? If they were, they would be the doubles of their originals, and indistinguishable from them; and how ridiculous would this be! Cratylus admits the truth of Socrates’ remark. But then Socrates rejoins, he should have the courage to acknowledge that letters may be wrongly inserted in a noun, or a noun in a sentence; and yet the noun or the sentence may retain a meaning. If we deny this, the argument will say ‘too late’ to us, as in the story of the belated traveller in Aegina. And, errors excepted, we may still affirm that a name to be correct must have proper letters, which bear a resemblance to the thing signified. I must remind you of what Hermogenes and I were saying about the letter  $\rho$ , which was held to be expressive of motion and hardness, as  $\lambda$  is of smoothness;—and this you will admit to be their natural meaning. But then, why do the Eretrians call that  $\sigma\kappa\lambda\eta\rho\sigma\tau\eta\rho$  which we call  $\sigma\kappa\lambda\eta\rho\sigma\tau\eta\varsigma$ ? We can understand one another, although the letter  $\rho$  is not equivalent to the letter  $s$ : why is this? You reply, because the two letters are sufficiently alike for the purpose of expressing motion. Well, then, there is the letter  $\lambda$ ; what business has this in a word meaning hardness? ‘Why, Socrates, I retort upon you, that we put in and pull out letters at pleasure.’ And the explanation of this is custom or agreement: we have made a convention that the  $\rho$  shall mean  $s$ , and a convention may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. How could there be names for all the numbers unless you allow that convention is used? Imitation is a poor thing, and has to be supplemented by convention, which is another poor thing; although I

quite agree, that if we could always have a perfect correspondence of sound and meaning, that would be the most perfect form of language. But let me ask you what is the use and force of names? ‘The use of names, Socrates, is to inform, and he who knows names knows things.’ Do you mean that the discovery of names is the same as the discovery of things? ‘Yes.’ But do you not see that there is a degree of deception about names? He who first gave names, gave them according to his conception, and that may have been erroneous. ‘But then, why, Socrates, is language so consistent? all words have the same laws.’ Mere consistency is no test of truth. In geometrical problems, for example, there may be a flaw at the beginning, and yet the conclusion may follow consistently. And, therefore, a wise man will take especial care of first principles. But I should be surprised to find that words were really consistent; for are there not as many terms of praise which signify rest as which signify motion? There is *ἐπιστήμη*, which is connected with *στάσις*, as *μνήμη* is with *μένω*. *Βέβαιον*, again, is the expression of station and position; and *ἰστορία* is clearly descriptive of the stopping of the stream: and there are many words having a bad sense, which are connected with ideas of motion, as *συμφορὰ*, *ἀμαρτία*, &c.: *ἀμαθία*, again, might be explained, as *ἡ ἀμα θεῷ ἴόντος πορεία*. Thus the bad names are framed on the same principle as the good, and other examples might be given, which would favour a theory of rest rather than of motion. ‘Yes; but the greater number of words express motion.’ Are we to count them, Cratylus; and is correctness of names to be determined by the voice of a majority?

Here is another point: we were saying that the legislator gives names; and we must suppose that he knows the things which he names: but how can he have learnt things from names before there were names? ‘I believe, Socrates, that some power more than human first gave things their names, and that these were necessarily true names.’ Then how came the giver of names to contradict himself, and to make some names expressive of rest, and others of motion? ‘I do not suppose that he did make them both.’ Then which did he make—those which are expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? . . . But if some names are true and others false, we can only decide between them, not by counting words, but by appealing to things. And, if so, we must allow that things may be known without names; for names, as we have several times admitted, are the images of things; and the higher knowledge is

of things, and is not to be derived from names; and though I do not doubt that the inventors of language gave names, under the idea that all things are in a state of motion and flux, I believe that they were mistaken; and that having fallen into a whirlpool themselves, they are trying to drag us after them. For is there not a true beauty and a true good, which is always beautiful and always good? Can the thing beauty be vanishing away from us while the words are yet in our mouths? And they could not be known by any one if they are always passing away—for if they are always passing away, the observer has no opportunity of knowing their state. Whether the doctrine of the flux or of the eternal nature be the truer, is hard to determine. But no man of sense will put himself, or the education of his mind, in the power of names: he will not condemn himself to be an unreal thing, nor will he believe that everything is in a flux like the water in a leaky vessel, or that the world is a man who has a running at the nose. This doctrine may be true, Cratylus, but is also very likely to be untrue; and therefore I would have you reflect while you are young, and find out the truth, and when you know come and tell me. ‘I have thought, Socrates, and after a good deal of thinking I incline to Heracleitus.’ Then another day, my friend, you shall give me a lesson. ‘Very good, Socrates, and I hope that you will continue to study these things yourself.’

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We may now consider (I) how far Plato in the Cratylus has discovered the true principles of language, and then (II) proceed to compare modern speculations respecting the origin and nature of language with the anticipations of his genius.

I. (1) Plato is aware that language is not the work of chance; nor does he deny that there is a natural fitness in names. He only insists that this natural fitness shall be intelligibly explained. But he has no idea that language is a natural organism. He would have heard with surprise that languages are the common work of whole nations in a primitive or semi-barbarous age. How, he would probably have argued, could men devoid of art have contrived a structure of such complexity? No answer could have been given to this question, either in ancient or in modern times, until the nature of primitive antiquity had been thoroughly studied, and the instincts of man had been shown to exist in greater force, when his state approaches more nearly to that of children or animals. The

philosophers of the last century, after their manner, would have vainly endeavoured to trace the process by which proper names were converted into common, and would have shown how the last effort of abstraction invented prepositions and auxiliaries. The theologian would have proved that language must have had a divine origin, because in childhood, while the organs are pliable, the intelligence is wanting, and when the intelligence is able to frame conceptions, the organs are no longer able to express them. Or, as others have said: Man is man because he has the gift of speech; and he could not have invented that which he is. But this would have been an 'argument too subtle' for Socrates (429 D), who rejects the theological account of the origin of language 'as an excuse for not giving a reason,' which he compares to the introduction of the '*Deus ex machina*' by the tragic poets when they have to solve a difficulty; thus anticipating many modern controversies in which the primary agency of the Divine Being is confused with the secondary cause; and God is assumed to have worked a miracle in order to fill up a lacuna in human knowledge. (Cp. Timaeus, p. 46.)

Neither is Plato wrong in supposing that an element of design and art enters into language. The creative power abating is supplemented by a mechanical process. 'Languages are not made but grow,' but they are made as well as grow; bursting into life like a plant or a flower, they are also capable of being trained and improved and engrafted upon one another. The change in them is effected in earlier ages by musical and euphonic improvements, at a later stage by the influence of grammar and logic, and by the poetical and literary use of words. They develop rapidly in childhood, and when they are full grown and set they may still put forth intellectual powers, like the mind in the body, or rather we may say that the nobler use of language only begins when the framework is complete. The savage or primitive man, in whom the natural instinct is strongest, is also the greatest improver of the forms of language. He is the poet or maker of words, as in civilized ages the dialectician is the definor or distinguisher of them. The latter calls the second world of abstract terms into existence, as the former has created the picture sounds which represent natural objects or processes. Poetry and philosophy—these two, are the two great formative principles of language, when they have passed their first stage, of which, as of the first invention of the arts in general, we only entertain conjecture. And mythology is a link between them, connecting the visible and invisible,

until at length the sensuous exterior falls away, and the severance of the inner and outer world, of the idea and the object of sense, becomes complete. At a later period, logic and grammar, sister arts, preserve and enlarge the decaying instinct of language, by rule and method, which they gather from analysis and observation.

(2) There is no trace in any of Plato's writings that he was acquainted with any language but Greek. Yet he has conceived very truly the relation of Greek to foreign languages, which he is led to consider, because he finds that many Greek words are incapable of explanation. Allowing a good deal for accident, and also for the fancies of the *conditores linguae Graecae*, there is an element of which he is unable to give an account. These unintelligible words he supposes to be of foreign origin, and to have been derived from a time when the Greeks were either barbarians, or in close relations to the barbarians. Socrates is aware that this principle is liable to great abuse; and, like the '*Deus ex machinā*', explains nothing. Hence he excuses himself for the employment of such a device, and remarks that in foreign words there is still a principle of correctness, which applies equally both to Greeks and barbarians.

(3) But the greater number of primary words do not admit of derivation from foreign languages; they must be resolved into the letters out of which they are composed, and therefore the letters must have a meaning. The framers of language were aware of this; they observed that *a* was adapted to express size; *η* length; *ο* roundness; *ν* inwardness; *ρ* rush or roar; *λ* liquidity; *γλ* the detention of the liquid or slippery element; *δ* and *τ* binding; *φ*, *ψ*, *σ*, *ξ*, wind and cold, and so on. Plato's analysis of the letters of the alphabet shows a wonderful insight into the nature of language. He does not expressly distinguish between mere imitation and the symbolical use of sound to express thought, but he recognises in the examples which he gives both modes of imitation. Gesture is the mode which a deaf and dumb person would take of indicating his meaning. And language is the gesture of the tongue; in the use of the letter *ρ*, to express a rushing or roaring, or of *ο* to express roundness, there is a direct imitation; while in the use of the letter *a* to express size, or of *η* to express length, the imitation is symbolical. The use of analogous or similar sounds, in order to express similar or analogous ideas, seems to have escaped him.

In passing from the gesture of the body to the movement of the

language. Plato makes a great step in the physiology of language. He was probably the first who said that language is imitation sound, which is the greatest and deepest truth of physiology, although he is not aware of the laws of sympathy and association by which imitation must be regulated. He was probably also the first who made a distinction between simple and compound words, a truth second only in importance to that which has just been mentioned. His great insight in one direction does not, however, coincide with his blindness in another; for he appears to be wholly ignorant of his derivation of *drakos* from *dravus* and *drax*, or the difference between the root and termination. But we must recollect that he was necessarily more ignorant than any schoolboy of Greek grammar, and had no knowledge of the inflections of verbs and nouns before his eyes which might have suggested to him the distinction.

(ii) Plato elsewhere allows that language is not truth, or '*philia phorou* language has not'. At first Socrates has delighted himself with discovering the flux of heredities in language. But he is covertly surmising the presence of that in any other age he had philosophy in words; and he thus words corrects any erroneous inference which might be gathered from his experiment. For he finds as many, or almost as many, words expressive of rest, as he had previously found expressive of motion. And even if this had been otherwise, who would learn of words when he might learn of things? There is a great controversy and high argument between Heraclitans and Eleatics, but no man of sense would commit his soul in such enquiries to the imposers of names. . . In this and other passages Plato shows that he is as completely emancipated from the influence of 'Idols of the tribe' as Bacon himself.

The lesson which may be gathered from words is not metaphysical or moral, but historical. They teach us the affinity of races, they tell us something about the association of ideas, they occasionally preserve the memory of a disused custom, but we cannot safely argue from them about right and wrong, matter and mind, freedom and necessity, or the other problems of moral and metaphysical philosophy. For the use of words on such subjects may often be metaphorical, accidental, derived from other languages, and may have no relation to the contemporary state of thought and belief. Nor in any case is the invention of them the result of philosophical reflection; they have been commonly transferred from matter to mind, and their meaning is the very reverse of their etymology. Because there is or is not a name for a thing, we

cannot argue that the thing has or has not an actual existence; or that the antitheses, parallels, conjugates, correlatives of language have anything corresponding to them in nature. There are too many words as well as too few; and they generalize the objects or ideas which they represent. The greatest lesson which the philosophical analysis of language teaches us is, that we should be above language, making words our servants, and not allowing them to be our masters.

Plato does not add the further observation, that the etymological meaning of words is in process of being lost. If at first framed on a principle of intelligibility, they would gradually cease to be intelligible, like those of a foreign language. He is willing to admit that they are subject to many changes, and put on many disguises. He acknowledges that the ‘poor creature’ imitation is supplemented by another ‘poor creature,’—convention. But he does not see that ‘habit and repute,’ and their relation to other words, are always exercising an influence over them. Words appear to be isolated, but they are really the parts of an organism which is always being reproduced. They are refined by civilization, harmonized by poetry, emphasized by literature, technically applied in philosophy and art; they are used as symbols on the border-ground of human knowledge; they receive a fresh impress from individual genius, and come with a new force and association to every lively-minded person. They are fixed by the simultaneous utterance of millions, and yet are always imperceptibly changing;—not the inventors of language, but writing and speaking, and particularly great writers, or works which pass into the hearts of nations, Homer, Shakespear, Dante, the German or English Bible, Kant and Hegel, are the makers of them in later ages. They carry with them the faded recollection of their own past history; the use of a word in a striking and familiar passage gives a complexion to its use everywhere else, and the new use of an old and familiar phrase has also a peculiar power over us. But these and other subtleties of language escaped the observation of Plato. He is not aware that the languages of the world are organic structures, and that every word in them is related to every other; nor does he conceive of language as the joint work of the speaker and the hearer, requiring in man a faculty not only of expressing his thoughts but of understanding those of others.

On the other hand, he cannot be justly charged with a desire to frame language on artificial principles. Philosophers have sometimes dreamed

of a technical or scientific language, in words which should have fixed meanings, and stand in the same relation to one another as the substances which they denote. But there is no more trace of this in Plato than there is of a language corresponding to the ideas; nor, indeed, could the want of such a language be felt until the sciences were far more developed. Those who would extend the use of technical phraseology beyond the limits of science or of custom, seem to forget that freedom and suggestiveness and the play of association are essential characteristics of language. The great master has shown how he regarded pedantic distinctions of words or attempts to confine their meaning in the satire on Prodicus in the *Protagoras*.

(5) In addition to these anticipations of the general principles of philology, we may note also a few curious observations on words and sounds. ‘The Eretrians say *σκληρότης* for *σκληρότηρ*;’ ‘the Thessalians call Apollo *Απλῶς*;’ ‘the Phrygians have the words *πῦρ*, *βδωρ*, *κύνες* slightly inflected;’ ‘there is an old Homeric word *ἐμήσατο*, meaning “he contrived”;’ ‘our forefathers, and especially the women, who are most conservative of the ancient language, loved the letters *ι* and *δ*; but now *ι* is changed into *η* and *ε*, and *δ* into *ζ*; this is supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound.’ Plato was very willing to use inductive arguments, so far as they were within his reach; but he would also have assigned a large influence to chance. Nor indeed is induction applicable to philology in the same degree as to most of the physical sciences. For after we have pushed our researches to the furthest point, in language as in all the other creations of the human mind, there will always remain an element of exception or accident or free-will, which cannot be eliminated.

The question, ‘whether falsehood is impossible,’ which Socrates characteristically sets aside as too subtle for an old man (429 D; cp. *Euthyd.* 284), could only have arisen in an age of imperfect consciousness, which had not yet learned to distinguish words from things. Socrates replies in effect that words have an independent existence; thus anticipating the solution of the mediaeval controversy of Nominalism and Realism. He is aware too that languages exist in various degrees of perfection (435), and that the analysis of them can only be carried to a certain point (422). ‘If we could always, or almost always, use likenesses, which are the appropriate expressions, that would be the most perfect state of language’ (439 D). These words suggest a question of deeper interest

than the origin of language ; viz. what is the ideal of language, how far by any correction of their usages existing languages might become clearer and more expressive than they are, more poetical, and also more logical ; or whether they are now finally fixed and have received their last impress from time and authority.

On the whole, the Cratylus seems to contain deeper truths about language than any other ancient writing. But feeling the uncertain ground upon which he is walking, and partly in order to preserve the character of Socrates, Plato envelopes the whole subject in a robe of fancy, and allows his principles to drop out as if by accident.

II. What is the result of recent speculations about the origin and nature of language ? Like other modern metaphysical enquiries, they end at last in a statement of facts. But, in order to state or understand the facts, a metaphysical insight seems to be required. There are more things in language than the human mind easily conceives. And many fallacies have to be dispelled, as well as observations made. The true spirit of philosophy or metaphysics can alone charm away metaphysical illusions, which are always reappearing, formerly in the fancies of neoplatonist writers, now in the disguise of experience and common sense. An analogy, a figure of speech, an intelligible theory, a superficial observation of the individual, have often been mistaken for a true account of the origin of language.

Speaking is one of the simplest natural operations, and also the most complex. Nothing would seem to be easier or more trivial than a few words uttered by a child in any language. Yet into the formation of those words have entered causes which the human mind is not capable of calculating. They are a drop or two of the great stream or ocean of speech which has been flowing in all ages. They have been transmitted from one language to another ; like the child himself, they go back to the beginnings of the human race. How they originated, who can tell ? Nevertheless we can imagine a stage of human society in which the circle of men's minds was narrower and their sympathies and instincts stronger ; in which their organs of speech were more flexible, and the sense of hearing finer and more discerning ; in which they lived more in company, and after the manner of children were more given to express their feelings ; in which 'they moved all together,' like a herd of wild animals, 'when they moved at all.' Among them, as in every society, a particular person would be more sensitive and intelligent

than the rest. Suddenly, on some occasion of interest (at the approach of a wild beast, shall we say?), he first, they following him, utter a cry which resounds through the forest. The cry is almost or quite involuntary, and may be an imitation of the roar of the animal. Thus far we have not speech, but only the inarticulate expression of feeling or emotion in no respect differing from the cries of animals; for they too call to one another and are answered. But now suppose that some one at a distance not only hears the sound, but apprehends the meaning: or we may imagine that the cry is repeated to a member of the society who had been absent; the others act the scene over again when he returns home in the evening. And so the cry becomes a word. The hearer in turn gives back the word to the speaker, who is now aware that he has acquired a new power. Many thousand times he exercises this power; like a child learning to talk, he repeats the same cry again, and again he is answered; he tries experiments with a like result, and the speaker and the hearer rejoice together in their newly-discovered faculty. At first there would be few such cries, and little danger of mistaking or confusing them. For the mind of primitive man had a narrow range of perceptions and feelings; his senses were microscopic; twenty or thirty sounds or gestures would be enough for him, nor would he have any difficulty in finding them. Naturally he broke out into speech—like the young infant he laughed and babbled; but not until there were hearers as well as speakers did language begin. Not the interjection or the vocal imitation of the object, but the interjection or the vocal imitation of the object understood, is the first rudiment of human speech.

After a while the word gathers associations, and has an independent existence. The imitation of the lion's roar calls up the fears and hopes of the chase, which are excited by his appearance. In the moment of hearing the sound, without any appreciable interval, these and other latent experiences wake up in the mind of the hearer. Not only does he receive an impression, but he brings previous knowledge to bear upon that impression. Necessarily the pictorial image becomes less vivid, while the association of the nature and habits of the animal is more distinctly perceived. The picture passes into a symbol, for there would be too many of them and they would crowd the mind; the vocal imitation, too, is always in process of being lost and being renewed, just as the picture is brought back again in the description of the poet. Words now can be used more freely because there are more of them. What was

once an involuntary expression becomes voluntary. Not only can men utter a cry or call, but they can communicate and converse; they can not only use words, but they can even play with them. The word is separated both from the object and from the mind; and slowly nations and individuals attain to a fuller consciousness of themselves.

Parallel with this mental process the articulation of sounds is gradually becoming perfected. The finer sense detects the differences of them, and begins, first to agglomerate, then to distinguish them. Times, persons, places, relations of all kinds, are expressed by modifications of them. The earliest parts of speech, as we may call them by anticipation, like the first utterances of children, probably partook of the nature of interjections and nouns; then came verbs; at length the whole sentence appeared, and rhythm and metre followed. Each stage in the progress of language was accompanied by some corresponding stage in the mind and civilization of man. In time, when the family became a nation, the wild growth of dialects passed into a language. Then arose poetry and literature. We can hardly realize to ourselves how much with each improvement of language the powers of the human mind were enlarged; how the inner world took the place of the outer; how the pictorial or symbolical or analogical word was refined into a notion; how language, fair and large and free, was at last complete.

So we may imagine the speech of man to have begun as with the cries of animals, or the stammering lips of children, and to have attained by degrees the perfection of Homer and Plato. Yet we are far from saying that this or any other theory of language is proved by facts. It is not difficult to form an hypothesis which by a series of imaginary transitions will bridge over the chasm which separates man from the animals. Differences of kind may often be thus resolved into differences of degree. But we must not assume that we have in this way discovered the true account of them. Through what struggles the harmonious use of the organs of speech was acquired; to what extent the conditions of human life were different; how far the genius of individuals may have contributed to the discovery of this as of the other arts, we cannot say: Only we seem to see that language is as much the creation of the ear as of the tongue, and the expression of a movement stirring the hearts not of one man only but of many, 'as the trees of the wood are stirred by the wind.' The theory is consistent or not inconsistent with our own mental

experience, and throws some degree of light upon a dark corner of the human mind.

In the later analysis of language, we trace the opposite and contrasted elements of the individual and nation, of the past and present, of the inward and outward, of the subject and object, of the notional and relational, of the root or unchanging part of the word and of the changing inflexion, of the vowel and the consonant, of quantity and accent, of speech and writing, of poetry and prose. We observe also the reciprocal influence of sounds and conceptions on each other, like the connexion of body and mind; and further remark that although the names of objects were originally proper names, as the grammarian or logician might call them, yet at a later stage they become universal notions, which combine into particulars and individuals, and are taken out of the first rude agglomeration of sounds that they may be replaced in a higher and more logical order. We see that in the simplest sentences are contained grammar and logic—the parts of speech, the Eleatic philosophy and the Kantian categories. So complex is language, and so expressive not only of the meanest wants of man, but of his highest thoughts; so various are the aspects in which it is regarded by us. Then again, when we follow the history of languages, we observe that they are always slowly moving, half dead, half alive, half solid, half fluid; the breath of a moment, yet like the air, continuous in all ages and countries,—like the glacier, too, containing within them a trickling stream which deposits fossil strata. There were happy moments, as we may conjecture, in the lives of nations, at which they came to the birth—as in the golden age of literature, the man and the time seem to conspire; the eloquence of the bard or chief, as in later times the creations of the great writer who is the expression of his age, became impressed on the minds of their countrymen, perhaps in the hour of some crisis of national development—a migration, a conquest, or the like. The picture of the word which was beginning to be lost, is now revived; the sound again echoes to the sense; men find themselves capable not only of expressing more feelings, and describing more objects, but of expressing and describing them better. The world before the flood, that is to say, the world of ten, twenty, a hundred thousand years ago, has passed away and left no sign. But the best conception that we can form of it, though imperfect and uncertain, is gained from the analogy of causes still in action, some powerful and sudden, others working slowly in the course

of infinite ages. Something too may be allowed to 'the persistency of the strongest,' to 'the survival of the fittest,' in this as in the other realms of nature.

These are some of the reflections which the modern philosophy of language suggests to us about the powers of the human mind and the forces and influences by which the efforts of men to utter articulate sounds were inspired. Yet in making these and similar generalizations we may note also dangers to which we are exposed. (1) There is the confusion of ideas with facts—of mere possibilities, and generalities, and modes of conception with actual and definite knowledge. The words 'evolution,' 'birth,' 'law,' 'development,' 'instinct,' 'implicit,' 'explicit,' and the like, have a false clearness or comprehensiveness, which adds nothing to our knowledge. The metaphor of a flower or a tree, or some other work of nature or art, is often in like manner only a pleasing picture. (2) There is the fallacy of resolving the languages which we know into their parts, and then imagining that we can discover the nature of language by reconstructing them. (3) There is the danger of identifying language, not with thoughts but with ideas. (4) There is the error of supposing that the analysis of grammar and logic has always existed, or that their distinctions were familiar to Socrates and Plato. (5) There is the fallacy of exaggerating, and also of diminishing the interval which separates articulate from inarticulate language—the cries of animals from the speech of man—the instinct of animals from the reason of man. (6) There is the danger which besets all enquiries into the early history of man—of interpreting the past by the present, and of substituting the definite and intelligible for the true but dim outline which is the horizon of human knowledge.

The greatest light is thrown upon the nature of language by analogy. We have the analogy of the cries of animals, of the songs of birds ('man, like the nightingale, is a singing bird, but is ever binding up thoughts with musical notes'), of music, of children learning to speak, of barbarous nations in which the linguistic instinct is still undecayed, of ourselves learning to think and speak a new language, of the deaf and dumb who have words without sounds, of the various disorders of speech; and we have the after-growth of mythology, which, like language, is an unconscious creation of the human mind. We can observe the social and collective instincts of animals; and may remark how, when domesticated, they have the power of understanding but not of speaking,

while on the other hand, some birds which are comparatively devoid of intelligence, make a nearer approach to articulate speech. We may note how in the animals there is a want of that sympathy with one another which appears to be the soul of language. We can compare the use of speech with other mental and bodily operations; for speech too is a kind of gesture, and in the child or savage accompanied with gesture. We may observe that the child learns to speak, as he learns to walk or to eat, by a natural impulse; yet in either case not without a power of imitation which is also natural to him—he is taught to read, but he breaks forth spontaneously in speech. We can trace the impulse to bind together the world in ideas beginning in the first efforts to speak and culminating in philosophy. But there remains an element which cannot be explained, or even adequately described. We can understand how man creates or constructs consciously and by design; and see, if we do not understand, how nature, by a law, calls into being an organized structure. But the intermediate organism which stands between man and nature, which is the work of mind yet unconscious, and in which mind and matter seem to meet, and mind unperceived to herself is really limited by all other minds, is neither understood nor seen by us, and is with reluctance admitted to be a fact.

Language is an aspect of man, of nature, and of nations, the transfiguration of the world in thought, the meeting-point of the physical and mental sciences, and also the mirror in which they are reflected, present at every moment to the individual, and yet having a sort of eternal or universal nature. When we analyze our own mental processes, we find words everywhere in every degree of clearness and consistency, fading away in dreams and more like pictures, rapidly succeeding one another in our waking thoughts, attaining a greater distinctness and consecutiveness in speech, and a greater still in writing, taking the place of one another when we try to become emancipated from their influence. For in all processes of the mind which are conscious we are talking to ourselves; the attempt to think without words is a mere illusion,—they are always reappearing when we fix our thoughts. And speech is not a separate faculty, but the expression of all our faculties, to which all our other powers of expression, signs, looks, gestures, lend their aid.

The minds of men are sometimes carried on to think of their lives and of their actions as links in a chain of causes and effects going back to the beginning of time. A few have seemed to lose the sense of their

own individuality in the universal cause or source. In like manner we might think of the words which we daily use, as derived from the first speech of man, and of all the languages in the world, as the expressions or varieties of a single force or life of language of which the thoughts of men are the accident. Such a conception enables us to grasp the power and wonder of languages, and is very natural to the scientific philologist. For he, like the metaphysician, believes in the reality of that which absorbs his own mind. Nor do we deny the enormous influence which language has exercised over thought. Fixed words, like fixed ideas, have often governed the world. But in such representations we attribute to language too much the nature of a cause, and too little of an effect,—too much of an absolute, too little of a relative character,—too much of an ideal, too little of a matter-of-fact existence.


Or again, we may frame a single abstract notion of language of which all existent languages may be supposed to be the perversion. But we must not conceive that this logical figment had ever a real existence, or is anything more than an effort of the mind to give unity to infinitely various phenomena. There is no abstract language '*in rerum natura*,' any more than there is an abstract tree, but only languages in various stages of growth, maturity, and decay. Nor do other logical distinctions, or even grammatical exactly correspond to the facts of language; for they too are attempts to give unity and regularity to a subject which is partly irregular.

We find, however, that there are distinctions of another kind by which this vast field of language admits of being mapped out. There is the distinction between biteral and trilateral roots, and the various inflexions which accompany them; between the mere mechanical cohesion of sounds or words, and the 'chemical' combination of them into a new word; there is the distinction between languages which have had a free and full development of their organisms, and languages which have been stunted in their growth,—lamed in their hands or feet, and never able to acquire afterwards the powers in which they are deficient; there is the distinction between synthetical languages like Greek and Latin, which have retained their inflexions, and analytical languages like English or French, which have lost them. Innumerable as are the languages and dialects of mankind, there are comparatively few classes to which they can be referred.

Another road through this chaos is provided by the physiology of speech. The organs of language are the same in all mankind, and are only capable of uttering a certain number of sounds. Every man has tongue, teeth, lips, palate, throat, mouth, which he may close or open, and adapt in various ways ; making, first, vowels and consonants ; and secondly, other classes of letters. The elements of all speech, like the elements of the musical scale, are few and simple, though admitting of infinite gradations and combinations. Whatever slight differences exist in the use or formation of these organs, owing to climate or the sense of euphony or other causes, they are as nothing compared with their agreement. Here then is a real basis of unity in the study of philology, unlike that imaginary abstract unity of which we were just now speaking.

Whether we regard language from the psychological, or historical, or physiological point of view, the materials of our knowledge are inexhaustible. The comparisons of children learning to speak, of barbarous nations, of musical notes, of the cries of animals, of the song of birds, increase our insight into the nature of human speech. Many observations which would otherwise have escaped us are suggested by them. But they do not explain why, in man and in man only, the speaker met with a response from the hearer, and the half articulate sound gradually developed into Sanscrit and Greek. They hardly enable us to approach any nearer the secret of the origin of language, which, like some of the other great secrets of nature,—the origin of birth and death, or of animal life,—remains inviolable. That problem is indissolubly bound up with the origin of man; and if we ever know more of the one, we may expect to know more of the other<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Compare W. Humboldt, ‘Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues ;’ M. Müller, ‘Lectures on the Science of Language ;’ Steinthal, ‘Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft.’



## CRATYLUS.

### PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, HERMOGENES, CRATYLUS.

Steph. *Hermogenes*. SUPPOSE that we make Socrates a party to the  
383 argument?

*Cratylus*. If you please.

*Her.* I must inform you, Socrates, that Cratylus has been arguing about names; he says that they are natural and not conventional; not articulate sounds which men agree to utter, but that there is a truth or correctness in them, which is the same for Hellenes as for barbarians. Whereupon I ask him, whether his own name of Cratylus is a true name or not, and he answers 'Yes.' And Socrates? 'Yes.' Then every man's name, as I tell him, is that which he is called. To this he replies—'If all the world were to call you Hermogenes, that would not be your name.' And when I am anxious to have  
384 a further explanation he is ironical and mysterious, and seems to imply that he has a notion in his own mind, if he would only tell, and could entirely convince me, if he chose to be intelligible. Tell me, Socrates, what this oracle means; or rather tell me, if you will be so good, what is your own view of the truth or correctness of names, which I would far sooner hear.

*Socrates*. Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying, that 'hard is the knowledge of the good.' And the knowledge of names is a great part of knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard the fifty-drachma course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete education in grammar and language—these are his own words—and then I should have been at once able

to answer your question about the correctness of names. But, indeed, I have only heard the single-drachma course, and therefore, I do not know the truth about such matters; I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in the investigation of them. When he declares that your name is not really Hermogenes, I suspect that he is only making fun of you;—he means to say that you are no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking after a fortune and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good deal of difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better leave the question open until we have heard both sides.

*Her.* I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and others, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of correctness in names other than convention and agreement; any name which you give, in my judgment, is the right one, and if you change that and give another, the new name is as correct as the old: we frequently change the names of our slaves, and the newly-imposed name is as good as the old: for there is no name given to anything by nature; all is convention and habit of the users;—that is my view. But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to hear and learn of Cratylus, or of any one.

*Soc.* I dare say that you may be right, Hermogenes: let us <sup>385</sup> see;—Your meaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which anybody agrees to call it?

*Her.* That is my view.

*Soc.* Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* Well, now, let me take an instance;—suppose that I call a man a horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest of the world; and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by the world:—that is your meaning?

*Her.* Yes, that is my view.

*Soc.* But how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there is in words a true and a false?

*Her.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Which is contained in propositions?

*Her.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And a true proposition says that which is, and a false proposition says that which is not?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then in a proposition there is a true and false?

*Her.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts untrue?

*Her.* No; the parts are true as well as the whole.

*Soc.* Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every part?

*Her.* I should say that every part is true.

*Soc.* Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name?

*Her.* No; that is the smallest.

*Soc.* Then the name is a part of the true proposition?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* Yes, and a true part, as you say.

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true and false?

*Her.* That is the inference.

*Soc.* And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the name?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And will there be as many names of each thing as are given by any one? and will they be true names at the time of giving them?

*Her.* Yes, Socrates, that is the only correctness of names which I can imagine; I have one name which I give, and you have another which you give—that is all; and in different cities and countries there are different names for the same things; Hellenes differ from barbarians in their use of names, and the several Hellenic tribes from one another.

*Soc.* But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ 386 as the names differ? and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us? For he says that man is the measure of

all things, and that things are to me as they appear to me, and that they are to you as they appear to you. Do you agree with him, or would you say that things have a permanent essence of their own?

*Hes.* There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in my perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras; not that I agree with him at all.

*Soc.* What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such thing as a bad man?

*Hes.* No, indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there are very bad men, and a good many of them.

*Soc.* Well, and have you ever found any very good ones?

*Hes.* Not many.

*Soc.* Still you have found them?

*Hes.* Yes.

*Soc.* And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and the very evil very foolish? Would that be your view?

*Hes.* Yes; that would be my view.

*Soc.* But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as they appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish?

*Hes.* Impossible.

*Soc.* But admitting the existence of wisdom and folly, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of Protagoras can hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is true to him, one man cannot in reality be wiser than another.

*Hes.* He cannot.

*Soc.* Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all things equally belong to all men at the same moment and always; for neither on that view can there be some good and others bad, if virtue and vice are always equally to be attributed to all.

*Hes.* That is true.

*Soc.* But if neither is right; and things are not relative to individuals, and all things do not equally belong to all at the same moment and always, they must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent essence: they are not in relation to us, or influenced by us, fluctuating according to our fancy, but

they are independent, and maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed by nature.

*Her.* I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth.

*Soc.* Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a class of being?

*Her.* Yes, the actions are real as well as the things.

387 *Soc.* Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature, and not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for example, we do not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument; but we cut with the proper instrument only, and according to the natural process of cutting; and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail and be of no use at all.

*Her.* I should say that the natural way is the right way.

*Soc.* Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the right way is the natural way, and the right instrument the natural instrument.

*Her.* True.

*Soc.* And this holds good of all actions?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And speech is a kind of action?

*Her.* True.

*Soc.* And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way of speaking, and as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural instrument? Any other mode of speaking will result in failure and error.

*Her.* I quite agree with you.

*Soc.* And is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men speak.

*Her.* That is true.

*Soc.* And if speaking is a sort of action and concerned with acts, is not naming also a sort of action?

*Her.* True.

*Soc.* And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had a special nature of their own?

*Her.* Precisely.

*Soc.* Then the argument would lead us to infer that names

ought to be given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not at our pleasure : in this and no other way shall we name with success.

*Her.* That seems to me true.

*Soc.* But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with something?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or pierced with something?

*Her.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And that which has to be named has to be named with something?

*Her.* That is true.

*Soc.* What is that with which we pierce?

*Her.* An awl.

*Soc.* And with which we weave?

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*Her.* A shuttle.

*Soc.* And with which we name?

*Her.* A name.

*Soc.* Very good : then a name is an instrument?

*Her.* True.

*Soc.* Suppose that I ask, ‘What sort of instrument is a shuttle?’ And you answer, ‘A weaving instrument.’

*Her.* Well.

*Soc.* And I ask again, ‘What do we do when we weave?’—The answer is, that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof.

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of instruments in general?

*Her.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names : will you answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we name?

*Her.* I cannot answer.

*Soc.* Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish things according to their natures?

*Her.* That is very true.

*Soc.* Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of distin-

guishing natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of the web.

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver?

*Her.* Assuredly.

*Soc.* Then the weaver will use the shuttle well—and well means like a weaver? and the teacher will use the name well—and well means like a teacher?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be using well?

*Her.* That of the carpenter.

*Soc.* And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only?

*Her.* Only the skilled.

*Soc.* And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using well?

*Her.* That of the smith.

*Soc.* And is every man a smith, or only the skilled?

*Her.* The skilled only.

*Soc.* And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using?

*Her.* There I am puzzled.

*Soc.* Cannot you tell me who gives us the names which we use?

*Her.* Indeed I cannot.

*Soc.* Does not the law seem to you to give us them?

*Her.* Yes, that is so, I suppose.

*Soc.* Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the legislator?

*Her.* I agree.

*Soc.* And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only?

*Her.* The skilled only.

*Soc.* Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name, but only a maker of names; and this is the legislator, who of all skilled artisans in the world is the rarest.

*Her.* That is true.

*Soc.* And how does the legislator make names? and to what does he look? Consider this in the light of the previous instances: to what does the carpenter look in making the shuttle?

Does he not look to that which is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle?

*Her.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make another, looking to the broken one? or will he look to the form according to which he made the other?

*Her.* To the latter, I should imagine.

*Soc.* Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle?

*Her.* I should say 'Yes' to that.

*Soc.* And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of garments, thin or thick, of woollen, flaxen, or other material, ought all of them to have the true form of the shuttle: and whatever is the shuttle best adapted to each kind of work, that ought to be the form which the maker produces in each case.

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the same holds of other instruments: when a man has discovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he must take care to introduce that into the material of which he makes his work, and in the natural form, not in some other which he fancies; for example, he ought to know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to their several works.

*Her.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And how to put into wood forms of a shuttle adapted to their works.

*Her.* True.

*Soc.* For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the several kinds of webs; and this is true of instruments in general.

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how to put the true natural name of each thing into sounds and syllables, and to make and give all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is to be a namer in any true sense? And we must remember that different legislators will not use the same syllables. For neither does every smith, although he may be making the same instrument for the same purpose, make them all of the same iron. The form must be the same, but the material may vary, and still the instrument may be equally good of whatever iron made, whether in Hellas or in a foreign country;—that makes no difference.

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is not therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he gives the true and proper form of the name in whatever syllables; this or that country makes no matter.

*Her.* Quite true.

*Soc.* But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to the shuttle, whatever material may be used? the carpenter who makes, or the weaver who is to use them?

*Her.* I should say, that he who is to use them ought to know, Socrates.

*Soc.* And who uses the work of the lyre-maker? Will not he be the man who knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also whether the work is being well done or not?

*Her.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And who is he?

*Her.* The player of the lyre.

*Soc.* And who will direct the shipwright?

*Her.* The pilot.

*Soc.* And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work, and will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other country? Will not the user be the man?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And this is he who knows how to ask questions?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And how to answer them?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a dialectician?

*Her.* Yes; that would be the name of him.

*Soc.* Then the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder, and the pilot has to direct him, if the rudder is to be well made.

*Her.* True.

*Soc.* And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the dialectician must be his director if the names are to be rightly given?

*Her.* That is true.

*Soc.* Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving of names can be no such light matter as you fancy, or the work of light

or chance persons ; and Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by nature, and that not every man is an artificer of names, but he only who looks to the name which each thing by nature has and is will be able to express the true forms of things in letters and syllables.

*Her.* I cannot answer you, Socrates ; but I find a difficulty in changing my opinion all in a moment, and I think that I should 391 be more readily persuaded, if you would show me what this is which you term the natural fitness of names.

*Soc.* My good Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling you just now (but you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and proposing to share the enquiry with you ? But now that you and I have talked over the matter, a step has been gained ; for we have discovered that names have by nature a truth, and that not every man knows how to give a thing a name.

*Her.* Very good.

*Soc.* And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names ? That, if you care to know, is the next question.

*Her.* But I do care to know.

*Soc.* Then reflect.

*Her.* How shall I reflect ?

*Soc.* The true way is to have the assistance of those who know, and you must pay them well in money and not merely in thanks ; these are the Sophists, of whom your brother, Callias, has—rather dearly—bought the reputation of wisdom. But you have not yet come into your inheritance, and therefore you had better go to him, and beg and entreat him to tell you what he has learnt from Protagoras about the fitness of names.

*Her.* But how inconsistent should I be, if, whilst repudiating Protagoras and his truth<sup>1</sup>, I were to attach any value to what he and his book affirm !

*Soc.* Then if you despise him, you must learn of Homer and the poets.

*Her.* And where does Homer say anything about names, and what does he say ?

*Soc.* He often speaks of them ; notably and nobly in the

<sup>1</sup> ‘Truth’ was the title of the book of Protagoras ; cp. *Theaet.* 161 E.

places where he distinguishes the different names which Gods and men give to the same things. Does he not in these passages make a remarkable statement about the correctness of names? For the Gods must clearly be supposed to call things by their right and natural names; do you not think so?

*Her.* Why, of course they call them rightly, if they call them at all. But to what are you referring?

*Soc.* Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had a single combat with Hephaestus?

'Whom,' as he says, 'the Gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander.'

*Her.* I remember.

92 *Soc.* Well, and about this river—to know that he ought to be called Xanthus and not Scamander—is not that a solemn lesson? Or about the bird which, as he says,

'The Gods call Chalcis, and men Cymindis:'

to be taught how much more correct the name Chalcis is than the name Cymindis,—do you deem that a light matter? There is also the hill, which

'Men call Batieia, and the immortals Myrina's tomb.'

And there are many other observations of the same kind in Homer and other poets. Now, I think that this is beyond the understanding of you and me; but the names of Scamandrius and Astyanax, which he affirms to have been the names of Hector's son, are more within the range of human faculties, as I am disposed to think; and what the poet means by correctness may be more readily apprehended in that instance: I dare say that you remember the lines to which I refer.

*Her.* I do.

*Soc.* Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct of the names given to Hector's son—Astyanax or Scamandrius?

*Her.* I do not know.

*Soc.* How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the unwise are more likely to give correct names?

*Her.* I should say the wise, of course.

*Soc.* And are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the wiser?

*Her.* I should say, the men.

*Soc.* And Homer, as you know, says that the Trojan men called him Astyanax (king of the city); but if the men called him Astyanax, the other name of Scamandrius could only have been given to him by the women.

*Her.* That may be inferred.

*Soc.* And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than their wives?

*Her.* To be sure.

*Soc.* Then he must have thought that Astyanax was a more correct name for the boy than Scamandrius?

*Her.* That is clear.

*Soc.* And what is the reason of this? Let us consider:—does he not himself suggest a very good reason, when he says,

‘For he alone defended their city and long walls?’

This appears to be a good reason for calling the son of the saviour king of the city which his father was saving, as Homer observes.

*Her.* I see.

*Soc.* Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you?

*Her.* No, indeed.

*Soc.* But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give 393 Hector a name?

*Her.* What of that?

*Soc.* That name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name of Astyanax—both are Hellenic; and a king (*ἄραξ*) and a holder (*έκτωρ*) have nearly the same meaning, and are both descriptive of a king; for a man is clearly the holder of that of which he is king; he rules, and owns, and holds that. But, perhaps, you do not understand me; and I think that I am very likely mistaken in supposing myself to have found some indication of the opinion of Homer about the correctness of names.

*Her.* I assure you that I think otherwise, and that I believe you to be on the right track.

*Soc.* There is reason, I think, in calling the lion's whelp a lion, and the foal of a horse a horse; I am speaking only of the ordi-

nary course of nature, when an animal produces after his kind<sup>1</sup>, and not of extraordinary births;—if, contrary to nature, a horse have a calf, then I should not call that a foal but a calf; nor do I call any inhuman birth a man, but only a natural birth. And the same may be said of trees and other things. Do you agree to that?

*Her.* Yes, I agree.

*Soc.* Very good. But you had better watch me and see that I do not play tricks with you. For on the same principle the son of a king is to be called a king. And whether the syllables of the name are the same or not the same, that makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained; nor does the addition or subtraction of a letter make any difference so long as the essence of the thing remains in possession of the name and appears in it.

*Her.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* A very simple matter. I may illustrate my meaning by the names of letters, which you know are not the same as the letters themselves, with the exception of the four, *ε*, *v*, *ο*, *ω*,—the names of the other letters, whether vowels or consonants, are made up of letters which we attach to them; but so long as we introduce the meaning, and there can be no mistake, the name of the letter is quite correct. Take, for example, the letter *beta*—the addition of *η*, *τ*, *α*, gives no offence, and does not prevent the whole name from having the value which the legislator intended—so well did he know how to give the letters names.

*Her.* There is truth in that.

*Soc.* And may not the same be said of a king? a king will often be the son of a king, the good son or the noble son of a good or noble sire; and similarly the offspring of every kind, in the course of nature, is like the parent, and therefore has the same name. Yet the syllables may be disguised until they appear different to the ignorant person, and he may not recognize them, although they are the same, just as any one of us would not recognize the same drugs under different disguises of colour and smell, although to the physician, who regards the power of them, they are the same, and he is not put out by the addition; and in like manner the etymologist is not put out by the addition or transposition or subtraction of a letter or two,

<sup>1</sup> Reading *οὐδὲν*.

or indeed by the change of all the letters, for this need not interfere with the meaning. As was just now said, the names of Hector and Astyanax have only one letter alike, which is the  $\tau$ , and yet they have the same meaning. And how little in common with the letters of their names has Archeopolis (ruler of the city) —and yet the meaning is the same. And there are many other names which just mean ‘king.’ Again, there are several names for a general, as, for example, Agis (leader) and Polemarchus (chief in war) and Eupolemus (good warrior); and others which denote a physician, as Iatrocles (famous healer) and Acesimbrotus (curer of mortals); and there are many others which might be cited, differing in their syllables and letters, but having the same meaning. You admit that?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who follow in the course of nature?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and are prodigies? for example, when a good and religious man has an irreligious son, he ought to bear the name not of his father, but of the class to which he belongs, just as in the case which was before supposed of a horse foaling a calf.

*Her.* Quite true.

*Soc.* Then the irreligious son of a religious father should be called irreligious?

*Her.* That is true.

*Soc.* He should not be called Theophilus (beloved of God) or Mnesitheus (mindful of God), or any of these names: if names are correctly given, his should have an opposite meaning.

*Her.* Certainly, Socrates.

*Soc.* Again, Hermogenes, there is Orestes (the man of the mountains) who is rightly called; whether chance gave the name, or perhaps some poet who meant to express the brutality and fierceness and mountain wildness of his hero’s nature.

*Her.* That is very likely, Socrates.

*Soc.* And his father’s name is also according to nature.

*Her.* That seems to be true.

*Soc.* Yes, for as is his name, so also is his nature; Agamemnon (admirable for remaining) is one who is patient and perse-

vering in the accomplishment of his resolves, and by his virtue crowns them; and the proof of this is the continuance of his purpose and of the host at Troy<sup>1</sup>. I have told you the meaning of the name Agamemnon; and I think that Atreus is rightly called, for his murder of Chrysippus and his exceeding cruelty to Thyestes are damaging and destructive to his reputation; the name is a little altered and disguised so as not to be intelligible to every one, but to the etymologist there is no difficulty in seeing the meaning, for whether you think of him as ἀτειρῆς the stubborn, or as ἀτρεστος the fearless, or as ἀτηρὸς the destructive one, the name is perfectly correct in every point of view. And I think that Pelops is also named appropriately; for, as the name implies, he is rightly called Pelops who sees what is near only (*ὅ τὰ πέλας δρῶν*).

*Her.* How is that?

*Soc.* Because, according to the tradition, he had no forethought or foresight of all the evil which the murder of Mytilus would entail upon his whole race in remote ages; he saw only what was near and immediate,—or in other words, *πέλας* (near), in his eagerness to win Hippodamia by all means for his bride. Every one would agree that the name of Tantalus is rightly given and in accordance with nature, if the traditions about him are true.

*Her.* And what are the traditions?

*Soc.* Many terrible misfortunes are said to have happened to him in his life—he ended by being the ruin of his country; and after his death he had the stone suspended over his head in the world below—all this agrees wonderfully well with his name. You might imagine that some person who wanted to call him *ταλάντατος* (the most weighed down by misfortune), disguised the name by altering it into Tantalus; but this transformation has been produced in the legend by accident. The name of Zeus, 396 who is his alleged father, has also an excellent meaning, although hard to be understood, because really like a sentence, which is divided into two parts, for some call him *Zena* (*Ζήνα*), and use the one half, and others call him *Dia* (*Δία*), and use the other

<sup>1</sup> Or: his long stay in Troy is a sign of the fulness and endurance of his character.

half; the two together signify the nature of the God, and the business of a name, as we were saying, is to express this. For there is none who is more the author of life to us and to all, than the lord and king of all. Wherefore we ought to call him Zena and Dia, which are one name, although divided, meaning the God in whom all creatures always have life (*οἱ οὐ ζῆντες πάσιν*). There is a want of reverence, at first sight, in calling him the son of Cronos (who is a proverb for stupidity), and we might rather expect Zeus to be the child of a mighty intellect. Which is the fact; for this is the meaning of his father's name: *Κρότος* quasi *Kópos*, not in the sense of a youth, but signifying *τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀκίρατον τοῦ νοῦ*, the pure and garnished mind. He, as we are informed by tradition, was begotten of Uranus, who is called *ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄρανος τὰ ἄνω* from looking upwards; and this, as philosophers tell us, is the way to have a pure mind, and the name Uranus is therefore correct. If I could remember the genealogy of Hesiod, I would have gone on and tried more conclusions of the same sort on the remoter ancestors of the Gods,—then I might have seen whether this philosophy, which has come to me all in an instant, I know not whence, will hold good to the end.

*Her.* You seem to me, Socrates, to be quite like a prophet newly inspired, and to be uttering oracles.

*Soc.* Yes, Hermogenes, and I believe that I caught the inspiration from the great Euthyphro of the Prospaltian deme, who gave me a long lecture which commenced at dawn: he talked and I listened, and his wisdom and enchanting ravishment has not only filled my ears but taken possession of my soul, and to-day I shall let his superhuman power work and finish the investigation of names—that will be the way; but to-morrow, if you are so disposed, we will conjure him away, and make a purgation of him, if we can only find some priest or sophist who is skilled in purifications of this sort.

*Her.* With all my heart; for I am very curious to hear the rest of the enquiry about names.

*Soc.* Then let us proceed; and where would you have us begin, now that we have got a sort of outline of the enquiry? Are there any names which witness of themselves that they are not given arbitrarily, but have a natural fitness? The names

of heroes and of men in general are apt to be deceptive because they are often called after ancestors with whose names, as we were saying, they may have no business, or they are the expression of a wish like Eutychides (the son of good fortune), or Sosias (the Saviour), or Theophilus (the beloved of God), and others. But I think that we had better leave these, for there will be more chance of finding correctness in the names of immutable essences;—there ought to have been more care taken in naming them, and perhaps there may have been some more than human power at work occasionally in giving them names.

*Her.* I think so, Socrates.

*Soc.* Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the Gods, and show that they are rightly named Gods?

*Her.* Yes, that will be well.

*Soc.* My notion would be something of this sort:—I suspect that the sun, moon, earth, stars, and heaven, which are still the Gods of many barbarians, were the only Gods known to the aboriginal Hellenes. Seeing that they were always moving and running, from this running nature of them they called them Gods or runners (*θεοὺς θέοντας*); and afterwards, when they discovered all the other Gods, they retained the old name. Do you think that likely?

*Her.* I think that very likely indeed.

*Soc.* What shall follow the Gods? Must not demons and heroes and men come next?

*Her.* Let us take demons.

*Soc.* I wish that you would consider what is the real meaning of this word ‘demons.’ I wonder whether you would think my view right?

*Her.* Let me hear.

*Soc.* You know how Hesiod uses the word?

*Her.* Indeed I do not.

*Soc.* Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race of men who came first?

*Her.* Yes, I know that.

*Soc.* He says of them—

‘But now that fate has closed over this race  
They are holy demons upon the earth,  
Beneficent, averters of ills, guardians of mortal men.’

*Her.* What of that?

*Soc.* What of that! Why, I suppose that he means by the golden men, not men literally made of gold, but good and noble; and I am convinced of this, because he further says that we are the iron race.

*Her.* That is true.

*Soc.* And do you not suppose that good men of our own day would by him be said to be of that golden race?

*Her.* Very likely.

*Soc.* And are not the good wise?

*Her.* Yes, they are wise.

*Soc.* And therefore I have the most entire conviction that he called them demons, because they were *δαήμονες* (knowing or wise), and in the ancient Attic dialect this is the very form of the word. Now he and other poets say truly, that when a good man dies he has honour and a mighty portion among the dead, and becomes a demon; which is a name given to him signifying wisdom. And I say too, that every wise man who happens to be a good man is more than human (*δαιμόνιος*) both in life and death, and is rightly called a demon.

*Her.* I believe that I quite agree with you in that. But what is the meaning of the word 'hero'? (*ἥρως*, in the old writing *ἥρως*.)

*Soc.* I think that there is no difficulty in explaining that, for the name is not much altered, and signifies that they were born of love.

*Her.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* Do you not know that the heroes are demigods?

*Her.* What then?

*Soc.* All of them sprang either from the love of a God for a mortal woman, or of a mortal man for a Goddess; think of the word in the old Attic, and you will see better that the name heros is only a slight alteration of Eros, from whom the heroes sprang: either this is the meaning, or, if not this, then they must have been skilful as rhetoricians and dialecticians, and able to put the question (*ἐρωτᾶν*), for *ἐρευνεῖν* is equivalent to *λέγειν*. And therefore, as I was saying, in the Attic dialect the heroes turn out to be rhetoricians and questioners. All this is easy enough; the noble breed of heroes are a tribe of sophists and rhetors.

But can you tell me why men are called *ἄνθρωποι*?—that is more difficult.

*Her.* No, I cannot; and I would not try even if I could, because I think that you are the more likely to succeed.

399 *Soc.* That is to say, you trust to the inspiration of Euthyphro.

*Her.* Of course.

*Soc.* Your faith is not vain; for at this very moment a new and ingenious thought strikes me, and, if I am not careful, before to-morrow's dawn I shall be wiser than I ought to be. Now, attend to me; and first, remember that we often put in and pull out letters in words, and give names as we please and change the accents. Take, for example, the word *Διὰ φίλος*; in order to convert this from a sentence into a noun, we omit one of the iotae and sound the middle syllable grave instead of acute; as, on the other hand, letters are sometimes inserted in words, and the acute takes the place of the grave.

*Her.* That is true.

*Soc.* The name *ἄνθρωπος*, which was once a sentence, and is now a noun, appears to be a case just of this sort, for one letter, which is the *a*, has been omitted, and the acute on the last syllable has been changed to a grave.

*Her.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* I mean to say that the word ‘man’ implies that other animals never examine, or consider, or look up at what they see, but that man not only sees (*διπλεῖ*) but considers and looks up at that which he sees, and hence he alone of all animals is rightly called *ἄνθρωπος*, meaning *ἀναθρέψεις διπλεῖ*.

*Her.* May I ask you to examine another word about which I am curious?

*Soc.* Certainly.

*Her.* I will take that which appears to me to follow next in order. You know the distinction of soul and body?

*Soc.* Of course.

*Her.* Let us endeavour to analyze them like the previous words.

*Soc.* You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of the word *ψυχὴ* (soul), and then of the word *σῶμα* (body)?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment, I

should imagine that those who first used the name  $\psi\chi\eta$  meant to express that the soul when in the body is the source of life and gives the power of breath and revival, and when this reviving power fails then the body perishes and dies, and this, if I am not mistaken, they called psyche. But please stay a moment ; I fancy that I can discover something which will be more acceptable to the disciples of Euthyphro, for I am afraid that 400 they will scorn this explanation. What do you say to another ?

*Her.* Let me hear.

*Soc.* What is that which holds and carries and gives life and motion to the entire nature of the body ? What is that but the soul ?

*Her.* Just that.

*Soc.* And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is the ordering and containing principle of all things ?

*Her.* Yes ; I do.

*Soc.* Then you may well call that power  $\phi\nu\sigma\acute{\epsilon}\chi\eta$  which carries and holds nature, and this may be refined away into  $\psi\chi\acute{\eta}$ .

*Her.* Certainly ; and I think that this is a more scientific derivation.

*Soc.* True ; and yet I cannot help laughing, if I am to suppose that this is the original meaning.

*Her.* But what shall we say of the next word ?

*Soc.* You mean  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$  (the body).

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* That may be variously interpreted ; and yet more variously if a little permutation is allowed. For some say that the body is the grave ( $\sigma\hat{\eta}\mu\alpha$ ) of the soul which may be thought to be buried in our present life ; or again the index of the soul, because the soul indicates ( $\sigma\eta\muai'rei$ ) through the body ; probably the Orphic poets were the inventors of the name, and they were under the impression that the soul is suffering the punishment of sin, and that the body is an enclosure or prison in which the soul is incarcerated, kept ( $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ ,  $\sigma\acute{\omega}\zeta\eta\tauai$ ), as the name  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$  implies, until the penalty is paid ; according to this view, not even a letter of the word need be changed.

*Her.* I think, Socrates, that we have said enough of this class of words. But have we any more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that which you were giving of Zeus ? I should

like to know whether any similar principle of correctness is to be applied to them. •

Soc. Yes, indeed, Hermogenes; and there is one excellent principle which, as men of sense, we must acknowledge, that of the Gods we know nothing, either of their natures or of the names which they give themselves; but we are sure that the names by which they call themselves, whatever they may be, are true. And this is the best of all principles; and the next best is to say, as in prayers, that we will call them by any sort or kind of names or patronymics which they like, because we do 401 not know of any other. That, I think, is a very good custom, and one which I should much wish to observe. Let us, then, if you please, in the first place announce to them that we are not enquiring about them; we do not presume that we are able to do that; but we are enquiring about the meaning of men in giving them these names,—in this there can be small blame.

Her. I think, Socrates, that you are quite right, and I would like to do as you say.

Soc. Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom?

Her. Yes, that will be very proper.

Soc. What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name Hestia?

Her. That is another and certainly a most difficult question.

Soc. My dear Hermogenes, the first imposers of names must surely have been considerable persons; they were philosophers, and had something to say.

Her. Well, and what of that?

Soc. They are the men to whom I should attribute the imposition of names. Even in foreign names, if you analyze them, a meaning is still discernible. For example, that which we term *oὐσία* is by some called *έστια*, and by others again *ώσια*. Now that the essence of things should be called *έστια*, which is akin to the first of these (*έστια*=*έστιά*), is rational enough. And there is reason in the Athenians calling that *έστια* which participates in *οὐσία*. For in ancient times we too seem to have said *έστια* for *οὐσία*, and this you may note to have been the idea of those who appointed that sacrifices should be first offered to *έστια*, which was natural enough if they meant that *έστια* was the essence of things. Those again who read *ώσια* seem to have

Inclined to the opinion of Heracleitus, that all things flow and nothing stands; with them the pushing principle is the cause and ruling power of all things, and is therefore rightly called *daimōn*. *Enōtē* of this, which is all that we who know nothing can affirm. Next in order after Hestia we ought to consider Rhea and Cronos, although the name of Cronos has been already discussed. But I dare say that I am talking great nonsense.

*Her.* Why, Socrates?

*Soc.* My good friend, I have discovered a hive of wisdom.

*Her.* Of what nature?

*Soc.* Well, rather ridiculous, and yet plausible.

*Her.* How plausible?

*Soc.* I fancy to myself Heracleitus repeating wise traditions of antiquity as old as the days of Cronos and Rhea, and of which Homer also spoke.

*Her.* How do you mean?

*Soc.* Heracleitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and nothing at rest; he compares them to the stream of a river, and says that you cannot go into the same water twice.

*Her.* That is true.

*Soc.* Well, then, how can we avoid inferring that he who gave the names of Cronos and Rhea to the ancestors of the Gods, agreed in the doctrine of Heracleitus? Is the giving of the names of streams to both of them purely accidental? Compare the line in which Homer, and, as I believe, Hesiod also, tells of

'Ocean, the origin of Gods, and mother Tethys.'

And again, Orpheus says, that

'The first river of Ocean was the first to marry, and he espoused his sister Tethys, who was his mother's daughter.'

You see that this is a remarkable coincidence, and all in the direction of Heracleitus.

*Her.* I think that there is something in what you say, Socrates; but I do not understand the meaning of the name Tethys.

*Soc.* Well, that is almost self-explained, being only the name of a spring, a little disguised: for that which is strained and filtered (*harrubēzōn iderūzōn*) may be likened to a spring, and the name Tethys is made up of these two words.

*Her.* That is ingenious, Socrates.

*Soc.* To be sure. But what comes next?—of Zeus we have spoken.

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then let us next take his two brothers, Poseidon and Pluto, whether the latter is called by that or by his other name.

*Her.* By all means.

*Soc.* Poseidon is *ποσιδῶνες*, the chain of the feet: the original inventor of the name had been stopped by the watery element in his walks, and not allowed to go on, and therefore he called the ruler of this element Poseidon: the ε was probably inserted as an ornament. Yet, perhaps, not so; but the name may have been originally written with a double λ and not with a σ, meaning that the God knew many things (*πολλὰ εἰδὼς*). And perhaps also he being the shaker of the earth, has been named from shaking (*τρέμειν*), and then π and ο have been added. Pluto gives wealth (*πλοῖτος*), and his name means the giver of wealth, which comes out of the earth beneath. People in general use the term as a euphemism for Hades, which their fears lead them erroneously to derive from the invisible (*ἀειδῆς*).

*Her.* And what is the true derivation?

*Soc.* In spite of the mistakes which are made about the power of this deity, and the foolish fears which people have of him, such as the fear of always being with him after death, and of the soul denuded of the body going to him, my belief is that all is quite consistent, and that the office and name of the God really correspond.

*Her.* Why, how is that?

*Soc.* I will tell you my own view; but first, I should like to ask you which chain does any animal feel to be the stronger? and which confines him more to the same spot,—desire or necessity?

*Her.* Desire, Socrates, is stronger far.

*Soc.* And do you not think that many an one would escape from Hades, if he did not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of chains?

*Her.* There can be no doubt of that.

*Soc.* And if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I should certainly infer, and not by necessity?

*Her.* That is clear.

*Soc.* And there are many desires?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be the greatest?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And is any desire stronger than the thought that you will be made better by associating with another?

*Her.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has been to him, is willing to come back to us? Even the Sirens, like all the rest of the world, have been laid under his spells. Such a charm, as I imagine, is the God able to infuse into his words. And, according to this view, he is the perfect and accomplished Sophist, and the great benefactor of the inhabitants of the other world; and even to us who are upon earth he sends from below exceeding blessings. For he has much more than he wants there, and that is why he is called Pluto (or the rich). Note also, that he will have nothing to do with men while they are in the body, but only when the soul is liberated from the desires and evils of the body. Now there is a great deal of philosophy and reflection in that: for in their liberated state he can bind them with the desire of virtue, but while they are flustered and maddened by the body, not even father Cronos himself would suffice to keep them with him in his own far-famed chains.

*Her.* I think that there is reason in that.

*Soc.* Yes, Hermogenes, and the legislator called him Hades, not from the unseen (*ἀειδὲς*)—far otherwise, but from his knowledge (*εἰδέναι*) of all noble things.

*Her.* Very good; and what do we say of Demeter, and Herè, and Apollo, and Athene, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities?

*Soc.* Demeter is ἡ διδοῦσα μήτηρ, who gives food like a mother; Herè is the lovely one (*ἔρατη*)—for Zeus, according to tradition, loved and married her; possibly also the name may have been given when the legislator was thinking of the heavens, and may be only a disguise of the air (*ἀὴρ*), putting the end in the place of the beginning. You will recognize the truth of this if you

repeat the letters of Herè several times over. People dread the name of Pherephatta as they dread the name of Apollo,—and with as little reason; the fear, if I am not mistaken, only arises from ignorance of the nature of names. But they go changing the name into Phersephone, and they are terrified at this; whereas the new name means only that the Goddess is wise (*σοφή*; for seeing that all things in the world are in motion (*φερομένων*), that principle which embraces and touches and is able to follow them, is wisdom. And therefore the Goddess may be truly called Pherepaphe (*Φερεπάφη*), or something of that sort, because she touches that which is in motion (*τὸν φερόμενον ἐφαπτομένη*), herein showing her wisdom. And Hades, who is wise, consorts with her, because she is wise. They alter her name into Pherephatta now-a-days, because the present generation care for euphony more than truth. There is the other name, Apollo, which, as I was saying, is generally supposed to have some terrible signification. Have you remarked that?

*Her.* To be sure I have, and what you say is true.

*Soc.* But the name, in my opinion, is really most expressive of the power of the God.

*Her.* How is that?

*Soc.* I will endeavour to explain, for I do not believe that any 405 single name could have been better adapted to express the attributes of the God, touching on and in a manner signifying all four of them,—music, and prophecy, and medicine, and archery.

*Her.* That must be a strange name, and I should like to hear the explanation.

*Soc.* Say rather an harmonious name, as beseems the God of Harmony. In the first place, the purgations and purifications which doctors and diviners use, and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as well as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same object, which is to make a man pure both in body and soul.

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* And is not Apollo the purifier, and the washer, and the absolver from all impurities?

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then in reference to his ablutions and absolutions, as

being the physician who cures them, he may be rightly called 'Απόλλων (purifier), or in respect of his powers of divination, and his truth and sincerity, which is the same as truth, he may be most fitly called 'Απόλλος, from ἀπόλλος sincere, as in the Thessalian dialect, for all the Thessalians call him 'Απόλλος; also he is ἀράχτης (always shooting), because he is a master archer who never misses; or again, the name may refer to his musical attributes, and then, as in διάλυσε, and ἀσύρμα, and in many other words the α is supposed to mean 'together,' so the meaning of the name Apollo will be 'moving together,' whether in the so-called poles of heaven, or in the harmony of song, which is termed concord, because he moves all together by a harmonious power, as astronomers and musicians ingeniously declare. And he is the God who presides over harmony, and makes all things move round together, both among Gods and men. And, as in the words ἀκόλθος and ἀκοτης the α is substituted for an ο, so the name 'Απόλλος is equivalent to Απόλλα, only the second λ is added in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction (ἀπόλλω). Now the suspicion of this still haunts the minds of some who do not consider the true value of the name, which, as 406 I was saying just now<sup>1</sup>, has reference to all the powers of the God, who is the single one, the ever-darting, the purifier, the mover together (ἀπόλλος, ἀπόλλα, ἀπόλλων, ἀπόλλων). The name of the Muses and of music would seem to be derived from their making philosophical enquiries (ἀρέσκεια); and Leto is called by this name, because she is such a gentle Goddess, and willing (εὐθύνων) to grant our requests; or her name may be Letho, as strangers often call her—they seem to imply in this her slowness to anger, and her readiness to forgive and forget (νηστίς). Artemis is named from her healthy (ἀρετή), happy nature, and because of her love of virginity, perhaps because she is a proficient in virtue (ἀρετή), and perhaps also as hating intercourse of the sexes (τὸν διορθοῦ παρεγγάγειαν). He who gave the Goddess her name may have had any or all of these reasons.

*Plato.* What is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite?

*Socrates.* Son of Hippomenes, that is a solemn question; there is a serious and also a facetious explanation of both these names;

<sup>1</sup> Omitting μολις.

the serious explanation is not to be had from me, but there is no objection to your hearing the facetious one; for the Gods too love a joke. Διώνυσος is simply διδοὺς οὐρός (giver of wine), Διοολίντος, as he might be called in fun,—and οὐρός is properly οἰνόρος, because wine makes those who drink, think (*οἴεσθαι*) that they have a mind (*νοῦν*) when they have none. The derivation of Aphrodite, born of the foam (*ἀφρός*), may be fairly accepted on the authority of Hesiod.

*Her.* Still there remains Athene, whom you, Socrates, as an Athenian, will surely not forget; there are also Hephaestus and Ares.

*Soc.* I am not likely to forget them.

*Her.* No.

*Soc.* There is no difficulty in explaining the other appellation of Athene.

*Her.* What other appellation?

*Soc.* We call her Pallas.

*Her.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And we cannot be wrong in supposing that this is derived from armed dances. For the elevation of oneself or anything else above the earth or in the hands we call shaking (*πάλασσειν*), or dancing.

*Her.* That is quite true.

*Soc.* Then that is the explanation of the name Pallas?

*Her.* Yes; but what do you say of the other name?

*Soc.* Athene?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* That is a graver matter, and there, my friend, I think that the modern interpreters of Homer may assist in explaining the view of the ancients. For most of these in their explanations of the poet, assert that he meant by Athene 'mind' (*νοῦς*) and 'intelligence' (*διάνοια*), and the maker of names appears to have had a singular notion about her; and indeed calls her by a still higher title, 'divine intelligence' (*θεοῦ νόησιν*), as though he would say: This is she who has the mind of God (*θεονόα*);—using *α* as a dialectical variety for *η*, and taking away *ι* and *σ*. Perhaps, however, there may be a further explanation; the name *θεούση* may mean 'she who knows divine things' (*θεῖα νοοῦσα*). Nor shall we be far wrong in supposing that he wished to identify this

Goddess with mortal intelligence is *Wise woman*, and there are who gave her the name *Hera*, which, however, either he or his successors have altered into what they thought a nicer term, and called her Athene.

*Her.* But what do you say of Hephaestus?

*Soc.* Speak you of the princey lord of light *Ares* *Brave*?<sup>1</sup>

*Her.* Surely.

*Soc.* Hephaestus is *Brave*, and has added the *s* by attraction, that is obvious to anybody.

*Her.* That is very probable, until some more probable notion gets into your head.

*Soc.* To prevent that, you had better ask what is the derivation of Ares.

*Her.* What is Ares?

*Soc.* Ares may be called, if you will, from his manhood *Man* and manliness, or if you please, from his hard and unchangeable nature, which is the meaning of *Ares*; this latter is a derivation quite appropriate to the God of war.

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* And now, by the Gods, let us have no more of the Gods, for I am afraid of them; ask about anything but them, and thou shalt see how the steeds of Euthyphro can prance.

*Her.* Only one more God! I should like to know about Hermes, of whom I am said not to be a true son. Let us make him out, and then I shall know whether there is anything in what Cratylus says.

*Soc.* I should imagine that the name Hermes has to do with speech, and signifies that he is the interpreter (*ερμηνεὺς*), or messenger, or thief, or liar, or bargainer; all that sort of thing has a great deal to do with language; as I was telling you, the word *εἰπεῖν* is expressive of the use of speech, and there is an old Homeric word *εἴρηνος*, which means 'he contrived'; and out of these two words, *εἰπεῖν* and *εἴρηνος*, the legislator formed the name of the God who invented language and speech<sup>1</sup>; and we may imagine him dictating to us the use of this name; 'O my friends,' says he to us, 'seeing that he is the contriver of tales or speeches, you may rightly call him *Eipeiros*.' And this has been

<sup>1</sup> Omitting τὸ δὲ λέγειν δῆ ἐστιν εἰπεῖν.

improved by us, as we think, into Hermes. Iris also appears to have been called from the verb 'to tell' (*εἰπεῖν*), because she was a messenger.

*Her.* Then I am very sure that Cratylus was quite right in saying that I was no true son of Hermes (*Ἑρμογένης*), for I am not a good hand at speeches.

*Soc.* There is also reason, my friend, in Pan being the double-formed son of Hermes.

*Her.* How do you make that out?

*Soc.* You are aware that speech signifies all things (*πᾶν*), and is always turning them round and round, and has two forms, true and false?

*Her.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Is not the truth that is in him the smooth or sacred form which dwells above among the Gods, whereas falsehood dwells among men below, and is rough like the goat of tragedy; for tales and falsehoods have generally to do with the tragic or goatish life, and tragedy is the place of them.

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then surely Pan, who is the declarer of all things (*πᾶν*) and the perpetual revolver (*ἀεὶ πολῶν*) of all things, is rightly called *αἴτόλος* (goat-herd), he being the two-formed son of Hermes, smooth in his upper part, and rough and goatlike in his lower regions. And, as the son of Hermes, he is speech or the brother of speech, and that brother should be like brother is no marvel. But, as I was saying, my dear Hermogenes, let us get away from the Gods.

*Her.* From these sort of Gods, by all means, Socrates. But why should we not discuss another kind of Gods—the sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year?

*Soc.* You impose a great many tasks upon me. Still, if you wish, I will not refuse.

*Her.* You will oblige me.

*Soc.* How would you have me begin? Shall I take the sun first, which you mentioned first?

*Her.* Very good.

*Soc.* The origin of the sun will probably be clearer in the 409 Doric form, for the Dorians call him *ἄλιος*, and this name is given to him because when he rises he gathers (*ἄλιξοι*) men

together or because he is always rolling in his course (*εἰλεύνω* *ἰών*) about the earth: or from *αιολεύνω*, of which the meaning is the same as *ποιηίλλειν* to variegate, because he variegates the productions of the earth.

*Her.* But what is *σελήνη* (the moon)?

*Soc.* That name is rather unfortunate for Anaxagoras.

*Her.* How is that?

*Soc.* The word seems to forestall his recent discovery, that the moon receives her light from the sun.

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* The two words *σέλας* (brightness) and *φῶς* (light) have the same meaning?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* This light about the moon is always new (*νέον*) and always old (*ἔρον*), if the disciples of Anaxagoras say truly. For the sun in his revolution always adds new light, and there is the old light of the previous month.

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* Many call the moon *σελανάλα*.

*Her.* True.

*Soc.* And as she has a light which is always old and always new (*ἔρον νέον ἀεὶ*), she may very properly have the name *σελανάλανά*, and this is hammered into shape and called *σελανάλα*.

*Her.* A real dithyrambic sort of name that, Socrates. But what do you say of the month and the stars?

*Soc.* Μῆν (month) is called from *μειοῦσθαι* (to lessen), because suffering diminution: the name of *ἄστρα* (stars) seems to be derived from *ἀστραπή*, which is an improvement on *ἀναστρωπή*, signifying the upsetting of the eyes (*ἀναστρέψειν ὁπα*).

*Her.* What do you say of *πῦρ* (fire) and *ὕδωρ* (water)?

*Soc.* I am at a loss how to explain *πῦρ*; either the muse of Euthyphro has deserted me, or there is some very great difficulty in the word. Please, however, to note the contrivance which I adopt whenever I am in a difficulty of this sort.

*Her.* What is that?

*Soc.* I will tell you; but I should like to know first whether you can tell me what is the meaning of the word *πῦρ*?

*Her.* Indeed I cannot.

*Soc.* Shall I tell you what I suspect to be the true explanation

of this and several other words?—I believe that they are of foreign origin. For the Hellenes, especially those who were under the dominion of the barbarians, often took words from them.

*Her.* Well, and what follows from that?

*Soc.* Why, you know that any one who seeks to demonstrate the fitness of these names according to the Hellenic language, and not according to the language from which the words are derived, is rather likely to be at fault.

*Her.* Yes, certainly.

410 *Soc.* Well then, consider whether this *πῦρ* is not foreign; for the word is not easily brought into relation with the Hellenic tongue, and the Phrygians may be observed to have the same word slightly inflected, just as they have *ιδωρ* and *κύνες* (dogs), and many other words.

*Her.* That is true.

*Soc.* Any violent interpretations of the words should be avoided; for something to say about them may easily be found. And thus I get rid of *πῦρ* and *ιδωρ*. 'Αήρ (air), Hermogenes, may be explained as the element which raises (*αὔρει*) things from the earth, or as ever flowing (*ἀεὶ ρεῖ*), or because the flux of the air is wind, and the poet calls the winds 'air-blasts,' and I suppose him to mean by the word 'wind-flux,' 'air-flux,' as you might say, because they are air. Αἰθήρ (aether) I should interpret as *ἀειθεήρ*; this may be correctly said, because this element is always running in a flux about the air (*ἀεὶ θεῖ ἀέρα ρέων*). The meaning of the word γῆ (earth) comes out better when in the form of γῆ, for the earth may be truly called 'mother' (*γαῖα γεγενῆτερα*), as Homer implies when he uses the term *γεγάσῃ* for *γεγενῆσθαι*.

*Her.* Good.

*Soc.* What shall we take next?

*Her.* There are ὥραι (the seasons), and the two names of the year, ἐνιαυτὸς and ἔτος.

*Soc.* The ὥραι should be spelt in the old Attic way, if you desire to know the probable truth about them; they are rightly called the ὥραι because they divide (*διλίζονται*) the summers and winters and winds and the fruits of the earth. The words ἐνιαυτὸς and ἔτος appear to be the same,—‘that which brings to

light the plants and growths of the earth in their turn, and passes them in review within itself (*αἰτὸς εἰναι τῷ ἐξετάσει*) : this is broken up into two words, *ἐναντίος* from *εἰναι τῷ*, and *επος* from *εξετάσει*, just as the original name of *Zeūs* was divided into *Zēus* and *Δαῦς*: and the whole proposition means that this power of reviewing from within is one, but has two names, two words *ἐπος* and *ἐναντίος* being thus formed out of a single proposition.

*Her.* Indeed, Socrates, you make surprising progress.

*Soc.* I am run away with.

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* But not yet at my utmost speed.

*Her.* I should like very much to know, in the next place, how 411 you would explain the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those charming words—wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of them?

*Soc.* That is a tremendous class of names which you are disinterring: still, as I have put on the lion's skin, I must not be faint of heart: and I suppose that I must consider the meaning of wisdom and understanding, and judgment and knowledge, and all those other charming words, as you call them?

*Her.* Surely, we must not leave off until we find out their meaning.

*Soc.* By the dog of Egypt I have not a bad notion which came into my head only this moment: I believe that the primeval givers of names were undoubtedly like too many of our modern philosophers, who, in their search after the nature of things, are always getting dizzy from constantly going round and round, and then they imagine that the world is going round and round and moving anyhow: and this appearance, which arises out of their own internal condition, they suppose to be a reality of nature; they think that there is nothing stable or permanent, but only flux and motion, and that the world is full of every sort of motion and change. The consideration of the names which I mentioned has led me into making this reflection.

*Her.* How is that, Socrates?

*Soc.* Perhaps you did not observe that in the names which have been just cited, the motion or flux or generation of things is most surely indicated.

*Her.* No, indeed, I never thought of it.

*Soc.* Take the first of those which you mentioned; clearly that is a name indicative of motion.

*Her.* What was the name?

*Soc.* Φύρωντις (wisdom), which may signify φορᾶς καὶ βίου τόντος (perception of motion and flux), or perhaps φορᾶς ὄντος (the blessing of motion), but is at any rate connected with φέρεσθαι (motion); γνώμη (judgment), again, certainly implies the ponderation or consideration (*rώμησις*) of generation, for to ponder is the same as to consider; or, if you would rather, there is τόντος, which is νέον ἔστις (the desire of the new); the word νέος implies that the world is always in process of creation. The giver of the name wanted to express this longing of the soul, for the original name was νεότης and not τόντος, but η took the place of a double ε. The word σωφροσύνη is the salvation (*iσωτηρία*) of that wisdom 412 (φύρωνται) which we were just now considering. Ἐπιστήμη (knowledge) is akin to this, and indicates that the soul which is good for anything follows (*ἐπεταί*) the motion of things, neither anticipating them nor falling behind them; wherefore the word should rather be read as ἐπιστημένη<sup>1</sup>, adding an ε. Σύνεστις (understanding) is a kind of conclusion, and is derived from συνιέναι (to go along with), which, like ἐπιστασθαι (to know), implies the progression of the soul in company with the nature of things. Σοφία (wisdom) is very dark, and appears not to be of native growth; the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things. You must remember that the poets, when they speak of the commencement of any rapid motion, often use the word ἐσύθη (she rushed); and there was a famous Lacedaemonian who was named Σοῦς (Rush), for by this word the Lacedaemonians signify rapid motion, and the touching (*ἐπαφή*) of motion is expressed by σοφία, for all things are supposed to be in motion. Good (*ἀγαθὸν*) is the name which is given to the admirable (*ἀγαστῷ*) in nature; for, although all things move, still there are degrees of motion; some are swifter, some slower; but there are some things which are admirable for their swiftness, and this admirable part of nature is called *ἀγαθόν*. Δικαιοσύνη (justice) is clearly δικαίου σύνεστις (understanding of the just); but the actual word δικαιον is more difficult: men are only agreed to a certain extent

<sup>1</sup> The reading is here uncertain.

about justice and then they begin to disagree. For those who suppose all things to be in motion conceive the greater part of nature to be a mere receptacle; and they say that there is a penetrating power which passes through all this, and is the instrument of creation in all, and is the subtlest and swiftest element, for if it were not the subtlest, and a power which none can keep out, and also the swiftest, passing by other things as if they were standing still, it could not penetrate through the moving universe. And this element, which superintends all things and pierces *(θάλαττα)* all, is rightly called *δίκην*; the letter *ε* is only added for the sake of euphony. Thus far, as I was saying, there is a general agreement about the nature of justice; but I, Hermogenes, being an enthusiastic disciple, have been told in a mystery that this is justice and the cause of the world: now a cause is that because of which anything is created; and some one comes and whispers in my ear that justice is so called because partaking of the nature of the cause, and I begin, after hearing what he has said, to interrogate him gently: 'Well, my excellent friend,' say I, 'but if all this be true, I still want to know what is justice?' Thereupon they think that I ask tiresome questions, and am leaping over the barriers, and have been already sufficiently answered, and they try to satisfy me with one derivation after another, and at length they quarrel. For one of them says that justice is the sun, and that he only is the piercing (*θάλαττα*) and burning (*σαρπα*) element which is the guardian of nature. And when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I am answered by the satirical remark, 'What, is there no justice in the world when the sun is down?' And when I earnestly beg my questioner to tell me his own honest opinion, he says, 'Fire in the abstract'; but this is not very intelligible. Another says, 'No, not fire in the abstract, but the abstraction of heat in the fire.' Another man professes to laugh at all this, and says, as Anaxagoras says, that justice is mind, for mind, as they say, has absolute power, and mixes with nothing, and orders all things, and passes through all things. At last, my friend, I find myself in far greater perplexity about the nature of justice than I was before I began to learn. But still I am of opinion that the name, which has led me into this digression, was given for the reasons which I have mentioned.

*Her.* I think, Socrates, that you are not improving now ; you must have heard this from some one else.

*Soc.* And not the rest?

*Her.* Hardly.

*Soc.* Well, then, let me go on in the hope of making you believe in the originality of the rest. What remains after justice? I do not think that we have as yet discussed courage (*bravery*), for injustice (*timoros*), which is obviously nothing more than a hindrance to the penetrating principle (*haeritos*), need not be considered. Well, then, the name of *bravery* seems to imply a battle : this battle is in the world of existence, and according to the doctrine of flux is only the counterflux (*ekavria p̄h*) : if you extract the *p̄* from *arete*, the name at once signifies the thing, and you may clearly understand that not the stream opposed to every stream is *bravela*, but only to that which is contrary to justice, for otherwise courage would not have been praised. The words *brave* (male) and *hero* (man) also contain a similar allusion to the same principle of the upward flux (*t̄h avoroph*). *Fuq* (woman) I expect to be the same word as *yov̄i* (birth) ; *giale* (female) appears to be derived from *θηλη* (the teat,) because the teat is like rain, and makes things have a flourishing look (*reθηλέval*).

*Her.* That is surely probable.

*Soc.* Yes ; and the very word *θικεiv* (to flourish) seems to figure the growth of youth, which is swift and sudden ever. And this is expressed by the legislator in the name, which is a compound of *θeiv* (running), and *aikevθai* (leaping). Pray observe how I gallop away when I get on smooth ground. There are a good many names generally thought to be of importance, which have still to be explained.

*Her.* That is true.

*Soc.* There is the meaning of the word *t̄eym* (art), for example.

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* That may be identified with *égorón*, and expresses the possession of mind : you have only to take away the *τ* and insert two *o*'s, one between the *χ* and *v*, and another between the *v* and *η*.

*Her.* That is a very shabby etymology.

*Soc.* Yes, my dear friend ; but then you know that the original

names have been long ago buried and disguised by people sticking on and stripping off letters for the sake of euphony, and twisting and bedizening them in all sorts of ways: and time too may have had a share in the change. Take, for example, the word *κάτοπτρον*; why is the letter *ρ* inserted? This must surely be the addition of some one who cares nothing about the truth, but thinks only of putting the mouth into shape. And the additions are often such that at last no human being can possibly make out the original meaning of the word. Another example is the word *σφιγξ*, *σφιγγός*, which ought properly to be *φὶγξ*, *φὶγγός*, and there are other examples.

*Her.* That is quite true, Socrates.

*Soc.* And yet, if you are permitted to put in and pull out any letters which you please, names will be too easily made, and any name may be adapted to any object.

*Her.* That is true.

*Soc.* Yes, that is true. And therefore a wise dictator, like yourself, should observe the laws of moderation and probability.

*Her.* That is my desire.

*Soc.* And mine, too, Hermogenes. But do not be too much of a precisian, or 'you will unnerve me of my strength'<sup>1</sup>. When 415 you have allowed me to add *μηχανή* (contrivance) to *τέχνη* (art) I shall be at the top of my bent, for I conceive *μηχανή* to be a sign of great accomplishment—*ἀνευ*; for *μῆκος* has the meaning of greatness, and these two, *μῆκος* and *ἀνευ*, make up the word *μηχανή*. But, as I was saying, being at the top of my bent, I should like to consider the meaning of the two words *ἀρετή* (virtue) and *κακία* (vice); *ἀρετή* I do not as yet understand, but *κακλα* is transparent, and agrees with the principles which preceded, for all things being in a flux (*ιόντων*), *κακλα* is *κακῶς ιόν* (going badly); and this evil motion when existing in the soul has assuredly the general name of *κακλα*, or vice. The meaning of *κακῶς λέναι* may be further illustrated by the use of *δειλία* (cowardice), which ought to have come after *ἀνδρελα*, but was forgotten, and, as I fear, is not the only word which has been passed over. *Δειλία* signifies that the soul is bound with a strong chain (*δεσμὸς*), for *λάν* means strength, and therefore *δειλία* expresses the greatest and strongest bond of the soul; and *ἀπορλα*

<sup>1</sup> Iliad vi. 265.

(difficulty) is an evil of the same nature (from *a* not, and πορεύεσθαι to go), like anything else which is an impediment to motion and movement. Then the word *κακία* appears to mean κακώς ἔραι, or going badly, or limping and halting; of which the consequence is, that the soul becomes filled with vice. And if *κακία* is the name of this sort of thing, ἀρετή will be the opposite of this, signifying in the first place ease of motion, then that the stream of the good soul is unimpeded, and has therefore the attribute of ever flowing without let or hindrance, and is therefore called ἀρετή, or, more correctly, ἀειφετή (ever-flowing), and may perhaps have had another form, αἱρετή (eligible), indicating that nothing is more eligible than virtue, and this has been hammered into ἀρετή. I daresay that you will deem this to be another invention of mine, but I think that if the previous word *κακία* was right, then ἀρετή is also right.

416 *Her.* But what is the meaning of *καλὸν*, which has indeed played a great part in your etymologies?

*Soc.* That is a very singular word about which I can hardly form an opinion, and therefore I must have recourse to that ingenious device of mine.

*Her.* What device?

*Soc.* The device of a foreign origin, which I shall give to this word also.

*Her.* Very likely you are right; but suppose that we leave these words, and endeavour to see the rationale of *καλὸν* and *ἀσχρόν*.

*Soc.* The meaning of *ἀσχρόν* is evident, being only ἀεὶ ἵσχον ρόῆς (always preventing from flowing), and this is in accordance with our former derivations. For the name-giver was a great enemy to stagnation of all sorts, and hence he gave the name ἀεισχοροῦν to that which hindered the flux (ἀεὶ ἵσχον ροῦν), and this is now beaten together into *ἀσχρόν*.

*Her.* But what do you say of *καλόν*?

*Soc.* That is more obscure; yet the form is only due to the quantity, and has been changed by altering *ov* into *o*.

*Her.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* This name appears to denote mind.

*Her.* How is that?

*Soc.* Let me ask you what is the cause why anything has

a name; is not the principle which imposes the name the cause?

*Her.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And must not this be the mind of Gods, or of men, or of both?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* Is not mind that which called (*καλέσας*) things by their names, and is not mind the beautiful (*καλόν*)?

*Her.* That is evident.

*Soc.* And are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of praise, and are not other works worthy of blame?

*Her.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Physic does the work of a physician, and carpentering does the works of a carpenter?

*Her.* Exactly.

*Soc.* And the principle of beauty does the works of beauty?

*Her.* Of course.

*Soc.* And that principle we affirm to be mind?

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works which we recognize and speak of as the beautiful?

*Her.* That is evident.

*Soc.* What more names remain to us?

*Her.* There are the words which are connected with ἀγαθὸς and καλὸν, such as συμφέρον and λυσιτελοῦν, ὀφέλιμον, κερδαλέον, and their opposites.

*Soc.* The meaning of συμφέρον expedient I think that you may discover for yourself by the light of the previous examples,—for it is a sister word to ἐπιστήμη, meaning just the motion (*φορὰ*) of the soul accompanying the world, and things which are done upon this principle are called σύμφορα or συμφέροντα, because they are carried round with the world.

*Her.* That is probable.

*Soc.* Again, κερδαλέον (gainful) is called from κέρδος (gain), but you must alter the δ into ρ if you want to get at the meaning; for this word also signifies good, but in another way; he who gave the name intended to express the power of admixture (*κεραυνύμενον*) and universal penetration in the good; in forming the word, however, he inserted a δ instead of an ρ, and so made κέρδος.

*Her.* Well, but what is *λνσιτελοῦν* (profitable) ?

*Soc.* I suppose, Hermogenes, that people do not mean by the profitable the gainful or that which pays (*λύει*) the retailer, but they use the word in the sense of swift. You regard the profitable (*λνσιτελοῖν*), as that which being the swiftest thing in existence, allows of no stay in things and no pause or end of motion, but always, if there begins to be any end, lets things go again (*λύει*), and makes motion immortal and unceasing : and in this point of view, as appears to me, the good is happily denominated *λνσιτελοῖν*— being that which looses (*λύει*) the end (*τέλος*) of motion. *Ωφέλιμον* (the advantageous) is derived from *όφέλλειν*, meaning that which creates and increases ; this is a common Homeric word, and has a foreign character.

*Her.* And what do you say of the inopposites?

*Soc.* Of such as are mere negatives I hardly think that I need speak.

*Her.* Which are they?

*Soc.* The words *ἀξύμφορον* (inexpedient), *ἀνωφελὲς* (unprofitable), *ἀλνσιτελὲς* (unadvantageous), *ἀκερδὲς* (ungainful).

*Her.* True.

*Soc.* But I would rather take the words *βλαβερὸν* (harmful), *ζημιώδες* (hurtful).

*Her.* Good.

*Soc.* The word *βλαβερὸν* is that which is said to hinder or harm (*βλάπτειν*) the stream (*ῥοῦν*) ; *βλάπτον* is *βουλόμενον ἀπτειν* (seeking to hold or bind) ; for *ἀπτειν* is the same as *δεῖν*, and *δεῖν* is always a term of censure ; *βουλόμενον ἀπτειν ῥοῦν* (wanting to bind the stream), would properly be *βουλαπτεροῦν*, and this, as I imagine, is improved into *βλαβερόν*.

*Her.* You bring out curious results, Socrates, in the use of names ; and when I hear the word *βουλαπτεροῦν* I cannot help imagining that you are making your mouth into a flute, and puffing away at a prelude to Athene.

418 *Soc.* That is the fault of the name, Hermogenes ; not mine.

*Her.* Very true ; but what is the derivation of *ζημιώδες* ?

*Soc.* What is the meaning of *ζημιώδες* ?—let me remark, Hermogenes, how right I was in saying that great changes are made in the meaning of words by putting in and pulling out letters ; even a very slight permutation will sometimes give an entirely

opposite sense; I may instance the word *δεον*, which occurs to me at the moment, and reminds me of what I was going to say to you, that the fine fashionable language of modern times has twisted and disguised and entirely altered the original meaning both of *δεον*, and also of *γενιατης*, which in the old language is clearly indicated.

*Her.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* I will try to explain. You are aware that our forefathers loved the sounds *i* and *e*, especially the women, who are most conservative of the ancient language, but now they change *i* into *η* or *ɛ*, and *ε* into *ζ*; this is supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound.

*Her.* How do you mean?

*Soc.* For example, in very ancient times they called the day either *λαέα* or *λαέα*, which is called by us *λαέα*.

*Her.* That is true.

*Soc.* Do you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention of the giver of the name? of which the reason is, that men long for (*τιμησι*) and love the light coming after the darkness, thence called *λαέα* (from *λαέει*, desire.) But now the name is so travestied that you cannot tell the meaning, although some are of opinion that the day is called *λαέα*, because making things gentle (*λαέπα*).

*Her.* That is my view.

*Soc.* And do you know that the ancients said *δροζήρ* and not *ξροζήρ*?

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* And *γρύζηρ* (yoke) has no meaning, but the word *δροζήρ* is very expressive of the binding of two together (*δρεῖρ ἀγοῖ*) for the purpose of drawing; - this has been changed into *ξροζήρ*, and there are many other examples of similar changes.

*Her.* There are.

*Soc.* Proceeding in the same train of thought I may remark that the word *δεον* (obligation) has a meaning which is the opposite of all the other appellations of good; for *δεον* is here a species of good, and is, nevertheless, the chain (*δεοτης*) or hinderer of motion, and therefore own brother of *βλαφεπών*.

*Her.* Yes, Socrates, and that is true.

*Soc.* Not if you restore the ancient form, which is more likely to be the correct one, and read δῶν instead of δέον; if you convert the ε into an ι after the old fashion, this word will then agree with other words meaning good; for δῶν, not δέον, signifies the good, and is a term of praise; and the author of names has not fallen into any contradiction, but in all these various appellations, δέον (obligatory), ὀφέλιμον (advantageous), λυστελοῦν (profitable), κερδαλέον (gainful), ἄγαθὸν (good), συμφέρον (expedient), εὔπορον (plenteous), the same conception is implied of the ordering or all-pervading principle which is praised, and the restraining and binding principle which is censured. And this is further illustrated by the word ζημιώδης (hurtful), which if the ζ is only changed into δ as in the ancient language, becomes δημιώδης; and this name, as you will perceive, is given to that which binds motion (*δοῦντι λόν*).

*Her.* What do you say of ἡδονὴ (pleasure), λύπη (pain), ἐπιθυμία (desire), and the like, Socrates?

*Soc.* I do not think, Hermogenes, that there is any great difficulty about them—ἡδονὴ is ἡ ὄνησις, the action which tends to advantage; and the original form may be supposed to have been ἡοινή, but this has been altered by the insertion of the δ. Λύπη appears to be derived from the relaxation (λύεω) which the body feels when in sorrow; ἀνία (trouble) is the hindrance of motion (*a* and *lēvai*); ἀλγηδῶν (distress), if I am not mistaken, is a foreign word, which is derived from ἀλγεινὸς (grievous); δδύνη (grief) is called from the putting on (*ἐνδύνης*) sorrow; in ἀχθηδῶν (vexation) the word too labours, as any one may see; χαρὰ (joy) is the very expression of the fluency and diffusion of the soul (χέω); τερπνὸν (delightful) is so called from the breath creeping (*ἔρπον*) through the soul, which may be likened to a breath, and is properly ἔρπονūν, but has been altered by time into τερπνόν; ἐνθροσύνη (cheerfulness) and ἐπιθυμία explain themselves; the former, which ought to be ἐνθροσύνη and has been changed into ἐνθροσύνη, is named, as every one may see, from the soul moving (*φέρεσθαι*) in harmony with nature; ἐπιθυμία is really ἡ ἐπὶ τὸν θυμὸν λοντα δύναμις, the power which enters into the soul; θυμὸς (passion) is called from the rushing (*θύσεως*) and boiling of the soul; ἴμερος (desire) denotes the stream (*ρόὖς*) which most draws the soul διὰ τὴν ἔστι τῆς ροῆς—because flowing with desire (*ἰέμενος*), and expresses a

longing after things and violent attraction of the soul to them, 420 and is termed *īμερος* from possessing this power; *πόθος* (longing) is expressive of the desire of that which is not present but absent, and in another place (*πον*); this is the reason why the name *πόθος* is applied to things absent, as *īμερος* is to things present: *ἔρως* (love) is so called because flowing in (*ἐσρῶν*) from without; the stream is not inherent, but is an influence introduced through the eyes, and from flowing in was called *ἔσρος* (influx) in the old time when they used *ο* for *ω*, and is called *ἔρως*, now that *ω* is substituted for *ο*. But why do you not give me another word?

*Her.* What do you think of *δόξα* (opinion), and that class of words?

*Soc.* *Δόξα* is either derived from *δίωξις* (pursuit), and expresses the march of the soul in the pursuit of knowledge, or from the shooting of a bow (*τόξον*); the latter is more likely, and is confirmed by *οἴησις* (thinking), which is only *οἴσις* (moving), and implies the movement of the soul to the essential nature of each thing—just as *βουλὴ* (counsel) has to do with shooting (*βολή*); and *βούλεσθαι* (to wish) combines the notion of aiming and deliberating—all these words seem to follow *δόξα*, and all involve the idea of shooting, just as *ἀβονλία*, absence of counsel, on the other hand, is a mishap, or missing, or mistaking of the mark, or aim, or proposal, or object.

*Her.* You are quickening your pace now, Socrates.

*Soc.* Why yes, the end I now dedicate to<sup>1</sup> God, not, however, until I have explained *ἀνάγκη* (necessity), which ought to come next, and *ἐκούσιον* (the voluntary). ‘*Ἐκούσιον*’ is certainly the yielding (*εἰκον*) and unresisting—the notion implied is yielding and not opposing, yielding, as I was just now saying, to that motion which is in accordance with our will; but the necessary and resistant being contrary to our will, implies error and ignorance; the idea is taken from walking through a ravine which is impassable, and rugged, and overgrown, and impedes motion—and this is the derivation of the word *ἀναγκαῖον* (necessary) *ἀν'* *ἄγκη* *ἰὸν*, going through a ravine. But while my strength lasts let us persevere, and I hope that you will persevere with your questions.

<sup>1</sup> Reading θεῷ.

*Her.* Well, then, let me ask about the greatest and noblest, 421 such as ἀλήθεια (truth) and ψεῦδος (falsehood) and ὄν (being), not forgetting to enquire why the word ὄνομα (name), which is the theme of our discussion, has this name of ὄνομα.

*Soc.* You know the word μάλεσθαι (to seek)?

*Her.* Yes;—meaning the same as ζητεῖν (to enquire).

*Soc.* The word ὄνομα seems to be a compressed sentence, signifying ὅν οὐδὲ ζήτημα (that this is in reality that which is being sought); as is still more obvious in ὄνομαστὸν (notable), which states in so many words that real existence is that for which there is a search (*ὅν οὐ μάστημα*); ἀλήθεια is also an agglomeration of θεῖα ἀλη (divine wandering), implying the divine motion of existence; ψεῦδος (falsehood) is the opposite of motion; here is another ill name given by the legislator to stagnation and forced inaction, which he compares to sleep (*εῦθαινειν*); but the original meaning of the word is disguised by the addition of ψ; ὄν and οὐσία are λόγοι with an ι broken off; this agrees with the true principle, for being (*ὄν*) is also moving (*λόγοι*), and the same may be said of not being, which is likewise called not going (*οὐκίον* or οὐκὶ ὄν=οὐκ λόγοι).

*Her.* You have hammered away at them manfully; but suppose that some one were to say to you, what is the word *ἴόν*, and what are *φέον* and *δοῦν*?—show me their fitness.

*Soc.* You mean to say, how should I answer him?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* One way of giving the appearance of an answer has been already suggested.

*Her.* What way?

*Soc.* To say that names which we do not understand are of foreign origin—this is very likely the true answer, and some of them may be foreign words; but also the original forms may have been lost in the lapse of ages; names have been so twisted in all manner of ways, that I should not be surprised if the old language were to appear to us now to be quite like a barbarous tongue.

*Her.* Very likely.

*Soc.* Yes, very likely. But still the enquiry demands our earnest attention and we must not flinch. For we should remember, that if a person go on analysing names into words, and

enquiry, also, into the elements out of which the words are formed, and so always repeating his question, he who has to answer him must at last give up the enquiry in despair.

*Her.* Very true.

*Sok.* And in what you ought to do first, how and give an end to the enquiry? Must he not stop when he comes to the names which are the elements of all other names and sentences: for these cannot be supposed to be made up of other names? The word *charis* (good), for example, is, as we were saying, a compound of *charis* (admirable) and *eu-* (well). Now *charis* (admirable) is made up of other elements, and these again of others. But if we take a word which is incapable of further resolution, then we shall be right in saying that we have at last reached a primary element, which need not be resolved any further.

*Her.* I believe that to be true.

*Sok.* And suppose the names about which you are now asking should turn out to be primary elements, then their truth or falsehood must be examined according to some new method.

*Her.* That is very likely.

*Sok.* Quite so, Hermogenes, all that has preceded would lead to this conclusion. And if, as I think, the conclusion is true, then I shall again say to you, come and help me, that I may not fall into some absurdity in stating the principle of primary names.

*Her.* Let me hear, and I will do my best to assist you.

*Sok.* I think that you will acknowledge with me, that one principle is applicable to all names, primary as well as secondary, when regarded simply as names.

*Her.* Certainly.

*Sok.* All the names that we have been explaining were intended to indicate the nature of things.

*Her.* Of course.

*Sok.* And that this is true of the primary name as much as of the secondary names, is implied in their being names.

*Her.* Surely.

*Sok.* But the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from the primary.

*Her.* That is evident.

*Sok.* Very good; but then how do the primary names which precede analysis show the natures of things, as far as they can

be shown; which they must do, if they are to be real names? And here I will ask you a question: Suppose that we had no voice or tongue, and wanted to communicate with one another, should we not, like the deaf and dumb, make signs with the hands and head and the rest of the body?

*Her.* There would be no choice, Socrates.

423 *Soc.* We should imitate the nature of the thing; the elevation of our hands to heaven would mean lightness and upwardness; heaviness and downwardness would be expressed by letting them drop to the ground; the running of a horse, or any other animal, would be expressed by the most nearly similar gestures of our own frame.

*Her.* I do not see that we could do anything else.

*Soc.* We could not; for by bodily imitation only can the body ever express anything.

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* And when we want to express ourselves, either with the voice, or tongue, or mouth, the expression is simply their imitation of that which we want to express.

*Her.* That, I think, must be acknowledged.

*Soc.* Then a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal imitator names or imitates?

*Her.* That, I think, is true.

*Soc.* Nay, my friend, I am disposed to think that we have not reached the truth as yet.

*Her.* Why not?

*Soc.* Because if we have we shall be obliged to admit that the people who imitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals, name that which they imitate.

*Her.* That is true.

*Soc.* Then could I have been right in what I was saying?

*Her.* In my opinion, no. But I wish that you would tell me, Socrates, what sort of an imitation is a name?

*Soc.* In the first place, I should reply, not a musical imitation, although that is also vocal; nor, again, an imitation of that which music imitates; that, in my judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the matter thus: all objects have sound and figure, and many have colour.

*Her.* Certainly.

Soc. But the art of naming is not to be supposed to have anything to do with these forms of imitation; the arts which have to do with them are music and drawing.

*Her.* True.

Soc. Again, is there not an essence of each thing, just as there is a colour or sound? And is there not an essence of colour and sound as well as of anything else which may be said to have an essence?

*Her.* That is true.

Soc. Well, and if any one could express the essence of each thing in letters and syllables, would he not express the nature of each thing?

*Her.* Certainly he would.

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Soc. The musician and the painter were the two names which you gave to the two other imitators. What will this imitator be called?

*Her.* I imagine, Socrates, that he must be the namer, or name-giver, of whom we are in search.

Soc. If this is true, then I think that we are in a condition to consider the names *λόγος* (stream), *ιέναι* (to go), *εχεῖν* (retention), about which you were asking: and we may see whether the namer has grasped the nature of them in letters and syllables in such a manner as to imitate the essence or not.

*Her.* Very good.

Soc. But are these the only primary names, or are there others?

*Her.* There must be others.

Soc. Yes, that I should expect. But how shall we analyse them, and where does the imitator begin? Imitation of the essence is made by syllables and letters: ought we not, therefore, first to separate the letters, just as those who are beginning rhythm first distinguish the powers of single elements, and then of compounds, and then, and not until then, proceed to the consideration of rhythms?

*Her.* Yes.

Soc. Must we not begin in the same way with letters; first separating the vowels into classes, and then the consonants and mutes, according to the received distinctions of the learned; also the semi-vowels, which are not vowels, neither are they

mutes ; and the different classes of the vowels themselves ? And when we have perfected the classification of things, we shall give them names, and see whether, as in the case of letters, there are any classes to which they may be all referred<sup>1</sup> ; and hence we shall see their natures, and see, too, whether they have in them classes as there are in the letters ; and when we have well considered all this, we shall know how to apply them—whether one letter is used to denote one thing, or whether there is to be an admixture of several of them ; just as in painting the painter who wants to depict anything sometimes uses purple only, or any other colour, and sometimes mixes up several colours, as his method is when he has to paint flesh colour or anything of that kind—he uses his colours as his figures appear to require them ; and so, too, we shall apply letters to the expression of objects, either single letters when required, or several letters ; and then we shall form syllables, as they are called, and from 425 syllables make nouns and verbs ; and thus, at last, from the combinations of nouns and verbs arrive at language, large and fair and whole ; and as the painter made a figure, even so shall we make speech by the art of the namer or the rhetorician, or by some art or other. Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, but I was carried away—meaning to say that this was the way in which the ancients formed language, and what they put together we must take to pieces in like manner, if we are to attain a scientific view of the whole subject ; and we must see whether the primary, and also whether the secondary elements are rightly given or not, for if they are not, the composition of them, my dear Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work, and in the wrong direction.

*Her.* That, Socrates, I can quite believe.

*Soc.* Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse them in this way ? for I am certain that I should not.

*Her.* Much less am I likely to be able.

*Soc.* Shall we leave them, then ? or shall we seek to discover, if we can, something about them, according to the measure of our ability, saying by way of preface, as I said before of the

<sup>1</sup> The text is here uncertain; the most probable meaning has been followed.  
Cf. *Phaedrus*, 271.

Gods, that we know nothing of the truth about them, and do but attain conjecture of human notions of them. And in this present enquiry, let us say to ourselves, before we proceed, that the higher method is the one which we or others who would analyse language to any purpose must follow; but under the circumstances, as men say, we must do as well as we can. What do you think?

*Her.* I very much approve.

*Soc.* That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and so find expression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but cannot be avoided—there is no better principle to which we can look for the truth of first names. Deprived of this, we must have recourse to divine help, like the tragic poets, who in any perplexity have their gods waiting in the air; and must get out of our difficulty in like fashion, by saying that ‘the Gods gave the first names, and therefore they are right.’ This will be the best contrivance, or perhaps that other notion may be even better still, of deriving them from some barbarous people, for the barbarians are older than we are; or we may say that antiquity has cast a veil over them, which is the same sort of 426 excuse as the last; for all these are not reasons but only ingenious excuses for having no reasons. And yet any sort of ignorance of first or primitive names involves an ignorance of secondary words; for they can only be explained by the primary. Clearly then the professor of languages should be able to give a very lucid explanation of first names, or let him be assured he will only talk nonsense about the rest. Do you not suppose this to be true?

*Her.* Certainly, Socrates.

*Soc.* My first notions of original names are truly wild and ridiculous, though I have no objection to impart them to you if you desire, and I hope that you will communicate to me in return anything better which you may have.

*Her.* Fear not; I will do my best.

*Soc.* In the first place, the letter  $\acute{\rho}$  appears to me to be the general instrument expressing all motion ( $\kappaίνησις$ ). But I have not yet explained the meaning of this latter word, which is just  $\iota\epsilon\sigmaις$  (going); for the letter  $\eta$  was not in use among the ancients, who only employed  $\epsilon$ ; and the root is  $\kappa\acute{\iota}\epsilon\omega$ , which is a dialectical

form, the same as *ἴέναι*. And the old word *κίνησις* will be correctly given as *ἴεσθις* in corresponding modern letters. Assuming this foreign root *κίειν*, and allowing for the change of the *η* and the insertion of the *v*, we have *κίνησις*, which should have been *κιείνησις* or *είεσθις*; and *στάσις* is the negative of *λέναι* (or *εῖσθις*), and has been improved into *στάσις*. Now the letter *ρ̄*, as I was saying, appeared to the imposer of names an excellent instrument for the expression of motion; and he frequently uses the letter for this purpose: for example, in the actual words *ρέων* and *ροὴ* he represents motion by *ρ̄*; also in the words *τρόμος* (trembling), *τραχύς* (rugged); and again, in words such as *θραύσιν* (crush), *κρούειν* (strike), *ἐρείκειν* (bruise), *θρύπτειν* (break), *κερματίζειν* (crumble), *ρυμβέων* (whirl): of all these sorts of movements he generally finds an expression in the letter *R*, because, as I imagine, he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and least at rest in the pronunciation of this letter, which he therefore used in order to express motion, just as he used *i* to express the subtle elements which pass through 427 all things. This is why he uses the letter *i* as imitative of motion, *ἴέναι*, *ἴεσθαι*. And there is another class of letters, *φ*, *ψ*, *σ* and *ζ*, of which the pronunciation is accompanied by great expenditure of breath; these are used in the imitation of such notions as *ψυχρὸν* (shivering), *ζέον* (seething), *σείεσθαι* (to be shaken), *σεισμὸς* (shock), and are also introduced by the imposer of names whenever he wants to imitate what is windy. He seems to have thought that the closing and pressure of the tongue in the utterance of *δ* and *τ* was expressive of binding and rest in a place: he further observed the liquid movement of *λ*, in the pronunciation of which the tongue slips, and in this he found the expression of smoothness, as in *λεῦος* (level), and in the word *δλισθάνειν* (to slip) itself, *λιπαρὸν* (sleek), *κολλώδες* (gluey), and the like; the heavier sound of *γ* detained the slipping tongue, and the union of the two gave the notion of a glutinous clammy nature, as in *γλίσχρος*, *γλυκὺς*, *γλοιώδες*. The *v* he observed to be sounded from within, and therefore to have a notion of inwardness; hence he introduced the sound in *ἔνδον* and *ἔντος*: *a* he assigned to the expression of size, and *η* of length, because they are great letters: *o* was the sign of roundness, and therefore there is plenty of *o* mixed up

in the word *signification*. Thus did the legislator reducing all things into letters and syllables, and impressing on them names and signs, and out of them by invention compounded other signs. That is my view. Hermogenes, of the truth of names; but I should like to hear what Cratylus has more to say.

*Ph.* But Socrates, as I was telling you before, Cratylus mistakes me, he says that there is a fitness of names but he never explains what this fitness is, so that I cannot tell whether his observation is intended for me. Tell me now, Cratylus, here in the presence of Socrates, do you agree in what Socrates has been saying about names, or have you something better of your own? and if you have, tell me what your view is, and then you will either learn of Socrates, or Socrates and I will learn of you.

*Crat.* Well, but say, Hermogenes, you do not suppose that you can learn of I expect any subject of importance at all in a moment, at any rate not such a subject as language, which is perhaps, the very greatest of all.

*Ph.* No indeed, but as Herodotus says and I agree with him, <sup>428</sup> 'to add little to "little" is worth while.' And, therefore, if you think that you can do any good at all, however small, take a little trouble and consult Socrates, and we too, who certainly have a claim upon you.

*Socr.* I am by no means positive. Cratylus, in the view which Hermogenes and myself have worked out, and therefore I should like to hear yours, which I dare say is far better, and which, if better, I shall gladly receive. For you have evidently reflected on these matters, and have had teachers, and if you have really a better theory of the truth of names, you may add me to the number of your disciples.

*Ph.* You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have attended to these matters, and possibly I might even turn you into a disciple. But I fear that the converse is more probable, and I already find myself moved to say to you what Achilles in the 'Prayers' says to Ajax,—

'Eloquacious Ajax, son of Telamon, king of men,  
And appear to have spoken in all things much to my mind.'

And you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle, and to give

answers much to my mind whether you are inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some Muse may have long been an inhabitant of your breast, unconsciously to yourself.

*Soc.* Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my own wisdom: I cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to stop and ask myself What am I saying? for there is nothing worse than self-deception—when the deceiver is always at home and always with you: that is indeed terrible, and therefore I ought often to retrace my steps, and endeavour to ‘look before me and behind me,’ in the words of the aforesaid Homer. Have we not been saying that the true name indicates the nature of the thing:—is that acknowledged?

*Crat.* Yes, Socrates, what you say, as I am disposed to think, is quite true.

*Soc.* Names, then, are given in order to instruct?

*Crat.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And naming is an art, and has artificers?

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* And who are they?

429 *Crat.* The legislators, of whom you spoke at first.

*Soc.* And does this art grow up among men like other arts? Let me explain what I mean: of painters, some are better and some worse?

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* The better painters execute their works, I mean their figures, better, and the worse, execute them worse; and of builders also, the better sort build fairer houses, and the worse build them worse.

*Crat.* True.

*Soc.* And among legislators, there are some who do their work better and some worse?

*Crat.* No, I do not agree with you in thinking that.

*Soc.* Then you do not think that some laws are better and others worse?

*Crat.* No, indeed.

*Soc.* Or that one name is better than another?

*Crat.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Then all names are rightly imposed?

*Crat.* Yes, if they are names at all.

*Soc.* Well, what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes, which was mentioned before:—assuming that he has nothing of the nature of Hermes in him, shall we say that this is a wrong name, or not his name at all?

*Crat.* I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but only appears to be his, and is really that of somebody else, who has the nature which answers to the name.

*Soc.* And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be even speaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can call him Hermogenes, if he is not.

*Crat.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For to that I should answer, that there have been plenty of liars in all ages.

*Crat.* Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?—say something and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying the thing which is not?

*Soc.* That, my friend, is an argument which is too subtle for me at my age. But I should like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who think that falsehood may be spoken but not said?

*Crat.* Neither spoken nor said.

*Soc.* Nor uttered nor addressed? For example: If a person, saluting you in a foreign country, were to take your hand and say: ‘Hail, Athenian stranger, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion’—these words, whether spoken, said, uttered, or addressed, would have no application to you but only to our friend Hermogenes, or perhaps to nobody at all?

*Crat.* In my opinion, Socrates, the speaker would only be talking nonsense.

*Soc.* Well, but that will be quite enough for me, if you will tell me whether the nonsense would be true or false, or partly 430 true and partly false:—that is all which I want to know.

*Crat.* I should say that the motion of his lips would be an unmeaning sound like the noise of hammering at a brazen pot.

*Soc.* But let us see, Cratylus, whether we cannot find a meeting point, for you would admit that the name is not the same as the thing named?

*Crat.* I should.

*Soc.* And would you further acknowledge that the name is an imitation of the thing?

*Crat.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And you would say that pictures are also imitations of things, but in another way?

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* I daresay that you may be right, and that I do not rightly understand you. Please to say, then, whether both sorts of imitation (I mean both pictures or words) are not equally attributable and applicable to the things imitated.

*Crat.* They are.

*Soc.* First look at the matter thus: you may attribute the likeness of the man to the man, and of the woman to the woman; and so on?

*Crat.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to the woman, and of the woman to the man?

*Crat.* That is true.

*Soc.* And are both modes of assigning them right, or only the first?

*Crat.* Only the first.

*Soc.* That is to say, the mode of assignment which attributes to each that which belongs to them and is like them?

*Crat.* That is my view.

*Soc.* Now then, as I am desirous that we being friends should have a good understanding about the argument, let me state my view to you: the first mode of assignment, whether applied to figures or to names, I call right, and when applied to names only, true as well as right; and the other mode of giving and assigning the name which is unlike, I call wrong, and in the case of names, false as well as wrong.

*Crat.* That may be true, Socrates, in the case of pictures; they may be wrongly assigned; but not in the case of names—they must be always right.

*Soc.* Why, what is the difference? May I not go to a man and say to him, ‘This is your picture,’ showing him his own likeness, or perhaps the likeness of a woman; and when I say ‘show,’ I mean bring before the sense of sight.

*Crat.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And may I not go to him again, and say, 'This is your name'—for the name, like the picture, is an imitation. May I not say to him—'This is your name'? and may I not then bring 431 to his sense of hearing the imitation of himself, when I say, 'This is a man'; or of a female of the human species, when I say, 'This is a woman,' as the case may be? Is not all that quite possible?

*Crat.* I would fain agree with you, Socrates; and therefore I say, Granted.

*Soc.* That is very good of you, if I am right, which need hardly be disputed at present. But if I can assign names as well as pictures to objects, the right assignment of them may be said to be truth, and the wrong assignment of them falsehood. Now if there be such a wrong assignment of names, there may also be a wrong or inappropriate assignment of verbs; and if of names and verbs then of the sentences, which are made up of them. What do you say, Cratylus?

*Crat.* I agree; and think that what you say is very good.

*Soc.* And further, primitive nouns may be compared to pictures, and in pictures you may either give all the appropriate colours and figures, or you may not give them all—some may be wanting; or there may be too many or too much of them? Is not that true?

*Crat.* Yes; that is true.

*Soc.* And he who gives all gives a perfect picture or figure; and he who takes away or adds also gives a picture or figure, but not a good one.

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* In like manner, he who by syllables and letters imitates the nature of things, if he gives all that is appropriate will produce a good image, or in other words a name; but if he subtracts or perhaps adds a little, he will make an image but not a good one; whence I infer that some names are well and others ill made.

*Crat.* That is true.

*Soc.* Then the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be bad;—that is also true?

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* And this artist of names is called the legislator?

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may be bad: there can be no mistake about that, assuming our previous admission.

*Crat.* Very true, Socrates; but the case of language, you see, is different; for when by the help of grammar we assign the 432 letters  $\alpha$  or  $\beta$ , or any other letters to a certain name, then, if we add, or subtract, or misplace a letter, the name which is written is not only written wrongly, but not written at all; and in any of these cases becomes other than a name.

*Soc.* But I doubt whether your view is altogether correct, Cratylus.

*Crat.* How do you mean?

*Soc.* I believe that what you say may be true about numbers, which must be just what they are, or not be at all; for example, the number ten at once becomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted, and so of any other number: but this does not apply to that which is qualitative or to anything which is represented under an image. I should say rather that the image, if expressing in every point the entire reality, would no longer be an image. Let us suppose the existence of two objects: one of them shall be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus; and we will suppose, further, that some God makes not only a representation such as a painter would make of your outward form and colour, but also creates an inward organization like yours, having the same warmth and softness; and into this infuses motion, and soul, and mind, such as you have, and in a word copies all your qualities, and places them by you in another form; would you say that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that there were two Cratyluses?

*Crat.* I should say that there were two Cratyluses.

*Soc.* Then you see, my friend, that we must find some other principle of truth in images, and also in names; and not insist that an image is no longer an image when something is added or subtracted. Do you not perceive that images are very far from having qualities which are the exact counterpart of the realities which they represent?

*Crat.* Yes, I see.

*Soc.* But then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on things, if they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the doubles of them, and no one would be able to determine which were the names and which were the realities.

*Crat.* That is true.

*Soc.* Then fear not, but have the courage to admit that one name may be correctly and another incorrectly given; and do not insist that the name shall be exactly the same as the thing: but allow the occasional substitution of a wrong letter, and if of a letter also of a noun in a sentence, and if of a noun in a sentence also of a sentence which is not appropriate to the matter, and acknowledge that the thing may be named, and described, so long as the general character of the thing which you are describing is retained; and this, as you will remember, was remarked by Hermogenes and myself in the particular instance 433 of the names of the letters.

*Crat.* Yes, I remember.

*Soc.* Good; and when the general character is preserved, even if some of the proper letters are wanting, still the thing is signified;—well, if all the letters are given; not well, when only a few of them are given. I think that we had better admit this, or truth will say ‘Too late’ to us as to the belated traveller in Aegina, and at things we shall never arrive; or if not, you must find out some new notion of correctness of names, and no longer maintain that a name is the expression of a thing in letters or syllables; for if you say both, you will be inconsistent with yourself.

*Crat.* I quite acknowledge, Socrates, the truth of what you say, which is very reasonable.

*Soc.* Then as we are agreed thus far, let us ask ourselves whether a name rightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters.

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the proper letters are those which are like the things?

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* Enough then of names which are rightly given. And in names which are incorrectly given, the greater part may be supposed to be made up of proper and similar letters, or there

would be no likeness; but there is likewise a part which is improper and spoils the formation of the word: you would admit that?

*Crat.* There would be no use, Socrates, in my quarrelling with you, since I cannot be satisfied that a name which is incorrectly given is a name at all.

*Soc.* Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing?

*Crat.* Yes, I admit that.

*Soc.* But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some derived?

*Crat.* Yes, I do.

*Soc.* Then if you admit that primitive or first nouns are representations of things, is there any better way of framing representations than by assimilating them to the objects as much as you can; or do you prefer the notion of Hermogenes and of many others, who say that names are conventional, and have a meaning to those who have agreed about them, and who have previous knowledge of the things intended by them, and that convention is the only principle; and whether you abide by our present convention, or make a new and opposite one, according to which you call small great and great small—that, as they say, makes no difference, if you are only agreed. Which of these two notions do you prefer?

434 *Crat.* There is the most utter and entire difference, Socrates, between representation by likeness and representation by any chance sign.

*Soc.* Very good: but if the name is to be like the thing, the letters out of which the first names are composed must also be like things. Returning to the image of the picture, I would ask, How could any one ever compose a picture which would be like anything at all, if there were not pigments in nature which resembled the things imitated, and out of which the picture is composed?

*Crat.* Impossible.

*Soc.* No more could names ever resemble any actually existing thing, unless the original elements of which they are compounded bore a resemblance to the objects of which the names are the imitation: And the original elements are letters?

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* Let me now ask you to consider what Hermogenes and I were saying about sounds. Do you agree with me that the letter *λ* is expressive of *softness*, and *smoothness*, and *hardness*? Were we right or wrong in saying so?

*Crat.* I should say that you were right.

*Soc.* And that *ν* was expressive of *smoothness*, and *softness*, and the like?

*Crat.* Right in that too.

*Soc.* And yet, as you are aware, that which is called by us *οὐδέποτε*, is by the Eretrians called *οὐδέποτιμον*.

*Crat.* Very true.

*Soc.* But are the letters *ν* and *λ* equivalents; and is there the same significance to them in the termination *λη*, which there is to us in *νη*, or is there no significance to one of us?

*Crat.* I should say that there is a significance to both of us.

*Soc.* In as far as they are like, or in as far as they are unlike?

*Crat.* In as far as they are like.

*Soc.* Are they altogether alike?

*Crat.* Yes, for the purpose of expressing motion.

*Soc.* And what do you say of the insertion of the *κ* for that is expressive not of hardness but of softness.

*Crat.* Why, perhaps that is wrongly inserted, Socrates, and should be altered into *λ*, as you were saying to Hermogenes, and in my opinion rightly, when you speake of adding and subtracting letters upon occasion.

*Soc.* Good. But still the word is intelligible to both of us; when I say *οὐδέποτε* hard, you know what I mean.

*Crat.* Yes, my dear friend, and the explanation of that is custom.

*Soc.* And what is custom but convention? I utter a sound which I understand, and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound; that is what you are maintaining? 435

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* But if when I speak you know my meaning, that is an indication given by me to you?

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* And yet this indication of my meaning may proceed not only from like, but from unlike, as in the instance of the *λ*

in *convention*. But if this is true, then you have made a convention with yourself, and the correctness of a name turns out to be convention, since letters which are unlike are indicative equally with those which are like, if they are sanctioned by custom and convention. And even supposing that you distinguish custom from convention ever so much, still you must say that the signification of words is good by custom and not by likeness, for custom may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. But as we are agreed about this, Cratylus (for I shall assume that your silence gives consent), then custom and convention must be supposed to contribute to the indication of our thoughts; for suppose we take the instance of number, how can you ever imagine, my good friend, that you will find names for all the numbers, unless you allow that which you term convention and agreement to be in some way concerned with the correctness of names? I quite agree with you that words should as far as possible resemble things; but the force of resemblance, as Hermogenes says, is a mean thing: and the mechanical aid of convention must be further employed to make names correct; for I believe that if we could always, or almost always, use likenesses which are perfectly appropriate, that would be the most perfect state of language; as the opposite of this is the most imperfect. But let me ask you, what is the force of names, and what is the use of them?

*Crat.* The use of names, Socrates, as I should imagine, is to inform: the simple truth is, that he who knows names knows also the things which are expressed by them.

*Soc.* I suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as the name is, so is also the thing; and that he who knows the one will also know the other, because they are similar, and all similars fall under the same art or science; and therefore you would say that he who knows names will also know things.

*Crat.* That is exactly what I mean.

*Soc.* But let us consider what is the nature of this information about things which, according to you, is given us by names. Is it the best sort of information? or is there any other? What do you say?

436 *Crat.* I believe that it is the only and the best sort of information about them, and that there can be no other.

Socr. But do you believe that in the discovery of them, he who discovers the names discovers also the things, or is there one method of enquiry, and discovery, and of instruction another?

Crat. I certainly believe that there is one method of enquiry and discovery, and of instruction.

Socr. Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names in the search after things, and analyses their meaning, is in great danger of being deceived?

Crat. How is that?

Socr. Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his conception of the things which they signified—you would allow that?

Crat. Yes.

Socr. And if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names according to his conception, what will be the situation of us who follow him? Shall we not be deceived by him?

Crat. But Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must surely have known, or else, as I was saying, his names would not be names at all? And you have a clear proof that he has not missed the truth, and the proof is—that he is perfectly consistent. Did you ever observe in speaking that all words have a common character and purpose?

Socr. But that, friend Cratylus, is no defence of him. For if he did begin in error, he may have forced the remainder into agreement with the original error and with himself; there would be nothing strange in this, any more than in geometrical diagrams, which have often a slight and invisible flaw in the first part of the process, and are consistently mistaken in the long deductions which follow. And this is the reason why every man should expend his chief thought and attention on the consideration of his first principles:—are they or are they not rightly laid down? and when he has sifted them all the rest will follow. Now I should be astonished to find that names are really consistent. And here let us revert to our former discussion: Were we not saying that all things are in motion, and progress, and flux, and that this idea of motion is expressed by names? Do you not conceive that to be the meaning of them?

Crat. Yes; that is assuredly their meaning, and the true meaning

437 Soc. Let us revert to *επισήμη* (knowledge), and observe how ambiguous this word is, seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at things, than going round with them; and therefore we should have the beginning at *as present*, and not reject the ε (cp. 412 A), but make an insertion of an ε instead of an ο (not *μνημόνη*, but *επισήμη*). Take another example: *βέσσων* (sure) is clearly the expression of station and position, and not of motion. Again, the word *λαρυγξ* (enquiry) bears upon the face of it the stopping (*λαρυγξ*) of the stream; and the word *πιστος* (faithful) certainly indicates cessation of motion; then, again, *μνήμη* (memory), as one may see, expresses rest in the soul, and not motion. Moreover, words such as *διαρτίλα* and *σύρφορα*, which have a bad sense, viewed in the light of their etymology, will be the same as *επισήμη* and *επιστήμη* and other words which have a good sense (cp. *διαρτίλη*, *σύρφορα*, *επειθαι*, *σύρφεσθαι*); and much the same may be said of *αράθια* and *ἀκολασία*, for *ἀράθια* may be explained as ἡ διὰ θεῶν ιδιος πορεία, and *ἀκολασία* as ἡ αράθια τοῖς πρόγυμναις. Thus, the names which, as we imagine, have the worst sense, will turn out to be like those which have the best. And I have no doubt that, if you were to take the trouble, you might find many other examples which would lead to the inference that the giver of names meant to imply, not that things were in motion or progress, but that they were at rest, which is the opposite of motion.

Crat. Yet, Socrates; but observe that the greater number of words express motion.

Soc. What of that, Cratylus? Are we to count them like votes? and is correctness of names the voice of the majority? Are we to say of whichever sort there are most, those are to be true ones?

Crat. No; that is not reasonable.

Soc. Certainly not. Let us, then, have done with this, and proceed to another question about which I should like to know whether you agree with me. Were we not lately acknowledging that the first givers of names in states, both Hellenic and barbarian, were the legislators, and that the art which gave names was the art of the legislator?

Crat. Quite true.

Soc. Tell me, then, did the first legislators, who were the

givers of the first names, know or not know the things which they named?

*Crat.* I imagine, Socrates, that they must have known.

*Soc.* Why, yes, friend Cratylus, they could hardly have been <sup>438</sup> ignorant.

*Crat.* I should say not.

*Soc.* Let us return to the point from which we digressed. You were saying, if you remember, that he who gave names must have known the things which he named; are you still of that opinion?

*Crat.* That I am.

*Soc.* And would you say that the giver of the first names had also a knowledge of the things which he named?

*Crat.* I should.

*Soc.* But how could he have learned or discovered things from names if the primitive names were not yet given? For, as we maintain, the only way of learning and discovering things, is either by learning their names of others or discovering them ourselves.

*Crat.* I think that there is a good deal in what you say, Socrates.

*Soc.* But if things are only to be known through names, how can we suppose that the givers of names had knowledge, or were legislators before there were names at all, and therefore before they could have known them?

*Crat.* I believe, Socrates, the true account of the matter to be, that a power more than human gave things their first names, and that the names which are thus given are necessarily their true names.

*Soc.* Then how came the giver of the names, if he was an inspired being or God, to contradict himself? For were we not saying that he made some names expressive of rest and others of motion? Were we mistaken?

*Crat.* But I do not suppose that he did make both of them.

*Soc.* And which, then, did he make, my good friend: those which are expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? That is a point which, as I said before, cannot be determined by counting them.

*Crat.* No: that ought not to be the way, Socrates.

*Soc.* But if this is a battle of names, and some of them are

asserting that they are like the truth, and others that *they* are, how or by what criterion are we to decide between them? For there are no other names to which appeal can be made, but obviously recourse must be had to another standard which, without employing names, will make clear which of the two are right; and this must be a standard which shows the truth of things.

*Crat.* I agree.

*Soc.* But if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may be known without names?

*Crat.* Clearly.

*Soc.* But how would you expect to know them? What other way can there be of knowing them, except the true and natural way, through their affinities, when they are akin to each other, and through themselves? For that which is other and different from them must signify something other and different from them.

*Crat.* That, as I think, is true.

439 *Soc.* Well, but reflect; have we not several times acknowledged that names rightly given are the likenesses and images of the things which they name?

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then, supposing that you can learn things in one or two ways—either through the medium of names, or through the things themselves—which is likely to be the nobler and clearer way; to learn of the image whether the truth is fairly imitated, or to learn of the truth whether the image is rightly executed?

*Crat.* I should say that we certainly ought to learn of the truth.

*Soc.* How real existence is to be studied or discovered is, I suspect, beyond you and me. But we may admit so much, that the knowledge of things is not to be derived from names. No; they must be studied and investigated in themselves.

*Crat.* That is evident, Socrates.

*Soc.* There is another point. I should not like us to be imposed upon by the appearance of such a multitude of names, all tending in the same direction. I do not deny that the givers of names did really give them under the idea that all things were in motion and flux; which was their sincere but, as I think,

mistaken opinion. And having fallen into a kind of whirlpool themselves, they are carried round, and want to drag us in after them. There is a matter, master Cratylus, about which I often dream, and should like to ask your opinion: Tell me, whether there is or is not any absolute beauty or good, or any other absolute existence?

*Crat.* Certainly, Socrates, I think that there is.

*Soc.* Then let us seek the true beauty: not asking whether a face is fair, or anything of that sort, or whether all is in a flux; but let us ask whether the true beauty is not always beautiful.

*Crat.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And can we rightly speak of a beauty which is always passing away, and is first this and then that: must not the same thing be born and retire and vanish while the word is in our mouths?

*Crat.* Undoubtedly.

*Soc.* Then how can that be a real thing which is never in the same state? for obviously things which are the same cannot change while they remain the same; and if they are always in the same state and the same, and never change their original form, they can never change or be moved.

*Crat.* Certainly they cannot.

*Soc.* Nor yet can they be known by any one: for at the moment that the observer approaches, then they become other and of another nature, so that you cannot get any further in knowing their nature or state, for you cannot know that which has no state.

*Crat.* True.

*Soc.* Nor can we reasonably say, Cratylus, that there is knowledge at all, if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding; for knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge without continuing always to abide and exist. But if the very nature of knowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no knowledge; and if the transition is always going on, there will always be no knowledge, and, according to this view, there will be no one to know and nothing to be known: but if that which knows and that which is known exists ever, and the beautiful and the good and every other thing also exist, then I do not think that they can be in a pro-

cess or flux, as we were just now supposing. Whether there is this eternal nature in things, or whether the truth is what Heraclitus and his followers and many others say, is a question hard to determine; and no man of sense will like to put himself or the education of his mind in the power of names: neither will he so far trust names or the givers of names as to be confident in any knowledge which condemns himself and other existences to an unhealthy state of unreality; he will not believe that all things leak like a pot, or that the world is a man who has a running at the nose. This may be true, Cratylus, but is also very likely to be untrue: and therefore I would not have you be too easily persuaded of it. Reflect well and manfully now in the days of your youth, which is the time of learning; and when you have found the truth, come and tell me.

*Crat.* I will do as you say, though I can assure you, Socrates, that I have been considering the matter already, and the result of a great deal of trouble and consideration is that I incline to Heraclitus.

*Soc.* Then, another day, my friend, when you come back, you shall give me a lesson; but at present, go into the country, as you are intending, and Hermogenes shall set you on your way.

*Crat.* Very good, Socrates; I hope, however, that you will continue to think about these things yourself.



GORGIAS.



## I N T R O D U C T I O N.

IN several of the dialogues of Plato, doubts have arisen among his interpreters as to which of the various subjects discussed in them is the main thesis. The speakers have the freedom of conversation; no severe rules of art restrict them, and sometimes we are inclined to think, with one of the dramatis personae in the *Theaetetus* (177 c), that the digressions have the greater interest. Yet in the most irregular of the dialogues there is also a certain natural growth or unity; the beginning is not forgotten at the end, and numerous allusions and references are interspersed, which form the loose connecting links of the whole. We must not neglect this unity, but neither must we attempt to confine the Platonic dialogue on the Procrustean bed of a single idea. (Cp. Introduction to the *Phaedrus*.)

Two tendencies seem to have beset the interpreters of Plato in this matter. First, they have endeavoured to hang the dialogues upon one another by the very slightest threads; and this has led to opposite and contradictory assertions respecting their order and sequence. The mantle of Schleiermacher has descended upon his successors, who have applied his method with the most various results. The value and use of the method has been hardly, if at all, examined either by him or them. Secondly, they have extended almost indefinitely the scope of each separate dialogue; in this way they think that they have escaped all difficulties, not seeing that what they have gained in generality they have lost in truth and distinctness. Metaphysical conceptions easily pass into one another; and the simpler notions of antiquity, which we can only realize by an effort, imperceptibly blend with the more familiar theories of modern philosophers. An eye for proportion is needed (his own art of measuring) in the study of Plato, as well as of other great artists. We may readily admit that the moral antithesis of good and pleasure, or

the intellectual antithesis of knowledge and opinion, being and appearance, are never far off in a Platonic discussion. But because they are in the background, we should not bring them into the foreground, or expect to find them equally in all the dialogues.

There may be some advantage in drawing out a little the main outlines of the building ; but the use of this is limited, and may be easily exaggerated. We may give Plato too much system, and alter the natural form and connection of his thoughts. Under the idea that his dialogues are finished works of art, we may find a reason for everything, and lose the highest characteristic of art, which is simplicity. Most great works receive a new light from a new and original mind. But whether these new lights are true or only suggestive, will depend on their agreement with the spirit of Plato, and the amount of direct evidence which can be urged in support of them. When a theory is running away with us, criticism does a friendly office in counselling moderation, and recalling us to the indications of the text.

Like the Phaedrus, the Gorgias has puzzled students of Plato by the appearance of two or more subjects. Under the cover of rhetoric much higher themes are introduced ; the world is convinced of falsehood ; and the argument expands into a general view of the good and evil of man. First, after an ineffectual attempt to obtain a sound definition of his art from Gorgias, we begin by imagining a universal art of flattery or simulation ; this is the genus of which rhetoric is only one, and not the highest species. To flattery is opposed the true and noble art of life which he who possesses seeks always to impart to others, and which at last triumphs, if not in this world, at any rate in another. These two aspects of life and knowledge appear to be the two leading ideas of the dialogue. The true and the false in individuals and states, in the treatment of the soul as well as of the body, are conceived under the forms of true and false art. In the development of this opposition there arise various other questions, such as the two famous paradoxes of Socrates (paradoxes as they are to the world in general, ideals as they may be more worthily called) : (1) that to do is worse than to suffer evil ; and (2) that when a man has done evil he had better be punished than unpunished ; to which may be added (3) a third Socratic paradox or ideal, that bad men do what they think best, but not what they desire, for the desire of all is towards the good. That pleasure is to be distinguished from good is proved by the simultaneousness of pleasure and pain, and

by the possibility of the bad having in certain cases pleasures as great as those of the good, or even greater. Not merely rhetoricians, but poets, musicians, and other artists, the whole tribe of statesmen, past as well as present, are included in the class of flatterers. The true and false finally appear before the judgment-seat of the gods below.

The dialogue naturally falls into three divisions, to which the three characters of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles respectively correspond; and the form and manner change with the stages of the argument. Socrates is deferential towards Gorgias, playful and yet cutting in dealing with the youthful Polus, ironical and sarcastic in his encounter with Callicles. In the first division the question is asked—What is rhetoric? To this there is no answer given, for Gorgias is soon made to contradict himself by Socrates, and the argument is transferred to the hands of the younger Polus, who rushes to the defence of his master. The answer has at last to be given by Socrates himself, but before he can even explain his meaning to Polus, he must enlighten him upon the great subject of shams or flatteries. When Polus finds his favourite art reduced to the level of cookery, he replies that at any rate rhetoricians, like despots, have great power. Socrates denies that they have any real power, and this leads to the three paradoxes already mentioned. Although they are strange to him, Polus is at last convinced of their truth; at least, they seem to him to follow legitimately from the premises. Thus the second act of the dialogue closes. Then Callicles appears on the scene, at first maintaining that pleasure is good, and that might is right, and that law is nothing but the combination of the many weak against the few strong. When he is confuted he withdraws from the argument, and leaves Socrates to arrive at the conclusion by himself. The conclusion is that there are two kinds of statesmanship, a higher and a lower—that which makes the people better, and that which only flatters them, and he exhorts Callicles to choose the higher. The dialogue terminates with a mythus of a final judgment, in which there will be no more flattery or disguise, and no further use for the teaching of rhetoric.

The characters of the three interlocutors also correspond to the parts which are assigned to them. Gorgias is the great rhetorician, now advanced in years, who goes from city to city displaying his talents, and is celebrated throughout Greece. Like all the Sophists in the dialogues of Plato, he is vain and boastful, yet he has also a certain dignity, and is

treated by Socrates with considerable respect. But he is no match for him in dialectics. Although he has been teaching rhetoric all his life long, he is still incapable of defining his own art. When his ideas begin to clear up, he is unwilling to admit that rhetoric can be wholly separated from justice and injustice, and this lingering sentiment of morality, or regard for public opinion, enables Socrates to detect him in a contradiction. Like Protagoras, he is described as of a generous nature; he expresses his approbation of Socrates' manner of approaching a question; he is quite 'one of Socrates' sort, ready to be refuted as well as to refute,' and very eager that Callicles and Socrates should have the game out. He knows by experience that rhetoric exercises great influence over other men, but he is unable to explain the puzzle how rhetoric can teach everything and know nothing.

Polus is an impetuous youth, a runaway 'colt,' as Socrates describes him, who wanted originally to have taken the place of Gorgias under the pretext that he was tired, and avails himself of the earliest opportunity to enter the lists. He is said to be the author of a work on rhetoric (462 C), and is again mentioned in the Phaedrus (267 B), as the inventor of balanced or double forms of speech (cp. 448 C, 467 C; Sym. 185 C). At first he is violent and ill-mannered, and is angry at seeing his master overthrown. But in the judicious hands of Socrates he is soon restored to good humour, and compelled to assent to the required conclusion. Like Gorgias, he is overthrown because he compromises; he is unwilling to say that to do is fairer or more honourable than to suffer injustice. Though he is fascinated by the power of rhetoric, and dazzled by the splendour of success, he is not insensible to higher arguments. Plato may have felt that there would be an incongruity in a youth maintaining the cause of injustice against the world. He has never heard the other side of the question, and he listens to the paradoxes, as they appear to him, of Socrates with evident astonishment. He can hardly understand the meaning of Archelaus being miserable, or of rhetoric being only useful in self-accusation. When the argument with him has fairly run out,

Callicles, in whose house they are assembled, is introduced on the stage: he is with difficulty convinced that Socrates is in earnest; for if these things are true, then, as he says with real emotion, the foundations of society are upside down. In him another type of character is represented; he is neither sophist nor philosopher, but man of the world, and an accomplished Athenian gentleman. He might be described in modern

language as a cynic or materialist, a lover of power and also of pleasure, and unscrupulous in his means of attaining both. There is no desire on his part to offer any compromise in the interests of morality; nor is any concession made by him. Like Thrasymachus in the Republic, though he is not of the same weak and vulgar class, he consistently maintains that might is right. His great motive of action is political ambition; in this he is characteristically Greek. Like Anytus in the *Meno*, he is the enemy of the Sophists; but favours the new art of rhetoric, which he regards as an excellent weapon of attack and defence. He is a despiser of mankind as he is of philosophy, and sees in the laws of the state only a violation of the order of nature, which intended that the stronger should govern the weaker (cp. *Rep.* 358–360). Like other men of the world who are of a speculative turn of mind, he generalizes the bad side of human nature, and has easily brought down his principles to his practice. Philosophy and poetry alike supply him with distinctions suited to his view of human life. He has a good will to Socrates, whose talents he evidently admires, while he censures the puerile use which he makes of them. He expresses a keen intellectual interest in the argument. Like Anytus, again, he has a sympathy with other men of the world; the Athenian statesmen of a former generation, who showed no weakness and made no mistakes, such as Miltiades, Themistocles, Pericles, are his favourites. His ideal of human character is a man of great passions and great powers, which he has developed to the utmost, and which he uses in his own enjoyment and in the government of others. Had Critias been the name instead of Callicles, about whom we know nothing from other sources, the opinions of the man would have seemed to reflect the history of his life.

And now the combat deepens. In Callicles, far more than in any sophist or rhetorician, is concentrated the spirit of evil against which Socrates is contending, the spirit of the world, the spirit of the many contending against the one wise man, of which the Sophists, as he describes them in the *Republic*, are the imitators rather than the authors, being themselves carried away by the great tide of public opinion. Socrates approaches his antagonist warily from a distance, with a sort of irony which touches with a light hand both his personal vices (probably in allusion to some scandal of the day) and his servility to the populace. At the same time, he is in most profound earnest, as Chaerephon remarks. Callicles soon loses his temper, but the more he is irritated, the

more provoking and matter of fact does Socrates become. A repartee of his which appears to have been really made to the 'omniscient' Hippias, according to the testimony of Xenophon (Mem. IV. 4, 6, 10), is introduced (490 E). He is called by Callicles a popular declaimer, and certainly shows that he has the power, in the words of Gorgias, of being 'as long as he pleases,' or 'as short as he pleases' (cp. Protag. 336 D). Callicles exhibits great ability in defending himself and attacking Socrates, whom he accuses of trifling and word-splitting ; he is scandalized (p. 494) that the legitimate consequences of his own argument should be stated in plain terms ; after the manner of men of the world, he wishes to preserve the decencies of life. But he cannot consistently maintain the bad sense of words ; and getting confused between the abstract notions of better, superior, stronger, he is easily turned round by Socrates, and only induced to continue the argument by the authority of Gorgias. Once, when Socrates is describing the manner in which the ambitious citizen has to identify himself with the people, he partially recognises the truth of his words.

The Socrates of the *Gorgias* may be compared with the Socrates of the *Protagoras* and *Meno*. As in other dialogues, he is the enemy of the Sophists and rhetoricians ; and also of the statesmen, whom he regards as another variety of the same species. His behaviour is governed by that of his opponents ; the least forwardness or egotism on their part is met by a corresponding irony on the part of Socrates. He must speak, for philosophy will not allow him to be silent. He is indeed more ironical and provoking than in any other of Plato's writings : for he is 'fooled to the top of his bent' by the worldliness of Callicles. But he is also more deeply in earnest. He rises higher than even in the *Phaedo* and *Crito*: at first enveloping his moral convictions in a cloud of dust and dialectics, he ends by losing his method, his life, himself, in them. As in the *Protagoras* and *Phaedrus*, throwing aside the veil of irony, he makes a speech, but, true to his character, not until his adversary has refused to answer any more questions. The presentiment of his own fate is hanging over him. He is aware that Socrates, the single real teacher of politics, as he ventures to call himself, cannot safely go to war with the whole world, and that in the courts of earth he will be condemned. But he will be justified in the world below. Then the position of himself and Callicles will be reversed ; all those things unfit for ears polite which Callicles has prophesied as likely to happen to him in this

life, the insulting language, the box on the ears, will then fall upon himself. (Compare Rep. 613, D, E, and the similar reversal of the position of the lawyer and the philosopher in the *Theaetetus*, 173–176.)

There is an interesting allusion to his own behaviour at the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae, which he ironically attributes to his ignorance of the manner in which a vote of the assembly should be taken (473 E). This is said to have happened ‘last year’ (B.C. 406), and therefore the dramatic date of the dialogue has been fixed at 405 B.C., when Socrates would already have been an old man. The date is clearly marked, but is scarcely reconcilable with another indication of time, viz. the ‘recent’ usurpation of Archelaus, which occurred in the year 413 (470 D); and still less with the ‘recent’ death (503 B) of Pericles, who really died twenty-four years previously (429 B.C.) and is afterwards reckoned among the statesmen of a past age (cp. 517 A); or with the mention of Nicias, who died in 413, and is nevertheless spoken of as a living witness (472 A, B). But we shall hereafter have reason to observe, that although there is a general consistency of times and persons in the dialogues of Plato, a precise dramatic date is an invention of his commentators.

The conclusion of the dialogue is remarkable, (1) for the truly characteristic declaration of Socrates (p. 509 A) that he is ignorant of the true nature and bearing of these things, while he affirms at the same time that no one can maintain any other view without being ridiculous. The profession of ignorance reminds us of the earlier and more exclusively Socratic dialogues. But neither in them, nor in the *Apology*, nor in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, does Socrates express any doubt of the fundamental truths of morality. He evidently regards this ‘among the multitude of questions’ which agitate human life ‘as the principle which alone remains unshaken’ (527 B). He does not insist here, any more than in the *Phaedo*, on the literal truth of the myth, but only on the soundness of the doctrine which is contained in it, that doing wrong is worse than suffering, that a man should be rather than seem; for the next best thing to a man’s being just is that he should be corrected and become just; also that he should avoid all flattery, whether of himself or of others; and that rhetoric should be employed for the maintenance of the right only. The revelation of another life is a recapitulation of the argument in a figure.

(2) Socrates makes the singular remark, that he is himself the only true politician of his age. In other passages, especially in the *Apology*, he disclaims being a politician at all. There he is convinced that he or any other good man who attempted to resist the popular will would be put to death before he had done any good to himself or others. Here he anticipates such a fate for himself, from the fact that he is ‘the only man of the present day who performs his public duties at all.’ The two points of view are not really inconsistent, but the difference between them is worth noticing: Socrates is and is not a public man. Not in the ordinary sense, like Alcibiades or Pericles, but in a higher one; and this will sooner or later entail the same consequences on him. He cannot be a private man if he would; neither can he separate morals from politics. Nor is he unwilling to be a politician, although he foresees the dangers which await him; but he must first become a better and wiser man, for he as well as Callicles is in a state of perplexity and uncertainty (527 D, E). And yet there is an inconsistency: for should not Socrates too have taught the citizens better than to put him to death (519)?

And now, as he himself says (506 D), we will ‘resume the argument from the beginning.’

Socrates, who is attended by his inseparable disciple, Chaerephon, meets Callicles in the streets of Athens. He is informed that he has just missed an exhibition of Gorgias, which he regrets, because he was desirous, not of hearing Gorgias display his rhetoric, but of interrogating him concerning the nature of his art. Callicles proposes that they shall go with him to his own house, where Gorgias is staying. There they find the great rhetorician and his younger friend and disciple Polus.

*Soc.* Put the question to him, Chaerephon. *Ch.* What question? *Soc.* Who is he?—such a question as would elicit from a man the answer, ‘I am a cobbler.’ Polus suggests that Gorgias may be tired, and desires to answer for him. ‘Who is Gorgias?’ asks Chaerephon, imitating the manner of his master Socrates. ‘One of the best of men, and a proficient in the best and noblest of experimental arts,’ etc., replies Polus, in rhetorical and balanced phrases. Socrates is dissatisfied at the length and unmeaningness of the answer; he tells the disconcerted volunteer that he has mistaken the quality for the nature of the art, and remarks to Gorgias, that Polus has learnt how to make a speech, but not

how to answer a question. He wishes that Gorgias would answer him. Gorgias is willing enough, and replies to the question asked by Chaerophon,—that he is a rhetorician, and in Homeric language, ‘boasts himself to be a good one.’ At the request of Socrates he promises to be brief; for ‘he can be as long as he pleases, and as short as he pleases.’ Socrates would have him bestow his length on others, and proceeds to ask him a number of questions, which are answered by him to his own great satisfaction, and with a brevity which excites the admiration of Socrates. The result of the discussion may be summed up as follows :—

Rhetoric treats of discourse ; but music and medicine, and other particular arts, are also concerned with discourse ; in what way then does rhetoric differ from them ? Gorgias draws a distinction between the art which deals with words, and the arts which have to do with external actions. Socrates extends this distinction further, and divides all productive arts into two classes : (1) arts which may be carried on in silence ; and (2) arts which have to do with words, or in which words are coextensive with action, such as arithmetic, geometry, rhetoric. But still Gorgias could hardly have meant to say that arithmetic was the same as rhetoric. Even in the arts which are concerned with words there are differences. What then distinguishes rhetoric from the other arts which have to do with words ? ‘The words which rhetoric uses relate to the best and greatest of human things.’ But tell me, Gorgias, what are the best ? ‘Health first, beauty next, wealth third,’ in the words of the old song, or how would you rank them ? The arts will come to you in a body, each claiming precedence and saying that her own good is superior to that of the rest—How will you choose between them ? ‘I should say, Socrates, that the art of persuasion, which gives freedom to all men, and to individuals power in the state, is the greatest good.’ But what is the exact nature of this persuasion?—is the persevering retort : You could not describe Zeuxis as a painter, or even as a painter of figures, if there were other painters of figures ; neither can you define rhetoric simply as an art of persuasion, because there are other arts which persuade, such as arithmetic, which is an art of persuasion about odd and even numbers. Gorgias is made to see the necessity of a further limitation, and he now defines rhetoric as the art of persuading in the law courts, and in the assembly, about the just and unjust. But still there are two sorts of persuasion : one which gives knowledge, and

another which gives belief without knowledge; and knowledge is always true, but belief may be either true or false,—there is therefore a further question: which of the two sorts of persuasion does rhetoric effect in courts of law and assemblies? Plainly that which gives belief and not that which gives knowledge; for no one can impart a real knowledge of such matters to a crowd of persons in a few minutes. And there is another point to be considered:—when the assembly meets to advise about walls or docks or military expeditions, the rhetorician is not taken into counsel, but the architect or the general. How would Gorgias explain this phenomenon? All who intend to become disciples, of whom there are several in the company, and not Socrates only, are eagerly asking:—About what then will rhetoric teach us to persuade or advise the state?

Gorgias illustrates the nature of rhetoric by adducing the example of Themistocles, who persuaded the Athenians to build their docks and walls, and of Pericles, whom Socrates himself has heard speaking about the middle wall of the Piraeus. He adds that he has exercised a similar power over the patients of his brother Herodicus. He could be chosen a physician by the assembly if he pleased, for no physician could compete with a rhetorician in popularity and influence. He could persuade the multitude of anything by the power of his rhetoric; not that the rhetorician ought to abuse this power any more than a boxer should abuse the art of self-defence. Rhetoric is a good thing, but, like all good things, may be unlawfully used. Neither is the teacher of the art to be deemed unjust because his pupils are unjust and make a bad use of the lessons which they have learned from him.

Socrates would like to know before he replies, whether Gorgias will quarrel with him if he points out a slight inconsistency into which he has fallen, or whether he, like himself, is one who loves to be refuted. Gorgias declares that he is quite one of his sort, but fears that the argument may be tedious to the company. The company cheer, and Chaerephon and Callicles exhort them to proceed. Socrates gently points out the supposed inconsistency into which Gorgias appears to have fallen, and which he is inclined to think may arise out of a misapprehension of his own. The rhetorician has been declared by Gorgias to be more persuasive to the ignorant than the physician, or any other expert. And he is said to be ignorant, and this ignorance of his is regarded by Gorgias as a happy condition, for he has escaped the

trouble of learning. But is he as ignorant of just and unjust as he is of medicine or building? Gorgias is compelled to admit that if he did not know them previously he must learn them from his teacher as a part of the art of rhetoric. But he who has learned carpentry is a carpenter, and he who has learned music is a musician, and he who has learned justice is just. The rhetorician then must be a just man, and rhetoric is a just thing. But Gorgias has already admitted the opposite of this, viz. that rhetoric may be abused, and that the rhetorician may act unjustly. How is the inconsistency to be explained?

The fallacy of this argument is twofold; for in the first place, a man may know justice and not be just—here is the old confusion of the arts and the virtues;—nor can any teacher be expected to counteract wholly the bent of natural character; and secondly, a man may have a degree of justice, but not sufficient to prevent him from ever doing wrong. Polus is naturally exasperated at the sophism, which he is unable to detect; of course, he says, the rhetorician, like every one else, will admit that he knows justice (how can he do otherwise when pressed by the interrogations of Socrates?), but he thinks that great want of manners is shown in bringing the argument to such a pass. Socrates ironically replies, that when old men trip, the young set them on their legs again; and he is quite willing to retract, if he can be shown to be in error, but upon one condition, which is that Polus studies brevity. Polus is in great indignation at not being allowed to use as many words as he pleases in the free state of Athens. Socrates retorts, that yet harder will be his own case, if he is compelled to stay and listen to them. After some alteration they agree (cp. *Protag.* 338), that Polus shall ask and Socrates answer.

‘What is the art of rhetoric?’ says Polus. Not an art at all, replies Socrates, but a thing which in your book you affirm to have created art. Polus asks, ‘What thing?’ and Socrates answers, An experience or routine of making a sort of delight or gratification. ‘But is not rhetoric a fine thing?’ I have not yet told you what rhetoric is. Will you ask me another question—What is cookery? ‘What is cookery?’ An experience or routine of making a sort of delight or gratification. Then they are the same, or rather fall under the same class, and rhetoric has still to be distinguished from cookery. ‘What is rhetoric?’ asks Polus once more. A part of a not very creditable whole, which may be termed flattery, is the reply. ‘But what part?’ A shadow of a part of

politics. This, as might be expected, is wholly unintelligible, both to Gorgias and Polus; and, in order to explain his meaning to them, Socrates draws a distinction between shadows or appearances and realities; e. g. there is real health of body or soul, and the appearance of them; real arts and sciences, and the simulations of them. Now the soul and body have two arts waiting upon them, first the art of politics, which attends on the soul, having a legislative part and a judicial part; and another art attending on the body, which has no generic name, but may also be described as having two divisions, one of which is medicine and the other gymnastic. Corresponding with these four arts or sciences there are four shams or simulations of them, mere experiences, as they may be termed, because they give no reason of their own existence. The art of dressing up is the sham or simulation of gymnastic, the art of cookery, of medicine; rhetoric is the simulation of justice, and sophistic of legislation. They may be summed up in an arithmetical formula:—

Tiring : gymnastic :: cookery : medicine :: sophistic : legislation.

And,

Cookery : medicine :: rhetoric : justice.

And this is the true scheme of them, but when measured only by the gratification which they procure, they become jumbled together and return to their aboriginal chaos. Socrates apologizes for the length of his speech, which was necessary to the explanation of the subject, and begs Polus not unnecessarily to retaliate on him.

‘Do you mean to say that the rhetoricians are esteemed flatterers?’ They are not esteemed at all. ‘Why, have they not great power, and can they not do whatever they desire?’ They have no power, and they only do what they think best, and never what they desire; for they never attain the true object of desire, which is the good. ‘As if you, Socrates, would not envy the possessor of despotic power, who can imprison, exile, kill any one whom he pleases.’ But Socrates replies that he has no wish to put any one to death; he who kills another, even justly, is not to be envied, and he who kills him unjustly is to be pitied; it is better to suffer than to do injustice. He does not consider that going about with a dagger and putting men out of the way, or setting a house on fire, is real power. To this Polus assents, on the ground that such acts would be punished, but he is still of opinion that evil-doers, if they are unpunished, may be happy enough. He instances Archelaus, son of

Perdiccas, the usurper of Macedonia. Does not Socrates think him happy?—Socrates would like to know more about him; he cannot pronounce even the great king to be happy, unless he knows his mental and moral condition. Polus explains that Archelaus was a slave, being the son of a woman who was the slave of Aleetas, brother of Perdiccas king of Macedon—and he, by every species of crime, first murdering his uncle and then his cousin and half brother, obtained the kingdom. This was very wicked, and yet all the world, including Socrates, would like to have his place. Socrates dismisses the appeal to numbers; Polus, if he will, may summon all the rich men of Athens, Nicias, Aristocrates, whose splendid offerings fill the temples, the house of Pericles, or any other great family—this is the kind of evidence which is adduced in courts of justice, where truth depends upon numbers. But Socrates employs proof of another sort; his appeal is to one witness only,—that is to say, the person with whom he is speaking; him he will convict out of his own mouth. And he is prepared to show, after his manner, that Archelaus cannot be a wicked man and yet happy.

The evil-doer is deemed happy if he escapes, and miserable if he suffers punishment; but Socrates thinks him less miserable if he suffers than if he escapes. Polus is of opinion that such a paradox as this hardly deserves refutation, and is at any rate sufficiently refuted by the fact. Socrates has only to compare the lot of the successful tyrant who is the envy of the world, and of the wretch who, having been detected in a criminal attempt against the state, is crucified or burnt to death. Socrates replies, that if they are both criminal they are both miserable, but that the unpunished is the more miserable of the two. At this Polus laughs outright, which leads Socrates to remark that laughter is a new species of refutation. Polus replies, that he is already refuted; for if he will take the votes of the company, he will find that no one agrees with him. To this Socrates rejoins, that he is not a public man, and (referring to his own conduct at the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae) is unable to take the suffrages of any company, as he had shown on a recent occasion; he can only deal with one witness at a time, and that is the person with whom he is arguing. But he is certain that every man believes that to do is worse than to suffer evil.

Polus, though he will not admit this, is ready to acknowledge that to do evil is considered the more foul or dishonourable of the two. But what is fair and what is foul; whether the terms are applied to bodies,

colours, figures, laws, habits, studies, must they not be defined with reference to pleasure and utility? Polus assents to this latter doctrine, and is easily persuaded that the fouler of two things must exceed either in pain or in hurt. But the doing cannot exceed the suffering of evil in pain, and therefore must exceed in hurt. Thus doing is proved by the testimony of Polus himself to be worse or more hurtful than suffering.

There remains the other question: Is a guilty man better off when he is punished or when he is unpunished? Socrates replies, that what is done justly is suffered justly; if the act is just, the effect is just; if to punish is just, to be punished is just, and therefore fair, and therefore beneficent; and the benefit is that the soul is improved. There are three evils from which a man may suffer, and which affect him in estate, body, and soul:—these are, poverty, disease, injustice; and the foulest of these is injustice, the evil of the soul, because that brings the greatest hurt. And there are three arts which heal these evils—trading, medicine, justice—and the saltiest of these is justice. Happy is he who has never committed injustice, and happy in the second degree he who has been healed by punishment. And therefore the criminal should himself go to the judge as he would to the physician, and purge away his crime. Rhetoric will enable him to display his guilt in proper colours, and to sustain himself and others in enduring the necessary penalty. This is at least a conceivable use of the art, and no other has been discovered by us. And if a man had an enemy, he would desire not to punish him, but that he should go unpunished and become worse and worse, taking care only that he did no injury to himself.

Here Callicles, who has been listening in silent amazement, asks Chaerephon whether Socrates is in earnest, and on receiving the assurance that he is, proceeds to ask the same question of Socrates himself. For if such doctrines are true, life must have been turned upside down, and all of us are doing the opposite of what we ought to be doing.

Socrates replies in a style of playful irony, that before men can understand one another they must have some common feeling. And such a community of feeling exists between himself and Callicles, for both of them are lovers, and they have both a pair of loves; the beloved of Callicles are the Athenian Demos and Demos the son of Pyrilampes; the beloved of Socrates are Alcibiades and philosophy. The peculiarity

of Callicles is that he can never contradict his loves; he changes as his Demos changes in all his opinions; he watches the countenance of both his loves, and repeats their sentiments, and if any one is surprised at his sayings and doings, the explanation of them is, that he is not a free agent, but must always be imitating his two loves. And this is the explanation of Socrates' peculiarities also. He is always repeating what his mistress, Philosophy, is saying to him, who, unlike his other love, Alcibiades, is ever the same, ever true. Callicles must refute her, or he will never be at unity with himself; and discord in life is far worse than the discord of musical sounds.

Callicles answers, that Gorgias was overthrown because, as Polus said, in compliance with popular prejudice he had admitted that if his pupil did not know justice the rhetorician must teach him; and Polus has been similarly entangled, because his modesty led him to admit that to suffer is more honourable than to do injustice. By custom 'yes,' but not by nature, says Callicles. And Socrates is always playing between the two points of view, and putting one in the place of the other. In this very argument, what Polus only meant in a conventional sense has been affirmed by him to be a law of nature. For convention says that 'injustice is dishonourable,' but nature says that 'might is right.' And we are always taming down the nobler spirits among us to the conventional level. But sometimes a great man will rise up and reassert his original rights, trampling under foot all our formalities, and then the light of natural justice shines forth. As Pindar says, 'Law, the king of all, does violence with high hand'; as is proved by the example of Heracles, who drove off the oxen of Geryon and never paid for them.

This is the truth, Socrates, as you will be convinced, if you leave philosophy and pass on to the real business of life. A little philosophy is an excellent thing; too much is the ruin of a man. He who has not 'passed his metaphysics' before he has grown up to manhood will never know the world. Philosophers are ridiculous when they take to politics, and I dare say that politicians are equally ridiculous when they take to philosophy: 'Every man,' as Euripides says, 'is fondest of that in which he is best.' Philosophy is graceful in youth, like the lisp of infancy, and should be cultivated as a part of education; but when a grown-up man lisps or studies philosophy, I should like to beat him. None of those over-refined natures ever come to any good; they avoid the busy haunts of men, and skulk in corners, whispering

to a few admiring youths, and never giving utterance to any noble sentiments.

For you, Socrates, I have a regard, and therefore I say to you, as Zethus says to Amphion in the play, that you have ‘a noble soul disguised in a puerile exterior.’ And I would have you consider the danger which you and other philosophers incur. For you would not know how to defend yourself if any one accused you in a law-court,—there you would stand, with gaping mouth and dizzy brain, and might be murdered, robbed, boxed on the ears with impunity. Take my advice, then, and get a little common sense; leave to others these frivolities; walk in the ways of the wealthy and be wise.

Socrates professes to have found in Callicles the philosopher’s touchstone; and he is certain that any opinion in which they both agree must be the very truth. Callicles has all the three qualities which are needed in a critic—knowledge, goodwill, frankness; Gorgias and Polus were too modest, and their modesty made them contradict themselves. But Callicles is a well-educated man; and he is not too modest to speak out (of this he has already given proof), and his good-will is shown both by his own profession and by his giving the same caution against philosophy to Socrates, which Socrates remembers hearing him give long ago to his own clique of friends. He will pledge himself to retract any error into which he may have fallen, and which Callicles may point out. But he would like to know first of all what he and Pindar mean by natural justice. Do they suppose that the rule of justice is the rule of the stronger or of the better? ‘There is no difference.’ Then are not the many superior to the one, and the opinions of the many better? And their opinion is that justice is equality, and that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer wrong. And as they are the superior or stronger, this opinion of theirs must be in accordance with natural as well as conventional justice. ‘Why will you continue splitting words? Have I not told you that the superior is the better?’ But what do you mean by the better? Tell me that, and please to be a little milder in your language, if you do not wish to drive me away. ‘I mean the worthier, the wiser.’ You mean to say that one man of sense ought to rule over ten thousand fools? ‘Yes, that is my meaning.’ Ought the physician then to have a larger share of meats and drinks? or the weaver to have more coats, or the cobbler larger shoes, or the farmer more seed? ‘You are always saying the same things, Socrates.’ Yes, and on the same subjects

too; but you are never saying the same things. For, first, you defined the superior to be the stronger, and then the wiser, and now something else:—whom *do* you mean? ‘I mean men of political ability, who ought to govern, and have more than the governed.’ Than themselves? ‘What do you mean?’ I mean to say that every man is his own governor. ‘I see that you mean the temperate. But my doctrine is, that a man should let his desires grow, and take the means of satisfying them. To the many this is impossible, and therefore they combine to prevent him. But if he is a king, and has power, how base would he be in submitting to them! To invite the common herd to be lord over him, when he might have the enjoyment of all things! For the truth is, Socrates, that luxury and self-indulgence are virtue and happiness; all the rest is mere talk.’

Socrates compliments Callicles on his frankness in saying what other men only think. According to his view, those who want nothing are not happy. ‘Why,’ says Callicles, ‘if they were, stones and the dead would be happy.’ Socrates in reply is led into a half serious, half comic vein of reflection. ‘Who knows,’ as Euripides says, ‘whether life may not be death, and the body a tomb?’ How true is this! Moreover, the part of the soul in which the desires are situated is a leaky vessel, and some ingenious Sicilian has made an allegory, in which he represents fools as the uninitiated, who are supposed to be carrying water to this vessel, which is full of holes, in a similarly holey sieve, and this sieve is their own soul. The idea is fanciful, but nevertheless is a figure of a truth which I want to make you acknowledge, viz. that the life of contentment is better than the life of indulgence. ‘Are you disposed to admit that? ‘Far otherwise.’ Then hear another parable. The life of self-contentment and self-indulgence may be represented respectively by two men, who are filling jars with streams of wine, honey, milk,—the jars of the one are sound, and the jars of the other leaky; the first fills his jars, and has no more trouble with them; the second is always filling them, and would suffer extreme misery if he desisted. Are you of the same opinion still? ‘Yes, Socrates, and the figure expresses what I mean. For true pleasure is a perpetual stream, flowing in and flowing out. To be hungry and always eating, to be thirsty and always drinking, and to have all the other desires and to satisfy them, that, as I admit, is my idea of happiness.’ And to be itching and always scratching? ‘I do not deny that there may be happiness even in that.’ And to indulge unnatural desires,

if they are abundantly satisfied? Callicles is indignant at the introduction of such topics. But he is reminded by Socrates that they are introduced, not by him, but by the maintainer of the identity of pleasure and good. Will Callicles still maintain this? ‘Yes, for the sake of consistency, he will.’ The answer does not satisfy Socrates, who fears that he is losing his touchstone. A profession of seriousness on the part of Callicles reassures him, and they proceed with the argument. Pleasure and good are the same, but knowledge and courage are not the same either with pleasure or good, or with one another. Socrates disproves the first of these statements by showing that two opposites cannot coexist, but must alternate with one another—to be well and ill together is impossible. But pleasure and pain are simultaneous, and the cessation of them is simultaneous; e.g. in the case of drinking and thirsting, whereas good and evil are not simultaneous, and do not cease simultaneously, and therefore pleasure cannot be the same as good.

Callicles has already lost his temper, and can only be persuaded to go on by the interposition of Gorgias. Socrates, having already guarded against objections by distinguishing courage and knowledge from pleasure and good, proceeds:—The good are good by the presence of good, and the bad are bad by the presence of evil. And the brave and wise are good, and the cowardly and foolish are bad. And he who feels pleasure is good, and he who feels pain is bad, and both feel pleasure and pain in nearly the same degree, and sometimes the bad man or coward in a greater degree. Therefore the bad man or coward is as good as the brave or may be even better.

Callicles endeavours now to avert the inevitable absurdity by affirming that he and all mankind admitted some pleasures to be good and others bad. The good are the beneficial, and the bad are the hurtful, and we should choose the one and avoid the other. But this, as Socrates observes, is a return to the old doctrine of himself and Polus, that all things should be done for the sake of the good.

Callicles assents to this, and Socrates, finding that they are agreed in distinguishing pleasure from good, returns to his old division of empirical habits, or shams, or flatteries, which study pleasure only, and the arts which are concerned with the higher interests of soul and body. Does Callicles agree to this division? Callicles will agree to anything, in order that he may get through the argument. Which of the arts then are flatteries? Flute-playing, harp-playing, choral exhibitions, the

dithyrambics of Cinesias are all equally condemned on the ground that they give pleasure only; and Meles the harp-player, who was the father of Cinesias, failed even in that. The stately muse of Tragedy is bent upon pleasure, and not upon improvement. Poetry in general is only a rhetorical address to a mixed audience of men, women, and children. And the orators are very far from speaking with a view to what is best; their way is to humour the assembly as if they were children.

Callicles replies, that this is only true of some of them; others have a real regard for their fellow-citizens. Granted; then there are two species of oratory; the one a flattery, another which has a real regard for the citizens. But where are the orators among whom you find the latter? Callicles admits that there are none remaining, but there were such in the days when Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and the great Pericles were still alive. Socrates replies that none of these were true artists, setting before themselves the duty of bringing order out of disorder. The good man and true orator has a settled design, running through his life, to which he conforms all his words and actions; he desires to implant justice and eradicate injustice, to implant all virtue and eradicate all vice in the minds of his citizens. He is the physician who will not allow the sick man to indulge his appetites with a variety of meats and drinks, but insists on his exercising self-restraint. And this is good for the soul, and better than the unrestrained indulgence which Callicles was recently approving.

Here Callicles, who has been with difficulty brought to this point, turns restive, and suggests that Socrates shall answer his own questions. ‘Then,’ says Socrates, ‘one man must do for two;’ and though he had hoped to have given Callicles an ‘Amphion’ in return for his ‘Zethus,’ he is willing to proceed; at the same time, he hopes that Callicles will correct him, if he falls into error. He recapitulates the advantages which he has already won:—

The pleasant is not the same as the good—Callicles and I are agreed about that,—but pleasure is to be pursued for the sake of the good, and the good is that of which the presence makes us good; we and all things good have acquired some virtue or other. And virtue, whether of body or soul, of things or persons, is not attained by accident, but is due to order and harmonious arrangement. And the soul which has order is better than the soul which is without order, and is therefore temperate and is therefore good, and the intemperate is bad. And he who is

temperate is also just and brave and pious, and has attained the perfection of goodness and therefore of happiness, and the intemperate whom you approve is the opposite of all this and is wretched. He therefore who would be happy must pursue temperance and avoid intemperance, and if possible escape the necessity of punishment, but if he have done wrong he must endure punishment. In this way states and individuals should seek to attain harmony, which, as the wise tell us, is the bond of heaven and earth, of gods and men. Callicles has never discovered the power of geometrical proportion in both worlds; he would have men aim at disproportion and excess. But if he be wrong in this, and if self-control is the true secret of happiness, then the paradox that the only use of rhetoric is in self-accusation is true, and Polus was right in saying that to do wrong is worse than to suffer wrong, and Gorgias was right in saying that the rhetorician must be a just man. And you were wrong in taunting me with my defenceless condition, and in saying that I might be accused or put to death or boxed on the ears with impunity. For I may repeat once more, that to strike is worse than to be stricken—to do than to suffer. What I say is now made fast in adamantine bonds. I myself know not the true nature of these things, but I know that no one can deny my words and not be ridiculous. To do wrong is the greatest of evils, and to suffer wrong is the next greatest evil. He who would avoid the last must be a ruler, or the friend of a ruler; and to be the friend he must be the equal of the ruler, and must also resemble him. Under his protection he will suffer no evil, but will he also do no evil? Nay, will he not rather do all the evil which he can and escape? And in this way the greatest of all evils will befall him. ‘But this imitator of the tyrant,’ rejoins Callicles, ‘will kill any one who does not similarly imitate him.’ Socrates replies that he is not deaf, and that he has heard that repeated many times, and can only reply, that a bad man will kill a good one. ‘Yes, and that is the provoking thing.’ Not provoking to a man of sense who is not studying the arts which will preserve him from danger; and this, as you say, is the use of rhetoric in courts of justice. But how many other arts are there which also save men from death, and are yet quite humble in their pretensions—such as the art of swimming, or the art of the pilot? Does not the pilot do men at least as much service as the rhetorician, and yet for the voyage from Aegina to Athens he does not charge more than two obols, and when he disembarks is quite unassuming in his demeanour? The reason is that he is not certain

whether he has done his passengers any good in saving them from death, if one of them is diseased in body, and still more if he is diseased in mind—who can say? The engineer too will often save whole cities, and yet you despise him, and would not allow your son to marry his daughter, or his son to marry yours. But what reason is there in this? For if virtue only means the saving of life, whether your own or another's, you have no right to despise him or any practiser of saving arts. But is not virtue something different from saving and being saved? I would have you rather consider whether you ought not to disregard length of life, and think only how you can live best, leaving all besides to the will of Heaven. For you must not expect to have influence either with the Athenian Demos or with Demos the son of Pyrilampes, unless you become like them. What do you say to this?

‘There is some truth in what you are saying, but I do not entirely believe you.’

That is because you are in love with Demos. But let us have a little more conversation. You remember the two processes—one which was directed to pleasure, the other which was directed to making men as good as possible. And those who have the care of the city should make the citizens as good as possible. But who would undertake a public building, if he had never had a teacher of the art of building, and had never constructed a building before? or who would undertake the duty of state-physician, if he had never cured either himself or any one else? Should we not examine him before we entrusted him with the office? And as Callicles is about to enter public life, should we not examine him? Whom has he made better? For we have already admitted that this is the statesman's proper business. And we must ask the same question about Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles. Whom did they make better? Nay, did not Pericles make the citizens worse? For he gave them pay, and at first he was very popular with them, but at last they condemned him to death. And yet surely he would be a bad tamer of animals who, having received them gentle, taught them to kick and butt; and man is an animal, and Pericles had the charge of man, and he made him wilder, and more savage and unjust, and therefore he could not have been a good statesman. The same tale might be repeated about Cimon, Themistocles, Miltiades. And yet the charioteer who keeps his seat at first is not thrown out when he gains greater experience and skill. The inference is, that the statesman of a

past age were no better than those of our own. They may have been cleverer constructors of docks and harbours, but they did not improve the character of the citizens. I have told you again and again (and I purposely use the same images) that the soul, like the body, may be treated in two ways—there is the meaner and the higher art. And you seemed to understand this at the time, but when I ask you who were the really good statesmen, you answer—as if I asked you who were the good trainers, and you answered, Thearion, the baker, Mithoecus, the author of the Sicilian cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner. And you would be affronted if I told you that these are a parcel of cooks who make men fat only to make them thin. And those whom they have fattened applaud them, instead of finding fault with them, and lay the blame of their subsequent disorders on their physicians. And in this, Callicles, you are like them; you applaud the statesmen of old, who pandered to the vices of the citizens, and filled the city with docks and harbours, but neglected virtue and justice. And when the fit of illness comes, the citizens who in like manner applaud Themistocles, Pericles, and others, will lay hold of you and my friend Alcibiades, and you will suffer for the misdeeds of your predecessors. The old story is always being repeated—‘after all his services, the ungrateful city banished him, or condemned him to death.’ As if the statesman should not have taught the city better! He surely cannot blame the state for having unjustly used him, any more than the sophist or teacher can find fault with his pupils if they cheat him. And the sophist and orator are in the same case; although you admire rhetoric and despise sophistic, whereas sophistic is really the higher of the two. The teacher of the arts takes money, but the teacher of virtue or politics takes no money, because this is the only kind of service which makes the disciple desirous of requiting his teacher.

Socrates concludes by finally asking, to which of the two modes of serving the state Callicles invites him:—‘to the inferior and ministerial one,’ is the ingenuous reply. That is the only way of avoiding death, replies Socrates; and he has heard often enough, and would rather not hear again, that the bad man will kill the good. But he thinks that such a fate is very likely reserved for him, because he remarks that he is the only person who teaches the true art of politics. And very probably, as in the case which he described to Polus, he may be the physician who is tried by a jury of children. He cannot say that he has procured the citizens any pleasure, and if any one charges him with perplexing them,

or with reviling their elders, he will not be able to make them understand that he has only been actuated by a desire for their good. And therefore there is no saying what his fate may be. ‘And do you think that a man who is unable to help himself is in a good condition?’ Yes, Callicles, if he have the true self-help, which is never to have said or done any wrong to himself or others. If I had not this kind of self-help, I should be ashamed; but if I die for want of your flattering rhetoric, I shall die in peace. For death is no evil, but to go to the world below laden with offences is the worst of evils. In proof of which I will tell you a tale:

Under the rule of Cronos, men were judged on the day of their death, and when judgment had been given on them they departed—the good to the islands of the blest, the bad to the house of vengeance. But as they were still living, and had their clothes on at the time when they were being judged, there was favouritism, and Zeus, on his coming to the throne, was obliged to alter the mode of procedure, and try them after death, having first sent down Prometheus to take away from them the foreknowledge of death. Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus, were appointed to be the judges; Rhadamanthus for Asia, Aeacus for Europe, and Minos was to hold the court of appeal. Now death is the separation of soul and body, but after death soul and body alike retain their characteristics; the fat man, the dandy, the branded slave, are all distinguishable. Some prince or potentate, perhaps even the great king himself, appears before Rhadamanthus, and he instantly detects him, though he knows not who he is; he sees the scars of perjury and iniquity, and sends him away to the house of torment.

For there are two classes of souls who undergo punishment—the curable and the incurable. The curable are those who are benefited by their punishment; the incurable are such as Archelaus, who benefit others by becoming a warning to them. The latter class are generally kings and potentates; meaner persons, happily for themselves, have not the same power of doing injustice. Sisyphus and Tityus in Homer, and not Thersites, are undergoing everlasting punishment. Not that there is anything to prevent a great man from being a good one, as is shown by the famous example of Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus. But to Rhadamanthus the souls are only known as good or bad; they are stripped of their dignities and preferments; he despatches the bad to Tartarus, labelled either as curable or incurable, and looks with love

and admiration on the soul of some just one, whom he sends to the islands of the blest. Similar is the practice of Aeacus; and Minos overlooks them, holding a golden sceptre, as Odysseus in Homer saw him

‘Wielding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.’

My wish for myself and my fellow-men is, that we may present our souls undefiled to the judge in that day; my desire in life is to be able to meet death. And I exhort you, and retort upon you the reproach which you cast upon me,—that you will stand before the judge, gaping, and with dizzy brain, and any one may box you on the ear, and do you all manner of evil.

Perhaps you think that this is an old wives’ fable. But you, who are the three wisest men in Hellas, have nothing better to say, and no one will ever show that to do is better than to suffer evil. A man should study to be, and not merely to seem. If he is bad, he should become good, and avoid all flattery, whether of the many or of the few.

Follow me, then; and if you are looked down upon, that will do you no harm. And when we have practised virtue, we will betake ourselves to politics, but not until we are delivered from the shameful state of ignorance and uncertainty in which we are at present. Let us follow in the way of virtue and justice, and not in the way to which you, Callicles, invite us; for that way is nothing worth.

We will now consider in order some of the principal points of the dialogue. Having regard (1) to the age of Plato and the ironical character of his writings, we may compare him with himself and with other great teachers, and we may note in passing the objections of his critics. And then (2) casting one eye upon him, we may cast another upon ourselves, and endeavour to draw out the great lessons which he teaches for all time, stripped of the accidental form in which they are enveloped.

(1) In the *Gorgias*, as in nearly all the other dialogues of Plato, we are made aware that formal logic has as yet no existence. The old difficulty of framing a definition recurs. The illusive analogy of the arts and the virtues also continues. The ambiguity of several words, such as nature, custom, the honourable, the good, is not cleared up. The Sophists are still floundering about the distinction of the real and seeming. Figures of speech are made the basis of arguments. The

possibility of conceiving a universal art or science, which admits of application to a particular subject-matter, is a difficulty which remains unsolved, and has not altogether ceased to haunt the world at the present day (cp. *Charmides*, 166 ff.). The defect of clearness is also apparent in Socrates himself, unless we suppose him to be practising on the simplicity of his opponent, or rather perhaps trying an experiment in dialectics. Nothing can be more fallacious than the contradiction which he pretends to have discovered in the answers of Gorgias (see Analysis). The advantages which he gains over Polus are also due to a false antithesis of pleasure and good, and to an erroneous assertion that an agent and a patient may be described by similar predicates; — a mistake which Aristotle partly shares and partly corrects in the *Nichomachean Ethics*, V. i. 4; xi. 2. Traces of a 'robust sophistry' are likewise discernible in his argument with Callicles (pp. 490, 496, 516).

(2) Although Socrates professes to be convinced by reason only, yet the argument is often a sort of dialectical fiction, by which he conducts himself and others to his own ideal of life and action. And we may sometimes wish that we could have suggested answers to his antagonists, or pointed out to them the rocks which lay concealed under the ambiguous terms good, pleasure, and the like. But it would be as useless to examine his arguments by the requirements of modern logic, as to criticise this ideal from a merely utilitarian point of view. If we say that the ideal is generally regarded as unattainable, and that mankind will by no means agree in thinking that the criminal is happier when punished than when unpunished, any more than they would agree to the stoical paradox that a man may be happy on the rack, Plato has already admitted that the world is against him. Neither does he mean to say that Archelaus is tormented by the stings of conscience; or that the sensations of the impaled criminal are more agreeable than those of the tyrant drowned in luxurious enjoyment. Neither is he speaking, as in the *Protagoras*, of virtue as a calculation of pleasure, an opinion which he afterwards repudiates in the *Phaedo*. What then is his meaning? His meaning we shall be able to illustrate best by parallel notions, which, whether justifiable by logic or not, have always existed among mankind. We must remind the reader that Socrates himself implies that he will be understood or appreciated by very few.

He is speaking not of the consciousness of happiness, but of the

idea of happiness. When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier falls in battle, we do not suppose that death or wounds are without pain, or that their physical suffering is always compensated by a mental satisfaction. Still we regard them as happy, and we would a thousand times rather have their death than a shameful life. Nor is this only because we believe that they will obtain an immortality of fame, or that they will have crowns of glory in another world, when their enemies and persecutors will be proportionably tormented. Men are found in a few instances to do what is right, without reference to public opinion or to consequences. And we regard them as happy on this ground only, much as Socrates' friends in the opening of the *Phaedo* are described as regarding him; or as was said of another, 'they looked upon his face as upon the face of an angel.' We are not concerned to justify this idealism by the standard of utility or public opinion, but merely to point out the existence of such a sentiment in the better part of human nature.

The idealism of Plato is founded upon this sentiment. He would maintain that in some sense or other truth and right are alone to be sought, and that all other goods are only desirable as means towards these. He is thought to have erred in 'considering the agent only, and making no reference to the happiness of others, as affected by him.' But the happiness of others or of mankind, if regarded as an end, is really quite as ideal and almost as paradoxical to the common understanding as Plato's conception of happiness. For the greatest happiness of the greatest number may mean also the greatest pain of the individual which will procure the greatest pleasure of the greatest number. Ideas of utility, like those of duty and right, may be pushed to unpleasant consequences. Nor can Plato in the *Gorgias* be deemed purely self-regarding, considering that Socrates expressly mentions the duty of imparting the truth when discovered to others. Nor must we forget that the side of ethics which regards others is by the ancients merged in politics. Both in Plato and Aristotle, as well as in the Stoics, the social principle, though taking another form, is really far more prominent than in most modern treatises on ethics.

The idealizing of suffering is one of the conceptions which have exercised the greatest influence on mankind. Into the theological import of this, or into the consideration of the errors to which the idea may have given rise, we need not now enter. All will agree that the ideal of

the Divine Sufferer, whose words the world would not receive, the man of sorrows of whom the Hebrew prophets spoke, has sunk deep into the heart of the human race. It is a similar picture of suffering goodness which Plato desires to pourtray, not without an allusion to the fate of his master Socrates. He is convinced that, somehow or other, such an one must be happy in life or after death. In the Republic, he endeavours to show that his happiness would be assured here in a well-ordered state. But in the actual condition of human things the wise and good are weak and miserable; he is like a man fallen among wild beasts, exposed to every sort of wrong and obloquy.

Plato, like other philosophers, is thus led on to the conclusion, that if 'the ways of God' to man are to be 'justified,' the hopes of another life must be included. If the question could have been put to him, whether a man dying in torments was happy still, even if, as he suggests in the *Apology*, 'death be only a long sleep,' we can hardly tell what would have been his answer. There have been a few, who, quite independently of rewards and punishments or of posthumous reputation, or any other influence of public opinion, have been willing to sacrifice their lives for the good of others. It is difficult to say how far in such cases an unconscious hope of a future life, or a general faith in the victory of good in the world, may have supported the sufferers. But this extreme idealism is not in accordance with the spirit of Plato. He supposes a day of retribution, in which the good are to be rewarded and the wicked punished (522 E). Though, as he says in the *Phaedo*, no man of sense will maintain that the details of the stories about another world are true, he will insist that something of the kind is true, and will frame his life with a view to this unknown future. Even in the *Republic* he introduces a future life as an afterthought, when the superior happiness of the just has been established on what is thought to be an immutable foundation. At the same time he makes a point of determining his main thesis independently of remoter consequences (612 A).

(3) Plato's theory of punishment is partly vindictive, partly corrective. In the *Gorgias*, as well as in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, a few great criminals, chiefly tyrants, are reserved as exemplés. But most men have never had the opportunity of attaining this pre-eminence of evil. They are not incurable, and their punishment is intended for their improvement. They are to suffer because they have sinned; like sick men, they must go to the physician and be healed. On this representation of

Plato's the criticism has been made, that the analogy of disease and injustice is partial only, and that suffering instead of improving men may have just the opposite effect.

Like the general analogy of the arts and the virtues, the analogy of disease and injustice, or of medicine and justice, is certainly imperfect. But ideas must be given through something; the nature of the mind which is unseen can only be represented under figures derived from visible objects. If these figures are suggestive of some new aspect under which the mind may be considered, we cannot find fault with them for not exactly coinciding with the ideas represented. They partake of the imperfect nature of language, and must not be construed in too strict a manner. That Plato sometimes reasons from them as if they were not figures but realities, is due to the defective logical analysis of his age.

Nor does he distinguish between the suffering which improves and the suffering which only punishes and deters. He applies to the sphere of ethics a conception of punishment which is really derived from criminal law. He does not see that such punishment is only negative, and supplies no principle of moral growth or development. He is not far off the higher notion of an education of man to be begun in this world, and to be continued in other stages of existence, which is further developed in the Republic. And Christian thinkers, who have ventured out of the beaten track in their meditations on the 'last things,' have found a ray of light in his writings. But he has not explained how or in what way punishment is to contribute to the improvement of mankind. He has not followed out the principle which he affirms in the Republic, that 'God is the author of evil only with a view to good,' and that 'they were the better for being punished.' Still his doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments may be compared favourably with that perversion of Christian doctrine which makes the everlasting punishment of human beings depend on a brief moment of time, or even on the accident of an accident. And he has escaped the difficulty which has often beset divines, respecting the future destiny of the meaner sort of men (Thersites and the like), who are neither very good nor very bad, by not counting them worthy of eternal damnation.

We do Plato violence in pressing his figures of speech or chains of argument; and not less so in asking questions which were beyond the horizon of his vision, or did not come within the scope of his design. The main purpose of the Gorgias is not to answer questions about a

future world, but to place in antagonism the true and false life, and to contrast the judgments and opinions of men with judgment according to the truth. Plato may be accused of representing a superhuman or transcendental virtue in the description of the just man in the *Gorgias*, or in the companion portrait of the philosopher in the *Theaetetus*; and at the same time may be thought to be condemning a state of the world which always has existed and always will exist among men. But such ideals act powerfully on the imagination of mankind. And such condemnations are not mere paradoxes of philosophers, but the natural rebellion of the higher sense of right in man against the ordinary conditions of human life. The greatest statesmen have fallen very far short of the political ideal, and are therefore justly involved in the general condemnation.

Subordinate to the main purpose of the dialogue are some other questions, which may be briefly considered:—

a. The antithesis of good and pleasure, which as in other dialogues is supposed to consist in the permanent nature of the one compared with the transient and relative nature of the other. Good and pleasure, knowledge and sense, truth and opinion, essence and generation, virtue and pleasure, the real and the apparent, the infinite and finite, harmony or beauty and discord, dialectic and rhetoric or poetry, are so many pairs of opposites, which in Plato easily pass into one another, and are seldom kept perfectly distinct. And we must not forget that Plato's conception of pleasure is the Heraclitean flux transferred to the sphere of human conduct. There is some degree of unfairness in opposing the principle of good, which is objective, to the principle of pleasure, which is subjective. For the assertion of the permanence of good is only based on the assumption of its objective character. Had Plato fixed his mind, not on the ideal nature of good, but on the subjective consciousness of happiness, that would have been found to be as transient and precarious as pleasure.

b. The arts or sciences, when pursued without any view to truth, or the improvement of human life, are called flatteries. They are all alike dependent upon the opinion of mankind, from which they are derived. To Plato the whole world appears to be sunk in error, based on self-interest. To this is opposed the one wise man hardly professing to have found truth, yet strong in the conviction that a virtuous life is the only good, whether regarded with reference to this world or to another.

Statesmen, Sophists, rhetoricians, poets, are alike brought up for judgment. They are the parodies of wise men, and their arts are the parodies of true arts and sciences. All that they call science is merely the result of that study of the tempers of the Great Beast, which he describes in the Republic.

c. Various other points of contact naturally suggest themselves between the Gorgias and other dialogues, especially the Republic, the Philebus, and the Protagoras. There are closer resemblances both of spirit and language in the Republic than in any other dialogue, the verbal similarity tending to show that they were written at the same period of Plato's life. For the Republic supplies that education and training of which the Gorgias suggests the necessity. The theory of the many weak combining against the few strong in the formation of society (which is indeed a partial truth), is similar in both of them, and is expressed in nearly the same language. The sufferings and fate of the just man, the powerlessness of evil, and the reversal of the situation in another life, are also points of similarity. The poets, like the rhetoricians, are condemned because they aim at pleasure only, as in the Republic they are expelled the State, because they are imitators, and minister to the weaker side of human nature. That poetry is akin to rhetoric may be compared with the analogous notion, which occurs in the Protagoras, that the ancient poets were the Sophists of their day. In some other respects the Protagoras rather offers a contrast than a parallel. The character of Protagoras may be compared with that of Gorgias, but the conception of happiness is different in the two dialogues; being described in the former, according to the old Socratic notion, as deferred or accumulated pleasure, while in the Gorgias, and in the Phaedo, pleasure and good are distinctly opposed.

This opposition is carried out from a speculative point of view in the Philebus. There neither pleasure nor wisdom are allowed to be the chief good, but pleasure and good are not so completely opposed as in the Gorgias. For innocent pleasures, and such as have no antecedent pains, are allowed to rank in the class of goods. The allusion to Gorgias' definition of rhetoric (Philebus, 58 A, B; cp. Gor. 452 D, E), as the art of persuasion, and the best of arts, and the art which subjects all things, not by force, but voluntarily, seems to mark a designed connection between the two dialogues. In both the ideas of measure, order, harmony, are the connecting links between the beautiful and the good.

In general spirit and character, that is, in irony and antagonism to public opinion, the Gorgias most nearly resembles the *Apology*, *Crito*, and portions of the *Republic*, and like the *Philebus*, though from another point of view, may be thought to stand in the same relation to Plato's theory of morals which the *Theaetetus* bears to his theory of knowledge.

*d.* A few minor points still remain to be summed up: (1) The extravagant irony in the reason which is assigned for the pilot's modest charge (p. 512); and in the proposed use of rhetoric as an instrument of self-condemnation (p. 480); and in the mighty power of geometrical equality in both worlds (p. 508). (2) The reference of the mythus to the previous discussion should not be overlooked: the fate reserved for incurable criminals such as Archelaus (p. 525); the retaliation of the box on the ears (p. 527); the nakedness of the souls and of the judges who are stript of the clothes or disguises which rhetoric and public opinion have hitherto provided for them (p. 523; cp. Swift's notion that the universe is a suit of clothes). The fiction seems to have involved Plato in the necessity of supposing that the soul retained a sort of corporeal likeness after death (p. 524). (3) The appeal to the authority of Homer, who says that Odysseus saw Minos in his court 'holding a golden sceptre,' which gives verisimilitude to the tale (p. 526).

It is scarcely necessary to repeat that Plato is playing 'both sides of the game,' and that in criticising the characters of Gorgias and Polus, we are not passing any judgment on historical individuals, but only attempting to analyze the '*dramatis personae*' as they were conceived by him. Neither is it necessary to remark that Plato is a dramatic writer, whose real opinions cannot always be assumed to be those which he puts into the mouth of Socrates, or any other speaker who appears to have the best of the argument: or that he is to be criticised as a poet rather than as a mere philosopher: or that he is not to be tried by a modern standard, but interpreted with reference to his place in the history of thought and the opinion of his time.

It has been said that the most characteristic feature of the *Gorgias* is the assertion of the right of dissent, or private judgment. But this mode of stating the question is really opposed both to the spirit of Plato and of ancient philosophy generally. For Plato is not asserting any abstract right or duty of toleration, or advantage to be derived from freedom of thought; indeed, in some other parts of his writings (e. g. *Laws*, X), he has fairly laid himself open to the charge of in-

tolerance. No speculations had as yet arisen respecting the 'liberty of prophesying ;' and Plato is not assuming any abstract right of this nature : but he is asserting the duty and right of the one wise and true man to dissent from the folly and falsehood of the many. At the same time he acknowledges the natural result, which he hardly seeks to avert, that he who speaks the truth to a multitude, regardless of consequences, will probably share the fate of Socrates.

The irony of Plato sometimes veils from us the height of idealism to which he soars. When declaring truths which the many will not receive, he puts on an armour which cannot be pierced by them. The weapons of ridicule are taken out of their hands and the laugh is turned against themselves. The disguises which Socrates assumes are like the parables of the New Testament, or the oracles of the Delphian God ; they half conceal, half reveal, his meaning. The more he is in earnest, the more ironical he becomes ; and he is never more in earnest or more ironical than in the Gorgias. He hardly troubles himself to answer seriously the objections of Gorgias and Polus, and therefore he sometimes appears to be careless of the ordinary requirements of logic. Yet in the highest sense he is always logical and consistent with himself. The form of the argument may be paradoxical ; the substance is an appeal to the higher reason. He is uttering truths before they can be understood, as in all ages the words of philosophers, when they are first uttered, have found the world unprepared for them. A further misunderstanding arises out of the wildness of his humour ; he is supposed not only by Callicles, but by the rest of mankind, to be jesting when he is profoundly serious. At length he makes even Polus (p. 468) in earnest. Finally, he drops the argument, and heedless any longer of the forms of dialectic, he loses himself in a sort of triumph, while at the same time he retaliates upon his adversaries. From this confusion of jest and earnest, we may now return to the ideal truth, and draw out in a simple form the main theses of the dialogue.

First Thesis :—

It is a greater evil to do than to suffer injustice.

Compare the New Testament—

‘It is better to suffer for well doing than for evil doing.’—1 Pet. iii. 17.

And the Sermon on the Mount—

‘Blessed are they that are persecuted for righteousness’ sake.’—Matt. v. 10.

The words of Socrates are more abstract than the words of Christ, but they equally imply that the only real evil is moral evil. The righteous may suffer or die, but they have their reward; and even if they had no reward, would be happier than the wicked. The world, represented by Polus, is ready, when they are asked, to acknowledge that injustice is dishonourable, and for their own sakes men are willing to punish the offender (cp. Rep. 360 D). But they are not equally willing to acknowledge that injustice, even if successful, is essentially evil, and has the nature of disease and death. Especially when crimes are committed on the great scale—the crimes of tyrants, ancient or modern—after a while, seeing that they cannot be undone, and have become a part of history, mankind are disposed to forgive them, not from any magnanimity or charity, but because their feelings are blunted by time, and to forgive is convenient to them. The tangle of good and evil can no longer be unravelled; and although they know that the end cannot justify the means, they feel also that good has often come out of evil. But Socrates would have us pass the same judgment on the tyrant now and always; though he is surrounded by his satellites, and has the applauses of Europe and Asia ringing in his ears; though he is the civilizer or liberator of half a continent, he is, and always will be, the most miserable of men. The greatest consequences for good or for evil cannot alter a hair's breadth the morality of actions which are right or wrong in themselves. This is the standard which Socrates holds up to us. Because politics, and perhaps human life generally, are of a mixed nature we must not allow our principles to sink to the level of our practice.

And so of private individuals—to them, too, the world occasionally speaks of the consequences of their actions:—if they are lovers of pleasure, they will ruin their health; if they are false or dishonest, they will lose their character. But Socrates would speak to them, not of what will be, but of what is—of the present consequence of lowering and degrading the soul. And all higher natures, or perhaps all men everywhere, if they were not tempted by interest or passion, would agree with him—they would rather be the victims than the perpetrators of an act of treachery or of tyranny. Reason tells them that death comes sooner or later to all, and is not so great an evil as an unworthy life, or rather, if rightly regarded, not an evil at all, but to a good man the greatest good. For in all of us there are slumbering ideals of truth and right, which may at any time awaken and develop a new life in us.

Second Thesis :—

It is better to suffer for wrong doing than not to suffer.

There might have been a condition of human life in which the penalty followed at once, and was proportioned to the offence. Moral evil would then be scarcely distinguishable from physical; mankind would avoid vice as they avoid pain or death. But nature, with a view of deepening and enlarging our characters, has for the most part hidden from us the consequences of our actions, and we can only foresee them by an effort of reflection. To awaken in us this habit of reflection is the business of early education, which is continued in maturer years by observation and experience. The spoilt child is in later life said to be unfortunate—he had better have suffered when he was young, and been saved from suffering afterwards. But is not the sovereign equally unfortunate whose education and manner of life are always concealing from him the consequences of his own actions, until at length they are revealed to him in some terrible downfall, which may, perhaps, have been caused not by his own fault? Another illustration is afforded by the pauper and criminal classes, who scarcely reflect at all, except on the means by which they can compass their immediate ends. We pity them, and make allowances for them; but we do not consider that the same principle applies to human actions generally. Not to have been found out in some dishonesty or folly, regarded from a moral or religious point of view, is the greatest of misfortunes. The success of our evil doings is a proof that the gods have ceased to strive with us, and have given us over to ourselves. There is nothing to remind us of our sins, and therefore nothing to correct them. Like our sorrows, they are healed by time;

‘While rank corruption, mining all within,  
Infects unseen.’

The ‘accustomed irony’ of Socrates adds a corollary to the argument:—‘Would you punish your enemy, you should allow him to escape unpunished’—this is the true retaliation. (Compare the obscure verse of Proverbs, xxv. 21, 22, ‘Therefore if thine enemy hunger, feed him,’ etc., quoted in Romans xii. 20.)

Men are not in the habit of dwelling upon the dark side of their own lives: they do not easily see themselves as others see them. They are very kind and very blind to their own faults; the rhetoric of self-love is always pleading with them on their own behalf. Adopting a similar

figure of speech, Socrates would have them use rhetoric, not in defence but in accusation of themselves. As they are guided by feeling rather than by reason, to their feelings the appeal must be made. They must speak to themselves; they must argue with themselves; they must paint in eloquent words the character of their own evil deeds. To any suffering which they have deserved, they must persuade themselves to submit. Under the figure there lurks a real thought, which, expressed in another form, admits of an easy application to ourselves. For do not we too accuse as well as excuse ourselves? And we call to our aid the rhetoric of prayer and preaching, which the mind silently employs while the struggle between the better and the worse is going on within us. And sometimes we are too hard upon ourselves, because we want to restore the balance which self-love has overthrown or disturbed; and then again we may hear a voice as of a parent consoling us. In religious diaries a sort of drama is often enacted by the consciences of men 'accusing or else excusing them.' For all our life long we are talking with ourselves:—What is thought but speech? What is feeling but rhetoric? And if rhetoric is used on one side only we shall be always in danger of being deceived. And so the words of Socrates, which at first sounded paradoxical, come home to the experience of all of us.

Third Thesis:—

We do not what we will, but what we wish.

Socrates would teach us a lesson which we are slow to learn—that good intentions, and even benevolent actions, when they are not prompted by wisdom, are of no value. We believe something to be for our good which we afterwards find out not to be for our good. The consequences may be inevitable, for they may follow an invariable law, yet they may often be the very opposite of what is expected by us. When we increase pauperism by almsgiving; when we tie up property without regard to changes of circumstances; when we say hastily what we deliberately disapprove; when we do in a moment of passion what upon reflection we regret; when from any want of self-control we give another an advantage over us—we are doing not what we will, but what we wish. All actions of which the consequences are not weighed and foreseen, are of this impotent and paralytic sort; and the author of them has 'the least possible power' while seeming to have the greatest. For he is actually bringing about the reverse of what he intended. And yet

the book of nature is open to him, in which he who runs may read if he will exercise ordinary attention; every day offers him experiences of his own and of other men's characters, and he passes them unheeded by. The contemplation of the consequences of actions, and the ignorance of men in regard to them, seems to have led Socrates to his famous thesis: — 'Virtue is knowledge,' which is not so much an error or paradox as a half truth, seen first in the twilight of ethical philosophy, but also the half of the truth which is especially needed in the present age. For as the world has grown older men have been too apt to imagine a right and wrong apart from consequences; while a few, on the other hand, have sought to resolve them wholly into their consequences. But Socrates, or Plato for him, neither divides nor identifies them; though the time has not yet arrived either for utilitarian or transcendental systems of moral philosophy, he recognizes the two elements which seem to lie at the basis of morality.

Fourth Thesis:—

To be and not to seem is the end of life.

The Greek in the age of Plato admitted praise to be one of the chief incentives to moral virtue, and to most men the opinion of their fellows is a leading principle of action. Hence a certain element of seeming enters into all things; all or almost all desire to appear better than they are, that they may win the esteem or admiration of others. A man of ability can easily feign the language of piety or virtue; and there is an unconscious as well as a conscious hypocrisy which, according to Socrates, is the worst of the two. Again, there is the sophistry of classes and professions. There are the different opinions about themselves and one another which prevail in different ranks of society. There is the bias given to the mind by the study of one department of human knowledge to the exclusion of the rest; and stronger far the prejudice engendered by a pecuniary or party interest in certain tenets. There is the sophistry of law, the sophistry of medicine, the sophistry of politics, the sophistry of theology. All of these disguises wear the appearance of the truth; some of them are very ancient, and we do not easily disengage ourselves from them; for we have inherited them, and they have become a part of us. The sophistry of an ancient Greek sophist is nothing compared with the sophistry of a religious order, or of a church in which during many ages falsehood has been accumulating, and everything has been said on one side, and nothing on the other. The conventions and cus-

toms which we observe in conversation, and the opposition of our interests when we have dealings with one another ('the buyer saith, it is nought—it is nought,' etc.), are always obscuring our sense of truth and right. The sophistry of human nature is far more subtle than the deceit of any one man. Few persons speak freely from their own natures, and scarcely any one dares to think for himself: most of us imperceptibly fall into the opinions of those around us, which we partly help to make. A man who would shake himself loose from them, requires great force of mind; he hardly knows where to begin in the search after truth. On every side he is met by the world, which is not an abstraction of theologians, but the most real of all things, being another name for ourselves when regarded collectively and subjected to the influences of society.

Then comes Socrates, impressed as no other man ever was, with the unreality and untruthfulness of popular opinion, and tells mankind that they must be and not seem. How are they to be? At any rate they must have the spirit and desire to be. If they are ignorant, they must acknowledge their ignorance to themselves; if they are conscious of doing evil, they must learn to do well; if they are weak, and have nothing in them which they can call themselves, they must acquire firmness and consistency; if they are indifferent, they must begin to take an interest in the great questions which surround them. They must try to be what they would fain appear in the eyes of their fellow men. A single individual cannot easily change public opinion; but he can be true and innocent, simple and independent; he can know what he does, and what he does not know; and though not without an effort, he can form a judgment of his own, at least in common matters. In his most secret actions he can show the same high principle (cp. Rep. VIII. 554 D) which he shows when supported and watched by public opinion. And on some fitting occasion, on some question of humanity or truth or right, even an ordinary man, from the natural rectitude of his disposition, may be found to take up arms against a whole tribe of politicians and lawyers, and be too much for them.

Who is the true and who the false statesman?—

The true statesman is he who brings order out of disorder; who first organizes and then administers the government of his own country; and having made a nation, seeks to reconcile the national interests with those of Europe and of mankind. He is not a mere theorist, nor yet a dealer in expedients; the whole and the parts grow together in his mind;

while the head is conceiving, the hand is executing. Although obliged to descend to the world, he is not of the world. His thoughts are fixed not on power or riches or extension of territory, but on an ideal state, in which all the citizens have an equal chance of health and life, and the highest education is within the reach of all, and the moral and intellectual qualities of every individual are freely developed, and 'the idea of good' is the animating principle of the whole. Not the attainment of freedom alone, or of order alone, but how to unite freedom with order is the problem which he has to solve.

The statesman who places before himself these lofty aims has undertaken a task which will call forth all his powers. He must control himself before he can control others; he must know mankind before he can manage them. He has no private likes or dislikes; he does not conceal personal enmity under the disguise of moral or political principle: such meannesses, into which men too often fall unintentionally, are absorbed in the consciousness of his mission, and in his love for his country and for mankind. He will sometimes ask himself what the next generation will say of him; not because he is careful of posthumous fame, but because he knows that the result of his life as a whole will then be more fairly judged. He will take time for the execution of his plans; not hurrying them on when the mind of a nation is unprepared for them; but like the Ruler of the Universe Himself, working in the appointed time, for he knows that human life, 'if not long in comparison with eternity' (Rep. VI. 498 D), is sufficient for the fulfilment of many great purposes. He knows, too, that the work will be still going on when he is no longer here; and he will sometimes, especially when his powers are failing, think of that other city of which the pattern is in heaven (Rep. IX. 592 B).

The false politician is the serving man of the state. In order to govern men he becomes like them; their 'minds are married in conjunction;' they 'bear themselves' like vulgar and tyrannical masters, and he is their obedient servant. The true politician, if he would rule men, must make them like himself; he must 'educate his party' until they cease to be a party; he must breathe into them the spirit which will hereafter give form to their institutions. Politics with him are not a mechanism for seeming what he is not, or for carrying out the will of the majority. Himself a representative man, he is the representative not of the lower but of the higher elements of the nation. There is a better

(as well as a worse) public opinion of which he seeks to lay hold; as there is also a deeper current of human affairs in which he is borne up when the waves nearer the shore are threatening him. He acknowledges that he cannot take the world by force—two or three moves on the political chessboard are all that he can foresee—two or three weeks or months are granted to him in which he can provide against a coming struggle. But he knows also that there are permanent principles of politics which are always tending to the well-being of states—better administration, better education, the reconciliation of conflicting elements, increased security against external enemies. These are not ‘of to-day or yesterday,’ but are the same in all times, and under all forms of government. Then when the storm descends and the winds blow, though he knows not beforehand the hour of danger, the pilot, not like Plato’s captain in the Republic, half blind and deaf, but with penetrating eye and quick ear, is ready to take command of the ship and guide her into port.

The false politician asks not what is true, but what is the opinion of the world—not what is right, but what is expedient. The only measures of which he approves are the measures which will pass. He has no intention of fighting an uphill battle; he keeps the roadway of politics. He is unwilling to incur the persecution and enmity which political convictions would entail upon him. He begins with popularity, and in fair weather sails gallantly along. But unpopularity soon follows him. For men expect their leaders to be better and wiser than themselves: to be their guides in danger, their saviours in extremity; they do not really desire them to obey all the ignorant impulses of the popular mind; and if they fail them in a crisis they are disappointed. Then, as Socrates says, the cry of ingratitude is heard, which is most unreasonable; for the people, who have been taught no better, have done what might be expected of them, and their statesmen have received justice at their hands.

The true statesman is aware that he must adapt himself to times and circumstances. He must have allies if he is to fight against the world; he must enlighten public opinion; he must accustom his followers to act together. Although he is not the mere executor of the will of the majority, he must win over the majority to himself. He is their leader and not their follower, but in order to lead he must also follow. He will neither exaggerate nor undervalue the power of a statesman, neither adopting the ‘laissez faire’ nor the ‘paternal government’ principle; but

be well, whether he is dealing with children in politics, or with full-grown men, seek to do for the people what the government can do for them, and who, from want of education or deficient powers of combination, they cannot do for themselves. He knows that if he does too much for them, they will be mauling, and that if he does nothing for them in some states of society they will be quite helpless. Yet the many cannot exist without the few, if the material force of a country is from below, wisdom and experience are from above. It is not a small part of human errors which kings and governments make or cure. The statesman is well aware that a great purpose carried out consistently during many years will at last be executed. He is playing for a stake which may be partly determined by some accident, and therefore he will allow largely for the unknown element of politics. But the game being one in which chance and skill are combined, if he plays long enough he is certain of victory. He will not be always consistent, for the world is changing; and though he depends upon the support of a party, he will remember that he is the master of the whole. He lives not for the present, but for the future, and he is not, at all sure that he will be appreciated either now or then. For he may have the existing order of society against him, and may not be remembered by a distant posterity.

There are always disconcerned idealists in politics who, like Socrates in the *Gorgias*, find fault with all statesmen past as well as present, not excepting the greatest names of history. Mankind have an uneasy feeling that they ought to be better governed than they are. Just as the actual philosopher falls short of the one wise man, so does the actual statesman fall short of the ideal. And so partly from vanity and egotism, but partly also from a true sense of the faults of eminent men, a temper of dissatisfaction and criticism springs up among those who are ready enough to acknowledge the inferiority of their own powers. No matter whether a statesman makes high professions or none at all—they are reduced sooner or later to the same level. And sometimes the more unscrupulous man is better esteemed than the more conscientious, because he has not equally deceived expectations. Such sentiments may be unjust, but they are widely spread; we constantly find them recurring in reviews and newspapers, and still oftener in private conversation.

We may further observe that the art of government, while in some respects tending to improve, has in others a tendency to degenerate, as institutions become more popular. Governing for the people cannot

easily be combined with governing by the people : the interests of classes are too strong for the ideas of the statesman who takes a comprehensive view of the whole. According to Socrates the true governor will find ruin or death staring him in the face, and will only be induced to govern from the fear of being governed by a worse man than himself (*Rep.* I. 347 C). And in modern times, though the world has grown milder, and the terrible consequences which Plato foretells no longer await an English statesman, any one who is not actuated by a blind ambition will only undertake from a sense of duty a work in which he is most likely to fail ; and even if he succeed, will rarely be rewarded by the gratitude of his own generation.

Socrates, who is not a politician at all, tells us that he is the only real politician of his time. Let us illustrate the meaning of his words by applying them to the history of our own country. He would have said that not Pitt or Fox, or Canning or Sir R. Peel, are the real politicians of their time, but Locke, Hume, Adam Smith, Bentham, Ricardo. These during the greater part of their lives occupied an inconsiderable space in the eyes of the public. They were private persons ; nevertheless they sowed in the minds of men seeds which in the next generation have become an irresistible power. ‘Herein is that saying true, One soweth and another reapeth.’ We may imagine with Plato an ideal statesman in whom practice and speculation are perfectly harmonized ; for there is no necessary opposition between them. But experience shows that they are commonly divorced—the ordinary politician is the interpreter or executor of the thoughts of others, and hardly ever brings to the birth a new political conception. One or two only in modern times, like the Italian statesman Cavour, have created the world in which they moved. The philosopher is naturally unfitted for political life ; his great ideas are not understood by the many ; he is a thousand miles away from the questions of the day. Yet perhaps the lives of thinkers, as they are stiller and deeper, are also happier than the lives of those who are more in the public eye. They have the promise of the future, though they are regarded as dreamers and visionaries by their own contemporaries. And when they are no longer here, those who would have been ashamed of them during their lives claim kindred with them, and are proud to be called by their names. (*Cp. Thucyd.* VI. 16.)

Who is the true poet ?

Plato expels the poets from his Republic because they are allied to

sense; because they stimulate the emotions; because they are thrice removed from the ideal truth. And in a similar spirit he declares in the *Gorgias* that the stately muse of tragedy is a votary of pleasure and not of truth. In modern times we almost ridicule the idea of poetry admitting of a moral. The poet and the prophet, or preacher, in primitive antiquity are one and the same; but in later ages they seem to fall apart. The great art of novel writing, that peculiar creation of our own and the last century, which, together with the sister art of review writing, threatens to absorb all literature, has even less of seriousness in her composition. Do we not often hear the novel writer censured for attempting to convey a lesson to the minds of his readers?

Yet the true office of a poet or writer of fiction is not merely to give amusement, or to be the expression of the feelings of mankind, good or bad, or even to increase our knowledge of human nature. There have been poets in modern times, such as Goethe or Wordsworth, who have not forgotten their high vocation of teachers; and the two greatest of the Greek dramatists owe their sublimity to their ethical character. The noblest truths, sung of in the purest and sweetest language, are still the proper material of poetry. The poet clothes them with beauty, and has a power of making them enter into the hearts and memories of men. He has not only to speak of themes above the level of ordinary life, but to speak of them in a deeper and tenderer way than they are ordinarily felt, so as to awaken the feeling of them in others. The old he makes young again; the familiar principle he invests with a new dignity; he finds a noble expression for the common-places of morality and politics. He uses the things of sense so as to indicate what is beyond; he raises us through earth to heaven. He expresses what the better part of us would fain say, and the half-conscious feeling is strengthened by the expression. He is his own critic, for the spirit of poetry and of criticism are not divided in him. His mission is not to disguise men from themselves, but to reveal to them their own nature, and make them better acquainted with the world around them. True poetry is the remembrance of youth, of love, the embodiment in words of the happiest and holiest moments of life, of the noblest thoughts of man, of the greatest deeds of the past. The poet of the future may return to his greater calling of the prophet or teacher; indeed, we hardly know what may not be effected for the human race by a better use of the poetical and imaginative faculty. The reconciliation of poetry, as of religion, with truth, may still be possible.

Neither is the element of pleasure to be excluded. For when we substitute a higher pleasure for a lower we raise men in the scale of existence. Might not the novelist, too, make an ideal, or rather many ideals of social life, better than a thousand sermons? Plato, like the Puritans, is too much afraid of poetic and artistic influences, though he is not without a true sense of the noble purposes to which art may be applied (Rep. III. 401).

Modern poetry is often a sort of plaything, or, in Plato's language, a flattery, a sophistry, or sham, in which without any serious purpose, the poet lends wings to his fancy and exhibits his gifts of language and metre. Such an one seeks to gratify the taste of his readers; he has the '*savoir faire*,' or trick of writing, but he has not the higher spirit of poetry. He has no conception that true art should bring order out of disorder (504 A); that it should make provision for the soul's highest interest (501 C); that it should be pursued only with a view to 'the improvement of the citizens' (502, 503). He ministers to the weaker side of human nature (Rep. X. 603-605); he sings the strain of love in the latest fashion; instead of raising men above themselves he brings them back to the 'tyranny of the many masters,' from which all his life long a good man has been praying to be delivered. And often, forgetful of measure and order, he will express not that which is truest, but that which is strongest. Instead of a great and nobly-executed subject, perfect in every part, some fancy of a heated brain is worked out with the strangest incongruity. He is not the master of his words, but his words—perhaps borrowed from another—the faded reflection of some French or German or Italian writer, have the better of him. Though we are not going to banish the poets, how can we suppose that such utterances have any healing or life-giving influence on the minds of men?

'Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter.' Art then must be true, and politics must be true, and the life of man must be true and not a seeming or sham. In all of them order has to be brought out of disorder, truth out of error and falsehood. This is what we mean by the greatest improvement of man. And so, having considered in what way 'we can best spend the appointed time, we leave the result with God.' (512 E). Plato does not say that God will order all things for the best (cp. Phaedo, 97 C), but he indirectly implies that the evils of this life will be corrected in another. How indeed could we without stupidity 'leave the result with God,' unless we were satisfied that He had a settled

order and law which we knew to be good? And as we are very far from the best imaginable world at present, Plato here, as in the Phaedo and Republic, supposes a purgatory or place of education for mankind in general, and for a very few a Tartarus or hell. The myth which terminates the dialogue is not the revelation, but rather, like all similar descriptions, whether in the Bible or Plato, the veil of another life. For no visible thing can reveal the invisible. Of this Plato, unlike some commentators on Scripture, is fully aware. Neither will he dogmatize about the manner in which we are 'born again' (Rep. VI. 408 D). Only he is prepared to maintain the ultimate triumph of truth and right, and declares that no one, not even the wisest of the Greeks, can affirm any other doctrine without being ridiculous.



## GORGIAS.

### PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CALLICLES.

SOCRATES.

CHAEREPHON.

GORGIAS.

POLUS.

Steph.  
447 *Callicles.* The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a  
fray, but not for a feast.

*Socrates.* And are we late for a feast?

*Cal.* Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has been just  
exhibiting to us many fine things.

*Soc.* I must throw the blame, Callicles, on my friend Chaerophon here, who would keep us loitering in the Agora.

*Chaerophon.* Never mind, Socrates—the misfortune of which I have been the cause I will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine, and I will make him repeat the exhibition either now or at some future time.

*Cal.* What is the matter, Chaerophon—does Socrates want to hear Gorgias?

*Chaer.* Yes, that was our intention in coming.

*Cal.* Suppose, then, that you proceed to my house; for Gorgias is staying with me, and he shall exhibit to you.

*Soc.* Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I want to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what this is which he professes and teaches; he may defer the exhibition, as you suggested, to another time.

*Cal.* There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed to answer questions is a part of his exhibition, for he was saying only just now, that any one in my house might put any question to him, and that he would answer.

Sar. I am glad to hear that you will now tell him. (Chacophion)  
Zara. What shall I tell him?

Sar. And how will he be?

Zara. What do you mean?

Sar. I mean nothing more than what you have told me. If he had been a master or slave, the answer that he is a codpiece (do you understand?)

Zara. I understand and will tell him. Tell me, George, is  
there any other reason why you would like to know my  
experiences which you are asking?

Sar. No, no, Zara. (Chacophion) I was wrong, so much easier  
to you, and I was afraid that you would have thought something  
else when I asked you about your past.

Zara. You must be very ready, George.

Gen. Of that, Chacophion, you can make trial.

Palis. Yes indeed, and if you like, Chacophion, you may

ask me a question, and I will tell you all about it. But I  
long time talking is tiresome.

Zara. And do you Palis think that you can answer better  
than George?

Pal. What matters that if I answer well enough for you?

Zara. No, no, that's not the point, you don't understand yet.

Pal. Ask —

Zara. My question is this. If George had the skill of his  
brother, the one who taught me to sing, (George) ought he not  
to have the same skill to govern the kingdom?

Pal. Certainly.

Zara. Therefore should he reign in ruling such a kingdom?

Pal. Yes.

Zara. And is it true that the skill of Chacophion will not  
be equal to the skill of his brother? (George) — I mean, he is not  
so good.

Pal. George is good.

Zara. So, then, what skill we will have when is the art in  
which he is skilled?

Pal. O Chacophion, there are three arts among mankind  
which are called the fine arts. These three arts are known as the  
fine arts because they cannot easily be practised according to art,  
and, therefore, are called the fine arts. These three arts are

different ways are predominant in different arts, and the best  
performer in the best art. And our friend Gopalan is one of the  
best and the most eminent both as a performer in the arts.

Gov. Rama has been taught how to make a capital speech,  
but you have to give him time to practice and he will be equal to  
Chatterjee.

Gov. What do you mean by that?

Gov. I mean that he has not exactly answered the question  
which he was asked.

Gov. Then ask him yourself if you are so sharp-witted.

Gov. But I would prefer that you should answer his  
question : for I am, from the few words which Rama has uttered,  
sure he has recorded more in the art which is called rhetoric  
than in drama.

Pol. Why do you say that, Governor?

Gov. Why, Rama, because, when Chatterjee asked you what  
was the art of which you were the master, you passed the art off as if you  
were answering about some other friend than he with it, but you never  
told what that art was.

Pol. Why, did I not say that it was the subject of art?

Gov. Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question:  
indeedly said what was the subject, but what was the master of  
the art, and that you were not able to tell Chatterjee. And I would still  
ask you again, and sharply, as you are a man of the world, when  
he asked you what art you had, what art you had, and what was the  
subject of that art? for either Chatterjee or me have to you, and you  
have to us, to tell us what is your art and what are your

Gov. Rhetorician, Governor, is my art.

Gov. Then I am to call you a rhetorician?

Gov. True, Governor, and a good one too, if you would call me  
what is called in Hindoo language, "I want to be."

Gov. I should wish to do so.

Gov. Then pray do.

Gov. And are we to say that you make others make them  
for you?

Gov. You that is exactly what I prefer to make them, not  
only an American, but in all parts.

Gov. And will you now tell to me and answer again to  
Chatterjee, as we are at present doing, and receive for another

occasion the longer mode of speech which Polus was attempting? and will you keep your promise, and answer shortly the questions which are asked of you?

*Gor.* Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do my best to make them as short as I can; for a part of my profession is that I can be as short as any one.

*Soc.* That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method now, and the longer one at some other time.

*Gor.* Well, I will; and you will certainly say, that you never heard a man use fewer words.

*Soc.* Very good then: as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I might ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would you not?), with the making of garments?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* And music is concerned with the composition of melodies?

*Gor.* It is.

*Soc.* By Herè, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your answers.

*Gor.* Yes, Socrates; I do think myself good at that.

*Soc.* I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about rhetoric: with what is rhetoric concerned?

*Gor.* With discourse.

*Soc.* What sort of discourse, Gorgias?—such discourse as would teach the sick under what treatment they might get well?

*Gor.* No.

*Soc.* Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?

*Gor.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* And to understand that of which they speak?

*Gor.* To be sure.

*Soc.* But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick?

*Gor.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then medicine also treats of discourse?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* Of discourse concerning diseases?

*Gor.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the good or evil condition of the body?

*Gor.* Very true.

*Soc.* And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:—all of them treat of discourse concerning the subject of which they are the arts.

*Gor.* That is evident.

*Soc.* Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them arts of rhetoric?

*Gor.* Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to do with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no such action of the hand in rhetoric which operates and is perfected through the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified, as I maintain, in saying that rhetoric treats of discourse.

*Soc.* I do not know whether I entirely understand you, but I dare say I shall soon find out: please to answer me a question:—you would allow that there are arts?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* And in some of the arts a great deal is done and nothing or very little said; in painting, or statuary, or many other arts, the work may proceed in silence; and these are the arts, with which, as I suppose you would say, rhetoric has no concern?

*Gor.* You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates.

*Soc.* And there are other arts which work wholly by words, and require either no action or very little, as, for example, the arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of playing draughts; in some of which words are nearly co-extensive with things, but the greater number of them are dependent wholly on words for their efficacy and power: and I take your meaning to be that rhetoric is an art of this better sort?

*Gor.* Exactly.

*Soc.* And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of these arts rhetoric; although the precise expression

which you used was, that rhetoric is an art which operates and is perfected through the medium of discourse ; and an adversary who wished to be captious might take a fancy to say, ‘ And so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric.’ But I do not think that you *would* call arithmetic rhetoric, any more than you would call geometry rhetoric.

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*Gor.* You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of my meaning.

*Soc.* Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer :—seeing that rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of words, and there are other arts which also use words, tell me what is that quality in words with which rhetoric is concerned :—Suppose that a person asks me about some of the arts which I was mentioning just now ; he might say, ‘ Socrates, what is arithmetic?’ and I should reply to him, as you replied to me just now, that arithmetic is one of those arts which is perfected by words. And then he would proceed : ‘ With what?’ and I should say, With the knowledge of odd and even numbers, and how many there are of each. And if he asked again : ‘ And what is the art of calculation?’ I should say, That also is one of the arts which is concerned wholly with words. And if he further said, ‘ Concerned with what?’ I should say in the clerk’s phrase, ‘ as aforesaid,’ like arithmetic, but with a difference, and the difference is that the art of calculation considers not only the quantities of odd and even numbers, but also their relation to themselves and to one another. And suppose, again, I were to say that astronomy is only words—he would ask, ‘ Words about what, Socrates?’ and I should answer, that astronomy tells us about the motions of the stars and sun and moon, and their relative swiftness.

*Gor.* Very true, Socrates ; I admit that.

*Soc.* And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about rhetoric : which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those arts which operate and are perfected through the medium of words?

*Gor.* True.

*Soc.* Tell me, I say, what about? To what class of things do the words which rhetoric uses relate?

*Gor.* To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things.

*Soc.* That again, Gorgias, is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for which are the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you have heard men singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the singers enumerate the goods of life, first health, beauty next, thirdly, as the writer of the song says, wealth honestly obtained.

452 *Gor.* Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift?

*Soc.* I mean to say, that the producers of those things which the author of the song praises, that is to say, the physician, the trainer, the money-maker, will at once come to you, and first the physician will say: 'O Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you, for my art is concerned with the greatest good of men and not his.' And when I ask, Who are you? he will reply, 'I am a physician.' What do you mean? I shall say. Do you mean that your art produces the greatest good? 'Certainly,' he will answer, 'for is not health the greatest good? What greater good can men have, Socrates?' And after him the trainer will come and say, 'I too, Socrates, shall be greatly surprised if Gorgias can show more good of his art than I can show of mine.' To him I shall say, Who are you, my friend, and what is your business? 'I am a trainer,' he will reply, 'and my business is to make men beautiful and strong in body.' When I have done with the trainer, there arrives the money-maker, and he, as I expect, will utterly despise them all. 'Consider, Socrates,' he will say, 'whether Gorgias or any one else can produce any greater good than wealth.' Well, you and I say to him, and are you a creator of wealth? 'Yes,' he replies. And who are you? 'A money-maker.' And do you consider wealth to be the greatest good of man? 'Yes,' he will reply, 'of course.' And we shall rejoin: Yes; but our friend Gorgias contends that his art produces a greater good than yours. And then he will be sure to go on and ask, 'What good? Let Gorgias answer.' Now I want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this question is asked of you by them and by me; What is that which, as you say, is the greatest good of man, and of which you are the creator? Answer us.

*Gor.* That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to rulers the power of ruling over others in their several states.

*Soc.* And what would you consider this to be?

*Gor.* What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting?—if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.

*Soc.* Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer 453 of persuasion, having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion?

*Gor.* No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for persuasion is the crown of rhetoric.

*Soc.* Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever was a man who entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of knowing the truth, I am one, and I believe that you are another.

*Gor.* What is coming, Socrates?

*Soc.* I will tell you: I am very well aware that I do not know what, according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of that persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric; although I have a suspicion both about the one and about the other. And I am going to ask—what is this power of persuasion which is given by rhetoric, and about what? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask instead of telling you? Not for your sake, but in order that the argument may proceed in such a manner as is most likely to elicit the truth. And I would have you observe, that I am right in asking this further question: If I asked, ‘What sort of a painter is Zeuxis?’ and you said, ‘the painter of figures,’ should I not be right in asking, ‘What sort of figures, and where do you find them?’

*Gor.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And the reason for asking this second question would be, that there are other painters as well, who paint many other figures?

*Gor.* True.

*Soc.* But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them, then you would have answered very well?

*Gor.* Quite so.

*Soc.* Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way;—is rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same effect? I mean to say—Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that which he teaches or not?

*Gor.* He persuades, Socrates,—there can be no mistake about that.

*Soc.* Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now speaking:—do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the properties of number?

*Gor.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And therefore persuade us of them?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of persuasion?

*Gor.* Clearly.

*Soc.* And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and about what,—we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd and even; and we shall be in a position to show that 454 all the other arts of which we were just now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of what sort, and about what.

*Gor.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion?

*Gor.* True.

*Soc.* Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, but that other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question has arisen which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is rhetoric the artificer, and about what?—is not that a fair way of putting the question?

*Gor.* I think so.

*Soc.* Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer?

*Gor.* I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in the courts and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and unjust.

*Soc.* And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting to be your notion; yet I would not have you wonder if by-and-by I am

found repeating a seemingly plain question; for as I was saying, I ask not for your sake, but in order that the argument may proceed consecutively, and that we may not get the habit of anticipating and suspecting the meaning of one another's words, and that you may proceed in your own way.

*Gor.* I think that you are quite right, Socrates.

*Soc.* Then let me raise this question; you would say that there is such a thing as 'having learned'?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* And there is also 'having believed'?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* And is the 'having learned' the same as 'having believed,' and are learning and belief the same things?

*Gor.* In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same.

*Soc.* And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this way: If a person were to say to you, 'Is there, Gorgias, a false belief as well as a true?'—you would reply, if I am not mistaken, that there is.

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true?

*Gor.* No.

*Soc.* No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief differ.

*Gor.* That is true.

*Soc.* And yet those who have learned as well as those who have believed are persuaded?

*Gor.* That is so.

*Soc.* Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,—one which is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge?

*Gor.* By all means.

*Soc.* And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts of law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of persuasion which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives knowledge?

*Gor.* Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief.

*Soc.* Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction about them?

*Gor.* True.

*Soc.* And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of law or other assemblies about just and unjust, but he only creates belief about them ; for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast multitude about such high matters in a short time ?

*Gor.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about rhetoric ; for I do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the assembly meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will the rhetorician be taken into counsel ? Surely not. For at every election he ought to be chosen who is most skilled ; and, again, when walls have to be built or harbours or docks to be constructed, not the rhetorician but the master workman will advise ; or when generals have to be chosen and an order of battle arranged, or a position taken, then the military will advise and not the rhetoricians : would you admit that, Gorgias ? Since you profess to be a rhetorician and a maker of rhetoricians, I cannot do better than learn the nature of your art from you. And here let me assure you that I have your interest in view as well as my own. For I dare say that some one or other of the young men present might like to become your pupil, and in fact I see some, and a good many too, who have this wish, but they would be too modest to question you. And therefore when you are interrogated by me, I would have you imagine that you are interrogated by them. ‘What is the use of coming to you, Gorgias ?’ they will say—‘about what will you teach us to advise the state ?—about the just and unjust only, or about those other things also which Socrates has just mentioned ?’ How will you answer them ?

*Gor.* I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will endeavour to reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have heard, I think, that the docks and the walls of the Athenians and the plan of the harbour were devised in accordance with the counsels, partly of Themistocles, and partly of Pericles, and not at the suggestion of the builders.

*Soc.* Certainly, Gorgias, that is the tradition about Themistocles, and I myself heard the speech of Pericles when he advised us about the middle wall.

*Gor.* And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision 456 has to be given in such matters the rhetoricians are the advisers ; they are the men who win their point.

*Soc.* I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked what is the nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when I look at the matter in this way, to be a marvel of greatness.

*Gor.* A marvel indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric comprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior arts. Let me offer you a striking example of this. On several occasions I have been with my brother Herodicus or some other physician to see one of his patients, who would not allow the physician to give him medicine, or apply the knife or hot iron to him ; and I have persuaded him to do for me what he would not do for the physician just by the use of rhetoric. And I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to any city, and there had to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to which of them should be elected, the physician would have no chance ; but he who could speak would be chosen if he wished, and in a contest with a man of any other profession the rhetorician more than any one would have the power of getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the power and quality of rhetoric, Socrates. And yet rhetoric ought to be used like any other competitive art, not against every body,—the rhetorician ought not to abuse his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of fence ;—because he has powers which are more than a match either for enemy or friend, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends. And suppose a man who has been trained in the palestra and is a skilful boxer, and in the fulness of his strength he goes and strikes his father or mother or one of his familiars or friends, that is no reason why the trainer or master of fence should be held in detestation or banished ;—surely not. For they taught this art for a good purpose, as an art to be used against enemies and evil-doers, in self-defence, not in aggression, and others have perverted their instructions, making a bad use of their own strength and 457 skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither is the art in fault or bad in itself ; I should rather say that those

who make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the same holds good of rhetoric; for the rhetorician can speak against all men and on any subject, and in general he can persuade the multitude of anything better than any other man, but he ought not on that account to defraud the physician or any other artist of his reputation merely because he has the power; he ought to use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers. And if after having become a rhetorician he makes a bad use of his strength and skill, his instructor surely ought not on that account to be held in detestation or banished. For he was intended by his teacher to make a good use of his instructions, and he abuses them. And therefore he is the person who ought to be held in detestation, banished, and put to death, and not his instructor.

Soc. You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of arguments, and you must have observed, I think, that they do not always terminate to the satisfaction or mutual improvement of the disputants; but disagreements are apt to arise, and one party will often deny that the other has spoken truly or clearly; and then they leave off arguing and begin to quarrel, both parties conceiving that their opponents are only speaking from personal feeling. And sometimes they will go on abusing one another until the company at last are quite vexed at themselves for ever listening to such fellows. Why do I say this? Why, because I cannot help feeling that you are now saying what is not quite consistent or accordant with what you were saying at first about rhetoric. And I am afraid to point this out to you, lest you should think that I have some animosity against you, and that I speak, not for the sake of discovering the truth, but from personal feeling. Now if you are one of my sort, I should like to cross-examine you,  
458 but if not I will let you alone. And what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are very willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing to refute any one else who says what is not true, and just as ready to be refuted as to refute; for I hold that this is the greater gain of the two, just as the gain is greater of being cured of a very great evil than of curing the evil in another. For I imagine that there is no evil which a man can endure so great as an

erroneous opinion about the matters of which we are speaking ; and if you claim to be one of my sort, let us have the discussion out, but if you would rather have done, no matter ;— let us make an end.

*Gor.* I should say, Socrates, that I am quite the man whom you indicate ; but, perhaps, we ought to consider the audience, for, before you came, I had already given a long exhibition, and if we proceed the argument may run on to a great length. And therefore I think that we should consider whether we may not be detaining some part of the company when they are wanting to do something else.

*Chær.* You hear the audience cheering, Gorgias and Socrates, which shows their desire to listen to you, and for myself, Heaven forbid that I should have any business which would take me away from so important and interesting a discussion.

*Cal.* I swear by the gods Chaerephon, although I have been present at many discussions, that I doubt whether I was ever as much delighted before, and therefore if you go on discoursing all day I shall only be the better pleased.

*Soc.* I may truly say, Callicles, that I am willing, if Gorgias is.

*Gor.* After this, Socrates, I should be disgraced if I refused, especially as I have professed to answer all comers ; in accordance with the wishes of the company, then, do you begin, and ask of me any question which you like.

*Soc.* Let me tell you then, Gorgias, what I wonder at in your words ; though I dare say that you may be right, and I may have mistaken your meaning. You say that you can make any man, who will learn of you, a rhetorician ?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the multitude on any subject, and this not by instruction but by persuasion ?

*Gor.* Certainly.

*Soc.* You were saying, in fact, that the rhetorician will have greater powers of persuasion than the physician even in a matter of health ?

*Gor.* Yes, with the multitude,—that is.

*Soc.* That is to say, greater with the ignorant ; for with those who know he cannot be supposed to have greater powers of persuasion than the physician has.

*Gor.* Very true.

*Soc.* And if he is to have more power of persuasion than the physician, he will have greater power than he who knows?

*Gor.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Though he is not a physician :—is he?

*Gor.* No.

*Soc.* And he who is not a physician must, obviously, be ignorant of what the physician knows.

*Gor.* That is evident.

*Soc.* Then, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the physician, the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he who has knowledge?—is not that the inference?

*Gor.* In the case which is supposed :—yes.

*Soc.* And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other arts; the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge than those who know?

*Gor.* Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great blessing?—not to have learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be in no way inferior to the professors of them?

*Soc.* Whether the rhetorician is or is not inferior on this account is a question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to be of any service to us; but I would rather begin by asking, whether he is as ignorant of the just and unjust, base and honourable, good and evil, as he is of medicine and the other arts; I mean to say, does he know anything actually of what is good and evil, base or honourable, just or unjust in them; or has he only a way with the ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed to know more than another who knows? Or must the pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can acquire the art of rhetoric? And if he is ignorant, you who are the teacher of rhetoric will not teach him, for that is not your business, but you will make him seem to the multitude to know them, when he does not know them; and seem to be a good man, when he is not. Or will you be wholly

460 unable to teach him rhetoric, unless he knows the truth of these things first? What is to be said, Gorgias, about all this? I swear that I wish you would, as you were saying, reveal to me the power of rhetoric.

*Gor.* Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to know them, he will have to learn of me these things as well.

*Soc.* Say no more, for there you are right; and so he whom you make a rhetorician must either know the nature of the just and unjust of his own previous knowledge, or he must be taught by you.

*Gor.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* And he who has learned music a musician?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like manner? He who has learned anything whatever is that which his knowledge makes him.

*Gor.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just?

*Gor.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* And must not the rhetorician be just, and is not the just man desirous to do what is just?

*Gor.* That is clearly the inference.

*Soc.* Then the just man will surely never be willing to do injustice?

*Gor.* That is certain.

*Soc.* And according to the argument the rhetorician ought to be a just man?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* And will therefore never be willing to do injustice?

*Gor.* Clearly not.

*Soc.* But do you remember saying just now that the trainer is not to be accused or banished if the pugilist makes a wrong use of his pugilistic art; and in like manner, if the rhetorician makes a bad and unjust use of his rhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his instructor, neither is he to be banished,

but the wrong-doer himself who made a bad use of his rhetoric is to be banished—was not that said?

*Gor.* Yes, that was said.

*Soc.* And now it turns out that this same rhetorician can never have done any injustice.

*Gor.* True.

*Soc.* And at the very outset, Gorgias, there was an assertion made, that rhetoric treated of discourse, not about odd and even, but about just and unjust. Is not that true?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* And I thought at the time, when I heard you saying this, that rhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly be an unjust thing. But when you said, shortly afterwards, that the rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric  
461 I noted with surprise the inconsistency into which you had fallen; and I said, that if you thought, as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted, there would be an advantage in going on with the question, but if not, I would leave off. And in the course of our examination, as you will see yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged to be incapable of making an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do injustice. By the dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion, before we get at the truth of all this.

*Polus.* And do you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now saying about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that the rhetorician knew the just and the honourable and the good, and admitted that to any one who came to him ignorant of them he could teach them, you fancy, I suppose, that out of this admission a contradiction arose to which you delight in bringing the argument by your captious questions? But do you imagine that any one will ever say that he does not know, or cannot teach, the nature of justice? The truth is, that there is great want of manners in bringing the argument to such a pass.

*Soc.* Illustrious Polus, the great reason why we provide ourselves with friends and children is, that when we get old and stumble, a younger generation may be at hand, and set us on our legs again in our words and in our actions: and now, if I and Gorgias are stumbling, there are you a present help to us,

as you ought to be ; and I for my part engage to retract any error into which you may think that I have fallen—upon one condition :

*Pol.* What is that ?

*Soc.* That you contract, Polus, the prolixity of speech in which you indulged at first.

*Pol.* What ! do you mean that I am not to use as many words as I please ?

*Soc.* Only to think, my friend, that having come on a visit to Athens, which is the most free-spoken state in Hellas, you of all men should be deprived of the power of speech—that is hard indeed. But then look at my case :—shall not I be very hardly used, if, when you are making a long oration, and refusing to answer what you are asked, I am compelled to stay 462 and listen to you, and may not go away ? I say rather, if you have a real interest in the argument, or, to repeat my former expression, have any desire to set me on my legs, take back any statement which you please ; and in your turn ask and answer, like myself and Gorgias—refute and be refuted : for I suppose that you would claim to know what Gorgias knows ?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And you, like him, invite any one to ask you about anything which he likes, and you will know how to answer him ?

*Pol.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And now, which will you do, ask or answer ?

*Pol.* I will ask ; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question which Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer : What is rhetoric ?

*Soc.* Do you mean what sort of an art ?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* Not an art at all, in my opinion, if I am to tell you the truth, Polus.

*Pol.* Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric ?

*Soc.* A thing of which, as I was lately reading in a book of yours, you say that you have made an art.

*Pol.* What thing ?

*Soc.* I should say a sort of experience.

*Pol.* Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience ?

*Soc.* That is my view, if that is yours.

*Pol.* An experience in what?

*Soc.* An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification.

*Pol.* And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine thing?

*Soc.* What are you saying, Polus? Why do you ask me whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you what rhetoric is?

*Pol.* Why did you not tell me that rhetoric was a sort of experience?

*Soc.* As you are so fond of gratifying others, will you gratify me in a small particular?

*Pol.* I will.

*Soc.* Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery?

*Pol.* What sort of an art is cookery?

*Soc.* Not an art at all, Polus.

*Pol.* What then?

*Soc.* I should say an experience.

*Pol.* In what? I wish that you would tell me.

*Soc.* An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification, Polus.

*Pol.* Then are cookery and rhetoric the same?

*Soc.* No, they are only different parts of the same profession.

*Pol.* And what is that?

*Soc.* I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous; I should not like Gorgias to imagine that I am ridiculing his profession, and therefore I hesitate to answer. For whether or

463 no this is that art of rhetoric which Gorgias practises I really do not know:—from what he was just now saying, nothing appeared of what he thought of his art, but the rhetoric which I mean is a part of a not very creditable whole.

*Gor.* A part of what, Socrates? Say what you mean, and never mind me.

*Soc.* In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word ‘flattery,’ and it appears to me to have many other parts, one of which is cookery, which may seem to be an

art, but, as I maintain, is only an experience or routine and not an art:—another part is rhetoric, and the art of dressing up and sophistry are two others: thus there are four branches, and four different things answering to them. And Polus may ask, if he likes, for he has not as yet been informed, what part of flattery is rhetoric: he did not see that I had not yet answered him when he proceeded to ask a further question: Whether I do not think rhetoric a fine thing? But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, until I have first answered, ‘What is rhetoric?’ For that would not be right, Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if you will ask me, What part of flattery is rhetoric?

*Pol.* I will ask, and do you answer: What part of flattery is rhetoric?

*Soc.* Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric, according to my view, is the shadow of a part of politics.

*Pol.* And noble or ignoble?

*Soc.* Ignoble, as I should say, if I am compelled to answer, for I call what is bad ignoble:—though I doubt whether you understand what I was saying before.

*Gor.* Indeed, Socrates, I cannot say that I understand myself.

*Soc.* I do not wonder at that; for I have not as yet explained myself, and our friend Polus, like a young colt as he is, is apt to run away<sup>1</sup>.

*Gor.* Never mind him, but explain to me what you mean by saying that rhetoric is the shadow of a part of politics.

*Soc.* I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric, and if I am mistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. Are there not bodies and souls?

*Gor.* There are.

*Soc.* And you would further admit that there is a good condition of either of them?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* Which condition may not be really good, but good only in appearance? I mean to say, that there are many persons who appear to be in good health, and whom only a physician or trainer will discern at first sight not to be in good health.

<sup>1</sup> There is an untranslateable play on the name ‘Polus,’ which means ‘a colt.’

*Gor.* True.

*Soc.* And this applies not only to the body, but also to the soul: in either there may be that which gives the appearance of health and not the reality?

*Gor.* Yes, certainly.

*Soc.* And now I will endeavour to explain to you more clearly what I mean: The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to them: there is the art of politics attending on the soul; and another art attending on the body, of which I know no specific name, but which may be described as having two divisions—one of them is gymnastic, and the other medicine. And in politics there is a legislative part, which answers to gymnastic, as justice does to medicine; and the two parts run into one another, justice having to do with the same subject as legislation, and medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, yet there is a difference between them. Now, seeing that there are these four arts which are ever ministering to the body and the soul for their highest good; flattery knowing, or rather guessing their natures, has distributed herself into four shams or simulations of them; she puts on the likeness of one or other of them, and pretends to be that which she simulates, and has no regard for men's highest interests, but is ever making pleasure the bait of the unwary, and deceiving them into the belief that she is of the highest value to them. Cookery simulates the disguise of medicine, and pretends to know what food is the best for the body; and if the physician and the cook had to enter into a competition in which children were the judges, or men who had no more sense than children, as to which of them best understands the goodness or badness of food, the physician would be starved to death. A flattery I deem this and an ignoble sort of thing,

465 Polus, for to you I am now addressing myself, because it aims at pleasure instead of good. An art I do not call it, but only an experience, because it is unable to explain or to give a reason of the nature of its own applications. And I do not call any irrational thing an art; if you dispute my words, I am prepared to argue in defence of them.

Cookery, then, as I maintain, is a flattery which takes the form of medicine, and dressing up, in like manner, is a flattery which takes the form of gymnastic, and is knavish, false, ignoble,

illiberal, working deceitfully by the help of lines, and colours, and enamels, and garments, and making men affect a spurious beauty to the neglect of the true beauty which is given by gymnastic.

I would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say, after the manner of the geometricians, (for I think that by this time you will be able to follow,) .

as dressing up : gymnastic :: cookery : medicine ;

or rather,

as dressing up : gymnastic :: sophistry : legislation ;

and

as cookery : medicine :: rhetoric : justice.

And this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetorician and the sophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are apt to be jumbled up together; neither do they know what to make of themselves, nor do other men know what to make of them. For if the body presided over itself, and were not under the guidance of the soul, and the soul did not discern and discriminate between cookery and medicine, but the body was made the judge of them, and the rule of judgment was the bodily delight which was given by them, then the word of Anaxagoras, that word with which you, friend Polus, are so well acquainted, would come true: Chaos would return, and cookery, health, and medicine would mingle in an indiscriminate mass. And now I have told you my notion of rhetoric, which is in relation to the soul what cookery is to the body. I may have been inconsistent in making a long speech, when I would not allow you to discourse at length. But I think that I may be excused, because you did not understand me, and could make no use of my shorter answer, and therefore I had to enter into an explanation. And if I show an equal inability to make use of yours, 466 I hope that you will speak at equal length; but if I am able to understand you, let me have the benefit of your brevity, as is only fair; and now you may do what you please with my answer.

*Pol.* What do you mean? do you think that rhetoric is flattery?

*Soc.* Nay, I said a part of flattery; if at your age, Polus, you

cannot remember, what will you do by-and-by, when you get older?

*Pol.* And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded in states, under the idea that they are flatterers?

*Soc.* Is that a question or the beginning of a speech?

*Pol.* I am asking a question.

*Soc.* Then my answer is, that they are not regarded at all.

*Pol.* How not regarded? Have they not very great power in states?

*Soc.* Not if you mean to say that power is a good to the possessor.

*Pol.* And that is what I do mean to say.

*Soc.* Then, if so, I think that they have the least power of all the citizens.

*Pol.* What! Are they not like tyrants, who kill whom they will, or despoil or exile any one whom they think good?

*Soc.* By the dog, Polus, I cannot make out at each deliverance of yours, whether you are giving an opinion of your own, or asking a question of me.

*Pol.* I am asking a question of you.

*Soc.* Yes, my friend, but you ask two questions at once.

*Pol.* How two questions?

*Soc.* Why, did you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like tyrants, and that they kill whom they will, and despoil or exile any one whom they think good?

*Pol.* I did.

*Soc.* Well then, I say to you that here are two questions in one, and I will answer both of them. And I tell you, Polus, that rhetoricians and tyrants have the least possible power in states, as I was just now saying; for they do literally nothing which they will, but only what they think best.

*Pol.* And is not that a great power?

*Soc.* Polus has already said the reverse.

*Pol.* The reverse! nay, that is what I affirm.

*Soc.* No, by the great—what do you call him?—not you, for you say that great power is a good to him who has the power.

*Pol.* I do.

*Soc.* And would you maintain that if a fool does what he thinks best he does what is good, and would you call this great power?

*Pol.* I do not say that.

*Soc.* Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool, and that rhetoric is an art and not a flattery—in this way you 467 may refute me; but if you leave me unrefuted, then the rhetoricians who do what they think best in states and the tyrants will be deprived of the power or good which they have; for you assume that power is a good thing, and yet admit that the power which is exercised without understanding is an evil.

*Pol.* Yes; I admit that.

*Soc.* How then can the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power in states, unless Polus can refute Socrates, and prove to him that they do as they will?

*Pol.* This fellow—

*Soc.* I say that they do not do as they will;—now refute me.

*Pol.* Why, have you not already admitted that they do as they think best?

*Soc.* And that I still admit.

*Pol.* Then surely they do as they will?

*Soc.* To that I say 'No.'

*Pol.* And yet they do as they think best?

*Soc.* Aye.

*Pol.* That, Socrates, is monstrous and absurd.

*Soc.* Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your own peculiar style; but if you have any questions to ask of me, either prove that I am in error or give the answer yourself.

*Pol.* Very well, I am willing to answer that I may know what you mean.

*Soc.* Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or do they will that further end, for the sake of which they do it; for example, when they take medicine at the bidding of a physician, do they will the drinking of the medicine which is painful, or the health for the sake of which they drink?

*Pol.* Clearly, the health.

*Soc.* And when men go on a voyage or engage in business, they do not will that which they are doing at the time; for who would desire to take the risk of a voyage or the trouble of busi-

ness?—But they will to have the wealth, for the sake of which they go on a voyage.

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And is not this universally true? If a man does something for the sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that for the sake of which he does it.

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate and indifferent?

*Pol.* To be sure, Socrates.

*Soc.* Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call goods, and their opposites evils?

*Pol.* I should.

468 *Soc.* And the things which are neither good nor evil, and which partake sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or of neither, are such as sitting, walking, running, sailing; or, again, wood, stones, and the like:—these are the things which you call neither good nor evil?

*Pol.* Exactly.

*Soc.* And are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the indifferent?

*Pol.* Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good.

*Soc.* When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the idea that this is better, and when we stand we stand equally for the sake of the good?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil him of his goods, because, as we think, that will conduce to our good?

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Men who do these things do them all for the sake of the good?

*Pol.* I admit that.

*Soc.* And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of something else, we do not will those things which we do, but that further thing for the sake of which we do them?

*Pol.* Most true.

*Soc.* Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or to despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which

conduces to our good, and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not will it ; for we will, as you say, that which is our good, but that which is neither good nor evil, or simply evil, we do not will. Why are you silent, Polus? Am I not right?

*Pol.* Yes, that is true.

*Soc.* Granting this, if any one, whether he be a tyrant or a rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or despoils him of his goods, under the idea that the act is for his interests when really not for his interests, he may be said to do what seems best to him?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do you not answer?

*Pol.* Well, I suppose not.

*Soc.* Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such an one have great power in his state?

*Pol.* He will not.

*Soc.* Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to him in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills?

*Pol.* As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of doing what seemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would not be jealous when you saw any one killing or despoiling or imprisoning whom he pleased, Oh no!

*Soc.* Justly or unjustly, do you mean?

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*Pol.* In either case is he not equally to be envied?

*Soc.* Have done, Polus!

*Pol.* Why 'have done'?

*Soc.* Because you should not envy wretches who are not to be envied, but only pity them.

*Pol.* And are those of whom I spoke wretches?

*Soc.* Yes, certainly they are.

*Pol.* And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and justly slays him, is pitiable and wretched?

*Soc.* No, I do not think that of him any more than that he is to be envied.

*Pol.* Were you not saying just now that he is wretched?

*Soc.* Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case he is also to be pitied : neither is he to be envied if he killed him justly.

*Pol.* At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death is wretched, and to be pitied?

*Soc.* Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as he who is justly killed.

*Pol.* How can that be, Socrates?

*Soc.* That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the greatest of evils.

*Pol.* But is that the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater evil?

*Soc.* Certainly not.

*Pol.* Then would you rather suffer than do injustice?

*Soc.* I should not like either, but if I must choose between them, I would rather suffer than do.

*Pol.* Then you would not wish to be a tyrant?

*Soc.* Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean.

*Pol.* I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems good to you in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you like.

*Soc.* Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say, do you reply to me. Suppose that I go into the crowded Agora, and take a dagger under my arm. Polus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare power, and become a tyrant; for if I think that any of these men whom you see ought to be put to death, he is as good as dead; and if I am disposed to break his head or tear his garment, he will have his head broken or his garment torn in an instant. Such is my great power in this city. And if you do not believe me, and I show you the dagger, you would probably reply: Socrates, in that sort of way any one may have great power—he may burn any house which he pleases, and the docks and triremes of the Athenians, and all their other vessels, whether public or private—but can you believe that this mere doing as you think best is great power?

*Pol.* Certainly not, so doing.

470 *Soc.* But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power?

*Pol.* I can.

*Soc.* Why then?

*Pol.* Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be punished.

Soc. And punishment is an evil?

Pel. Certainly.

Soc. And you would admit once more, my good sir, that great power is a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage; and that this is the meaning of great power; and if not then his power is an evil and is no power. But let us look at the matter in another way.—do we not acknowledge that the things of which we were speaking, the infliction of death, and exile, and the deprivation of property are sometimes a good and sometimes not a good?

Pel. Certainly.

Soc. About that you and I may be supposed to agree?

Pel. Yes.

Soc. Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when that they are evil—what principle do you lay down?

Pel. I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as well as ask that question.

Soc. Well, Pelus, since you would rather have the answer from me, I say that they are good when they are just, and evil when they are unjust.

Pel. Though you are hard of refutation, Socrates, a child may refute that statement.

Soc. Then I shall be very grateful to the child, and equally grateful to you if you will refute me and deliver me from my foolishness. And I hope that you will refute me and not weary of doing good to a friend.

Pel. Yes, Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity; circumstances, which may be said to have happened only yesterday, are enough to refute you, and to prove that many men who do wrong are happy.

Soc. What circumstances?

Pel. You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now the ruler of Macedonia?

Soc. At any rate I hear that he is.

Pel. And do you think that he is happy or miserable?

Soc. I cannot say, Pelus, for I have never had any acquaintance with him.

Pel. And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance with him, whether a man is happy?

*Soc.* Indeed I cannot.

*Pol.* Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even know whether the great king was a happy man?

*Soc.* And I should say the truth ; for I do not know how he stands in the matter of education and justice.

*Pol.* What ! and does all happiness consist in this ?

*Soc.* Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine ; the men and women who are gentle and good are also happy, as I maintain, and the unjust and evil are miserable.

47<sup>1</sup> *Pol.* Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is miserable ?

*Soc.* Yes, my friend, if he is wicked he is.

*Pol.* I cannot deny that he is wicked ; for he had no title at all to the throne which he now occupies, he being only the son of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas the brother of Perdiccas, and therefore in strict right himself the slave of Alcetas ; if he had meant to do rightly he would have remained his slave, and then, according to your doctrine, he would have been happy ; but now he is unspeakably miserable, for he has been guilty of the greatest crimes : in the first place he invited his uncle and master, Alcetas, to come to him, under the pretence that he would restore to him the throne which Perdiccas had usurped, and after entertaining him and his son Alexander, who was his own cousin, and nearly of an age with him, and making them drunk, he threw them into a waggon and carried them off by night, and slew them, and got both of them out of the way ; and when he had done all this wickedness he never discovered that he was the most miserable of all men, and was very far from repenting : shall I tell you how he showed his remorse ? he had a younger brother, a child of seven years old, who was the legitimate son of Perdiccas, and to him of right the kingdom belonged ; Archelaus, however, had no mind to bring him up as he ought and restore the kingdom to him ; that was not his notion of happiness ; but not long afterwards he threw him into a well and drowned him, and declared to his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in while running after a goose, and had been killed. And now as he is the greatest criminal in all Macedonia, he may be supposed to be the most miserable and not the happiest, and I dare say that his misery would not be desired

by any Athenian ;—and by you least of all—certainly not ; he is the last of the Macedonians whose lot you would choose.

*Soc.* I praised you at first, Polus, for being a rhetorician rather than a reasoner. And this, as I suppose, is the sort of argument with which you fancy that a child might refute me, and by which I stand refuted when I say that the unjust man is not happy. But, my good friend, where is the refutation ? I cannot admit a word which you have been saying.

*Pol.* That is because you will not ; for you surely must think as I do.

*Soc.* Not so, my simple friend, but because you will refute me in the way which rhetoricians fancy to be refutation in courts of law. For there the one party think that they refute the other when they bring forward a number of witnesses of good repute in proof of their allegations, and their adversary has only a single one or none at all. But this kind of proof is 472 of no value where truth is the aim—though a man may sometimes be slandered by a crowd of false witnesses seeming to be somewhat. And now I know that nearly every one, Athenian as well as stranger, will be on your side in this argument, if you like to bring witnesses in disproof of my statement ;—you may, if you will, summon Nicias the son of Niceratus, and let his brother, who gave the row of tripods which stand in the temple of Dionysus, come with him ; or you may summon Aristocrates, the son of Scellius, who is the giver of that famous offering which is at Delphi ; summon, if you will, the whole house of Pericles, or any other great Athenian family whom you choose ;—they will all agree with you : I only am left alone and cannot agree, for you do not convince me ; you only produce many false witnesses against me, in the hope of depriving me of my inheritance, which is the truth. But I consider that I shall have proved nothing unless I make you yourself the one willing witness of my words ; neither will you, unless you have me as the one witness of yours ; no matter about the rest of the world. For there are two ways of refutation, one which is yours and that of the world in general ; but mine is of another sort—let us compare them, and see in what they differ. For, indeed, the matters at issue between us are not trifling ; to know or not to know happiness and misery—that is the sum of them. And

what knowledge can be nobler? or what ignorance more disgraceful than this? And therefore I will begin by asking you whether you do not think that a man who is unjust and doing injustice can be happy, seeing that you think Archelaus unjust, and yet happy? Am I not right in supposing that to be your meaning?

*Pol.* Quite right.

*Soc.* And I say that for him to be happy is an impossibility, and here is one point about which we are at issue:—very good. But do you mean to say also that if he meets with retribution and punishment he will still be happy?

*Pol.* Certainly not; in that case he will be most miserable.

*Soc.* On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then, according to you, he will be happy?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust actions is miserable in any case,—more miserable, however, if he be not punished and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he be punished and meets with retribution at 473 the hands of God and men.

*Pol.* You are maintaining a strange doctrine, Socrates.

*Soc.* I shall try to make you agree with me, O my friend, for as a friend I regard you. Then these are the points at issue between us—are they not? I was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice?

*Pol.* Exactly.

*Soc.* And you said the opposite?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* I said also that the wicked are miserable, and you refuted me?

*Pol.* By heaven I did.

*Soc.* In your own opinion, Polus.

*Pol.* Yes, and I rather suspect that I was in the right.

*Soc.* And you said again that the wrong-doer is happy if he be unpunished?

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And I say that he is most miserable, and that those who are punished are less miserable—are you going to refute this too?

*Pol.* That sentiment is truly hard of refutation, harder than the other, Socrates.

*Soc.* Not hard only, say rather, impossible, Polus; for who can refute the truth?

*Pol.* What do you mean? If a man is detected in an unjust attempt to make himself a tyrant, and when detected is racked, mutilated, has his eyes burned out, and after having had all sorts of great injuries inflicted on him, and having seen his wife and children suffer, is at last impaled or tarred and burned, will he be happier than if he escape and become a tyrant, and continue all through life doing what he likes and holding the reins of government, the envy and admiration both of citizens and strangers? Is that the paradox which, as you say, cannot be refuted?

*Soc.* There, again, you are raising hobgoblins, noble Polus, instead of refuting me; just now you were calling witnesses against me. But please to refresh my memory a little; did you say—in an unjust attempt to make himself a tyrant?

*Pol.* Yes, I did.

*Soc.* Then I say that neither of them will be happier than the other,—neither he who unjustly acquires a tyranny, nor he who suffers in the attempt, for of two miserables one cannot be the happier, but that he who escapes and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable of the two. Do you laugh, Polus? Well, this is a new kind of elenchus,—when any one says anything, instead of refuting him to laugh at him.

*Pol.* But do you not think, Socrates, that you have been sufficiently refuted, when you say that which no human being will allow? Ask the company.

*Soc.* O Polus, I am not a public man, and only last year, when my tribe were serving as Prytanes, and the lot fell upon me and I was made a senator, and had to take the votes, there was a laugh at me, because I was unable to take them. And 474 as I failed then, you must not ask me to count the suffrages of the company now; but if, as I was saying, you have no better argument than numbers, let me have a turn, and do you make trial of the sort of proof which, as I think, ought to be given; for I shall produce one witness only of the truth of my words, and he is the person with whom I am arguing;

his suffrage I know how to take; but with the many I have nothing to do, and do not even address myself to them. May I ask then whether you will answer in turn and have your words put to the proof? For I certainly think that I and you and every man do really believe, that to do is a greater evil than to suffer injustice: and not to be punished than to be punished.

*Pol.* And I should say neither I, nor any man: would you yourself, for example, suffer rather than do injustice?

*Soc.* Yes, and you, too; I or any man would.

*Pol.* Quite the reverse; neither you, nor I, nor any man.

*Soc.* But will you answer?

*Pol.* To be sure, I will; for I am curious to hear what you are going to say.

*Soc.* Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose that I am beginning at the beginning: which of the two, Polus, in your opinion, is the worst?—to do injustice or to suffer?

*Pol.* I should say that suffering was worst.

*Soc.* And which is the greater disgrace?—Answer.

*Pol.* To do.

*Soc.* And the greater disgrace is the greater evil?

*Pol.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the honourable is not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the evil?

*Pol.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Let me ask a question of you: When you speak of beautiful things, as, for example, bodies, colours, figures, sounds, institutions, do you not call them beautiful in reference to some standard:—bodies, for example, are beautiful in proportion as they are useful, or as the sight of them gives pleasure to the spectators; can you give any other account of personal beauty?

*Pol.* I cannot.

*Soc.* And you would speak of everything else—of figures or colours, for example, as beautiful, either by reason of the pleasure which they give, or of their use, or of both?

*Pol.* Yes, I should.

*Soc.* And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same reason?

*Pol.* I should.

*Soc.* Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in so far as they are pleasant or useful or both?

*Pol.* I think not.

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*Soc.* And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge?

*Pol.* To be sure, Socrates ; and I very much approve of your measuring beauty by the standard of pleasure and utility.

*Soc.* And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the opposite standard of pain and evil?

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty, the measure of the excess is to be taken in one or both of these ; that is to say, in pleasure or good or both ?

*Pol.* Very true.

*Soc.* And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity or disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil—does not that follow ?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* But then again, what was that observation which you just now made, about doing and suffering wrong ? Did you not say, that suffering wrong was more evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful ?

*Pol.* I did say that.

*Soc.* Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the more disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in evil or both : does not that also of necessity follow ?

*Pol.* Of course.

*Soc.* First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice exceeds the suffering in the consequent pain : Do the injurers suffer more than the injured ?

*Pol.* No, Socrates ; certainly not.

*Soc.* Then they do not exceed in pain ?

*Pol.* No.

*Soc.* But if not in pain, then not in both ?

*Pol.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Then they can only exceed in the other ?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* That is to say, in evil ?

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will therefore be a greater evil than suffering injustice?

*Pol.* Clearly.

*Soc.* But have not you and the world already agreed that to do injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And that is now discovered to be more evil?

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dis-honour to a less one? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm if you resign yourself without shrinking into the healing hand of the argument as to a physician, and either say 'Yes' or 'No' to me.

*Pol.* I should say 'No.'

*Soc.* Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil?

*Pol.* No, not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates.

*Soc.* Then I said truly, Polus, that neither you, nor I, nor any man, would rather do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is the greater evil of the two.

*Pol.* That is true.

*Soc.* Then you see, Polus, that when you compare the two kinds of refutations they are quite unlike. All men, with the exception of myself, agree with you; but your assent is enough 476 for me, and I have no need of any other witness; I take your suffrage, and am regardless of the rest. Enough of this, and now let us proceed to the next question; which is, Whether the greatest of evils to a guilty man is to suffer punishment, as you supposed, or whether to escape punishment is not a greater evil, as I supposed. Consider:—Would you not say that to suffer punishment is another name for being justly corrected?

*Pol.* I should.

*Soc.* And would you not allow that all just things are honourable in as far as they are just? Please to reflect, and tell me your opinion.

*Pol.* Yes, Socrates, I think that they are.

*Soc.* Consider again:—Where there is an agent, must there not also be a patient?

*Pol.* I admit that.

*Soc.* And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does, and will not the suffering have the quality of the action? I mean, for example, that if a man strikes, there must be something which is stricken?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which is struck will be struck violently or quickly?

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same nature as the act of him who strikes?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if a man burns, there is something which is burned?

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And if he burns in excess or with pain, the thing burned will be burned in the same way?

*Pol.* Truly.

*Soc.* And if he cuts, the same argument holds—there will be something cut?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if the cutting be great or deep or painful, the cut will be of the same nature?

*Pol.* That is evident.

*Soc.* Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition which I was just now asserting: that the affection of the patient answers to the act of the agent?

*Pol.* I agree.

*Soc.* Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished is suffering or acting?

*Pol.* Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that.

*Soc.* And suffering implies an agent?

*Pol.* Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher.

*Soc.* And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And therefore he acts justly?

*Pol.* Justly.

*Soc.* Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers justly?

*Pol.* That is evident.

*Soc.* And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable?

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished suffers what is honourable?

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the  
477 honourable is either pleasant or useful?

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then he who is punished suffers what is good?

*Pol.* That is true.

*Soc.* Then he is benefited?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term 'benefited'? I mean, that his soul is improved, if he be justly punished.

*Pol.* Surely.

*Soc.* Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his soul?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at the matter in this way:—In respect of a man's estate, do you see any greater evil than poverty?

*Pol.* There is no greater evil.

*Soc.* Again, in a man's body, you would say that the evil is weakness and disease and deformity?

*Pol.* I should.

*Soc.* And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil of her own?

*Pol.* Of course.

*Soc.* And this you would call injustice and ignorance and cowardice, and the like?

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have pointed out three corresponding evils—injustice, disease, poverty?

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?—Is not the most disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the soul?

*Pol.* By far the most.

*Soc.* And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst?

*Pol.* What do you mean, Socrates? I do not understand.

*Soc.* I mean to say, that what is most disgraceful has been already admitted to be most painful or hurtful, or both.

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted by us to be most disgraceful?

*Pol.* That has been admitted.

*Soc.* And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing excessive pain, or most hurtful, or both?

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and ignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick?

*Pol.* Nay, Socrates; the painfulness does not appear to me to follow from your premises.

*Soc.* Then, if, as you would argue, not more painful, the evil of the soul is of all evils the most disgraceful; and the excess of disgrace must be caused by some preternatural greatness, or extraordinary hurtfulness of the evil, or both.

*Pol.* Clearly.

*Soc.* And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the greatest of evils?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity of the soul, are the greatest of evils?

*Pol.* That is evident.

*Soc.* Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty? Does not the art of making money?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of medicine?

*Pol.* Very true.

*Soc.* And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able 478 to answer at once, ask yourself whether we go with the sick, and to whom we take them.

*Pol.* To the physicians, Socrates.

*Soc.* And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate?

*Pol.* To the judges, you mean.

*Soc.* Who are to punish them?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in accordance with a certain rule of justice?

*Pol.* Clearly.

*Soc.* Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty; medicine from disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice?

*Pol.* That is evident.

*Soc.* Which, then, is the best of these three?

*Pol.* Will you enumerate them?

*Soc.* Money-making, medicine, and justice.

*Pol.* Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others.

*Soc.* And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or advantage or both?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who are being healed pleased?

*Pol.* I think not.

*Soc.* Useful, then?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* Why, yes, because giving deliverance from great evils; and this is the advantage of enduring the pain—that you get well.

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who is healed, or who never was out of health?

*Pol.* Clearly he who was never out of health.

*Soc.* Yes; for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered from evils, but in never having had them.

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in their bodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil, and another is not healed, but retains the evil—which of them is the most miserable?

*Pol.* Clearly he who is not healed.

*Soc.* And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from the greatest of evils, which is vice?

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the healer of our vice?

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who has never had vice in his soul; for this has been shown to be the greatest of evils.

*Pol.* Clearly.

*Soc.* And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice?

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and punishment?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no deliverance from injustice?

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* That is, he who commits the greatest crimes lives worst,<sup>479</sup> and who, being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or correction or punishment, which, as you say, is the case of Archelaus and of all your tyrants and rhetoricians and mighty men?

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to the conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and yet contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins against his constitution, and will not be cured, because, like a child, he is afraid of the pain of being burned or cut:—Is not that a parallel case?

*Pol.* Yes, truly.

*Soc.* He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and bodily vigour; and if we are right, Polus, in our previous conclusions, they are in a like case who strive to evade justice, which they see to be painful, but are blind to the advantage which ensues from it, not knowing how far more miserable a companion a diseased soul is than a diseased body; a soul, I say, which is corrupt and unrighteous and unholy. And hence they do all that they can to avoid punishment and to avoid being released from the greatest of evils; they provide themselves with money and friends, and cultivate to the utmost their powers of persuasion. But if we, Polus,

are right, do you see what follows, or shall we draw out the consequences in form?

*Pol.* If you please.

*Soc.* It follows that injustice, and the doing of injustice, is the greatest of evils?

*Pol.* That is clear.

*Soc.* And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be released from this evil?

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil?

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but to do wrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all?

*Pol.* That is true.

*Soc.* Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend? You deemed Archelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and unpunished: I, on the other hand, maintained that he or any other who like him has done wrong and has not been punished, is, and ought to be, the most miserable of all men; and that the doer of injustice, whether Archelaus or any other, is more miserable than the sufferer; and he who escapes punishment, more miserable than he who suffers.—Was not that what I said?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And that has been proved to be true?

*Pol.* Certainly.

480 *Soc.* Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of rhetoric? If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in every way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby suffer great evil?

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does wrong, he ought of his own accord to go where he will be immediately punished; he will run to the judge, as he would to the physician, in order that the disease of injustice may not be rendered chronic and become the incurable cancer of the soul; must we not allow that, Polus, if our former admissions are to stand? and is any other inference consistent with them?

*Pol.* To that, Socrates, there can be but one answer.

*Soc.* Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to excuse his own injustice, or that of his parents or friends, or children or country; but may be of use to any one who holds that instead of excusing he ought to accuse—himself above all, and in the next degree, his family, or any of his friends who may be doing wrong; if he does not want to conceal, but to bring to light the iniquity, that the wrong-doer may suffer and be healed, and if he would force himself and others to stand firm, closing their eyes manfully, and letting the physician cut, as I may say, and burn him or them, in the hope of attaining the good and the honourable, not regarding the pain, but if he have done things worthy of stripes, allowing himself to be scourged, or if of bonds, to be bound, or if of a fine, to be fined, or if of exile, to be exiled, or if of death, to die, himself being the first to accuse himself and his own relations, and using rhetoric to this end, that his and their unjust actions may be made manifest, and that they themselves may be delivered from injustice, which is the greatest evil. Then, Polus, rhetoric would indeed be useful. Do you say ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to that?

*Pol.* To me, Socrates, what you are saying appears very strange, though probably in agreement with your premises.

*Soc.* Is not this the conclusion, if the premises are not disproven?

*Pol.* Yes; that is true.

*Soc.* And from the opposite point of view, of doing harm to some one, whether he be an enemy or not—I except the case in which I myself am suffering injury at the hands of another, for I must take precautions against that—but if my enemy injures 481 a third person, then in every sort of way, by word as well as deed, I should try to prevent his being punished, or appearing before the judge; and if he appears, I should contrive that he should escape, and not suffer punishment: if he has stolen a sum of money, let him keep and spend what he has stolen on him and his, regardless of religion and justice; and if he have done things worthy of death, let him not die, but rather be immortal in his wickedness; or, if this is not possible, let him at any rate be allowed to live as long as he can. For such purposes, Polus, rhetoric may be useful, but is of small if of any

use to him who is not intending to commit injustice; at least, there was no such use discovered by us in the previous discussion.

*Cal.* Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, or is he joking?

*Chacr.* I should say, Callicles, that he is in most profound earnest; but you may as well ask him.

*Cal.* By the gods, and I will. Tell me, Socrates, are you in earnest, or only in jest? For if you are in earnest, and what you say is true, is not the whole of human life turned upside down; and are we not doing, as would appear, in everything the opposite of what we ought to be doing?

*Soc.* O Callicles, if there were not some community of feelings among mankind, however varying in different persons—I mean to say, if every man's feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by the rest of his species—I do not see how we could ever communicate our impressions to one another. I make this remark because I perceive that you and I have a common feeling. For we are lovers both, and both of us have two loves apiece:—I am the lover of Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, and of philosophy; and you of the Athenian Demus, and of Demus the fair son of Pyrilampes. Now, I observe that you, with all your cleverness, do not venture to contradict your favourite in any word or opinion of his; but as he changes you change, backwards and forwards. When the Athenian Demus denies anything that you are saying in the assembly, you go over to his opinion; and you do the same with Demus, the fair young son of Pyrilampes. For you have not the power to resist the words and ideas of your loves; and if a person were to express surprise at the strangeness of what you are apt to say when under their influence, you  
482 would probably reply to him, if you were honest, that you must use the same language as your loves, and that you can only be silent when they are. Now you must understand that my words are an echo too, and therefore you need not wonder at me; but if you want to silence me, silence philosophy, who is my love, for she is always saying to me what I am now saying to you, my friend; neither is she capricious like my other love, for the son of Cleinias is inconstant, but philosophy

is always true. She is the teacher at whose words you are now wondering when you hear them spoken ;—her you must refute, and either show, as I was saying, that to do injustice and to escape punishment is not the worst of all evils ; or, if you leave her word unrefuted, by the dog the god of Egypt, I declare, O Callicles, that Callicles will never be at one with himself, but that his whole life will be a discord. And yet, my friend, I would rather that my lyre should be inharmonious, and that there should be no music in the chorus which I provided ; aye, or that the whole world should be at odds with me, and oppose me, rather than that I myself should be at odds with myself, and contradict myself.

*Cal.* O Socrates, you are a regular disclaimer, and are manifestly running riot in the argument. And now you are declaiming in this way because Polus has met with the same evil fate himself which he accused you of bringing upon Gorgias : he said, if I remember rightly, that when Gorgias was asked by you, whether, if some one came to him who wanted to learn rhetoric, and did not know justice, he would teach him justice ? and Gorgias in his modesty replied that he would, because he thought that mankind in general would expect this of him, and would be displeased if he said ‘No ;’ in consequence of this admission, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself, and you were delighted ; Polus laughed at you at the time, deservedly, as I think ; but now he has himself experienced the same misfortune. I cannot say very much for his wit when he conceded to you, that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer injustice, for this was what led to his being entangled by you ; and because he was too modest to say what he thought, he had his mouth stopped. For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth, are appealing now to the popular and vulgar notions of right, which are not natural, but only conventional. Convention and nature are generally at variance with one another : and hence, if a person is too modest to say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself ; and you, in your 483 ingenuity perceiving the advantage to be thereby gained, slyly ask of him who is arguing conventionally a question which is to be determined by the rule of nature ; and if he is talking

of the rule of nature, you slip away to custom : as you did in this very discussion about doing and suffering injustice. When Polus was speaking of the conventionally dishonourable, you assailed him from the point of view of nature ; for by the rule of nature, to suffer injustice is the greater disgrace because the greater evil ; but conventionally, to do evil is the more disgraceful. For the suffering of injustice is not the part of a man, but of a slave, who indeed had better die than live ; since when he is wronged and trampled upon, he is unable to help himself, or any other about whom he cares. The reason, as I conceive, is that the makers of laws are the majority who are weak ; and they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to themselves and to their own interests ; and they terrify the stronger sort of men, and those who are able to get the better of them, in order that they may not get the better of them ; and they say, that dishonesty is shameful and unjust ; meaning, by the word injustice, the desire of a man to have more than his neighbours ; for knowing their own inferiority, I suspect that they are too glad of equality. And therefore the endeavour to have more than the many, is conventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is called injustice, whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker ; and in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior. For on what principle of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, or his father the Scythians ? (not to speak of numberless other examples). These are the men who act according to nature ; yes, by Heaven, and according to the law of nature : not, perhaps, according to that artificial law, which we forge and impose upon our fellows, of whom we take the best and strongest from their youth upwards, and tame them like young lions,—

484 charming them with the sound of the voice, and saying to them, that with equality they must be content, and that the equal is the honourable and the just. But if there were a man who had sufficient force, he would shake off and break through, and escape from all this ; he would trample under foot all our formulas and spells and charms, and all our laws, sinning against

nature: the slave would rise in rebellion and be lord over us, and the light of natural justice would shine forth. And this I take to be the sentiment of Pindar, in the poem in which he says, that . . .

Law is the king of all, mortals as well as immortals;  
this, as he says,

Makes might to be right, and does violence with high hand; as I infer from the deeds of Heracles, for without buying them—

—I do not remember the exact words, but the meaning is, that without buying them, and without their being given to him, he carried off the oxen of Geryon, according to the law of natural right, and that the oxen and other possessions of the weaker and inferior properly belong to the stronger and superior. And this is true, as you may ascertain, if you will leave philosophy and go on to higher things: for philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the proper age, is an elegant accomplishment, but too much philosophy is the ruin of human life. Even if a man has good parts, still, if he carries philosophy into later life, he is necessarily ignorant of all those things which a gentleman and a person of honour ought to know; he is inexperienced in the laws of the State, and in the language which ought to be used in the dealings of man with man, whether private or public, and utterly ignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind and of human character, in general. And people of this sort, when they betake themselves to politics or business, are as ridiculous as I imagine the politicians to be, when they make their appearance in the arena of philosophy. For, as Euripides says,

Every man shines in that and pursues that, and devotes the greatest portion of the day to that in which he thinks himself to excel most,

and anything in which he is inferior, he avoids and depreciates, <sup>485</sup> and praises the opposite from partiality to himself, and because he thinks that he will thus praise himself. The true principle is to unite them. Philosophy, as a part of education, is an excellent thing, and there is no disgrace to a man while he is young in pursuing such a study; but when he is more advanced in years, the thing becomes ridiculous, and I feel towards philosophers as

I do towards those who lisp and imitate children. For I love to see a little child, who is not of an age to speak plainly, lisping at his play: there is an appearance of grace and freedom in his utterance, which is natural to his childish years. And when I hear some small creature carefully articulating its words, I am offended; the sound is disagreeable, and has to my ears the twang of slavery. But when I see a man lisping as if he were a child, that appears to me ridiculous and unmanly and worthy of stripes. And I have the same feeling about students of philosophy; when I see a youth so engaged,—that I consider to be quite in character, and becoming a man of a liberal education, and him who neglects philosophy I regard as an inferior man, who will never aspire to anything great or noble. But if I see him continuing the study in later life, and not leaving off, I think that he ought to be beaten, Socrates; for, as I was saying, such an one, even though he have good natural parts, becomes effeminate. He flies from the busy centre and the market-place, in which, as the poet says, men become distinguished; he creeps into a corner for the rest of his life, and talks in a whisper with three or four admiring youths, but never speaks out like a free-man in a satisfactory manner. Now I, Socrates, am very well inclined towards you, and my feeling may be compared with that of Zethus towards Amphion, in the play of Euripides, of which I was just now speaking: for I am disposed to say to you much what Zethus said to his brother, that you, Socrates, are careless when you ought to be careful;

486 Having a soul so noble, are remarkable for a puerile exterior;  
Neither in a court of justice could you state a case, or give any reason  
or proof,  
Or offer valiant counsel on another's behalf.

And you must not be offended, my dear Socrates, for I am speaking out of good-will towards you, if I ask whether you are not ashamed of being thus defenceless; which I affirm to be the condition not of you only but of all those who will carry the study of philosophy too far. For suppose that some one were to take you, or any one of your sort, off to prison, declaring that you had done wrong when you had done no wrong, you must allow that you would not know what to do:—there you would

stand giddy and gaping, and not having a word to say ; and when you went up before the Court, even if the accuser were a poor creature and not good for much, you would die if he were disposed to claim the penalty of death. And yet, Socrates, what is the value of

An art which converts a man of sense into a fool,

who is helpless, and has no power to save either himself or others, when he is in the greatest danger and is going to be despoiled by his enemies of all his goods, and deprived of his rights of citizenship ?—he being a man who, if I may use the expression, may be boxed on the ears with impunity. Then, my good friend, take my advice, and refute no more :

Learn the arts of business, and acquire the reputation of wisdom.  
But leave to others these niceties,

whether they are to be described as follies or absurdities :

For they will only  
Give you poverty for the inmate of your dwelling.

Cease, then, emulating these paltry splitters of words, and emulate only the man of substance and honour, who is well to do.

*Soc.* If my soul, Callicles, were made of gold, should I not rejoice to discover one of those stones with which they test gold, and the very best possible one to which I might bring my soul ; and if the stone and I agreed in approving of her training, then I should know that I was in a satisfactory state, and that no other test was needed by me.

*Cal.* What makes you say that, Socrates ?

*Soc.* I will tell you ; I think that in you I have found the desired touchstone.

*Cal.* Why ?

*Soc.* Because I am sure that if you agree with me in any of the opinions which my soul forms, I have at last found the truth indeed. For I consider that if a man is to make a complete trial of the good or evil of the soul, he ought to have three qualities—knowledge, good-will, frankness, which are all possessed by you. Many whom I meet are unable to make trial of me, because they are not wise as you are ; others are wise,

but they will not tell me the truth, because they have not the interest in me which you have ; and these two strangers, Gorgias and Polus, are undoubtedly wise men and my very good friends, but they are not frank enough, and they are too modest. Why, their modesty is so great that they are driven to contradict themselves, first one and then the other of them, in the face of a large company, on matters of the highest moment. But you have all the qualities in which these others are deficient, having received an excellent education ; to this many Athenians can testify. And I am certain that you are my friend. How do I prove it ? Shall I tell you how ? I know that you, Callicles, and Tisander of Aphidnae, and Andron the son of Androton, and Nausicydes of the deme of Cholarges, studied together : there were four of you, and I once heard you advising with one another as to the extent to which the pursuit of philosophy should be carried, and, as I know, you came to the conclusion that the study should not be pushed too much into detail. You were cautioning one another not to be overwise, lest, without your knowing, this should be the ruin of you. And now when I hear you giving the same advice to me which you then gave to your most intimate friends, I have in that a sufficient evidence of your real good-will to me. And of the frankness of your nature and freedom from modesty I am assured by yourself, and the assurance is confirmed by your last speech. Well then, the inference clearly is, that if you and I agree in an argument about any point, that point will have been sufficiently tested by you and me, and will not require to be referred to any further test. For you cannot have been led to agree with me, either from lack of knowledge or from superfluity of modesty, nor from a desire to deceive me, for you are my friend, as you tell me yourself. And therefore when you and I are agreed, the result will be the attainment of the perfect truth. Nevertheless, Callicles, there is no nobler enquiry than that which in me you censure,—What ought the character of a man to be, and what his pursuits, and how far is he to go, both in maturer years and in youth ? For 488 be assured that if I err in my own conduct I do not err intentionally, but from my ignorance. Do not then desist from advising me, now that you have begun, until I have learned clearly what this is which I am to practise, and how I may acquire it.

And if you find me assenting to your words, and hereafter not doing that to which I assented, call me 'dolt,' and 'good-for-nothing,' and deem me unworthy of receiving further instruction. Once more, then, tell me what you and Pindar mean by natural justice: Do you not mean that the superior should take the property of the inferior by force; that the better should rule the worse, the noble have more than the mean? Am I not right in my recollection?

*Cal.* Yes; that is what I was saying, and what I still maintain.

*Soc.* And do you mean by the better the same as the superior? for I could not make out what you were saying at the time—whether you meant by the superior the stronger, and that the weaker must obey the stronger, as you seemed to imply when you said that great cities attack small ones in accordance with natural right, because they are superior and stronger, as though the superior and stronger and better were the same; or whether the better may be also the inferior and weaker, and the superior the worse, or whether better is to be defined in the same way as superior:—this is the point which I want to have clearly explained. Are the superior and better and stronger the same or different?

*Cal.* I say unequivocally that they are the same.

*Soc.* Then the many are by nature superior to the one, against whom, as you were saying, they make the laws?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior?

*Cal.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then they are the laws of the better; for the superior are far better, as you were saying?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then the laws which are made by them are by nature noble, as they are the superior?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And are not the many of opinion, as you were lately saying, that justice is equality, and that to do is more disgraceful <sup>489</sup> than to suffer injustice? and that equality and not excess is justice?—is that so or no? Answer, Callicles, and let no modesty be found to come in the way<sup>1</sup>:—I must beg of you to answer,

<sup>1</sup> Cp. what is said of Gorgias by Callicles at p. 482.

in order that if you agree with me I may be fortified in my judgment by the assent of so competent an authority.

*Cal.* Yes; that is the opinion of the many.

*Soc.* Then not only custom but nature also affirms that to do is more disgraceful than to suffer injustice, and that justice is equality; so that you seem to have been wrong in your former assertion, when accusing me you said that nature and custom are opposed, and that I, knowing this, was artfully playing between them, appealing to custom when the argument is about nature, and to nature when the argument is about custom?

*Cal.* This man always will be talking nonsense. At your age, Socrates, are you not ashamed to be word-catching, and when a man trips in a word, thinking that to be a piece of luck? do you not see—have I not told you already, that by superior I mean better: do you imagine me to say, that if a rabble of slaves and nondescripts, who are of no use except perhaps for their physical strength, get together, their ipsissima verba are laws?

*Soc.* Ho! my philosopher, is that your line?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* I was thinking, Callicles, that something of the kind must have been in your mind, and that is why I repeated the question, what is the superior, because I wanted to know clearly what you meant; for you surely do not think that two men are better than one, or that your slaves are better than you because they are stronger? Then please to begin again, and tell me who the better are, if they are not the stronger; and I will ask you, great Sir, to be a little milder in your instructions, or I shall have to run away from you.

*Cal.* You are ironical.

*Soc.* No, by the hero Zethus, Callicles, by whose aid you were just now saying (485 A) many ironical things against me, I am not:—tell me, then, whom you mean by the better?

*Cal.* I mean the more excellent.

*Soc.* Do you not see that you are yourself repeating words and explaining nothing?—will you tell me whether you mean by the better and superior the wiser, or if not, whom?

490 *Cal.* Most assuredly, I do mean the wiser.

*Soc.* Then according to you, one wise man may often be superior to ten thousand fools, and he ought to rule them, and they

ought to be his subjects, and he ought to have more than they should. That is what I believe that you mean (and you must not suppose that I am word-catching), if you allow that the one is superior to the ten thousand?

*Cal.* Yes: that is what I mean, and that is what I conceive to be natural justice—that the better and wiser should rule and have more than the inferior.

*Soc.* Stop now, and let me ask you what you would say in this case: Let us suppose that we are all together as we are now; there are several of us, and we have a large common store of meats and drinks, and there are all sorts of persons in our company having various degrees of strength and weakness, and one of us, being a physician, is wiser in the matter of food than all the rest, and he is probably stronger than some and not so strong as others of us—will he not, being wiser, be also better than we are, and our superior in this matter of food?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Either, then, he will have a larger share of the meats and drinks, because he is better, or he will have the distribution of all of them by reason of his authority, but he will not expend or make use of a larger share of them on his own person, or if he does, he will be punished;—his share will exceed that of some, and be less than that of others, and if he be the weakest of all, he being the best of all will have the smallest share of all, Callicles:—am I not right, my friend?

*Cal.* You talk about meats and drinks and physicians and other nonsense; I am not speaking of them.

*Soc.* Well, but do you admit that the wiser is the better? Answer that.

*Cal.* I do.

*Soc.* And ought not the better to have a larger share?

*Cal.* Not of meats and drinks.

*Soc.* I understand: then, perhaps, of coats—the skilfullest weaver ought to have the largest coat, and the greatest number of them, and go about clothed in the best and finest of them?

*Cal.* Nonsense about coats.

*Soc.* Then the skilfullest and wisest in making shoes ought to have the advantage in shoes; the shoemaker, clearly, should

walk about in the largest shoes, and have the greatest number of them?

*Cal.* Shoes! fudge. What nonsense you are talking!

*Soc.* Or, if that is not your meaning, perhaps you mean to say that the wise and good and true husbandman should actually have a larger share of seeds, and have as much seed as possible for his own especial use?

*Cal.* How you go on, always talking in the same way, Socrates!

*Soc.* Yes, Callicles, and not only talking in the same way, but 491 on the same subjects.

*Cal.* Yes, by Heaven, you are literally always talking of cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with our argument.

*Soc.* But why will you not tell me in what a man must be superior and wiser in order to claim a larger share; will you neither accept a suggestion, nor offer one?

*Cal.* I have already told you. In the first place, I mean by the superior not cobblers or cooks, but wise politicians who understand the administration of a state, and who are not only wise, but also valiant and able to carry out their designs, and not the men to faint from want of soul.

*Soc.* See now, most excellent Callicles, how different my charge against you is from that which you bring against me, for you reproach me with always saying the same; but I reproach you with never saying the same about the same things, for at one time you were defining the better and the superior as the stronger, then again as the wiser, and now you bring forward a new notion; the superior and the better are now declared by you to be the more courageous: I wish, my good friend, that you would tell me, once for all, whom you affirm to be the better and superior, and in what they are better?

*Cal.* I have already told you that I mean those who are wise and courageous in the administration of a state; they ought to be the rulers of their states, and justice consists in their having more than their subjects.

*Soc.* But whether rulers or subjects will they or will they not have more than themselves, my friend?

*Cal.* How do you mean?

Soc. I mean that every man is his own ruler; but perhaps you think that there is no necessity for him to rule himself: he is only required to rule others?

Cal. What do you mean by his 'ruling over himself'?

Soc. A simple thing enough; just what is commonly said, that a man should be temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own pleasures and passions.

Cal. What innocence! you mean those fools,—the temperate?

Soc. Certainly:—any one may know that to be my meaning.

Cal. Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools, for how can a man be happy who is the servant of anything? On the contrary, I plainly assert, that he who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax to the uttermost, and not to chastise them; but when they have grown to their greatest he should have courage and intelligence to minister to them and to satisfy all his longings. And this I affirm to be natural justice and nobility. To this the many cannot attain: and they blame the strong man because they are ashamed of their own weakness, which they desire to conceal, and hence they say that intemperance is base. As I was saying before, they enslave the nobler natures, and being unable to satisfy their pleasures, they praise temperance and justice out of cowardice. For if a man had been originally the son of a king, or had a nature capable of acquiring an empire or a tyranny or exclusive power, what could be more truly base or evil than temperance—to a man like him, I say, who might freely be enjoying every good, and has no one to hinder him, and yet has admitted custom and reason and the opinion of other men to be lords over him?—must not he be in a miserable plight whom the reputation of justice and temperance hinders from giving more to his friends than to his enemies, even though he be a ruler in his city? Nay, Socrates, for you profess to be a votary of the truth, and the truth is this:—that luxury and intemperance and licence, if they are duly supported, are happiness and virtue—all the rest is a mere bauble, custom contrary to nature, fond inventions of men nothing worth.

Soc. There is a noble freedom, Callicles, in your way of approaching the argument: for what you say is what the rest of the world think, but are unwilling to say. And I must beg of you to persevere, that the true rule of human life may become

manifest. Tell me, then :—you say, do you not, that in the rightly-developed man the passions ought not to be controlled, but that we should let them grow to the utmost and somehow or other satisfy them, and that this is virtue?

*Cal.* Yes ; that is what I say.

*Soc.* Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be happy ?

*Cal.* No indeed, for then stones and dead men would be the happiest of all.

*Soc.* But surely according to you life is an awful thing ; and indeed I think that Euripides may have been right in saying,

‘Who knows if life be not death and death life ;’

493 and that we are very likely dead ; I have heard a philosopher say that at this moment we *are* dead, and that the body ( $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ ) is a tomb ( $\sigma\hat{\eta}\mu\alpha$ ), and that the part of the soul which is the seat of the desires is liable to be blown and tossed about ; and some ingenious man, probably a Sicilian or an Italian, playing with the word, invented a tale in which he called the soul a vessel ( $\pi\hat{\iota}\theta\oslash$ ), meaning a believing ( $\pi\iota\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\circ\delta$ ) vessel, and the ignorant he called the uninitiated or leaky, and the place in the souls of the uninitiated in which the desires are seated, being the intemperate and incontinent part, he compared to a vessel full of holes, because they can never be satisfied. He is not of your way of thinking, Callicles, for he declares, that of all the souls in Hades, meaning the invisible world ( $\grave{\alpha}\epsilon\delta\grave{\epsilon}\circ\delta$ ), these uninitiated or leaky persons are the most miserable, and that they carry water to a vessel which is full of holes in a similarly holey colander. The colander, as he declares, is the soul, and the soul which he compares to a colander is the soul of the ignorant, which is full of holes, and therefore incontinent, owing to a bad memory and want of faith. These are strange words, but still they show what, if I can, I desire to prove to you ; that you should change your mind, and, instead of the intemperate and insatiate life, you should choose that which is orderly and sufficient and has a due provision for daily needs. Do I make any impression on you, and are you coming over to the opinion that the orderly are happier than the intemperate ? Or do I fail to persuade you,

and, however many tales I rehearse to you, do you continue of the same opinion still?

*Cal.* The latter, Socrates, is more like the truth.

*Soc.* Well, I will tell you another image, which comes out of the same school:—Let me request you to consider how far you would accept this as an account of the two lives of the temperate and intemperate:—There are two men, both of whom have a number of casks; the one man has his casks sound and full, one of wine, another of honey, and a third of milk, besides others filled with other liquids, and the streams which fill them are few and scanty, and he can only obtain them with a great deal of toil and difficulty; but when his casks are once filled he has no need to feed them any more, and has no further trouble with them or care about them. The other, in like manner, can procure streams, though not without difficulty; but his vessels are leaky and unsound, and night and day he is compelled to be filling them, and if he pauses for a moment, he is in an agony 494 of pain. Such are their respective lives:—And now would you say that the life of the intemperate is happier than that of the temperate? Do I not convince you that the opposite is the truth?

*Cal.* You do not convince me, Socrates, for the one who has filled himself has no longer any pleasure left; and this, as I was just now saying, is the life of a stone: he has neither joy nor sorrow after he is once filled; but the life of pleasure is the pouring in of the stream.

*Soc.* And if the stream is always pouring in, must there not be a stream always running out, and holes large enough to admit of the discharge?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* The life, then, of which you are now speaking, is not that of a dead man, or of a stone, but of a cormorant; you mean that he is to be hungering and eating?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And he is to be thirsting and drinking?

*Cal.* Yes, that is what I mean; he is to have all his desires about him, and to be able to live happily in the gratification of them.

*Soc.* Capital, excellent; go on as you have begun, and have

no shame ; I, too, must disencumber myself of shame : and first, will you tell me whether you include itching and scratching, provided you have enough of scratching and continue scratching through life, in your notion of happiness ?

*Cal.* What a strange being you are, Socrates ! a regular claptrap speaker.

*Soc.* That was the reason, Callicles, why I scared the modesty out of Polus and Gorgias ; but your modesty will not be scared, for you are a brave man. And now, answer my question.

*Cal.* I answer, that the scratcher would live pleasantly.

*Soc.* And if pleasantly, then also happily ?

*Cal.* To be sure.

*Soc.* But what if the itching is not confined to the head ? Shall I pursue the question. And here, Callicles, I would have you consider how you would reply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially if in the last resort you are asked, whether the life of a catamite is not terrible, foul, miserable ? Or would you venture to say, that they too are happy, if they only get enough of what they want ?

*Cal.* Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics into the argument ?

*Soc.* Well, my fine friend, but am I to blame for that, or he who says without any qualification that all who feel pleasure are happy, whatever may be the character of their pleasure, and 495 admits of no distinction of good and bad pleasures ? And I would still ask, whether you say that pleasure and good are the same, or whether there is some pleasure which is not a good ?

*Cal.* Well, then, for the sake of consistency, I will say that they are the same.

*Soc.* You are breaking the original agreement, Callicles, and will no longer be a satisfactory companion in the search after truth, if you say what is contrary to your real opinion.

*Cal.* Why, that is what you are doing too, Socrates.

*Soc.* Then we are both doing wrong. Still, my dear friend, I would ask you to consider whether pleasure, from whatever source derived, is the good ; for, if this be true, then the disagreeable consequences which have been shadowed forth must follow, and many others.

*Cal.* That, Socrates, is only your opinion.

*Soc.* And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are saying?

*Cal.* Indeed I do.

*Soc.* Then, as you are in earnest, let us proceed with the argument.

*Cal.* By all means.

*Soc.* Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question for me:—There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge?

*Cal.* There is.

*Soc.* And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied knowledge?

*Cal.* I was.

*Soc.* And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things different from one another?

*Cal.* Certainly I was.

*Soc.* And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, or not the same?

*Cal.* Not the same, O man of wisdom.

*Soc.* And would you say that courage differed from pleasure?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian, says that pleasure and good are the same; but that knowledge and courage are not the same, either with one another, or with the good.

*Cal.* And what does our friend Socrates, of Fox-Court, say to this: does he assent, or not?

*Soc.* He does not assent: neither will Callicles, when he sees himself truly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune are opposed to each other?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and disease, they exclude one another: a man cannot have them both, or be without them both, at the same time?

*Cal.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* Take the case of any bodily affection:—a man may have the complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia?

*Cal.* To be sure.

*Soc.* He surely cannot have the same eyes at the same time well and sound?

*Cal.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of the health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of them both together?

*Cal.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* That would surely be marvellous and absurd?

*Cal.* Very.

*Soc.* I suppose that he has them, and gets rid of them in turns?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by fits?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Or swiftness and slowness?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation?

*Cal.* Certainly he has.

*Soc.* If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil—do we admit that? Please not to answer without consideration.

*Cal.* I entirely admit that.

*Soc.* Go back now to our former admissions.—Did you say that to hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful?

*Cal.* I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is pleasant.

*Soc.* I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not right?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And thirst, too, is painful?

*Cal.* Yes, very.

*Soc.* Need I adduce any more instances, or would you admit of all wants or desires, that they are painful?

*Cal.* That I admit, and therefore you need not adduce any more.

*Soc.* Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are thirsty, is pleasant?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word 'thirsty' implies pain?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the word 'drinking' is expressive of pleasure, and of the satisfaction of the want?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* There is pleasure in that you drink?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* When you are thirsty?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* When in pain?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Do you see the inference:—that pleasure and pain are simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same part, whether of the soul or the body; which of them is affected cannot be supposed to be of any consequence? Is that true, or not?

*Cal.* True.

*Soc.* You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at the same time?

*Cal.* Yes, I say that.

*Soc.* But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also 497 have pleasure?

*Cal.* That is evident.

*Soc.* Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant?

*Cal.* I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means.

*Soc.* You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know.

*Cal.* Well, get on, and don't be fooling: exhibit your wisdom in instructing me.

*Soc.* Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in drinking at the same time?

*Cal.* I do not understand what you are saying.

*Gor.* Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes, as we should like to hear the argument out.

*Cal.* Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions.

*Gor.* What matter? That does you no harm, Callicles; let Socrates argue in his own fashion.

*Cal.* Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these narrow and little questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them.

*Soc.* I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the great mysteries before you were initiated into the little. I thought that was not allowable. But to return to our argument:—Does not a man cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking, at the same moment?

*Cal.* True.

*Soc.* And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment?

*Cal.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as you have admitted:—do you not still admit that?

*Cal.* Yes, I do; but what is the inference?

*Soc.* Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful, for there is a cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and evil. How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in another light, which could hardly, I think, have been considered by you when you identified them: Are not the good good because they have good present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good—would you still say so?

*Cal.* Certainly I should.

*Soc.* And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing?

*Cal.* Yes, I have.

*Soc.* And a foolish man too?

*Cal.* Yes, certainly; but what is your drift?

498    *Soc.* Nothing particular, if you will only answer.

*Cal.* Yes, I have.

*Soc.* And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing?

*Cal.* Yes. •

*Soc.* Which rejoice and sorrow most—the wise or the foolish?

*Cal.* They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect.

*Soc.* Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle?

*Cal.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the coward or the brave?

*Cal.* I should say ‘most’ of both; or at any rate, they rejoiced about equally.

*Soc.* No matter; then the cowards rejoice?

*Cal.* Greatly.

*Soc.* And the foolish, as would appear?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their enemies, or are the brave also pained?

*Cal.* Both are pained.

*Soc.* And are they equally pained?

*Cal.* I should imagine that the cowards are more pained.

*Soc.* And are they not better pleased at the enemy’s departure?

*Cal.* I dare say.

*Soc.* Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave all nearly equally pleased and pained, as you were saying, but the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the cowardly are the bad?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then are the good and the bad nearly equally pleased and pained?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then are the good and bad equally good and equally bad, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? [i.e. in having more pleasure and more pain.]

*Cal.* I really do not know what you mean.

*Soc.* Why, do you not remember saying that the good were

good because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that pleasures were goods and pains evils?

*Cal.* Yes, I remember.

*Soc.* And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who rejoice—if they do rejoice?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then those who rejoice are good by reason of the presence of good?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the presence of evil?

*Cal.* I should.

*Soc.* Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure and of pain?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has more?

*Cal.* I should say that he has.

*Soc.* Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what 499 is good twice and thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we allow to be good?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the foolish man and the coward to be evil?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And he who has joy is good?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And he who is in pain is evil?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* We say further that the good and evil both have joy and pain, and, perhaps, that the evil has more of them?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad as the good, or, perhaps, even better?—is not this a further inference which follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the good and the pleasant are the same:—can this be denied, Callicles?

*Cal.* I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates; and I remark that if a person grants you anything in play, you like a child, want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do you really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some pleasures are good and others bad?

*Soc.* Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me as if I were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as if you were meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you were my friend, and would not have deceived me if you could have helped. But I see that I was mistaken; and now I suppose that I must make the best of a bad business, as they said of old, and take what I can get.—Well, then, as I understand you to say, I may assume that some pleasures are good and others evil?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil?

*Cal.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the hurtful are those which do some evil?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking, which we were just now mentioning—you mean to say that those which promote health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and their opposites evil?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil pains?

*Cal.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and pains?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But not the evil?

*Cal.* Clearly.

*Soc.* Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that

all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good ;—and will you agree with us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and that all our actions are to be done for the sake 500 of the good, and not the good for the sake of them?—will you add a third vote to our two?

*Cal.* I will.

*Soc.* Then pleasure as well as all else is for the sake of good, and not good for the sake of pleasure?

*Cal.* To be sure.

*Soc.* But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are evil, or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail?

*Cal.* He must have art.

*Soc.* Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and Polus; I was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were some processes which aim at pleasure, and at pleasure only, and know nothing of good and evil, and there are other processes which know good and evil. And I considered that cookery, which I do not call an art, but only an experience, was of the former class, which is concerned with pleasure, and that the art of medicine was of the class which is concerned with the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg you, Callicles, not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you; do not answer at random what is not your real opinion;—for you will observe that we are arguing about the way of human life; and to a man who has any sense at all, what question can be more serious than this?—whether he should follow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and act what you call the manly part of speaking in the assembly, and cultivating rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs, after your manner; or whether he should pursue the life of philosophy;—and in what the latter way of life differs from the former. But perhaps we had better distinguish them first, as I attempted to do before, and when we have come to an agreement that they are distinct, we may proceed to consider in what they differ from one another, and which of them we should choose. Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean?

*Cal.* No, I do not.

*Soc.* Then I will explain myself more clearly: seeing that you

and I have agreed that there is such a thing as good, and that there is such a thing as pleasure, and that pleasure is not the same as good, and that the pursuit and process of acquisition of the one, that is pleasure, is different from the pursuit and process of acquisition of the other, which is good—I wish that you would tell me whether you agree thus far or not?

*Cal.* Yes, I agree.

*Soc.* Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me, and whether you think that I spoke the truth when I further 501 said to Gorgias and Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience, and not an art at all; and that whereas medicine is an art, and attends to the nature and constitution of the patient, and has principles of action and reason in each case, cookery in attending upon pleasure, never regards either the nature or reason of that pleasure to which she devotes herself, nor ever considers or calculates anything, but works by experience and routine, and just preserves the recollection of what she had usually done when producing pleasure. And first, I would have you consider whether I have proved what I was saying, and then whether there are not other similar processes which have to do with the soul—some of them processes of art, making a provision for the soul's highest interest—others despising the interest, and, as in the previous case, considering only the pleasure of the soul, and how this may be acquired, but not considering what pleasures are good or bad, and having no other aim but to afford gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there are such processes, and this is the sort of thing which I term flattery, whether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed with a view to pleasure and without any consideration of good and evil. And now I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with us in this notion, or whether you differ.

*Cal.* I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for in that way I shall soonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend Gorgias.

*Soc.* And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more?

*Cal.* Equally true of two or more.

*Soc.* Then one may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no regard for their true interests?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind—or rather, if you would prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them belong to the pleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first place, what say you of flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an art which seeks only pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else?

*Cal.* I assent.

*Soc.* And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for example, the art of playing the lyre at festivals?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic poetry?—is not that of the same nature? Do you imagine that Cinesias the son of Meles cares about what will tend 502 to the moral improvement of his hearers, or about what will give pleasure to the multitude?

*Cal.* In the case of Cinesias, Socrates, the answer is manifest.

*Soc.* And what do you say of his father, Meles the harp-player? Did he perform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could he be said to regard even their pleasure? For his singing was an infliction to his audience. And of harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry in general, what would you say? Have they not been invented wholly for the sake of pleasure?

*Cal.* That is my notion of them.

*Soc.* And to what does their solemn sister, the wondrous muse of Tragedy, devote herself? Is all her aim and desire only to give pleasure to the spectators, or does she fight against them and refuse to speak of their pleasant vices, and willingly proclaim in word and song truths welcome and unwelcome?—which is her character?

*Cal.* There can be no doubt, Socrates, that Tragedy has her face turned towards pleasure and gratification.

*Soc.* And is not that the sort of thing, Callicles, which we were just now describing as flattery?

*Cal.* Quite true.

*Soc.* Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm and metre, there will remain speech?

*Cal.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric?

*Cal.* True.

*Soc.* And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be rhetoricians?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is addressed to a crowd of men, women, and children, bond and free. And this is not much to our taste, for we have described it as having the nature of flattery.

*Cal.* Quite true.

*Soc.* Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which addresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other states? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is best in their speeches, and to desire only the greatest improvement of the citizens, or are they too bent upon giving them pleasure, forgetting the public good in the thought of their own interest, playing with the people as with children, and trying to amuse them, but never considering whether they are better or worse for this?

*Cal.* I must distinguish. There are some who have a real care of the public in what they say, while others are such as you describe.

*Soc.* I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two sorts; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the other, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of the souls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best, whether welcome or unwelcome, to the audience; but have you ever known such a rhetoric; or if you have, and can point out any rhetorician who is of this stamp, will you tell me who he is?

*Cal.* But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any such among the orators who are at present living.

*Soc.* Well, then, can you mention any one of a former generation, who may be said to have improved the Athenians, who found them worse and made them better, from the day that he began to make speeches; for, indeed, I do not know of such a man?

*Cal.* What! did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man, and Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and whom you heard yourself?

*Soc.* Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at first, true virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own desire, and those of others; but if not, and if, as we were afterwards compelled to acknowledge, the satisfaction of some desires makes us better, and of others, worse, and we ought to gratify the one and not the other, and there is an art in distinguishing them,—can you tell me of any of these statesmen who did distinguish them?

*Cal.* No, indeed, I cannot.

*Soc.* Yet, surely, Callicles, if you look you will find such an one. Suppose that we just calmly consider whether any of them was such as I have described. Will not the good man, who says whatever he says with a view to the best, speak with a reference to some standard and not at random; just as all other artists, whether the painter, the builder, the shipwright, or any other look to their work, and do not select and apply at random what they apply, but keep in view the form of their work? The artist disposes all things in order, and compels the one part to harmonize and accord with the other part, until he has constructed a regular and systematic whole; and this is true of all artists, and in the same way the trainers and physicians, of whom we spoke before, give order and regularity to the body: do you deny that?

*Cal.* No; I am ready to admit that.

*Soc.* Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is good; that in which there is disorder, evil?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the same is true of a ship?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the same may be said of the human body?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And what would you say of the soul? Will the good soul be that in which disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony and order?

*Cal.* The latter follows from our previous admissions.

*Soc.* What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and order in the body?

*Cal.* I suppose that you mean health and strength?

*Soc.* Yes, I do; and what is the name which you would give to

the effect of harmony and order in the soul? Try and discover a name for this as well as for the other.

*Cal.* Why do you not give the name yourself, Socrates?

*Soc.* Well, if you would rather, I will; and you shall say whether you agree with me, and if not, you shall relate and answer me. Healthy, as I conceive, is the name which is given to the regular order of the body, whence comes health and every other bodily excellence: is that true or not?

*Cal.* True.

*Soc.* And 'lawful' and 'law' are the names which are given to the regular order and action of the soul, and these make men lawful and orderly:—and so we have temperance and justice, have we not?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And will not the true rhetorician who is honest as well as skilful have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words which he addresses to the souls of men, and in all his actions, both in what he gives and in what he takes away? Will not his aim be to implant justice in the souls of his citizens and take away injustice, to implant temperance and take away intemperance, to implant every virtue and take away every vice? Do you allow that?

*Cal.* Yes, I do.

*Soc.* For what use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body of a sick man who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the most delightful food or drink or any other pleasant thing, which may be really as bad for him as if you gave him nothing, or even ~~goes~~ worse if rightly estimated. Is not that true?

*Cal.* I will not say No to that.

*Soc.* For in my opinion there is no profit in a man's life if his body is in an evil plight—in that case his life also is evil: am I not right?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* When a man is in health the physicians will generally allow him to eat when he is hungry and drink when he is thirsty, and to satisfy his desires as he likes, but when he is sick they hardly suffer him to satisfy his desires at all: even you will admit that?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my good sir? While she is in a bad state and is senseless and intemperate and unjust and unholy, her desires ought to be controlled, and she ought to be prevented from doing anything which does not tend to her own improvement.

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And that will be for her true interests?

*Cal.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And controlling her desires is chastising her?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then control or chastisement is better for the soul than intemperance or the absence of control, which you were just now preferring?

*Cal.* I do not understand you, Socrates, and I wish that you would ask some one who does.

*Soc.* Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to be improved or corrected, as the argument would say.

*Cal.* I do not heed a word of what you are saying, and have only answered hitherto out of civility to Gorgias.

*Soc.* What are we to do, then? Shall we break off in the middle?

*Cal.* That I leave for you to determine.

*Soc.* Well, but people say that 'a tale should have a head and not break off in the middle,' and I should not like to have the argument wandering about without a head; please then to go on a little longer, and put the head on.

*Cal.* How tyrannical you are, Socrates! I wish that you and your argument would rest, or that you would get some one else to argue with you.

*Soc.* But who else is willing?—I want to finish the argument.

*Cal.* Cannot you finish without my help, either talking straight on, or questioning and answering yourself?

*Soc.* Must I then say with Epicharmus, 'two men spoke before, but now one shall be enough'? I suppose that there is absolutely no help. And if I am to carry on the enquiry by myself, I will first of all remark that not only I but all of us should have an ambition to know what is true and what is false in this matter, for the discovery of the truth is a common good. And now I will proceed to argue according to my

own notion. But if any of you think that I arrive at conclusions which are untrue you must interpose and refute me, for I do not speak from any knowledge of what I am saying; I am an enquirer like yourselves, and therefore, if my opponent says anything which is of force, I shall be the first to agree with him. I am speaking on the supposition that the argument ought to be completed; but if you think otherwise let us leave off and go our ways.

*Ger.* I think, Socrates, that we should not go our ways until you have completed the argument; and this appears to me to be the wish of the rest of the company; I myself should very much like to hear what more you have to say.

*Soc.* I too, Gorgias, should have liked to continue the argument with Callicles, and then I might have given him an 'Amphion' in return for his 'Zethus'<sup>1</sup>; but since you, Callicles, are unwilling to continue, I hope that you will listen and interrupt me if I seem to you to be in error. And if you refute me, I shall not be angry with you as you are with me, but I shall inscribe you as the greatest of benefactors on the tablets of my soul.

*Cal.* My good friend, never mind me, but get on.

*Soc.* Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument:— Is the pleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles and I are agreed about that. And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good? or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant is to be pursued for the sake of the good. And that is pleasant at the presence of which we are pleased, and that is good at the presence of which we are good? To be sure. And we are good, and all good things whatever are good when some virtue is present in us or them? That, Callicles, is my conviction. But the virtue of each thing, whether body or soul, instrument or creature, when given to them in the best way comes to them not by chance but as the result of the order and truth and art which are imparted to them: Am I not right? I maintain that I am. And is not the virtue of each thing dependent on order or arrangement? Yes, I say. And that which makes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing? That is my view.

<sup>1</sup> p. 485.

And is not the soul which has an order of her own better than that which has no order of her own? Certainly. And the soul which has order is orderly? Of course. And that which 507 is orderly is temperate? Assuredly. And the temperate soul is good? No other answer can I give, Callicles dear; have you any?

*Cal.* Go on, my good fellow.

*Soc.* Then I shall proceed to add, that if the temperate soul is the good soul, the soul which is in the opposite condition, that is, the foolish and intemperate, is the bad soul. Very true.

And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation to the gods and to men;—for he would not be temperate if he did not? Certainly he will do what is proper. In his relation to other men he will do what is just; and in his relation to the gods he will do what is holy; and he who does what is just and holy cannot be other than just and holy? Very true. And he must be courageous, for the duty of a temperate man is not to follow or to avoid what he ought not, but what he ought, whether things or men or pleasures or pains, and patiently to endure when he ought; and therefore, Callicles, the temperate man, being, as we have described, also just and courageous and holy, cannot be other than a perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise than well and perfectly whatever he does; and he who does well must of necessity be happy and blessed, and the evil man who does evil, miserable: now this latter is he whom you were applauding—the intemperate who is the opposite of the temperate. Such is my position which I assert to be true, and if I am right, then I affirm that he who desires to be happy must pursue and practise temperance and run away from intemperance as fast as his legs will carry him: he had better order his life so as not to need punishment; but if either he or any of his friends, whether private individual or city, are in need of punishment, then justice must be done and he must suffer punishment, if he would be happy. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought to have, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies both of himself and of the state, acting so that he may have temperance and justice present with him and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be

unrestrained, and in the never-ending desire to satisfy them leading a robber's life. Such an one is the friend neither of God nor man, for he is incapable of communion, and he who is incapable of communion is also incapable of friendship. And philosophers tell us, Callicles, that communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind together heaven 508 and earth and gods and men, and that this universe is therefore called *Cosmos* or order, not disorder or misrule, my friend. But although you are a philosopher you seem to me never to have observed that geometrical equality is mighty, both among gods and men; you think that you ought to cultivate inequality or excess, and do not care about geometry.—Well, then, either the principle that the happy are made happy by the possession of justice and temperance, and the miserable miserable by the possession of vice, must be refuted, or, if it is granted, what will be the consequences? All the consequences which I drew before, Callicles, and about which you asked me whether I was in earnest when I said that a man ought to accuse himself and his son and his friend if he did anything wrong, and that to this end he should use his rhetoric—all those consequences are true. And that which you thought that Polus was led to admit out of modesty is true, viz. that, to do injustice, if more disgraceful than to suffer, is in that degree worse; and the other position, which, according to Polus, Gorgias admitted out of modesty, that he who would truly be a rhetorician ought to be just and have a knowledge of justice, has also turned out to be true. And now, let us proceed in the next place to consider whether you are right in throwing in my my teeth that I am unable to help myself or any of my friends or kinsmen, or to save them in the extremity of danger, or that I am like an outlaw to whom any one may do what he likes,—he may box my ears, which was a brave saying of yours; or he may take away my goods or banish me, or even do his worst and kill me; and this, as you say, is the height of disgrace. My answer to you is one which has been already often repeated, but may as well be repeated once more. I tell you, Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears wrongfully is not the worst evil which can befall a man, nor to have my face and purse cut open, but that to smite and slay me and mine wrong-

fully is far more disgraceful and more evil; aye, and to despoil and enslave and pillage, or in any way at all to wrong me and mine, is far more disgraceful and evil to the doer of the wrong than to me who am the sufferer. These truths, which have 509 been already set forth as I state them in the previous discussion, would seem now, if I may use an expression which is certainly bold, to have been fixed and riveted by us, in iron and adamantine bonds; and unless you or some other still more enterprising hero shall break them, there is no possibility of denying what I say. For what I am always saying is, that I know not the truth about these things, and yet that I have never known anybody who could say anything else, any more than you can, and not be ridiculous. This has always been my position, and if this position is a true one, and if injustice is the greatest of evils, to the doer of injustice, and yet there is if possible a greater than the greatest evils, in an unjust man not suffering retribution, what is that defence without which a man will be truly ridiculous? Must not the defence be one which will avert the greatest of human evils? And will not the worst of all defences be that with which a man is unable to defend himself or his family or his friends?—and next will come that which is unable to avert the next greatest evil; thirdly that which is unable to avert the third greatest evil; and so of other evils. As is the greatness of evil so is the honour of being able to avert them in their several degrees, and the disgrace of not being able to avert them. Am I not right, Callicles?

*Cal.* Yes, quite right.

*Soc.* Seeing then that there are these two evils, the doing injustice and the suffering injustice—and we affirm that to do injustice is a greater, and to suffer injustice a lesser evil—how can a man succeed in obtaining the two advantages, the one of not doing and the other of not suffering injustice? must he have the power, or only the will to obtain them? I mean to ask whether a man will escape injustice if he has only the will to escape, or must he have provided himself with the power?

*Cal.* He must have provided himself with the power; that is clear.

*Soc.* And what do you say of doing injustice? Is the will

only sufficient, and will that prevent him from doing injustice, or must he have provided himself with power and art; and if he have not studied and practised, will he be unjust still? Surely you might say, Callicles, whether you think that Polus and I were right in admitting the conclusion that no one does wrong voluntarily, but that all do wrong against their will?

*Cal.* Granted, Socrates, if you will only have done. 510

*Soc.* Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in order that we may do no injustice?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And what is that art which will protect us from suffering injustice, if not wholly, yet as far as possible? I want to know whether you agree with me; for I think that such an art is the art of one who is either a tyrant or ruler himself, or the equal and companion of the ruling power.

*Cal.* Well said, Socrates; I hope that you will observe how ready I am to praise you when you talk sense.

*Soc.* Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view of mine; To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who is most like him—like to like, as ancient sages say. What do you think of that?

*Cal.* I approve.

*Soc.* But when the tyrant is rude and uneducated, if there is any one who is his superior in virtue, he may be expected to fear him, and will never be able to be perfectly friendly with him.

*Cal.* That is true.

*Soc.* Neither will he be the friend of any one who is greatly his inferior, for the tyrant will despise him, and will never seriously regard him as a friend.

*Cal.* That again is true.

*Soc.* Then the only friend worth mentioning, whom the tyrant can have, will be one who is of the same character, and has the same likes and dislikes, and is at the same time willing to be subject and subservient to him; he is the man who will have power in the state, and no one will injure him with impunity:—is that true?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if a young man begins to ask how he may be-

come great and formidable, this would seem to be the way; he will accustom himself, from his youth upward, to feel sorrow and joy on the same occasions as his master, and will contrive to be as like him as possible?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And in this way he will have accomplished, as you say, the end of becoming a great man and not suffering injury?

*Cal.* Very true.

*Soc.* But will he also escape from doing injury? Must not the very opposite be true, if he is to be like the tyrant in his 511 injustice, and to have influence with him? Will he not rather contrive to do as much wrong as possible, and not be punished?

*Cal.* True.

*Soc.* And as he imitates his master and acquires power his soul will become bad and corrupted, and that will be the greatest evil to him?

*Cal.* You always contrive somehow or other, Socrates, to invert everything: do you not know that he who imitates the tyrant will, if he has a mind, kill him who does not imitate him and take away his goods?

*Soc.* Excellent Callicles, I am not deaf, and I have heard that a great many times from you and from Polus and from nearly every man in the city, but I wish that you would hear me too. I dare say that he will kill him if he has a mind—the bad man will kill the good and true.

*Cal.* And is not that just the provoking thing?

*Soc.* Nay, not to a man of sense, as the argument shows: do you think that all our cares are to be directed to prolonging life to the uttermost, and to the study of those arts which secure us from danger always; like that art of rhetoric which saves men in courts of law, and which you recommend me to cultivate?

*Cal.* Yes, truly, and very good advice too.

*Soc.* Well, my friend, but what do you think of swimming; is that an art of any great pretensions?

*Cal.* No, indeed.

*Soc.* And yet surely swimming saves a man from death, and there are occasions on which he must know how to swim. And if you despise the swimmers, I will tell you of another and greater art, the art of the pilot, which not only saves the souls

of men, but also their bodies and properties from the extremity of danger, just like rhetoric. But the pilot's art is modest and un-presuming, and has no airs or pretences of doing anything extraordinary, and in return for the same salvation which is given by the pleader, demands only two obols, if he brings us from Aegina to Athens, or for the longer voyage from Pontus or Egypt at the utmost two drachmae, in return for the great benefit of saving the passenger and his wife and children and goods, and disembarking them safely at the Piraeus; and he who is the master of the art, and has done all this, gets oet and walks about on the sea-shore by his ship in an unassuming way. For he is a philosopher, you must know, and is aware that there is no certainty as to which of his fellow-passengers he has benefited, and which of them he has injured in not allowing them to be drowned. He knows that they are just the same when he has disembarked them as when they embarked, and not a whit better either in 512 their bodies or in their souls: and he considers that if a man who is afflicted by great and incurable bodily diseases is only to be pitied for having escaped, and is in no way benefited by him in having been kept alive, much less can he have benefited one who has great and incurable diseases, not of the body, but of the soul, which is the more valuable part of him; neither is life worth having nor of any profit to the bad man, whether he be saved from the sea, or the law-courts, or any other devourer;—of him he knows that he had better not live, for he cannot live well.

And this is the reason why the pilot, although he is our saviour, is not usually conceited, any more than the engineer, who is not at all behind either the general, or the pilot, or any one else, in his saving power, for he sometimes saves whole cities. Is there any comparison between him and the pleader? And if he were to talk, Callicles, in your grandiose style, he would bury you under a mountain of words, declaring and insisting that we ought all of us to be engine-makers, and that they are the only realities: he would have plenty to say. Nevertheless you despise him and his art, and sneeringly call him an engine-maker, and you will not allow your daughters to marry his son, or marry your son to his daughters. And yet, on your principle, what justice or reason is there in your refusal? What right have you to despise the engine-maker, and the other whom I was just

now mentioning? I know that you will say, 'I am better, and better born.' But if the better is not what I say, and virtue consists only in a man saving himself and his, whatever may be his character, then your censure of the engine-maker, and of the physician, and of the other arts of salvation, is ridiculous. O my friend! I want you to see that the noble and the good may possibly be something different from saving and being saved, and that he who is truly a man ought not to care about living a certain time:—he knows, as women say, that we must all die, and therefore he is not fond of life; he leaves all that with God, and considers in what way he can best spend his appointed term;—whether by assimilating himself to that constitution  
513 under which he lives, as you at this moment have to consider how you may become as like as possible to the Athenian people, if you intend to be dear to them, and to have power in the state; whereas I want you to think and see whether this is for the interest of either of us;—I would not have us risk that which is dearest on the acquisition of this power, like the Thessalian enchantresses, who, as they say, bring down the moon from heaven at the risk of their own perdition. But if you suppose that any man will show you the art of becoming great in the city, and yet not conforming yourself to the ways of the city, whether for better or worse, then I can only say that you are mistaken, Callicles; for he who would deserve to be the true natural friend of the Athenian Demus, aye, or of Pyrilampes' darling, who is called after them, must be by nature like them, and not an imitator only. He, then, who will make you most like them, will make you as you desire, a statesman and orator: for every man is pleased when he is spoken to in his own language and spirit, and dislikes any other. But perhaps you, sweet Callicles, may be of another mind. What do you say?

*Cal.* Somehow or other your words, Socrates, always appear to me to be good words; and yet, like the rest of the world, I am not quite convinced by you.

*Soc.* The reason is, Callicles, that the love of Demus which abides in your soul is an adversary to me; but I dare say that if we recur to these same matters, and consider them more thoroughly, you may be convinced for all that. Please, then, to remember that there are two processes of training all things,

including body and soul; in the one, as we said, we treat them with a view to pleasure, and in the other with a view to the highest good, and then we do not indulge but resist them: was not that the distinction which we drew?

*Cal.* Very true.

*Soc.* And the one which had pleasure in view was just a vulgar flattery:—was not that another of our conclusions?

*Cal.* I will not deny what you say.

*Soc.* And the other had in view the greatest improvement of that which was ministered to, whether body or soul?

*Cal.* Quite true.

*Soc.* And must we not have the same end in view in the treatment of our city and citizens? Must we not try and make them as good as possible? For we have already discovered that there is no use in imparting to them any other good, unless the mind of those who are to have the good, whether money, or office, or any other sort of power, be gentle and good. Shall we say that?

*Cal.* Yes, certainly, if you like.

*Soc.* Well, then, if you and I, Callicles, were engaged in the administration of political affairs, and were advising one another about some public work, such as walls, docks or temples of the largest size, ought we not to examine ourselves, first, as to whether we knew or do not know the art of building, and who taught us?—would not that be necessary, Callicles?

*Cal.* True.

*Soc.* In the second place, we should have to consider whether we had ever constructed any private house, either of our own or for our friends, and whether this building of ours was a success or not; and if upon consideration we found that we had had good and eminent masters, and had been successful in building, not only with their assistance, but without them, by our own unaided skill—in that case prudence would not dissuade us from proceeding to the construction of public works. But if we had no master to shew, and only a number of worthless buildings or none at all, then, surely, it would be ridiculous in us to attempt public works, or to advise one another to undertake them. Is not this true?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And does not the same hold in all other cases? If you and I were physicians, and were advising one another that we were competent to practise as state-physicians, should I not ask you, and would you not ask me, Well, but how about Socrates himself, has he good health? and was any one else ever known to be cured by him, whether slave or freeman? And I should make the same enquiries about you. And if we arrived at the conclusion that no one, whether citizen or stranger, man or woman, had ever been any the better for the medical skill of either of us, then, by Heaven, Callicles, what an absurdity to think that we or any human being should be so silly as to set up as a state-physician, and advise others like ourselves to do the same, without having first practised in private, whether successfully or not, and acquired experience of the art. Is not this, as they say, to begin with the big jar when you are learning the potter's art; which is a foolish thing?

515     *Cal.* True.

*Soc.* And now, my friend, as you are already beginning to be a public character, and are admonishing and reproaching me for not being one, suppose that we ask a few questions of one another. Tell me, then, Callicles, how about making any of the citizens better? Was there ever a man who was once vicious, or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and became by the help of Callicles good and noble? Was there ever such a man, whether citizen or stranger, slave or freeman? Tell me, Callicles, if a person were to ask these questions of you, what would you answer? Whom would you say that you had improved by your conversation? There may have been good deeds of this sort which were done by you as a private person, before you came forward in public. Why will you not answer?

*Cal.* You are contentious, Socrates.

*Soc.* Nay, I ask you, not from a love of contention, but because I really want to know in what way you think that affairs should be administered among us—whether, when you come to the administration of them, you have any other aim but the improvement of the citizens? Have we not already admitted many times over that such is the duty of a public man? Nay, we have surely said so; for if you will not answer for yourself I must answer for you. But if this is what the good man ought to effect

for the benefit of his own state, allow me to recall to you the names of those whom you were just now mentioning, Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles, and ask whether you still think that they were good citizens.

*Cal.* I do.

*Soc.* But if they were good, then clearly each of them must have made the citizens better instead of worse?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And, therefore, when Pericles first began to speak in the assembly, the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last?

*Cal.* Very likely.

*Soc.* Nay, my friend, 'likely' is not the word; for if he was a good citizen, the inference is certain.

*Cal.* And what difference does that make?

*Soc.* None: only I should like further to know whether the Athenians are supposed to have been made better by Pericles, or, on the contrary, to have been corrupted by him; for I hear that he was the first who gave the people pay, and made them idle and cowardly, and encouraged them in the love of talk and of money.

*Cal.* You heard that, Socrates, from the laconising set who bruise their ears.

*Soc.* But what I am going to tell you now is not mere hearsay, but well known both to you and me: that at first, Pericles was glorious and his character unimpeached by any verdict of the Athenians—this was during the time when they were not so <sup>516</sup> good—yet afterwards, when they had been made good and gentle by him, at the very end of his life they convicted him of theft, and almost put him to death, clearly under the notion that he was a malefactor.

*Cal.* Well, but how does that prove Pericles' badness?

*Soc.* Why, surely, you would say that he was a bad manager of asses or horses or oxen, who had received them originally neither kicking nor butting nor biting him, and imparted to them all these savage tricks? Would he not be a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle, and made them fiercer than they were when he received them? What do you say to that?

*Cal.* I will do you the favour of saying ‘yes.’

*Soc.* And will you also do me the favour of saying whether man is an animal?

*Cal.* Certainly he is.

*Soc.* And was not Pericles a shepherd of men?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if he was a good political shepherd, ought not the animals who were under him, as we were just now acknowledging, to have become more just, and not more unjust?

*Cal.* Quite true.

*Soc.* And are not just men gentle, as Homer says?—or are you of another mind?

*Cal.* I agree.

*Soc.* And yet he really did make them more savage than he received them, and their savageness was shown towards himself; which he must have been very far from desiring.

*Cal.* Do you want me to agree with you?

*Soc.* Yes, if I seem to you to speak the truth.

*Cal.* I grant what you say.

*Soc.* And if they were more savage, must they not have been more unjust and inferior?

*Cal.* Granted.

*Soc.* Then upon this view, Pericles was not a good statesman?

*Cal.* That is, upon your view.

*Soc.* Nay, the view is yours, after what you have admitted. Take the case of Cimon again. Did not the very persons whom he was serving ostracise him, in order that they might not hear his voice for ten years; and they did just the same to Themistocles, adding the penalty of exile; and they voted that Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, should be thrown into the pit of death, and he was only saved by the chief Prytanis. And yet, if they had been really good men, as you say, these things would never have happened to them. For the good charioteers are not those who at first keep their place, and then, when they have broken-in their horses, and themselves become better charioteers, are thrown out—that is not the way either in charioteering or in any other sort of occupation.—What do you think?

*Cal.* I should think not.

*Soc.* Well, but if so, the truth is as I said, that in the Athenian State no one has ever shown himself a good statesman; and you admitted that this was true of our present statesmen, but not true of former ones, and you preferred them to the others; yet they have turned out to be no better than our present ones: and therefore, if they were rhetoricians, they did not use the true art of rhetoric or of flattery, or they would not have fallen out of favour.

*Cal.* But surely, Socrates, no living man ever came near any one of them in his performances.

*Soc.* O, my dear friend, I say nothing against them regarded as the serving men of the State; and I do think that they were certainly better servants than those who are living now, and better able to gratify the desires of the State; but as to transforming those desires and not allowing them to have their way, and using the powers which they had, whether of persuasion or of force, in the improvement of their fellow-citizens, which is the prime object of the truly good citizen, I do not see that in these respects they were a whit superior to our present statesmen, although I do admit that they were more skilful at providing ships and walls and docks, and all that. You and I have a ridiculous way, for during the whole time that we are arguing, we are always going round and round to the same point, and constantly misunderstanding one another. If I am not mistaken, you have admitted and acknowledged more than once, that there are two kinds of operations which have to do with the body, and two which have to do with the soul: one of the two is ministerial, and if our bodies are hungry provides food for them, and if they are thirsty gives them drink, or if they are cold supplies them with garments, blankets, shoes, and all that they crave. I use the same images as before intentionally, in order that you may understand me the better. The purveyor of the articles may provide them either wholesale or retail, or he may be the maker of any of them,—the baker, or the cook, or the weaver, or the shoemaker, or the currier; and in so doing he is naturally supposed by himself and every one to minister to the body. For none of them know that there is another art—an art of gymnastic and medi-

cine which is the true minister of the body, and ought to be the mistress of all the others, and to use their results according to the knowledge which she has and they have not, of the real  
518 good or bad effects of meats and drinks on the body. All other arts which have to do with the body are servile and menial and illiberal; and gymnastic and medicine are, as they ought to be, their mistresses. Now, when I say that all this is equally true of the soul, you seem at first to know and understand and assent to my words, and then a little while afterwards you come repeating, Has not the State had good and noble citizens? and when I ask you who they are, you reply, seemingly quite in earnest, as if I had asked, Who are or have been good trainers?—and you replied, Thearion, the baker, Mithoccus, who wrote the Sicilian cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner: these are ministers of the body, first-rate in their art; for the first makes admirable loaves, the second excellent dishes, and the third capital wine;—to me these appear to be the exact parallel of the statesmen whom you mention. And yet you would not be altogether pleased if I said to you, My friend, you know nothing of gymnastics; those of whom you are speaking to me are only the ministers and purveyors of luxury, who have no good or noble notions of their art, and may very likely be filling and fattening men's bodies and gaining their approval, although the result is that they lose their original flesh in the long run, and become thinner than they were before; and yet they, in their simplicity, will not attribute their diseases and loss of flesh to their entertainers; but when in after years the unhealthy surfeit brings the attendant penalty of disease, he who happens to be near them at the time, and offers them advice, is accused and blamed by them, and if they could they would do him some harm; while they praise those who are the real authors of the mischief. That, I repeat, Callicles, is just what you are now doing. You praise the men who feasted the citizens and satisfied their desires, and people say that they have made the city great, not seeing that the ulcerated and swollen condition of the State is to be attributed to these elder statesmen; for they have filled the city full of harbours and docks and walls and revenues and all that, and have left no room for justice

and temperance. And when the crisis of the disorder comes,<sup>519</sup> the people will blame the advisers of the hour, and applaud Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, who are the real authors of their calamities ; and if you are not careful they may assail you and my friend Alcibiades, when they are losing not only their new acquisitions, but also their original possessions ; not that you are the authors of these calamities of theirs, although you may perhaps be accessories after the fact. A foolish piece of work is always being made, as I see and am told, now as of old, about our statesmen. When the State treats any of them as malefactors, I observe that there is a great uproar and indignation at the supposed ill behaviour to them ; ‘after all their valuable services, that they should unjustly perish,’—so the tale runs. But the cry is all a lie ; for no statesman ever could be unjustly put to death by the city of which he is the head. The case of the professed statesman is, I believe, very much like that of the professed sophist ; for the sophists, although they are wise men, are nevertheless guilty of a strange piece of folly ; professing to be teachers of virtue, they will often accuse their disciples of wronging them, and defrauding them of their pay, and showing no gratitude for their services. Yet what can be more absurd than that men who have become just and good, and whose injustice has been taken away from them, and who have had justice imparted to them by their teachers, should act unjustly by reason of the injustice which is not in them ? Can anything be more irrational, my friend, than this ? You, Callicles, compel me to be a claptrap speaker, because you will not answer.

*Cal.* And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is some one to answer ?

*Soc.* I suppose that I can ; at any rate, I am making long speeches now because you refuse to answer me. But I adjure you by the god of friendship, my good sir, do tell me whether there is not a great inconsistency in professing to have made a man good, and then blaming him for being bad ?

*Cal.* Yes, I acknowledge that.

*Soc.* Do you never hear our professors of education speak-<sup>520</sup> ing in this inconsistent manner ?

*Cal.* Yes, but why talk of men who are good for nothing ?

*Soc.* I would rather say, why talk of men who profess to be rulers, and declare that they are devoted to the improvement of the city, and nevertheless upon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of the city :—do you think that there is any difference between one and the other? My good friend, the sophist and the rhetorician, as I was saying to Polus, are the same, or nearly the same; but you ignorantly fancy that rhetoric is a perfect thing, and sophistry a thing to be despised; whereas the truth is, that sophistry is as much superior to rhetoric as legislation is to the practice of law, or gymnastic to medicine: the orators and sophists, as I am inclined to think, are the only class who cannot complain of the mischief ensuing to themselves from that which they teach others, without accusing themselves in the same breath of having done no good to those whom they profess to benefit. Is not that true?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* If they are right in saying that they make men better than they are the only class who can afford to leave their remuneration to those who have been benefited by them: whereas if a man has been benefited in any other way, if, for example, he has been taught to run by a trainer, he might possibly defraud him of his pay, if the trainer left the matter to him, and made no agreement with him that he should receive money as soon as he had given him the utmost speed; for not because of any deficiency of speed do men act unjustly, but by reason of injustice.

*Cal.* Very true.

*Soc.* But he who removes injustice can be in no danger of being treated unjustly: he alone can safely leave this question of payment to his pupils, if he be really able to make them good—am I not right?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then we have found the reason why there is no dis-honour in a man receiving pay who is called in to advise about building or any other art?

*Cal.* Yes, we have found the reason.

*Soc.* But when the point is, how a man may become best himself, and best govern his family and state, then to say that you will give no advice gratis is held to be dishonourable?

*Cal.* True.

*Soc.* And why? Because only such benefits call forth a desire to requite them, and there is evidence that a benefit has been conferred when the benefactor receives a return; otherwise not. Is not that true?

*Cal.* Yes, that is true.

*Soc.* Then to which service of the State do you invite me? determine that for me. Am I to be the physician of the State 521 who will strive and struggle to make the Athenians as good as possible; or am I to be the servant and flatterer of the State? Speak out, my good friend, freely and fairly as you did at first and ought to do again, and tell me your entire mind.

*Cal.* I say then that you should be the servant of the State.

*Soc.* The flatterer? well, sir, that is a noble invitation.

*Cal.* The Mysian, Socrates, or what you please. For if you refuse, the consequences will be—

*Soc.* Do not repeat the old story—that he who likes will kill me and get my money; for then I shall have to repeat the old answer, that he will be a bad man and will kill the good, and that the money will be of no use to him, but that he will wrongly use that which he wrongly took, and if wrongly, basely, and if basely, hurtfully.

*Cal.* How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never come to harm! you seem to think that you are living in another country, and can never be brought into a court of justice, as you very likely may be brought by some miserable and mean person.

*Soc.* Then I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if I do not know that in the Athenian State any man may suffer anything. And if I am brought to trial and incur the dangers of which you speak, he will be a villain who brings me to trial—of that I am very sure, for no good man would accuse the innocent. Nor shall I be surprised if I am put to death. Shall I tell you why I anticipate this?

*Cal.* By all means.

*Soc.* I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian living who practises the true art of politics; I am the only politician of my time. Now, seeing that when I speak I speak

not with any view of pleasing, and that I look to what is best and not to what is most pleasant, having no mind to use those arts and graces which you recommend, I shall have nothing to say in the justice court. And you might argue with me, as I was arguing with Polus:—I shall be tried just as a physician would be tried in a court of little boys at the indictment of the cook. What would he reply in such a case, if some one were to accuse him, saying, ‘O my boys, many evil things has this man done to you: he is the death of you, especially of the younger ones among you, cutting and burning and §22 starving and suffocating you, until you know not what to do; he gives you the bitterest potions, and compels you to hunger and thirst. How unlike the variety of meats and sweets on which I feasted you!’ What do you suppose that the physician would reply when he found himself in such a predicament? If he told the truth he could only say: ‘All this, my boys, I did for your health,’ and then would there not just be a clamour among a jury like that? How they would cry out!

*Cal.* I dare say.

*Soc.* Would he not be utterly at a loss for a reply?

*Cal.* He certainly would.

*Soc.* And I too shall be treated in the same way, as I well know, if I am brought before the court. For I shall not be able to rehearse to the people the pleasures which I have procured for them, and which, although I am not disposed to envy either the procurers or enjoyers of them, are deemed by them to be benefits and advantages. And if any one says that I corrupt young men, and perplex their minds, or that I speak evil of old men, and use bitter words towards them, whether in private or public, it is useless for me to reply, as I truly might:—‘All this I do for the sake of justice, and with a view to your interest, my judges, and of that only.’ And therefore there is no saying what may happen to me.

*Cal.* And do you think, Socrates, that a man who is thus defenceless is in a good position?

*Soc.* Yes, Callicles, if he have that defence, which you have often admitted that he should have; if he be his own defence, and have never said or done anything wrong, either in respect of gods or men; for that has often been acknowledged by us to

be the best sort of defence. And if any one could convict me of inability to defend myself or others after this sort, I should blush for shame, whether I was convicted before many, or before a few, or by myself alone ; and if I died for want of ability to do so, that would indeed grieve me. But if I died because I have no powers of flattery or rhetoric, I am very sure that you would not find me repining at death. For no man but an utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is afraid of doing wrong. For to go to the world below having one's soul full of injustice is the last and worst of all evils. And in proof of what I say, if you have no objection, I should like to tell you a story.

*Cal.* Very well, proceed ; and then we shall have done.

*Soc.* Listen, then, as story-tellers say, to a very pretty tale, 523 which I dare say that you may be disposed to regard as a fable only, but which, as I believe, is a true tale, for I mean to speak the truth. Homer tells us<sup>1</sup>, how Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided the empire which they inherited from their father. Now in the days of Cronos there existed a law respecting the destiny of man, which has always been, and still continues to be in Heaven, —that he who has lived all his life in justice and holiness shall go, when he dies, to the Islands of the Blessed, and dwell there in perfect happiness out of the reach of evil ; but that he who has lived unjustly and impiously shall go the house of vengeance and punishment, which is called Tartarus. And in the time of Cronos, and even later in the reign of Zeus, the judgment was given on the very day on which the men were to die ; the judges were alive, and the men were alive ; and the consequence was that the judgments were not well given. Then Pluto and the authorities from the Islands of the Blessed came to Zeus, and said that the souls found their way to the wrong places. Zeus said : ‘I shall put a stop to this ; the judgments are not well given, and the reason is that the judged have their clothes on, for they are alive ; and there are many having evil souls who are apparelled in fair bodies, or wrapt in wealth or rank, and when the day of judgment arrives many witnesses come forward and witness on their behalf that they have lived righteously. The judges are awed by them, and they themselves too have their clothes on

<sup>1</sup> Il. xv. 187, foll.

when judging ; their eyes and ears and their whole bodies are interposed as a veil before their own souls. All this is a hindrance to them ; there are the clothes of the judges and the clothes of the judged.—What is to be done ? I will tell you :—In the first place, I will deprive men of the foreknowledge of death, which they at present possess ; that is a commission, of which I have already entrusted the execution to Prometheus : in the second place, they shall be entirely stripped before they are judged, for they shall be judged when they are dead ; and the judge too shall be naked, that is to say, dead : he with his naked soul shall pierce into the other naked soul, and they shall die suddenly and be deprived of all their kindred, and leave their brave attire strewn upon the earth ; conducted in this manner, the judgment will be just. I knew all about the matter before you did, and therefore I have made my sons judges ; two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and one from Europe, Aeacus. And these, 524 when they are dead, shall give judgment in the meadow at the place where the three ways meet, out of which the two roads lead, one to the Islands of the Blessed, and the other to Tartarus. Rhadamanthus shall judge those who come from Asia, and Aeacus those who come from Europe. And to Minos I shall give the primacy, and he shall hold a court of appeal, in case either of the two others are in any doubt :—then the judgment respecting the last journey of men will be as just as possible.'

From this tale, Callicles, which I have heard and believe, I draw the following inferences :—Death, if I am right, is in the first place the separation from one another of two things, soul and body ; nothing else. And after they are separated they retain their several characteristics, which are much the same as in life ; the body has the same nature and ways and affections, all clearly discernible ; for example, he who by nature or training or both, was a tall man while he was alive, will remain as he was, after he is dead ; and the fat man will remain fat ; and so on ; and the dead man, who in life had a fancy to have flowing hair, will have flowing hair. And if he was marked with the whip and had the prints of the scourge, or of wounds in him when he was alive, you might see the same in the dead body ; and if his limbs were broken or misshapen when he was alive, the same appearance would be visible in the dead. And in a

word, whatever was the habit of the body during life would be distinguishable after death, either perfectly, or in a great measure and for a considerable time. And I should imagine that this is equally true of the soul, Callicles; when a man is stripped of the body, all the natural or acquired affections of the soul are laid open to view.—And when they come to the judge, as those from Asia come to Rhadamanthus, he places them near him and inspects them quite impartially, not knowing whose the soul is: perhaps he may lay hands on the soul of the great king, or of some other king or potentate, who has no soundness in him, but his soul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints and scars of perjuries and crimes with which each action has stained him, and he is all crooked with falsehood and imposture, and 525 has no straightness, because he has lived without truth. Him Rhadamanthus beholds, full of all deformity and disproportion, which is caused by licence and luxury and insolence and incontinence, and despatches him ignominiously to his prison, and there he undergoes the punishment which he deserves.

Now the proper office of punishment is twofold: he who is rightly punished ought either to become better and profit by it, or he ought to be made an example to his fellows, that they may see what he suffers, and fear and become better. Those who are improved when they are punished by gods and men, are those whose sins are curable; and they are improved, as in this world so also in another, by pain and suffering; for there is no other way in which they can be delivered from their evil. But they who have been guilty of the worst crimes, and are incurable by reason of their crimes, are made examples; for, as they are incurable, the time has passed at which they can receive any benefit themselves. But others get good when they behold them for ever enduring the most terrible and painful and fearful sufferings as the penalty of their sins—there they are, hanging up as examples, in the prison-house of the world below, a spectacle and a warning to all unrighteous men who come thither. And among them, as I confidently affirm, will be found Archelaus, if Polus truly reports of him, and any other tyrant who is like him. Of these fearful examples, most, as I believe, are taken from the class of tyrants and kings and potentates and public men, for they are the authors of the greatest and most

impious crimes, because they have the power. And Homer witnesses to the truth of this; for they are always kings and potentates whom he has described as suffering everlasting punishment in the world below: such were Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus. But no one ever described Thersites, or any private person who was a villain, as suffering everlasting punishment, or as incurable. For to commit the worst crimes, as I am inclined to think, was not in his power, and he was happier than those  
526 who had the power. Yes, Callicles, the very bad men come from the class of those who have power. And yet in that very class there may arise good men, and worthy of all admiration they are, for where there is great power to do wrong, to live and to die justly is a hard thing, and greatly to be praised, and few there are who attain to this. Such good and true men, however, there have been, and will be again, at Athens and in other states, who have fulfilled their trust righteously; and there is one who is quite famous all over Hellas, Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus. But, in general, great men are also bad, my friend.

As I was saying, Rhadamanthus, when he gets a soul of the bad kind, knows nothing about him, neither who he is, nor who his parents are; he knows only that he has got hold of a villain; and seeing this, he stamps him as curable or incurable, and sends him away to Tartarus, whither he goes and receives his recompense. Or, again, he looks with admiration on the soul of some just one who has lived in holiness and truth; he may have been a private man or not; and I should say, Callicles, that he is most likely to have been a philosopher who has done his own work, and not troubled himself with the doings of other men in his lifetime; him Rhadamanthus sends to the Islands of the Blessed. Aeacus does the same; and they both have sceptres, and judge; but Minos alone has a golden sceptre and is seated looking on, as Odysseus in Homer declares that he saw him:

‘Holding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.’

Now I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of these things, and I consider how I shall present my soul whole and undefiled before the judge in that day. Renouncing the honours at which the world aims, I desire only to know the truth, and to live as

well as I can, and, when the time comes, to die. And, to the utmost of my power, I exhort all other men to do the same. And, in return for your exhortation of me, I exhort you also to take part in the great combat, which is the combat of life, and greater than every other earthly conflict. And I retort your reproach of me, and say, that you will not be able to help yourself when the day of trial and judgment, of which I was speaking, comes upon you ; you will go before the judge, the son of <sup>527</sup> Aegina, and when you are in the hands of justice you will gape and your head will swim round, just as mine would in the courts of this world, and very likely some one will shamefully box you on the ears, and put upon you every sort of insult.

Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife's tale, which you will contemn. And there might be reason in your contemning such tales, if by searching we could find out anything better or truer : but now you see that you and Polus and Gorgias, who are the three wisest of the Greeks of our day, are not able to show that we ought to live any life which does not profit in another world as well as in this. And of all that has been said, nothing remains unshaken but the saying, that to do injustice is more to be avoided than to suffer injustice, and that the reality and not the appearance of virtue is to be followed above all things, as well in public as in private life ; and that when any one has been wrong in anything, he is to be chastised, and that the next best thing to a man being just is that he should become just, and be chastised and punished ; also that he should avoid all flattery of himself as well as of others ;—of the few as of the many : and rhetoric and any other art should be used by him, and all his actions should be done, always with a view to justice.

Follow me then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in life and after death, as your own argument shows. And never mind if some one despises you as a fool, and insults you, if he has a mind ; let him strike you, by Zeus, and do you be of good cheer and do not mind the insulting blow, for you will never come to any harm in the practice of virtue, if you are a really good and true man. When we have practised virtue together, we will apply ourselves to politics, if that seems desirable, or we will advise about whatever else may seem good to

us, for we shall be better able to judge then. In our present condition we ought not to give ourselves airs, for even on the most important subjects we are always changing our minds ; and what a state of education does that imply ! Let us, then, take the argument as our guide, which has revealed to us that the best way of life is to practise justice and every virtue in life and death. This way let us go ; and in this exhort all men to follow, not in the way in which you trust and in which you exhort me to follow you ; for that way, Callicles, is nothing worth.



## APPENDIX.



## A P P E N D I X.

It seems impossible to separate by any exact line the genuine writings of Plato from the spurious. The only external evidence to them which is of much value is that of Aristotle; for the Alexandrian catalogues of a century later include manifest forgeries. And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato, and some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they are taken. Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particular author, general considerations which equally affect all evidence to the genuineness of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works are more likely to have been forged, or to have received an erroneous designation, than longer ones; and some kinds of composition, such as epistles or panegyrical orations, are more liable to suspicion than others; those, again, which have a taste of sophistry in them, or the ring of a later age, or the slighter character of a rhetorical exercise, or in which a motive or some affinity to spurious writings can be detected, or which seem to have originated in a name or statement really occurring in some classical author, are also of doubtful credit; while, perhaps, there is no instance of any ancient writing proved to be a forgery, which combines great excellence with considerable length. A really great writer would have no object in fathering his works on Plato; and to the forger or imitator, the ‘literary hack’ of Alexandria and Athens, the Gods did not grant original genius. Further, in attempting to balance the evidence for and against a Platonic dialogue, we must not forget that the form of the Platonic writing was common to several of his contemporaries. Aeschines, Euclid, Phaedo, Antisthenes, and in the next generation Aristotle, are all said to have composed dialogues; and therefore mistakes may have sometimes

happened. Greek literature in the third century before Christ was almost as voluminous as our own, and without the safeguards of regular publication, or printing, or binding, or even of distinct titles. An unknown writing was naturally attributed to a known writer whose works bore the same character; and the name once appended easily obtained authority. A tendency may also be observed to blend the works and opinions of the master with those of his scholars. To a later Platonist, the difference between Plato and his imitators was not so perceptible as to ourselves. The *Memorabilia* of Xenophon and the *Dialogues* of Plato are but a part of a considerable Socratic literature which has passed away. And we must consider how we should regard the question of the genuineness of a particular writing, if this lost literature had been preserved to us.

These considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria of genuineness: (1) That is most certainly Plato's which Aristotle attributes to him by name, which (2) is of considerable length, of (3) great excellence, and also (4) in harmony with the general spirit of the Platonic writings. But the testimony of Aristotle has various degrees of importance. Those writings which he cites without mentioning Plato, under their own names, e. g. the *Hippias*, the *Funeral Oration*, the *Phaedo*, etc., have an inferior degree of evidence in their favour. They may have been supposed by him to be the writings of another, although in the case of really great works, e. g. the *Phaedo*, this is not credible; those again which are quoted but not named, are still more defective in their external credentials. There may be also a possibility that Aristotle was mistaken, or may have confused the master and his scholars in the case of a short writing; but this is inconceivable about a more important work, e. g. the *Laws*, especially when we remember that he was living at Athens, and a frequenter of the groves of the Academy, during the last twenty years of Plato's life. Nor must we forget that in all his numerous citations from the Platonic writings he never attributes any passage found in the extant dialogues to any one but Plato. And lastly, we may remark that one or two great writings, such as the *Parmenides* and the *Politicus*, which are wholly devoid of Aristotelian (1) credentials may be fairly attributed to Plato, on the ground of (2) length, (3) excellence, and (4) accordance with the general spirit of his writings.

Proceeding upon these principles we appear to arrive at the conclusion that nine-tenths of all the writings which have ever been ascribed to

Plato, are undoubtedly genuine. There is another portion of them, including the Epistles, the Epinomis, the dialogues rejected by the ancients themselves, namely, the Axiochus, De justo, De virtute, Demodocus, Sisyphus, Eryxias, which on grounds, both of internal and external evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject. But there still remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm either that they are genuine or spurious. They may have been written in youth, or possibly like the works of some painters, may be partly or wholly the compositions of scholars; or they may have been the writings of some contemporary transferred by accident to the more celebrated name of Plato, or of some Platonist in the next generation who aspired to imitate his master. Not that on grounds either of language or philosophy we should lightly reject them. Some difference of style, or inferiority of execution, or inconsistency of thought, can hardly be considered decisive of their spurious character. For who always does justice to his own powers, or writes with equal care at all times? Certainly not Plato, who exhibits the greatest differences in dramatic power, in the formation of sentences, and in the use of words, if his earlier writings are compared with his later ones, say the Protagoras or Phaedrus with the Laws. Or who can be expected to think always like himself during a period of authorship extending over above fifty years, in an age of great intellectual activity, as well as of political and literary transition? Certainly not Plato, whose earlier writings are separated from his later ones by as wide an interval of philosophical speculation as that which separates his later writings from Aristotle.

The dialogues which have been translated in the Appendix, and which appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonic writings, are the Lesser Hippias, the First Alcibiades, the Menexenus, or Funeral Oration. Of these, the Lesser Hippias and the Funeral Oration are cited by Aristotle; the first in the Metaphysics, iv. 29, 5, the latter in the Rhetoric, iii. 14, 11. Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in his citation of both of them he seems to be referring to passages in the extant dialogues. From the mention of 'Hippias' in the singular by Aristotle, we may perhaps infer that he was unacquainted with a second dialogue bearing the same name. Moreover, the mere existence of a Greater and Lesser Hippias, and of a First and Second Alcibiades, does to a certain extent throw a doubt upon both of them. Though a very clever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias

does not appear to contain anything beyond the power of an imitator, who was also a careful student of the earlier Platonic writings, to invent. The motive or leading thought of the dialogue may be detected in Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 21, and there is no similar instance of a 'motive' in an undoubted dialogue of Plato, which is taken from Xenophon. On the other hand, the upholders of the genuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socratic spirit; they will compare the Ion as being akin both in subject and treatment; they will urge the authority of Aristotle; and they will detect in the treatment of the Sophist, in the satirical reasoning upon Homer, in the *reductio ad absurdum* of the doctrine that vice is ignorance, traces of a Platonic authorship. In reference to the last point we are doubtful, as in some of the other dialogues, whether the author is asserting or overthrowing the paradox of Socrates, or merely following the argument 'whither the wind blows.' That no conclusion is arrived at is also in accordance with the character of the earlier dialogues. The resemblances or imitations of the Gorgias, Protagoras, and Euthydemus, which have been observed in the Hippias, cannot with certainty be adduced on either side of the argument.

The Menexenus or Funeral Oration is cited by Aristotle, and is interesting as supplying an example of the manner in which the orators praised 'the Athenians among the Athenians,' falsifying persons and dates, and casting a veil over the gloomier events of Athenian history. It exhibits an acquaintance with the funeral oration of Thucydides, and was, perhaps, intended to rival that great work. If genuine, the proper place of the Menexenus would be at the end of the Phaedrus. The satirical opening and the concluding words bear a great resemblance to the earlier dialogues; the oration itself is professedly a mimetic work, like the speeches in the Phaedrus, and cannot therefore be tested by a comparison of the other writings of Plato. The funeral oration of Pericles is expressly mentioned in the Phaedrus, and this may have suggested the subject, in the same manner that the Cleitophon appears to be suggested by the slight mention of Cleitophon, and his attachment to Thrasymachus in the Republic, cp. 465 A; and the Theages by the mention of Theages in the Apology and Republic; or as the Second Alcibiades seems to be founded upon the text of Xenophon, Mem. i. 3, 1. A similar taste for parody appears not only in the Phaedrus, but in the Protagoras, in the Symposium, and to a certain extent in the Parmenides.

To these two doubtful writings of Plato I have added the First Alcibiades, which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has the greatest merit, and is somewhat longer, though not verified by the testimony of Aristotle, and in many respects at variance with the Symposium in the description of the relations of Socrates and Alcibiades. Like the two preceding works, if genuine it is to be compared to the earlier writings of Plato. The motive of the piece may, perhaps, be found in that passage of the Symposium in which Alcibiades describes himself as self-convicted by the words of Socrates (216 B, C). For the disparaging manner in which Schleiermacher has spoken of this dialogue there seems to be no sufficient foundation. At the same time, the lesson imparted is simple, and the irony more transparent than in the undoubted dialogues of Plato. We know, too, that Alcibiades was a favourite thesis, and that at least five or six dialogues bearing this name passed current in antiquity, and are attributed to contemporaries of Socrates and Plato. (1) In the entire absence of real external evidence (for the catalogues of the Alexandrian librarians cannot be regarded as trustworthy); and (2) in the absence of the highest marks either of poetical or philosophical excellence; and (3) considering that we have express testimony to the existence of contemporary writings bearing the name of Alcibiades, we are compelled to suspend our judgment on the genuineness of the extant dialogue.

Neither at this point, nor at any other, do we propose to draw an absolute line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings of Plato. They fade off imperceptibly from one class to another. There may have been degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as there are certainly degrees of evidence by which they are supported. The traditions of the oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may have formed the basis of semi-Platonic writings; some of them may be of the same mixed character which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates, although the form of them is different. The three dialogues which we have offered in the Appendix to the criticism of the reader may be partly spurious and partly genuine; they may be altogether spurious; —that is an alternative which must be frankly admitted. Nor can we maintain of some other dialogues, such as the Parmenides, and the Sophist, and Politicus, that no considerable objection can be urged against them, though greatly overbalanced by the weight (chiefly) of internal evidence in their favour. Nor, on the other hand, can we exclude the possibility that some dialogues which are usually rejected,

such as the Greater Hippias and the Cleitophon, may be genuine. The nature and object of these semi-Platonic writings require more careful study and more comparison of them with one another, and with forged writings in general, than they have yet received, before we can finally decide on their character. We do not consider them all as genuine until they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintained and still more often implied in this and similar discussions; but should say of some of them, that their genuineness is neither proven nor disproven until further evidence about them can be adduced. And we are as confident that the Epistles are spurious, as that the Republic, the Timaeus, and the Laws are genuine.

On the whole, not a sixteenth part of the writings which pass under the name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the ancients themselves, can be fairly doubted by those who are willing to allow that a considerable change and growth may have taken place in his philosophy. That sixteenth debatable portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgment of Plato, either as a thinker or a writer, and though suggesting some interesting questions to the scholar and critic, is of little importance to the general reader.

# LESSER HIPPIAS.



## INTRODUCTION.

THE Lesser Hippias may be compared with the earlier dialogues of Plato, in which the contrast of Socrates and the Sophists is most strongly exhibited. Hippias, like Protagoras and Gorgias, though civil, is vain and boastful : he knows all things ; he can make anything, including his own clothes ; he is a manufacturer of poems and declamations, and also of seal-rings, shoes, strigils ; his girdle, which he has woven himself, is of a finer than Persian quality. He is a vainer, lighter nature than the two great Sophists (cp. *Protag.* 314, 337), but of the same character with them, and equally impatient of the short cut-and-thrust method of Socrates, whom he endeavours to draw into a long oration. At last, he gets tired of being defeated at every point by Socrates, and is with difficulty induced to proceed (compare Thrasymachus, Protagoras, Callicles, and others, to whom the same reluctance is ascribed).

Hippias like Protagoras has common sense on his side, when he argues, citing passages of the Iliad in support of his view, that Homer intended Achilles to be the bravest, Odysseus the wisest of the Greeks. But he is easily overthrown by the superior dialectics of Socrates, who pretends to show that Achilles is not true to his word, and that no similar inconsistency is to be found in Odysseus. Hippias replies that Achilles unintentionally, but Odysseus intentionally, speaks falsehood. But is it better to do wrong intentionally or unintentionally ? Socrates, relying on the analogy of the arts, maintains the former, Hippias the latter of the two alternatives. All this is quite conceived in the spirit of Plato, who is very far from making Socrates always argue on the side of truth. The over-reasoning on Homer, which is of course satirical, is also in the spirit of Plato. Poetry turned logic is more ridiculous than

'rhetoric turned logic,' and equally fallacious. There were reasoners in ancient as well as in modern times, who could never receive the natural impression of Homer, or of any other book which they read. The argument of Socrates, in which he picks out the apparent inconsistencies and discrepancies in the speech and actions of Achilles, and the final paradox, 'that he who is true is also false,' remind us of the explanation of Pittacus in the *Protagoras*, and of similar reasonings in the first book of the *Republic*. The discrepancies which Socrates discovers in the words of Achilles are perhaps as great as those discovered by some of the modern separatists of the Homeric poems.

At last, Socrates having caught Hippias in the toils of the voluntary and involuntary, is obliged to confess that he is wandering about in the same labyrinth; he makes the reflection on himself which others would make upon him (cp. *Protagoras*, sub fin.). He does not wonder that he should be in a difficulty, but he wonders at Hippias, and he becomes sensible of the gravity of the situation, when ordinary men like himself can no longer go to the wise and be taught by them.

## LESSER HIPPIAS.

*PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.*

EUDICUS, SOCRATES, HIPPIAS.

Steph. *Eudicus*. Why are you silent, Socrates, after the magnificent display which Hippias has been making? Why do you not either refute his words, if he seems to you to have been wrong in any point, or join with us in commending him? There is the more reason why you should speak, because we are now alone, and the audience is confined to those who may fairly claim to take part in a philosophical discussion.

*Socrates*. I should much like, Eudicus, to question Hippias about what he was just now saying of Homer. I have heard your father, Apemantus, declare that the Iliad of Homer is a finer poem than the Odyssey in the same degree that Achilles was a better man than Odysseus; for, as he said, Odysseus is the central figure of the one poem and Achilles of the other. Now, I should like to know, if Hippias has no objection to tell me, what is his opinion about these two heroes, and which of them he maintains to be the better; he has already told us in the course of his exhibition many things of various kinds about Homer and divers other poets.

*Eud.* I am sure that Hippias will have no objection to answer anything that you ask him; tell me, Hippias, if Socrates asks you a question, will you answer him?

*Hippias*. Indeed, Eudicus, I should be strangely inconsistent if I refused to answer Socrates, when at each Olympic festival, as I went up from my house at Elis to the temple of Olympia, where all the Hellenes were assembled, I continually professed my willingness to perform any of the exhibitions which I had prepared, and to answer any questions which any one had to ask.

Soc. Truly, Hippias, you are a happy man, if at every Olym- 364  
pic festival you have such an encouraging opinion of your own powers when you go up to the temple. I doubt whether any muscular hero would be as fearless and confident in offering his body to the combat at Olympia, as you are in offering your mind.

Hip. And with good reason, Socrates; for since the day when I first entered the lists at Olympia I have never found any one who was my superior in anything.

Soc. What an ornament, Hippias, will the reputation of your wisdom be to the city of Elis and to your parents! But to return: what do you say of Odysseus and Achilles? Which of the two is the better of them? and in what particular does either surpass the other? For when you were exhibiting and company was in the room, though I could not follow you, I did not like to ask what you meant, because there were other people present, and I was afraid that the question might interrupt your exhibition. But now that there are not so many of us, and my friend Eudicus bids me ask, I wish you would tell me what you were saying about these two heroes, so that I may clearly understand; how did you distinguish them?

Hip. I shall have much pleasure, Socrates, in explaining to you more clearly than I could in public my views about these and also about other heroes. I say that Homer intended Achilles to be the bravest of those who went to Troy, and Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus the wiliest.

Soc. O rare Hippias, will you be so good as not to laugh, if I find a difficulty in following you, and repeat my questions several times over? Please to answer me kindly and gently.

Hip. I should be greatly ashamed of myself, Socrates, if I, who teach others and take money of them, could not, when I was asked by you, answer in a civil and agreeable manner.

Soc. Thank you: the fact is, that I seemed to understand what you meant when you said that the poet intended Achilles to be the bravest of men, and also that he intended Nestor to be the wisest; but when you said that he meant Odysseus to be the wiliest, I must confess that I could not understand what you said. Will you tell me, and then I shall perhaps understand you better: has not Homer made Achilles equally wily?

*Hip.* Certainly not, Socrates; he is the most straightforward of mankind, and in the passage called the Prayers, when he makes them talking with one another, Achilles is supposed by the poet to say to Odysseus:—

365 ‘Son of Laertes, sprung from heaven, crafty Odysseus, I will speak out plainly the word which I intend to act, and which I believe will be accomplished. For I hate him like the gates of death, who thinks one thing and says another. But I will speak that which shall be accomplished.’

Now, in these verses he clearly indicates the character of the two men; he shows Achilles to be true and simple, and Odysseus to be wily and false; for he supposes Achilles to be addressing Odysseus in these lines.

*Soc.* Now, Hippias, I think that I understand your meaning; when you say that Odysseus is wily, you clearly mean that he is false?

*Hip.* Exactly. Socrates, and that is the character of Odysseus, as represented by Homer in many passages both of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.

*Soc.* And Homer must be presumed to have meant that the true man is not the same as the false?

*Hip.* Of course, Socrates.

*Soc.* And is that your own opinion, Hippias?

*Hip.* Certainly; how can I have any other?

*Soc.* Well, then, as there is no possibility of asking Homer what he meant in these verses of his, let us leave him; but as you are a friend of his, and are ready to take up his cause, will you answer on behalf of yourself and him?

*Hip.* I will; ask shortly anything that you like.

*Soc.* Do you say that the false, like the sick, have no power to do things, or that they have power to do things?

*Hip.* I should say that they have power to do many things, and in particular to deceive mankind.

*Soc.* Then, according to you, they are both powerful and wily, are they not? And are they wily, and do they deceive by reason of their simplicity and folly, or by reason of their cunning and a certain sort of prudence?

*Hip.* By reason of their cunning and prudence, I should say.

*Soc.* Then they are prudent, I suppose?

*Hip.* That they are—very.

*Soc.* And if they are prudent, do they know or do they not know what they do?

*Hip.* Of course, they know very well indeed; and that is why they do mischief to others.

*Soc.* And having this knowledge, are they ignorant, or are they wise?

*Hip.* Wise, certainly; at least, in so far as they can deceive.

*Soc.* Stop, and let us recall to mind what you are saying; 366 are you not saying that the false are powerful and prudent and knowing and wise in those things about which they are false?

*Hip.* That is what I am saying.

*Soc.* And the true are different from the false; and the true and the false are the very opposite of each other?

*Hip.* That is my view.

*Soc.* Then, according to your view, it would seem that the false are to be ranked among the powerful and wise?

*Hip.* Assuredly.

*Soc.* And when you say that the false are powerful and wise in so far as they are false, do you mean that they have or have not the power of uttering their falsehoods if they like?

*Hip.* I mean to say that they have the power.

*Soc.* In a word, then, the false are they who are wise and have the power to speak falsely?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then a man who has not the power of speaking falsely and is ignorant cannot be false?

*Hip.* You are right.

*Soc.* And every man has power who does that which he wishes at the time when he wishes. I am not speaking in any special case of his being prevented by disease or something of that sort, but I am speaking generally, as I might say of you, that you are able to write my name when you like. Would you not call a man able who could do that?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And tell me, Hippias, are you not a skilful calculator and arithmetician?

*Hip.* Yes, Socrates, assuredly I am.

*Soc.* And if some one were to ask you what is the sum of

3 multiplied by 700, you would tell him the true answer in a moment, if you pleased?

*Hip.* Certainly I should.

*Soc.* Is not that because you are the wisest and ablest of men in these matters?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And are you only the wisest and ablest of men, and not also the best in these matters of calculation in which you are the ablest and wisest?

*Hip.* To be sure, Socrates, I am the best.

*Soc.* And so you would be the best able to tell the truth about these matters, would you not?

*Hip.* Yes, I should.

*Soc.* And could you speak falsehoods about them equally well? I must beg, Hippias, that you will answer me with the same frankness and magnanimity which you have hitherto shown. If a person were to ask you what is the sum of 3 multiplied by 700, would you not be the best teller of a falsehood, having always the power of speaking falsely as you have of speaking truly, about these same matters, if you wanted to tell 367 a falsehood, and not to answer truly? Would the ignorant man be better able to tell a falsehood in matters of calculation than you would be, if you chose? Might he not sometimes stumble upon the truth, when he wanted to tell a lie, because he did not know, whereas you who are the wise man, if you wanted to tell a lie would always and uniformly lie?

*Hip.* Yes; you are quite right in that.

*Soc.* Does the false man tell lies about other things, but not about number, or when he is making a calculation?

*Hip.* To be sure; he would speak falsely about number as about all other things.

*Soc.* Then may we further assume, Hippias, that there are men who are false about calculation and number?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Who can they be? For you have already admitted that he who is false must have the ability to be false: you said, as you will remember, that he who is unable to be false will not be false?

*Hip.* Yes, I remember.

*Soc.* And were you not yourself just now shown to be best able to speak falsely about calculation?

*Hip.* Yes; that was also said.

*Soc.* And are you not likewise said to speak truly about calculation?

*Hip.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then is not the same person able to speak both falsely and truly about calculation? And that person is he who is good at calculation or the arithmetician?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Who, then, Hippias, is discovered to be false at calculation? Is he not the good man? For the good man is the able man, and he is the true man.

*Hip.* That is evident.

*Soc.* Do you not see, then, that the same man is false and also true about these matters? And the true man is not a whit better than the false; for indeed he is the same with him and not the very opposite, as you were just now imagining.

*Hip.* That appears to be the case in that instance.

*Soc.* Shall we examine other instances?

*Hip.* Certainly, if you are disposed.

*Soc.* Are you not also skilled in geometry?

*Hip.* I am.

*Soc.* Well, and does not the same hold in that? Is not the same person best able to speak falsely or to speak truly about diagrams; and he is the geometrician?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* He and no one else is good at that?

*Hip.* Yes, he and no one else.

*Soc.* Then the good and wise geometer has this double power in the highest degree; and if there be a man who is false about diagrams the good man will be the man, for he is able to be false; whereas the bad is unable, and for this reason is not false, as has been acknowledged.

*Hip.* True.

*Soc.* Once more—let us examine a third case; that of the astronomer, in whose art, again, you, Hippias, are a still greater proficient than in the previous arts—are you not?

*Hip.* Yes, I am.

*Soc.* And does not the same hold of astronomy?

*Hip.* True, Socrates.

*Soc.* And in astronomy, too, if any man be able to speak falsely he will be the good astronomer, but he who is not able will not speak falsely, for he has no knowledge.

*Hip.* That is true.

*Soc.* Then in astronomy also, the same man will be true and false?

*Hip.* That seems to be the case.

*Soc.* And now, Hippias, consider the question at large about all the sciences, and see whether the same principle does not always hold. I know that in most arts you are the wisest of men, as I have heard you boasting in the agora at the tables of the money-changers, when you were setting forth the great and enviable stores of your wisdom; and you said that upon one occasion, when you went to the Olympic games, all that you had on your person was made by yourself. In the first place, there was your ring;—you began with that, which was of your own workmanship, and you said that you could engrave rings; and you had another seal which was also of your own workmanship, and a strigil and an oil flask, which you had made yourself; you said also that you had made the shoes which you had on your feet, and the cloak and the tunic; but what appeared to us all most extraordinary and a proof of singular art, was the girdle of your tunic, which, you said, was as fine as the most costly Persian fabric, and of your own weaving; moreover, you told us that you had brought with you poems, epic, tragic, and dithyrambic, as well as prose writings of the most various kinds; and you said that your skill was also pre-eminent in the arts which I was just now mentioning, and in the true principles of rhythm and harmony and of orthography; and if I remember rightly, there were a great many other accomplishments in which you excelled. I have forgotten to mention your art of memory, which you regard as your special glory, and I dare say that I have forgotten many other things; but, as I was saying, only look to your own arts—and there are plenty of them—and to those of others; and tell me, having regard to the admissions which you and I have made, whether you discover any department of art or any description of wisdom or cunning, whichever name you use,

in which the true and false are different and not the same 350  
tell me, if you can, of any. But you cannot.

*Hip.* Not without consideration, Socrates.

*Soc.* Nor will consideration help you. Hippias, as I believe; but then if I am right, remember what the consequence will be.

*Hip.* I do not know what you mean, Socrates.

*Soc.* I suppose that you are not using your art of memory, doubtless because you think that such an accomplishment is not needed on the present occasion. I will therefore remind you of what you were saying: were you not saying that Achilles was a true man, and Odysseus false and wily?

*Hip.* I was.

*Soc.* And now do you perceive that the same person has turned out to be false as well as true? And if Odysseus is false he is also true, and if Achilles is true he is also false, and the two men are not different from one another, but they are the same.

*Hip.* O Socrates, you are always weaving the meshes of an argument, selecting the most difficult point, and fastening upon details instead of grappling with the matter in hand as a whole. Come now, and I will demonstrate to you, if you will allow me, by many satisfactory proofs, that Homer has made Achilles a better man than Odysseus, and a truthful man too; and that he has made the other crafty, and a teller of many untruths, and inferior to Achilles. And then, if you please, you shall make a speech on the other side, in order to prove that Odysseus is the better man; and this may be compared to mine, and then the company will know which of us is the better speaker.

*Soc.* O Hippias, I do not doubt that you are wiser than I am. But I have a way, when anybody else says anything, of giving close attention to him, especially if the speaker appears to me to be a wise man. Having a desire to understand, I question him, and I examine and analyse and compare what he says, in order that I may understand: but if the speaker appears to me to be little worth, I do not interrogate him, or trouble myself about him, and you may know by this who they are whom I deem to be wise men, for you will see that when I am talking with a wise man, I am very attentive to what he says; and I ask questions of him, in order that I may learn, and be improved by him.

And I could not help remarking while you were speaking, that when you recited the verses in which Achilles, as you declared, attacks Odysseus as a deceiver, that you must be strangely mistaken, because Odysseus, the man of wiles, is never found to tell a lie ; but Achilles is found to be wily on your own showing. At any rate he speaks falsely ; for first he utters these words, which you just now repeated,—

‘ He is hateful to me even as the gates of death, who thinks one thing and says another :—

And then he says, a little while afterwards, he will not be persuaded by Odysseus and Agamemnon, neither will he remain at Troy ; but, says he,—

‘ To-morrow, when I have offered sacrifices to Zeus and all the Gods, I will drag my ships down into the deep, and will load them well ; and then you shall see, if you have a mind, and if such things are a care to you, early in the morning my ships sailing over the fishy Hellespont, and my men eagerly pulling the oar ; and, if the illustrious shaker of the earth gives me a good voyage, on the third day I shall reach the fertile Phthia.’

And before that, when he was reviling Agamemnon, he said,—

‘ And now to Phthia I will go, since to return home in the beaked ships is far better, nor do I think that you remaining here, while I am dishonoured, will receive riches and wealth.’

But although on that occasion, in the presence of the whole army, he said this, and on the other occasion to his companions, he appears never to have made any preparation or attempt to draw down the ships, as if he had the least intention of sailing home ; so entirely regardless was he of speaking truth. Now I, Hippias, originally asked you the question, because I was in doubt as to which of the two heroes was intended by the poet to be the best, and because I thought that both of them were the best, and it was difficult to decide which was the better of them, not only in respect of truth and falsehood, but of virtue generally, for even in this matter of speaking the truth they are much upon a par.

*Hip.* There you are wrong, Socrates ; for in so far as Achilles speaks falsely, the falsehood is obviously unintentional. He is compelled against his will to remain and rescue the army in

their misfortune. But when Odysseus speaks falsely he is voluntarily and intentionally false.

*Soc.* You, sweet Hippias, like Odysseus, are a deceiver yourself.

*Hip.* Certainly not, Socrates : what makes you say that? 371

*Soc.* Because you say that Achilles does not speak falsely from design, when he is not only a deceiver, but in the picture which Homer has drawn of him, a master in the art of falsehood, and so far superior to Odysseus in lying and deception, that he dares to contradict himself, and Odysseus does not find him out ; at any rate he does not appear to say anything to him which would imply that he perceived his falsehood.

*Hip.* What do you mean, Socrates?

*Soc.* Did you not observe that afterwards, when he is speaking to Odysseus, he says that he will sail away with the early dawn ; but to Ajax he tells quite a different story ?

*Hip.* Where is that ?

*Soc.* Where he says,—

‘I will not think about bloody war until the son of warlike Priam, illustrious Hector, comes to the tents and ships of the Myrmidons, slaughtering the Argives, and burning the ships with fire ; and I suspect that about my tent and dark ship, Hector, although eager for the battle, will yet stay his hand.’

Now, do you really think, Hippias, that the son of Thetis and the pupil of the sage Cheiron had such a bad memory, considering that he had been assailing liars in the most violent terms only the instant before, or that he would have carried lying so far, as to say to Odysseus that he would sail away, and to Ajax that he would remain, and that he was not rather practising upon the simplicity of Odysseus, and thinking that he would get the better of him by his cunning and falsehood ?

*Hip.* No, I do not agree with you, Socrates : but I believe that Achilles is induced to say one thing to Ajax, and another to Odysseus in the innocence of his heart, whereas Odysseus, whether he speaks falsely or truly, speaks always out of design.

*Soc.* Then Odysseus would appear after all to be better than Achilles ?

*Hip.* Certainly not, Socrates.

*Soc.* Why, were not the voluntary liars only just now shown to be better than the involuntary ?

372 *Hip.* And how, Socrates, can those who intentionally err, and voluntarily and designedly commit iniquities, be better than those who err and do wrong involuntarily? Surely there is a great excuse to be made for a man telling a falsehood, or doing an injury or any sort of harm to another in ignorance. And the laws are obviously far more severe on those who lie, or do evil voluntarily, than on those who do evil involuntarily.

*Soc.* You see, Hippias, as I have already told you, how pertinacious I am in asking questions of a wise man. And I think that this is the only good point about me, for I am full of defects, and always getting wrong in some way or other. My deficiency is proved to me by the fact that when I meet one of you who are famous for wisdom, and to whose wisdom all the Hellenes are witnesses, I am found out to know nothing. For speaking generally, I hardly ever have the same opinion about anything which you have, and what proof of ignorance can be greater than to differ from wise men? But I have one singular good quality, which is my salvation; I am not ashamed to learn, and I ask and enquire, and am very grateful to those who answer me, and never fail to give them my grateful thanks; and when I learn a thing I never deny my teacher, or pretend that the lesson is a discovery of my own; but I praise his wisdom, and proclaim what I have learned from him. And now I cannot agree in what you are saying, but I strongly disagree. Well, I know that this is my own fault, and is a defect in my character, but I will not pretend to be more than I am; and my opinion, Hippias, is the very contrary of what you are saying. For I maintain that those who hurt or injure mankind, and speak falsely and deceive, and err voluntarily, are better far than those who do wrong involuntarily. Sometimes, however, I am of the opposite opinion; for I am all abroad in my ideas about this matter, and my perplexity is obviously occasioned by my not knowing. And just now I happen to be in a crisis of my disorder at which those who err voluntarily appear to me better than those who err involuntarily. My present state of mind is due to our previous argument, which inclines me to believe that in general those who do wrong involuntarily are worse than those who do wrong voluntarily, and therefore I hope that you will be good to me, and not refuse to heal me; for you will do me a much

greater benefit if you cure my soul of ignorance, than you would if you were to cure my body of disease. I must, however, tell you beforehand, that if you make a long oration to me you will not cure me, for I shall not be able to follow you ; but if you will answer me, as you did just now, you will do me a great deal of good, and I do not think that you will be any the worse yourself. And I have some claim upon you also, O son of Apemantus, for you incited me to converse with Hippias ; and now, if Hippias will not answer me, you must entreat him on my behalf.

*Eud.* But I do not think, Socrates, that Hippias will require any entreaty of mine ; for he has already said that he will refuse to answer no man.—Did you not say so, Hippias ?

*Hip.* Yes, I did ; but then, Eudicus, Socrates is always troublesome in an argument, and appears to be dishonest.

*Soc.* Excellent Hippias, that is not intentional on my part (that would show me to be a wise man and a master of wiles, as you would argue), but unintentional, and therefore you must pardon me ; for, as you say, he who is unintentionally dishonest should be pardoned.

*Eud.* Yes, Hippias, do as he says ; and for our sake, and also that you may not belie your profession, answer whatever Socrates asks you.

*Hip.* I will answer, as you wish ; and do you ask whatever you like.

*Soc.* I am very desirous, Hippias, of examining this question, as to which are the better—those who err voluntarily or involuntarily ? And if you will answer me, I think that I can put you in the way of approaching the subject : You would admit, would you not, that there are good runners ?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And there are bad runners ?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs ill is a bad runner ?

*Hip.* Very true.

*Soc.* And he who runs slowly runs ill, and he who runs quickly runs well ?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then in a race, and in running, swiftness is a good and slowness is an evil?

*Hip.* To be sure.

*Soc.* Which of the two then is a better runner? He who runs slowly voluntarily, or he who runs slowly involuntarily?

*Hip.* He who runs slowly voluntarily.

*Soc.* And is not running a species of doing?

*Hip.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And if a species of doing, also a species of action?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then he who runs badly does a bad and dishonourable action in a race?

*Hip.* Yes; a bad action, certainly.

*Soc.* And he who runs slowly runs badly?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then the good runner does this bad and disgraceful action voluntarily, and the bad involuntarily?

*Hip.* That is to be inferred.

*Soc.* Then he who involuntarily does evil actions, is worse in a race than he who does them voluntarily?

*Hip.* Yes, in a race.

374 *Soc.* Well; but at a wrestling match—which is the better wrestler, he who falls voluntarily or involuntarily?

*Hip.* He who falls voluntarily, doubtless.

*Soc.* And is it worse or more dishonourable at a wrestling match to fall or to throw another?

*Hip.* To fall.

*Soc.* Then, at a wrestling match, he who voluntarily does base and dishonourable actions is a better wrestler than he who does them involuntarily?

*Hip.* That appears to be the truth.

*Soc.* And what would you say of any other bodily exercise—is not he who has the stronger frame able to do both that which is strong and that which is weak—that which is honourable and that which is dishonourable?—so that when he does bad actions with the body, he who has the better frame does them voluntarily, and he who has the worse frame does them involuntarily.

*Hip.* Yes, that appears to be true about strength.

*Soc.* And what do you say about grace, Hippias? Is not the better frame able to make evil and disgraceful figures and postures voluntarily, as he who has the worse frame makes them involuntarily?

*Hip.* True.

*Soc.* Then voluntary ungracefulness comes from excellence of the bodily frame, and involuntary from the defect of the bodily frame?

*Hip.* True.

*Soc.* And what would you say of an unmusical voice; would you prefer the voice which is voluntarily or involuntarily out of tune?

*Hip.* That which is voluntarily out of tune.

*Soc.* The involuntary is the worse of the two?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And would you choose to possess goods or evils?

*Hip.* Goods.

*Soc.* And would you rather have feet which are voluntarily or involuntarily lame?

*Hip.* Feet which are voluntarily lame.

*Soc.* But is not lameness a defect or deformity?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And is not blinking a defect in the eyes?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And would you rather always have eyes with which you might voluntarily blink and not see, or with which you might involuntarily blink?

*Hip.* I would rather have eyes which voluntarily blink.

*Soc.* Then in your own case you deem that which voluntarily acts ill, better than that which involuntarily acts ill?

*Hip.* Yes, certainly, in such cases as that.

*Soc.* And does not the same hold of ears or nostrils, mouth, and all the senses—that those which involuntarily act ill are not to be desired, as being defective; and that those which voluntarily act ill are to be desired as being good?

*Hip.* I agree.

*Soc.* And what would you say of instruments;—which are the better sort of instruments—those with which a man acts ill voluntarily or involuntarily? For example, had a man better

have a rudder with which he will steer ill, voluntarily or involuntarily?

*Hip.* He had better have a rudder with which he will steer ill voluntarily.

*Soc.* And does not the same hold of the bow and the lyre, the flute and all other things?

*Hip.* Very true.

*Soc.* And would you rather have a horse of such a temper that you may ride him ill voluntarily or involuntarily?

375 *Hip.* I would rather have a horse which I could ride ill voluntarily.

*Soc.* That would be the better temper?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then with a horse of better temper, vicious actions would be produced voluntarily; and with a horse of bad temper involuntarily?

*Hip.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And that would be true of a dog, or of any other animal?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And is it better to possess the mind of an archer who voluntarily or involuntarily misses the mark?

*Hip.* Of him who voluntarily misses.

*Soc.* That would be the better mind for the purpose of archery?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then the mind which involuntarily errs is worse than that which errs voluntarily?

*Hip.* Yes, certainly, in the use of the bow.

*Soc.* And what would you say of the art of medicine;—has not the mind which voluntarily works harm to the body, more of the healing art?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then in the art of medicine the voluntary is better than the involuntary?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Well, and in lute-playing and in flute-playing, and in all arts and sciences, is not that mind the better which voluntarily does what is evil and dishonourable, and goes wrong, and is not the worse that which does all this involuntarily?

*Hip.* That is evident.

*Soc.* But what would you say of the characters of slaves? Should we not prefer to have those who voluntarily do wrong and make mistakes, and are they not better in their mistakes than those who commit them involuntarily?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And should we not desire to have our own minds in the best state possible?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And will our minds be better if they do wrong and make mistakes voluntarily or involuntarily?

*Hip.* O, Socrates, it would be a monstrous thing to say that those who do wrong voluntarily are better than those who do wrong involuntarily!

*Soc.* And yet that appears to be the inference.

*Hip.* I do not agree to that.

*Soc.* But I thought, Hippias, that you did agree. Please to answer once more: Is not justice a power, or knowledge, or both? Must not justice, at all events, be one of these?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if justice is a power of the soul, then the soul which has the greater power is also the more just; for that which has the greater power, my good friend, has been proved by us to be the better.

*Hip.* Yes, that has been proved.

*Soc.* And if justice is knowledge, then the wiser soul will be the juster soul, and the more ignorant the more unjust?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* But if justice be power as well as knowledge—then will not the soul which has both knowledge and power be the more just, and that which is the more ignorant [and weaker] be the more unjust? Must not that be so?

*Hip.* Clearly.

*Soc.* And is not the soul which has the greater power and wisdom also better, and better able to do both good and evil in every action?

*Hip.* Certainly:

*Soc.* The soul, then, which acts ill, acts involuntarily by power <sup>376</sup> and art—and these either one or both of them are elements of justice?

*Hip.* That seems to be true.

*Soc.* And to do injustice is to do ill, and not to do injustice is to do well?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And will not the better and abler soul when it does wrong, do wrong voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily?

*Hip.* Clearly.

*Soc.* And the good man is he who has the good soul, and the bad man is he who has the bad?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then the good man will voluntarily do wrong, and the bad man involuntarily, if the good man is he who has the good soul?

*Hip.* Which he certainly has.

*Soc.* Then, Hippias, he who voluntarily does wrong and disgraceful things, if there be such a man, will be the good man?

*Hip.* There I cannot agree with you.

*Soc.* Nor can I agree with myself, Hippias; and yet that seems to be the deduction which, as far as we can see at present, must follow from our argument. As I was saying before, I wander up and down, and being in perplexity am always changing my opinion. Now, that I or any ordinary man should wander in perplexity is not surprising; but if you wise men also wander, and we cannot come to you and find rest, the matter begins to be serious to us as well as to you.



FIRST ALCIBIADES.



## INTRODUCTION.

THE First Alcibiades is a conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades. Socrates is represented in the character which he attributes to himself in the *Apology* of a know-nothing who detects the conceit of knowledge in others. The two have met already in the *Protagoras* and in the *Symposium*; in the latter dialogue, as in this, the relation between them is that of a lover and his beloved. But the narrative of their loves is told differently in different places; for in the *Symposium* Alcibiades is depicted as the impassioned but rejected lover; here, as coldly receiving the advances of Socrates, who, for the best of purposes, lies in wait for the aspiring and ambitious youth.

Alcibiades, who is described as a very young man, is about to enter on public life, having an inordinate opinion of himself, and an extravagant ambition. Socrates, 'who knows what is in man,' astonishes him by a revelation of his designs. But has he the knowledge which is necessary for carrying them out? He is going to persuade the Athenians—about what? Not about any particular art, but about politics—when to fight and when to make peace. Now, men should fight and make peace on just grounds, and therefore the question of justice and injustice must enter into peace and war; and he who advises the Athenians must know the difference between them. Does Alcibiades know? If he does, he must either have been taught by some master, or he must have discovered the nature of them himself. If he has had a master, Socrates would like to be informed who he is, that he may go and learn of him also. Alcibiades admits that he has never learned. Then has he enquired for himself? He may have, if he was ever aware of a time when he was ignorant. But he never was ignorant; for when he played with other boys at dice, he charged them with cheating, and this implied a knowledge of just and unjust. He learned of the multitude, that is his own explanation. And why should he not learn of them the nature of justice, as he has learned the Greek language of them? To

this Socrates answers, that they can teach Greek, but they cannot teach justice; for they are agreed about the one, but they are not agreed about the other; and therefore Alcibiades, who has admitted that if he knows he must either have learned from a master or have discovered for himself the nature of justice, is convicted out of his own mouth.

Alcibiades rejoins, that the Athenians debate not about what is just, but about what is expedient; and he asserts that the two principles of justice and expediency are opposed. Socrates, by a series of questions, compels him to admit that the just and the expedient coincide. Alcibiades is thus reduced to the humiliating conclusion that he knows nothing of politics, even if, as he says, they are concerned with the expedient.

However, he is no worse than other Athenian statesmen; and he will not need training, for others are as ignorant as he is. Socrates reminds him that he has to contend, not only with his own countrymen, but with their enemies—with the Spartan kings and with the great king of Persia; and he can only attain this higher aim of ambition by the assistance of Socrates. Not that he himself professes to have attained, but the questions which he asks bring others to a knowledge of themselves, and this is the first step in the practice of virtue.

The dialogue continues:—We wish to become as good as possible. But to be good in what? Alcibiades replies—‘Good in transacting business.’ But what business? ‘The business of the most intelligent men at Athens.’ The cobbler is intelligent in shoemaking, and is therefore good in that; he is not intelligent, and therefore not good, in weaving. Is he good in the sense which Alcibiades means, who is also bad? ‘I mean,’ replies Alcibiades, ‘the man who is able to command in the city.’ But to command what—horses or men? and if men, under what circumstances? ‘I mean to say, that he is able to command men living in social and political relations.’ And what is their aim? ‘The better preservation of the city.’ But when is a city better? ‘When there is unanimity, such as exists between husband and wife.’ Then, when husbands and wives perform their own special duties, there can be no unanimity between them; nor can a city be well ordered when each citizen does his own work only. Alcibiades, having stated first that goodness consists in the unanimity of the citizens, and then in each of them doing his own separate work, is brought to the required point of self-contradiction, leading him to confess his own ignorance.

But he is not too old to learn, and may still arrive at the truth, if he is willing to be cross-examined by Socrates. He must know himself; that is to say, not his body, or the things of the body, but his mind, or truer self. The physician knows the body, and the tradesman knows his own business, but they do not necessarily know themselves. Self-knowledge can be obtained only by looking into the mind and virtue of the soul, which is the diviner part of a man, as we see our own image in another's eye. And if we do not know ourselves, we cannot know what belongs to ourselves or belongs to others, and are unfit to take a part in political affairs. Both for the sake of the individual and of the state, we ought to aim at justice and temperance, not at wealth or power. The evil and unjust should have no power,—they should be the slaves of better men than themselves. None but the virtuous are deserving of freedom.

And are you, Alcibiades, a freeman? ‘I feel that I am not; but I hope, Socrates, that by your aid I may become free, and from this day forward I will never leave you.’

The Alcibiades has several points of resemblance to the other dialogues. The process of interrogation is of the same kind as that which Socrates practises upon the youthful Cleinias in the *Euthydemus*; and he characteristically attributes to Alcibiades the answers which he has elicited from him. The definition of good is narrowed by successive questions, and virtue is shown to be identical with knowledge. Here, as elsewhere, Socrates awakens the consciousness not of sin but of ignorance. Self-humiliation is the first step to knowledge, even of the commonest things. No man knows how ignorant he is, and no man can arrive at virtue and wisdom who has not once in his life, at least, been convicted of error. The process by which the soul is elevated is not unlike that which religious writers describe under the name of ‘conversion,’ if we substitute the sense of ignorance for the consciousness of sin.

In some respects the dialogue differs from any other Platonic composition. The aim is more directly ethical and hortatory; the process by which the antagonist is undermined is simpler than in other Platonic writings, and the conclusion more decided. There is a good deal of humour in the manner in which the pride of Alcibiades, and of the Greeks generally, is supposed to be taken down by the Spartan and

Persian queens, and the dialogue has considerable dialectical merit. But we have a difficulty in supposing that the same writer, who has given so profound and complex a notion of the characters both of Alcibiades and Socrates in the *Symposium*, should have treated them in so thin and superficial a manner in the *Alcibiades*, or that he should have imagined that a mighty nature like his could have been reformed by a few not very conclusive words of Socrates. For the arguments by which Alcibiades is reformed are not convincing: the writer of the dialogue, whoever he was, arrives at his idealism by crooked and tortuous paths, in which many pitfalls are concealed. The anachronism of making Alcibiades about twenty years old during the life of his uncle, Pericles, may be noted; and the repetition of the favourite observation, which occurs also in the *Laches* and *Protagoras*, that great Athenian statesmen, like Pericles, failed in the education of their sons. There is none of the undoubted dialogues of Plato in which there is so little dramatic verisimilitude.

## ALCIBIADES I.

*PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.*

ALCIBIADES, SOCRATES.

Steph *Socrates*. I DARESAY that you may be surprised to find, O son  
103 of Cleinias, that I, who am your first lover, not having spoken  
to you for many years, when the rest of the world were wearying  
you with their attentions, am the last of your lovers who still  
speaks to you. The reason was, that I was hindered from speak-  
ing to you by a power—not human but divine, the nature of  
which I will some day explain to you; that impediment has  
been now removed, and I present myself before you, hoping that  
the hindrance will not again occur. Meanwhile, I have observed  
that your pride has been too much for the pride of your ad-  
mirers; they were very numerous, but they have all run away,  
overpowered by your superior force of character; not one of  
104 them remains. And I want you to understand the reason why  
you have overpowered them. You imagine that you have no  
need of any other man at all, as you have great possessions and  
abundance of all things, beginning with the body, and ending  
with the soul. In the first place, you think that you are the  
fairest and tallest of the citizens, and this every one who has  
eyes sees to be true; in the second place, that you are among  
the noblest of them, highly connected both on the father's and  
the mother's side, and sprung from one of the most distinguished  
families in your own state, which is the greatest in Hellas, and  
having many friends and kinsmen of the best sort, who can

assist you when in need, and there is one potent relative, who is more to you than all the rest, Pericles the son of Xanthippus, whom your father left guardian of you, and of your brother, and who can not only do as he pleases in this city, but in all Hellas, and among many and mighty barbarous nations. Moreover, you are rich; but I must say that you value yourself least of all upon your possessions. And all these things have lifted you up, and you have overcome your lovers, and they have acknowledged that you were too much for them. Have you not remarked their absence? And now I know that you wonder why I have not gone away like the rest of them, and what can be my motive in remaining.

*Alcibiades.* Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that I was just coming to ask you the same question—What do you want? And what is your motive in ameying me, and always, wherever I am, making a point of coming? I do really wonder what you mean, and should greatly like to know.

*Soc.* Then, if you desire to know, I suppose that you will be willing to hear, and I may consider myself to be speaking to an auditor who will remain, and will not run away?

*Ale.* Certainly, let me hear.

*Soc.* You had better be careful, for I may very likely be as unwilling to end as I have hitherto been to begin.

*Ale.* Proceed, my good man, and I will listen.

*Soc.* I will proceed; and, although no lover likes to speak with one who has no feeling of love in him, I will make an effort, and tell you what I meant. My love, Alcibiades, which 103 I hardly like to confess, would long ago have passed away, as I flatter myself, if I saw you loving your good things, or thinking that you ought to live in the enjoyment of them. But I know that you entertain other thoughts; and I will prove to you that I have always had my eye on you by declaring them. Suppose that at this moment some God came to you and said: O Alcibiades, will you live as you are, or die in an instant if you are forbidden to make any further acquisition?—I verily believe that you would choose death. And I will tell you the hope in which you are at present living: Before many days have elapsed, you think that you will come before the Athenian assembly, and will prove to them that you are more worthy of honour than Pericles,

or any other man that ever lived, and having proved this, you will have the greatest power in the state; and when you have got the greatest power among us, you will go on to other Hellenic states, and not only to Hellenes, but to all the barbarians who inhabit the same continent with us. And if the God were then to say to you again: Here in Europe is to be your seat of empire, and you must not cross over into Asia or meddle with Asiatic affairs, I do not believe that you would choose to live upon these terms; but the world, as I may say, must be filled with your power and name—no man less than Cyrus and Xerxes is of any account with you. Such I know to be your hopes—I am not guessing only—and very likely you, who know that I am saying the truth, will reply, Well, Socrates, but what have my hopes to do with the explanation which you promised of your unwillingness to leave me? And that is what I am now going to tell you, sweet son of Cleinias and Dinomachè. The explanation is, that all these designs of yours cannot be accomplished by you without my help; so great is the power which I believe myself to have over you and your concerns; and this I conceive to be the reason why the God has hitherto forbidden me to converse with you, and I have been long expecting his permission. For, as you hope to prove your own great value to the state, and having proved it, to attain at once to absolute power, so do I indulge a hope that I shall have the supreme power over you, if I am able to prove my own great value to you, and to show you that neither guardian, nor kinsman, nor any one is able to deliver into your hands the power which you desire, but I only, God being my helper. Now, when you were young and your hopes were not yet matured, I should have wasted my time, 106 and therefore, as I conceive, the God forbade me to converse with you; but now, having his permission, I will speak, for now you will listen to me.

*Al.* Your silence, Socrates, was always a marvel to me. I never could understand why you followed me about, and now that you have begun to speak again, I am still more amazed. Whether I think all this or not, is a matter about which you seem to have already made up your mind, and therefore my denial will have no effect upon you. But granting, if I must, that you have perfectly divined my intentions, why is your

assistance necessary to the attainment of them? Can you tell me why?

*Soc.* I suppose that you want to know whether I can make a long speech, such as you are in the habit of hearing; but that is not my way. I think, however, that I can prove to you the truth of what I am saying, if you will grant me one little favour.

*Al.* Yes, if the favour which you mean be not a troublesome one.

*Soc.* Will you be troubled at having questions to answer?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* Then please to answer.

*Al.* Ask me.

*Soc.* Have you not the intention which I attribute to you?

*Al.* I say 'yes,' in the hope of hearing what more you have to say.

*Soc.* You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in a little while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians? And suppose that when you are ascending the bema, I pull you by the sleeve and say, Alcibiades, you are getting up to advise the Athenians—do you know the matter about which they are going to deliberate, better than they?—How would you answer?

*Al.* I should reply, that I was going to advise them about a matter which I do know better than they.

*Soc.* Then you are a good adviser about the things which you know?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And do you know anything but what you have learned of others, or found out yourself?

*Al.* That is all.

*Soc.* And would you have ever learned or discovered anything, if you had not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself?

*Al.* I should not.

*Soc.* And would you have been willing to learn or to examine what you supposed that you knew?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Then there was a time when you thought that you did not know what you are now supposed to know?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* I think that I know the extent of your acquirements; and you must tell me if I forget any of them: according to my recollection, you learned the arts of writing, of playing on the lyre, and of wrestling; the flute you never would learn; this is the sum of your accomplishments, unless there were some which you acquired in secret; and I think that secrecy was hardly possible, as you could not have come out of your door, either by day or night, without my seeing you.

*Al.* Yes, that was the whole of my schooling.

107 *Soc.* And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, and give them advice about writing?

*Al.* No, indeed.

*Soc.* Or about the touch of the lyre?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And they are not in the habit of deliberating about wrestling, in the assembly?

*Al.* Hardly.

*Soc.* Then what are the deliberations in which you propose to advise them? Surely not about building?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* For the builder will advise better than you will about that?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Nor about divination?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* About that again the diviner will advise better than you will?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* Whether he be little or great, good or ill-looking, noble or ignoble—makes no difference.

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* A man is a good adviser about anything, not because he has riches, but because he has knowledge?

*Al.* Assuredly.

*Soc.* Whether their counsellor is rich or poor, is not a matter which will make any difference to the Athenians when they are deliberating about the health of the citizens; they only require that he should be a physician.

*Al.* Of course.

*Soc.* Then what will be the subject of deliberation about which you will be justified in getting up and advising them?

*Al.* About their own concerns, Socrates.

*Soc.* You mean about shipbuilding, for example, when the question is what sort of ships they ought to build?

*Al.* No, I should not advise them about that.

*Soc.* I suppose, because you do not understand shipbuilding: —is that the reason?

*Al.* Yes, that is the reason.

*Soc.* Then about what concerns of theirs will you advise them?

*Al.* About war, Socrates, or about peace, or about any other concerns of the state.

*Soc.* You mean, when they deliberate with whom they ought to make peace, and with whom they ought to go to war, and in what manner?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And they ought to go to war with those against whom it is better to go to war?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And when it is better?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And for as long a time as is better?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* But suppose the Athenians to deliberate with whom they ought to close in wrestling, and whom they shall seize by the hand, would you, or the master of gymnastics, be a better adviser of them?

*Al.* Clearly, the master of gymnastics.

*Soc.* And can you tell me on what grounds the master of gymnastics would decide, with whom they ought or ought not to close, and when and how? To take an instance: Would he not say that they should wrestle with those against whom it is best to wrestle?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And as much as is best?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And at such times as are best?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Again ; you sometimes accompany the lyre with the song and dance?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* When it is well to do so?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And as much as is well?

*Al.* Just so.

*Soc.* And as you speak of an excellence or art of the best in wrestling, and of an excellence in playing the lyre, I wish you would tell me what this latter is ;—the excellence of wrestling I call gymnastic, and I want to know what you call the other.

*Al.* I do not understand you.

*Soc.* Then try to do as I do ; for the answer which I gave is universally right, and when I say right, I mean according to rule.

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And was not the art of which I spoke gymnastic ?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And I called the excellence in wrestling gymnastic ?

*Al.* You did.

*Soc.* And I was right ?

*Al.* I think that you were.

*Soc.* Well, now,—for you should learn to argue prettily—let me ask you in return to tell me, first, what is that art of which playing and singing, and stepping properly in the dance, are parts,—what is the name of the whole ? I think that by this time you must be able to tell.

*Al.* Indeed I cannot.

*Soc.* Then let me put the matter in another way : what do you call the Goddesses who are the patronesses of art ?

*Al.* The Muses do you mean, Socrates ?

*Soc.* Very good ; and what is the name of the art which is called after them ?

*Al.* I suppose that you mean music.

*Soc.* Yes, that is my meaning ; and what is the excellence of the art of music, as I told you truly that the excellence of wrestling was gymnastic —what is the excellence of music—to be what ?

*Al.* To be musical, I suppose.

*Soc.* Very good ; and now please to tell me what is the excellence of war and peace ; as the more musical was the more excellent, or the more gymnastical was the more excellent ; tell me, what name do you give to the more excellent in war and peace ?

*Al.* But I cannot.

*Soc.* But if you, offering advice to another, said to him—This food is better than that, at this time and in this quantity, and he said to you—What do you mean, Alcibiades, by the word ‘better’? you would have no difficulty in replying that you meant ‘more wholesome,’ although you do not profess to be a physician. And when the subject is one on which you profess to have knowledge, and about which you are ready to get up and advise as if you knew, are you not ashamed of having nothing to say, as appears to be the case? Is not that disgraceful?

*Al.* Very.

*Soc.* Well, then, consider and try to explain what is the meaning of ‘better,’ in the matter of making peace and going to war with those against whom you ought to go to war? To what does the word refer?

*Al.* I am thinking, and I cannot tell.

*Soc.* But you surely know what are the charges which we bring against one another, when we arrive at the point of making war, and what name we give them?

*Al.* Yes, certainly ; we say that we have been deceived, or forced, or defrauded.

*Soc.* And how does this happen? Will you tell me how? For there may be a difference in the manner.

*Al.* Do you mean by ‘how,’ Socrates, whether we suffered these things justly or unjustly?

*Soc.* Exactly.

*Al.* There can be no greater difference than between just and unjust.

*Soc.* And would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the just or with the unjust?

*Al.* That is an awkward question; for certainly, even if a person did intend to go to war with the just, he would not admit that they were just.

*Soc.* He would not go to war, because that would be unlawful ?  
*Al.* Yes ; and not honourable.

*Soc.* Then you, too, would address them on principles of justice ?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* What, then, is justice but that better, of which I spoke, in going to war or not going to war with those against whom we ought or ought not, and when we ought or ought not to go to war ?

*Al.* Clearly.

*Soc.* But how is this, friend Alcibiades ? Have you forgotten that you do not know this, or have you been to the school-master without my knowledge, and has he taught you to discern the just from the unjust ? Who is he ? I wish you would tell me, that I may go and learn of him—you shall introduce me.

*Al.* You are mocking, Socrates.

*Soc.* No, indeed ; I most solemnly declare to you by Zeus, who is the God of our common friendship, and whom I never will forswear, that I am not ; tell me, then, who this instructor is, if he exists ?

*Al.* But, perhaps, he does not exist ; may I not have acquired the knowledge of just and unjust in some other way ?

*Soc.* Yes ; if you have discovered them.

*Al.* But do you not think that I could discover them ?

*Soc.* I am sure that you might, if you enquired about them.

*Al.* And do you not think that I would enquire ?

*Soc.* Yes ; if you thought that you did not know them.

*Al.* And was there ever a time when I did not know them ?

*Soc.* Very good ; then can you tell me the time when you  
110 thought that you did not know the nature of the just and the unjust ? What do you say to a year ago ? Were you in the state of conscious ignorance and enquiry ? or did you think that you knew ? And please to answer truly, that our discussion may not be in vain.

*Al.* Well, I thought that I knew.

*Soc.* And two years ago, and three years ago, and four years ago, you knew all the same ?

*Al.* I did.

*Soc.* And more than four years ago you were a child—were you not?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And then I am quite sure that you thought you knew.

*Al.* And why are you sure?

*Soc.* Because I often heard you when a child, in your teacher's house, or elsewhere, playing at dice or some other game with the boys, not hesitating at all about the nature of the just and unjust; but very confident—crying and shouting that one of the boys was a rogue and a cheat, and had been cheating. Is not that true?

*Al.* But what was I to do, Socrates, when anybody cheated me?

*Soc.* Yes; and that very question implies that you knew the nature of just and unjust.

*Al.* To be sure I knew; I was quite aware that I was being cheated.

*Soc.* Then you suppose yourself when a child to have known the nature of just and unjust?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And when did you discover them—not, surely, at the time at which you thought that you knew them?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And when did you think that you were ignorant—if you consider, you will find that there never was such a time?

*Al.* Really, Socrates, I cannot say.

*Soc.* Then you did not learn them by discovering them?

*Al.* Clearly not.

*Soc.* But just before you said that you did not know them by learning; now, if you have neither discovered nor learned them, how and whence do you come to know them?

*Al.* I suppose that I was mistaken in saying that I knew them through my own discovery of them; whereas, in truth, I learned them in the same way that other people learn.

*Soc.* That is what you said before, and I must again ask, of whom? Do tell me.

*Al.* Of the many.

*Soc.* Do you take refuge in them? I cannot say much for your teachers.

*Al.* Why, are they not able to teach?

*Soc.* They could not teach you how to play at draughts, which you would acknowledge (would you not) to be a much smaller matter than justice?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And can they teach the better who are unable to teach the worse?

*Al.* I think that they can; at any rate, they can teach many far better things than to play at draughts.

III *Soc.* What things?

*Al.* Why, for example, I learned to speak Greek of them, and I cannot say who was my teacher, or to whom I am to attribute my knowledge of Greek, if not to those good-for-nothing teachers, as you call them.

*Soc.* Why, yes, my friend; and the many are good enough teachers of Greek, and their instructions in that line may be justly praised.

*Al.* Why is that?

*Soc.* Why, because they have the qualities of good teachers.

*Al.* What qualities?

*Soc.* Why, you know that knowledge is the first qualification of any teacher?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And if they know, they must agree together and not differ?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And would you say that they knew the things about which they differ?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* Then how can they teach them?

*Al.* They cannot.

*Soc.* Well, but do you imagine that the many would differ about the nature of wood and stone? are they not agreed if you ask them what they are? and do they not run to fetch the same thing, when they want a piece of wood or a stone? And so in similar cases, which I suspect to be pretty nearly all that you mean by speaking Greek.

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* These, as we were saying, are matters about which they

are agreed with one another and with themselves; both individuals and states use the same words about them; they do not use some one word and some another.

*Al.* They do not.

*Soc.* Then they may be expected to be good teachers of these things?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if we want to instruct any one in them, we shall be right in sending him to be taught by our friends the many?

*Al.* Very true.

*Soc.* But if we wanted further to know not only which are men and which are horses, but which men or horses have powers of running, would the many be able to inform us?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And you have a sufficient proof that they do not know these things and are not true teachers of them, inasmuch as they are never agreed about them?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And suppose that we wanted to know not only what men are like, but what healthy or diseased men are like—would the many be able to teach us?

*Al.* They would not.

*Soc.* And you would have a proof that they were bad teachers of these matters, if you saw them at variance?

*Al.* I should.

*Soc.* Well, but are the many agreed with themselves, or with one another, about the justice or injustice of men and things? 112

*Al.* Assuredly not, Socrates.

*Soc.* There is no subject about which they are more at variance?

*Al.* None.

*Soc.* I do not suppose that you ever saw or heard of men quarrelling over the principles of health and disease to such an extent as to go to war and kill one another for the sake of them?

*Al.* No, indeed.

*Soc.* But of the quarrels about justice and injustice, even if you have never seen them, you have certainly heard from many people, including Homer; for you have heard of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*?

*Al.* To be sure, Socrates.

*Soc.* A difference of just and unjust is the argument of those poems?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* Which difference caused all the wars and deaths of Trojans and Achaeans, and the deaths of the suitors of Penelope in their quarrel with Odysseus.

*Al.* Very true.

*Soc.* And when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians and Boeotians fell at Tanagra, and afterwards in the battle of Coronea, at which your father, Cleinias, met his end, the question was one of justice—this was the sole cause of the battles, and of their deaths.

*Al.* Very true.

*Soc.* But can they be said to understand that about which they are quarrelling to the death?

*Al.* Clearly not.

*Soc.* And yet those whom you thus allow to be ignorant are the teachers to whom you are appealing.

*Al.* Very true.

*Soc.* But how are you ever likely to know the nature of justice and injustice, about which you are so perplexed, if you have neither learned them of others nor discovered them yourself?

*Al.* From what you say, I suppose not.

*Soc.* See, again, how inaccurately you speak, Alcibiades!

*Al.* In what respect?

*Soc.* In saying that I say so.

*Al.* Why, did you not say that I know nothing of the just and unjust?

*Soc.* No; I did not.

*Al.* Did I, then?

*Soc.* Yes.

*Al.* How was that?

*Soc.* Let me explain. Suppose I were to ask you which is the greater number, two or one; you would reply ‘two’?

*Al.* I should.

*Soc.* And by how much greater?

*Al.* By one.

*Soc.* Which of us now says that two is more than one?

*Al.* I do.

*Soc.* Did not I ask, and you answer the question?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then who is speaking? I who put the question, or you <sup>113</sup> who answer me?

*Al.* I am.

*Soc.* Or suppose that I ask and you tell me the letters which make up the name Socrates, which of us is the speaker?

*Al.* I am.

*Soc.* Now let us put the case generally: whenever there is a question and answer, who is the speaker,—the questioner or the answerer?

*Al.* I should say, Socrates, that the answerer was the speaker.

*Soc.* And have I not been the questioner all through?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And you the answerer?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Which of us, then, was the speaker?

*Al.* The inference is, Socrates, that I was the speaker.

*Soc.* Did not some one say that Alcibiades, the fair son of Cleinias, not understanding about just and unjust, but thinking that he did understand, was going to the assembly to advise the Athenians about what he did not know? Was not that said?

*Al.* That is true.

*Soc.* Then, Alcibiades, the result may be expressed in the language of Euripides. I think that you have heard all this 'from yourself, and not from me;' nor did I say this, which you erroneously attribute to me, but you yourself, and what you said was very true. For indeed, my dear fellow, the design which you meditate of teaching what you do not know, and have not taken any pains to learn, is downright insanity.

*Al.* But, Socrates, I think that the Athenians and the rest of the Hellenes do not often advise as to the more just or unjust; for they see no difficulty in them, and therefore they leave them, and consider which course of action will be most expedient; for there is a great difference between justice and expediency. Many persons have done great wrong and profited by their injustice; others have done rightly and suffered.

*Soc.* Well, but granting that the just and the expedient are

ever so much opposed, you surely do not imagine that you know what is expedient for mankind, or why a thing is expedient?

*Al.* Why not, Socrates? —But I am not going to be asked again from whom I learned, or when I made the discovery.

*Soc.* What a way you have! When you make a mistake which might be refuted by a previous argument, you insist on having a new and different refutation; the old argument is a worn-out garment which you will no longer put on, but some one must 114 produce another which is clean and new. Now I shall disregard this move of yours, and proceed to enquire again—where did you learn and how do you know the nature of the expedient, and who is your teacher? If I do but ask a single question, then, as is obvious, you will be in the old difficulty, and will not be able to show that you know the expedient, either because you learned or because you discovered it yourself. But, as I perceive that you are dainty, and dislike the taste of an argument which you have had already, I will enquire no further into your knowledge of what is expedient or what is not expedient for the Athenian people, and simply request you to say why you do not explain whether justice and expediency are the same or different? And if you like you may examine me as I have examined you, or, if you would rather, you may carry on the discussion by yourself.

*Al.* But I am not certain, Socrates, whether I shall be able to discuss the matter with you.

*Soc.* Then imagine, my dear fellow, that I am the demus and the ecclesia; for in the ecclesia, too, you will have to persuade men individually.

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And is not the same person able to persuade one individual singly and many individuals of the things which he knows? The grammarian, for example, can persuade one and he can persuade many about letters.

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* And about number, will not the same person persuade one and persuade many?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And this will be he who knows number, or the arithmetician?

*Al.* Quite true.

*Soc.* And cannot you persuade one man about that of which you can persuade many?

*Al.* I suppose that I can.

*Soc.* And that is clearly what you know?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the only difference between one who argues as we are doing, and the orator who is addressing an assembly, is that the one seeks to persuade a number, and the other an individual, of the same things.

*Al.* That may be supposed.

*Soc.* Well, then, since the same person who can persuade a multitude can persuade individuals, try conclusions upon me, and prove to me that the just is not always expedient.

*Al.* You take liberties, Socrates.

*Soc.* I shall take the liberty of proving to you the opposite of that which you will not prove to me.

*Al.* Proceed.

*Soc.* Answer my questions—that is all.

*Al.* Nay, I should like you to be the speaker.

*Soc.* What, do you not wish to be persuaded?

*Al.* Certainly I do.

*Soc.* And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth?

*Al.* I think not.

*Soc.* Then you shall answer; and if you do not hear the words, that the just is the expedient, coming out of your own lips, never believe another man again.

*Al.* No, indeed; and answer I will, for I do not see how I can come to any harm.

*Soc.* A true prophecy! Let me begin then by enquiring of 115 you whether you allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And sometimes honourable and sometimes not?

*Al.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* I am asking if you ever knew any one who did what was dishonourable and yet just?

*Al.* I never did.

*Soc.* All just things are honourable?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes not good, or are they always good?

*Al.* I rather think, Socrates, that some honourable things are evil.

*Soc.* And are some dishonourable things good?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* You mean in such a case as the following:—In time of war, men have been wounded or have died in rescuing a companion or kinsman, when others who have neglected the duty of rescuing them have escaped in safety?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* And to rescue another under such circumstances is honourable, because of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save; and this is courage?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* But evil because of death and wounds?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing, and the death another?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then the rescue of one's friends is honourable in one point of view, but evil in another?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* And if honourable, then also good: Will you consider now whether I may not be right, for you were acknowledging that the courage which is shown in the rescue is honourable? Now is this courage good or evil? Look at the matter thus: which would you rather choose, good or evil?

*Al.* Good.

*Soc.* And the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose, and would least like to be deprived of them?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* What would you say of courage? At what price would you be willing to be deprived of courage?

*Al.* I would rather die than be a coward.

*Soc.* Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils?

*Al.* I do.

*Soc.* As bad as death, I suppose?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And they are what you would most desire to have, and their opposites you would least desire?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Is this because you think life and courage the best, and death and cowardice the worst?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And you would regard the rescue of a friend in battle as good, because of the courage which is there shown?

*Al.* I should.

*Soc.* But evil because of the death which ensues?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Might we not describe their different effects as follows:— You may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the effect, and good in respect of the good which is the effect 116 of either of them?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And they are honourable in so far as they are good, and dishonourable in so far as they are evil?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* Then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle is honourable and yet evil, that is equivalent to saying that the rescue is good and yet evil?

*Al.* I believe that you are right, Socrates.

*Soc.* Nothing honourable, regarded as honourable, is evil; nor anything base, regarded as base, good.

*Al.* Clearly not.

*Soc.* Look at the matter yet once more in a further light: he who acts honourably acts well?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And he who acts well is happy?

*Al.* Of course.

*Soc.* And the happy are those who obtain good?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* And they obtain good by acting well and honourably?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then acting well is a good?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And happiness is a good?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then the good and the honourable are again identified?

*Al.* That is evident.

*Soc.* Then, according to the argument, that which we find to be honourable we shall also find to be good?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And is the good expedient or not?

*Al.* Expedient.

*Soc.* Do you remember our admissions about the just?

*Al.* Yes; if I am not mistaken, we said that those who acted justly must also act honourably.

*Soc.* And the honourable is the good?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the good is expedient?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient?

*Al.* I should infer so.

*Soc.* And all this I prove out of your own mouth, for I ask and you answer?

*Al.* I must acknowledge that you do.

*Soc.* And having acknowledged that the just is the same as the expedient, are you not (let me ask) prepared to ridicule any one who, pretending to understand the principles of justice and injustice, gets up to advise the noble Athenians or the ignoble Peparethians, that the just may be the evil?

*Al.* I declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I am saying. Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions to me I am of different minds in successive instants.

*Soc.* And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my friend?

*Al.* Indeed I am not.

*Soc.* Do you suppose that if some one were to ask you whether you have two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything of that sort, you would then be of different minds in successive instants?

*Al.* I begin to distrust myself, but still I do not suppose that <sup>117</sup> I should be of different minds about that.

*Soc.* You would feel no doubt ; and for this reason—because you would know ?

*Al.* I suppose so.

*Soc.* And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is clearly that you are ignorant ?

*Al.* Very likely.

*Soc.* And if you feel this perplexity in answering about just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, good and evil, expedient and inexpedient, the reason is that you are ignorant of them, and therefore in perplexity. Is not that clear ?

*Al.* I agree.

*Soc.* But is this always the case, and is a man necessarily perplexed about that of which he has no knowledge ?

*Al.* Certainly he is.

*Soc.* And do you know how to ascend into heaven ?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And in this case, too, is your judgment perplexed ?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* Do you see the reason why, or shall I tell you ?

*Al.* Tell me.

*Soc.* The reason is, that you not only do not know, my friend, but you do not think that you know.

*Al.* There again ; what do you mean ?

*Soc.* Ask yourself ; are you in any perplexity about things of which you are ignorant ? You know, for example, that you know nothing about the preparation of food.

*Al.* Very true.

*Soc.* And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of food : or do you leave that to some one who understands the art ?

*Al.* The latter.

*Soc.* Or if you are on a voyage, do you bewilder yourself by considering whether the rudder is to be drawn inwards or outwards, or do you leave that to the pilot, and do nothing ?

*Al.* That would be the concern of the pilot.

*Soc.* Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you know that you do not know it ?

*Al.* I imagine not.

*Soc.* Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practice are likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of knowledge?

*Al.* What do you mean by that, again?

*Soc.* I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what we are doing?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* But when people think that they do not know, they entrust their business to others?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And so there is a class of ignorant persons who do not make mistakes in life, because they trust others?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* Who, then, are the persons who make mistakes? They cannot, of course, be those who know?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* But if neither those who know, nor those who know that 118 they do not know, make mistakes, there remain those only who do not know and think that they know.

*Al.* Yes, only those.

*Soc.* Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is mischievous?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do with the greatest matters?

*Al.* By far.

*Soc.* And can there be any matters greater than the just, the honourable, the good, and the expedient?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And these, as you were saying, are what perplex you?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* But if you are perplexed, then, as the previous argument has shown, you are not only ignorant of the greatest matters, but being ignorant you fancy that you know them?

*Al.* I fear that you are right.

*Soc.* And now see what has happened to you, Alcibiades! I hardly like to speak of your evil case, but as we are alone I will: you are living, my good friend, in the most disgraceful

state of ignorance, of which you are convicted, not by me, but by the argument, and out of your own mouth -this is what makes you rush into polities before you are educated. Neither is your case singular. For I might say the same of almost all our statesmen, with the exception, perhaps, of your guardian, Pericles.

*Al.* Yes, Socrates; and Pericles is said not to have got his wisdom by the light of nature, but to have associated with several of the philosophers; with Pythocleides, for example, and with Anaxagoras, and now in advanced life with Damon, in the hope of gaining wisdom.

*Soc.* Very good; but did you ever know a man wise in anything who was unable to impart his particular wisdom? For example, he who taught you letters was not only wise, but he made you and any others whom he liked wise.

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And you, whom he taught, can do the same?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* And the same is true of the harper and gymnastic-master?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* When a person is enabled to impart his knowledge to another, that surely proves his own understanding of any matter.

*Al.* I agree.

*Soc.* Well, and did Pericles make any one wise; did he begin by making his sons wise?

*Al.* But, Socrates, if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what has that to do with the matter?

*Soc.* Well, but did he make your brother, Cleinias, wise?

*Al.* Cleinias was a madman; there is no use in talking of him

*Soc.* But if Cleinias was a madman and the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what reason can be given why he neglects you, and lets you be as you are?

*Al.* I believe that I am to blame for not listening to him.

*Soc.* But did you ever hear of any other Athenian or foreigner, bond or free, who was deemed to have grown wiser in the society 119 of Pericles,—as I might cite Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, and Callias, the son of Calliades, who have grown wiser in the

society of Zeno, for which privilege they have each of them paid him the sum of a hundred minae to the increase of their wisdom and name.

*Al.* I certainly never did hear of any one.

*Soc.* Well, and in reference to your own case, do you mean to remain as you are, or will you take pains about yourself?

*Al.* With your aid, Socrates, I will. And indeed, when I hear you speak, the truth of what you are saying strikes home to me, and I agree with you, for our statesmen, all but a few, do appear to be quite uneducated.

*Soc.* What is the inference from this?

*Al.* Why, that if they were educated they would be trained athletes, and he who means to rival them ought to have knowledge and experience in assailing them; but now, as they have become politicians quite without any special training, why should I have the trouble of learning and practising? For I know well that by the light of nature I shall get the better of them.

*Soc.* My dear friend, what a sentiment! And how unworthy of your noble form and your high estate!

*Al.* What makes you say that, Socrates?

*Soc.* I am grieved when I think of our mutual love.

*Al.* At what?

*Soc.* At your fancying that the contest on which you are entering is with people here.

*Al.* Why, what others are there?

*Soc.* Is that a question which a magnanimous soul should ask?

*Al.* Do you mean to say that the contest is not with these?

*Soc.* And suppose that you were going to steer a ship into action, would you only aim at being the best pilot on board? Would you not, while acknowledging that you must attain this degree of excellence, rather look to your true rivals, and not, as you are now doing, to your fellows?—You ought to be so far above these, that, instead of regarding them as rivals, you should despise them and not allow them to serve in the same ranks with you against the enemy, if you mean to accomplish any noble action really worthy of yourself and of the state.

*Al.* That would certainly be my aim.

*Soc.* Verily you have reason to be satisfied, for are you not better than the soldiers? and why, having trained yourself to

be the best of them, should you look so high as the generals of the enemy?

*Al.* But who are they, Socrates?

*Soc.* Why, you surely know that our city goes to war now and 120 then with the Lacedaemonians and with the great king?

*Al.* True enough.

*Soc.* And if you meant to be the ruler of this city, would you not be right in considering that the Lacedaemonian and Persian kings were your true rivals?

*Al.* I believe that you are right.

*Soc.* Oh no, my friend, I am quite wrong, and I think that you ought rather to turn your attention to Midias the quail-breeder and others like him, who manage our politics: in whom as the women would remark, you may still see the slaves' cut of hair, cropping out in their minds as well as on their pates; and they come with their barbarous lingo to flatter us and not to rule us. To these, I say, you should look, and then you will have no need to take any heed of yourself in this noble contest; you will not have to trouble yourself either with learning what has to be learned, or practising what has to be practised, or to prepare yourself thoroughly for a political career.

*Al.* There, I think, Socrates, that you are right: I do not suppose, however, that the Spartan generals or the great king are really different from anybody else.

*Soc.* But, my dear friend, do consider what you are saying.

*Al.* What shall I consider?

*Soc.* In the first place, will you be more likely to take care of yourself, if you are in a wholesome fear and dread of them, or if you are not?

*Al.* Clearly, if I have such a fear of them.

*Soc.* And do you think that you will sustain any injury if you take care of yourself?

*Al.* No, I shall be greatly benefited.

*Soc.* And this is one very important respect in which that notion of yours is bad.

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* In the next place, consider that what you say is probably false.

*Al.* How so?

*Soc.* Let me ask you whether better natures are likely to be found in noble races or not in noble races?

*Al.* Clearly in noble races.

*Soc.* Are not those who are well born and well bred most likely to be perfect in nature?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then let us compare our antecedents with those of the Lacedaemonian and Persian kings; are they inferior to us in descent? Have we not heard that the former are sprung from Heracles, and the latter from Achaemenes, and that the race of Heracles and the race of Achaemenes go back to Perseus, son of Zeus?

121 *Al.* Why, so does mine go back to Eurysaces, and he to Zeus!

*Soc.* And mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, and he to Hephaestus, son of Zeus. But, for all this, we are far inferior to them. For they are descended 'from Zeus,' through a line of kings—either kings of Argos and Lacedaemon, or kings of Persia, a country which the descendants of Achaemenes have always possessed, besides being at various times sovereigns of Asia, as they now are; whereas, we and our fathers were but private persons. How ridiculous would you be thought if you made a parade of your ancestors and of Salamis the island of Eurysaces, or of Aegina, the habitation of the still more ancient Aeacus, before Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes. You should consider how inferior we are to them both in the derivation of our birth and in other particulars. Did you never observe how great is the property of the Spartan kings? And their wives are under the guardianship of the Ephori, who are public officers, and watch over them, in order to preserve the purity of the Heracleid blood. Still greater is the difference among the Persians; for no one entertains a suspicion that the father of a prince of Persia can be any one but the king. Such is the awe which invests the person of the queen, that any other guard is needless. And when the heir of the kingdom is born, all the subjects of the king feast; and the day of his birth is for ever afterwards kept as a holiday and time of sacrifice by all Asia; whereas, when you and I were born, Alcibiades, as the comic poet says, the neighbours hardly knew of the important event. After the birth of the royal child,

he is tended, not by a good-for-nothing woman-nurse, but by the best of the royal eunuchs, who are charged with the care of him, and especially with the fashioning and formation of his limbs, in order that he may be as shapely as possible ; which being their calling, they are held in great honour. And when the young prince is seven years old he is put upon a horse and taken to the riding-masters, and begins to go out hunting. And at fourteen years of age he is handed over to the royal school-masters, as they are termed : these are four chosen men, reputed to be the best among the Persians of a certain age ; and one of them is the wisest, another the justest, a third the most temperate, and a fourth the most valiant. The first instructs him in the magianism of Zoroaster, the son of Oromasus, which is 122 the worship of the Gods, and teaches him also the duties of his royal office ; the second, who is the justest, teaches him always to speak the truth ; the third, or most temperate, forbids him to allow any pleasure to be lord over him, that he may be accustomed to be a freeman and king indeed,—lord of himself first, and not a slave ; the most valiant makes him bold and fearless, telling him that if he fears he is to deem himself a slave ; whereas Pericles gave you, Alcibiades, for a tutor Zopyrus the Thracian, a slave of his who was past all other work. I might enlarge on the nurture and education of your rivals, but that would be tedious ; and what I have said is a sufficient sample of what remains to be said. I have only to remark, by way of contrast, that no one cares about your birth or nurture or education, or, I may say, about that of any other Athenian, unless he has a lover who takes care of him. And if you cast an eye on the wealth, the luxury, the garments with their flowing trains, the anointings with myrrh, the multitudes of attendants, and all the other bravery of the Persians, you will be ashamed when you discern your own inferiority ; or if you look at the temperance and orderliness and ease and grace and magnanimity and courage and endurance and love of toil and desire of glory and ambition of the Lacedaemonians—in all these respects you will see that you are but a child in comparison of them. Even in the matter of wealth, if you value yourself upon that, I must reveal to you how you stand ; for if you form an estimate of the wealth of the Lacedaemonians, you will see that

our possessions fall far short of theirs. For no one here can compete with them either in the extent and fertility of their own and Messenian territory, or in the number of their slaves, and especially of the Helots, or of their horses, or of the animals which feed on the Messenian pastures. But I have said enough of this: and as to gold and silver, there is more of them in Lacedaemon than in all the rest of Hellas, for during many generations gold has been always flowing in to them from the whole Hellenic world, and often from the barbarian also, and never flowing out, as in the fable of Aesop, the fox said to the lion, ‘The prints of the feet of those going in are distinct enough;’ but who ever saw the trace of money going out of Lacedaemon? and therefore you may safely infer that the inhabitants are the richest of the Hellenes in gold and silver, and their kings are the richest of all, for they have a larger share of these things, and they have also a tribute paid to them which is very considerable. Yet the Spartan wealth, though great in comparison of the wealth of the other Hellenes, is as nothing in comparison of that of the Persians and their kings. Why, I have been informed by a credible person who went up to the king [at Susa], that he passed through a large tract of excellent land, extending for nearly a day’s journey, which the people of the country called the queen’s girdle, and another, which they called her veil; and several other fair and fertile districts, which were reserved for the adornment of the queen, and are named after her several habiliments. Now, I cannot help thinking to myself, What if some one were to go to Amestris, the wife of Xerxes and mother of Artaxerxes, and say to her, There is a certain Dinomachè, whose whole wardrobe is not worth fifty minae—and that will be more than the value—and she has a son who is possessed of a three-hundred acre patch at Erchiaæ, and he has a mind to go to war with your son—would she not wonder to what this Alcibiades trusts for success in the conflict? ‘He must rely,’ she would say to herself, ‘upon his training and wisdom—these are the things which Hellenes value.’ And if she heard that this Alcibiades who is making the attempt is not as yet twenty years old, and is wholly uneducated, and that when his lover tells him that he ought to get education and training first, and then go and fight the king, he refuses, and says that

he is well enough as he is, would she not be amazed, and ask, 'On what, then, does the youth rely?' And if we replied: He relies on his beauty, and stature, and birth, and mental endowments, she would think that we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages which you possess with those of her own people. And I believe that Lampido, the daughter of <sup>124</sup> Leptychides, the wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, all of whom were kings, would have the same feeling; if, in your present uneducated state, you were to turn your thoughts against her son, she too would be equally astonished. But how disgraceful, that we should not have as high a notion of what is required in us as our enemies' wives have of the qualities which are required in their assailants! O my friend, be persuaded by me, and hear the Delphian inscription, 'Know thyself'—not the men whom you think, but these kings are our rivals, and we can only overcome them by pains and skill. And if you fail in the required qualities, you will fail also in becoming renowned among Hellenes and Barbarians, which you seem to desire more than any other man ever desired anything.

*Al.* I entirely believe you; but what are the sort of pains which are required, Socrates,—can you tell me?

*Soc.* Yes, I can; but, as you say, with your aid<sup>1</sup>: we will enquire how we may be most improved; for what I am telling you of the necessity of education applies to myself as well as to you; and there is only one point in which I have an advantage over you.

*Al.* What is that?

*Soc.* I have a guardian who is better and wiser than your guardian, Pericles.

*Al.* Who is he, Socrates?

*Soc.* God, Alcibiades, who up to this day has not allowed me to converse with you; and he inspires in me the faith that I am especially designed to bring you to honour.

*Al.* You are jesting, Socrates.

*Soc.* Perhaps; at any rate, I am right in saying that all men greatly need pains and care, and you and I above all men.

*Al.* You are not far wrong about me.

*Soc.* And certainly not about myself.

<sup>1</sup> See above 119 B.

*Al.* But what can we do?

*Soc.* There must be no hesitation or cowardice, my friend.

*Al.* That would not become us, Socrates.

*Soc.* No, indeed, and we ought to take counsel together: for do we not wish to be as good as possible?

*Al.* We do.

*Soc.* In what sort of virtue?

*Al.* Plainly, in the virtue of good men.

*Soc.* Who are good in what?

*Al.* Those, clearly, who are good in the management of affairs.

*Soc.* What sort of affairs? Equestrian affairs?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* You mean that about them we should have recourse to horsemen?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Well; naval affairs?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* You mean that we should have recourse to sailors about them?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then what affairs? And who do them?

125 *Al.* The affairs which occupy Athenian gentlemen.

*Soc.* And when you speak of gentlemen, do you mean the wise or the unwise?

*Al.* The wise.

*Soc.* And a man is good in respect of that in which he is wise?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And evil in respect of that in which he is unwise?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* The shoemaker, for example, is wise in respect of the making of shoes?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then in that he is good?

*Al.* He is.

*Soc.* But in respect of the making of garments he is unwise?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then in that he is bad?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then upon this view of the matter the same man is good and also bad?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* But would you say that the good are the same as the bad?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Then whom do you call the good?

*Al.* I mean by the good those who are able to rule in the city.

*Soc.* Not, surely, over horses?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* But over men?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* When they are sick?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* Or on a voyage?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* Or reaping the harvest?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* When they are doing something or nothing?

*Al.* When they are doing something, I should say.

*Soc.* I wish that you would explain to me what that is.

*Al.* When they are having dealings with one another, and using one another's services, as citizens do.

*Soc.* Those of whom you speak are ruling over men who are using the services of other men?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Are they ruling over the signal-men who use the services of the rowers?

*Al.* No; they are not.

*Soc.* That would be the office of the pilot?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* But, perhaps you mean that they rule over flute-players, who lead the singers and use the services of the dancers?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* That would be the business of the teacher of the chorus?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then what is the meaning of being able to rule over men who use other men?

*All.* I mean that they rule over men who have common rights of citizenship, and dealings with one another.

*Soc.* And what sort of an art is this? Suppose that I ask you again, as I did just now, What art makes men know how to rule over their fellow-sailors,—how would you answer?

*All.* The art of the pilot.

*Soc.* And, if I may recur to another old instance, what art enables them to rule over their fellow-singers?

*All.* The art of the teacher of the chorus, which you were just now mentioning.

*Soc.* And what do you call the art of fellow-citizens?

*All.* Good counsel, Socrates, I should say.

*Soc.* And is the art of the pilot evil counsel?

*All.* No.

*Soc.* But good counsel?

126 *All.* Yes, that is what I should say,—good counsel, of which the aim is the preservation of the voyagers.

*Soc.* True. And what is the aim of that other good counsel of which you speak?

*All.* The aim is the better order and preservation of the city.

*Soc.* And what is that of which the absence or presence improves and preserves the order of the city? Suppose you were to ask me, what is that of which the presence or absence improves or preserves the order of the body? I should reply, the presence of health and the absence of disease. You would agree to that?

*All.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if you were to ask me the same question about the eyes, I should reply in the same way, ‘the presence of sight and the absence of blindness;’ or about the ears, I should reply, that they were improved and were in better case, when deafness was absent, and hearing was present in them.

*All.* True.

*Soc.* And what would you say of a state? What is that by the presence or absence of which the state is improved and better managed and ordered?

*All.* I should say, Socrates:—the presence of friendship and the absence of hatred and division.

*Soc.* And do you mean by friendship agreement or disagreement?

*Al.* Agreement.

*Soc.* What art makes cities agree about numbers?

*Al.* Arithmetic.

*Soc.* And private individuals?

*Al.* The same.

*Soc.* And what art makes each individual agree with himself?

*Al.* The same.

*Soc.* And what art makes each of us agree with himself about the comparative length of the span and of the cubit? Does not the art of measure?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Individuals and states are equally agreed about this?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the same holds of the balance?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* But what is that other agreement of which you speak, and about what? what art can give that agreement? And does that which gives it to the state give it also to the individual, so as to make him consistent with himself and with another?

*Al.* I should suppose so.

*Soc.* But what is the nature of the agreement?—answer, and faint not.

*Al.* I mean to say that there should be such friendship and agreement as exists between an affectionate father and mother and their son, or between brothers, or between husband and wife.

*Soc.* But can a man, Alcibiades, agree with a woman about the spinning of wool, which she understands and he does not?

*Al.* No, truly.

*Soc.* Nor has he any need, for spinning is a female accomplishment.

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And would a woman agree with a man about the science of arms, which she has never learned?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* I suppose that the use of arms would be regarded by you as a male accomplishment?

*Al.* I should.

*Soc.* Then, upon your view, women and men have two sorts of knowledge?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then in their knowledge there is no agreement of women and men?

*Al.* There is not.

*Soc.* Nor can there be friendship, if friendship is agreement?

*Al.* Plainly not.

*Soc.* Then women are not loved by men when they do their own work?

*Al.* I suppose not.

*Soc.* Nor men by women when they do their own work?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* Nor are states well administered, when individuals do their own work?

*Al.* I should rather think, Socrates, that the reverse is the truth.

*Soc.* What! do you mean to say that states are well administered when friendship is absent, the presence of which, as we were saying, alone secures their good order?

*Al.* But I should say that there is friendship among them, for this very reason, that the two parties respectively do their own work.

*Soc.* That was not what you were saying just now; and what do you mean by affirming that friendship exists when there is no agreement? How can there be agreement about matters which the one party knows, and of which the other is in ignorance?

*Al.* Impossible.

*Soc.* And when individuals are doing their own work, are they doing what is just or unjust?

*Al.* What is just, certainly.

*Soc.* And when individuals do what is just in the state, is there no friendship among them?

*Al.* I suppose that there must be, Socrates.

*Soc.* Then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement about which we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men? I cannot make out where it exists or among whom; according to you, the same persons may sometimes have it, and sometimes not.

*Al.* But, indeed, Socrates, I do not know what I am saying ; and I have long been, unconsciously to myself, in a most disgraceful state.

*Soc.* Nevertheless, cheer up : at fifty, if you had discovered your deficiency, you would have been too old, and the time for taking care of yourself would have passed away, but yours is just the age at which the discovery should be made.

*Al.* And what should he do, Socrates, who would make the discovery ?

*Soc.* Answer questions, Alcibiades ; and that is a process which, by the grace of God, if I may put any faith in my oracle, will be very improving to both of us.

*Al.* If I can be improved by answering, I will answer.

*Soc.* And first of all, that we may not be deceived by appearances, fancying, perhaps, that we are taking care of ourselves when we are not, what is the meaning of a man taking care of himself ? and when does he take care ? Does he take care of himself when he takes care of what belongs to him ?

*Al.* I should think so.

*Soc.* When does a man take care of his feet ? Does he not take care of them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet ?

*Al.* I do not understand.

*Soc.* Let me take the hand as an illustration ; does not a ring belong to the finger, and to the finger only ?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the shoe in like manner to the foot ?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And when we take care of our shoes, do we not take care of our feet ?

*Al.* I do not comprehend, Socrates.

*Soc.* But you acknowledge, Alcibiades, that there is such a thing as taking proper care ?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And taking proper care means improving ?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And what is the art which improves our shoes ?

*Al.* Shoemaking.

*Soc.* Then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes ?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And do we by shoemaking take care of our feet, or by some other art which improves the feet?

*Al.* By some other art.

*Soc.* And the same art improves the feet which improves the rest of the body?

*Al.* Very true.

*Soc.* And that is gymnastic?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemaking of that which belongs to our feet?

*Al.* Very true.

*Soc.* And by gymnastic we take care of our hands, and by the art of graving rings of that which belongs to our hands?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And by gymnastic we take care of the body, and by the art of weaving and the other arts we take care of the things of the body?

*Al.* Clearly.

*Soc.* Then the art which takes care of each thing is different from that which takes care of the belongings of each thing?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* Then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not take care of yourself?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to be the same as that which takes care of ourselves?

*Al.* Clearly not.

*Soc.* And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care of ourselves?

*Al.* I cannot say.

*Soc.* At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is not one which makes any of our belongings, but which makes ourselves better?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we did not know a shoe?

*Al.* Impossible.

*Soc.* Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did not know a ring?

*Al.* That is true.

*Soc.* And can we ever know what art makes a man better,<sup>129</sup> if we do not know what we are ourselves?

*Al.* Impossible.

*Soc.* And is self-knowledge an easy thing, and was he to be lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi? Or is self-knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain?

*Al.* At times I fancy, Socrates, that anybody can know himself; at other times the task appears to be very difficult.

*Soc.* But whether easy or difficult, Alcibiades, still there is no other way; knowing what we are, we shall know how to take care of ourselves, and if we are ignorant we shall not know.

*Al.* That is true.

*Soc.* Well, then, let us see in what way the self-existent can be discovered by us; that will give us a chance of discovering our own existence, which otherwise we can never know.

*Al.* You say truly.

*Soc.* Come, now, I beseech you, tell me with whom you are conversing?—with whom but with me?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* As I am, with you?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* That is to say, I, Socrates, am talking?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And I in talking use words?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And talking and using words have, I suppose, the same meaning?

*Al.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And the user is not the same as the thing which he uses?

*Al.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* I will explain; the shoemaker, for example, uses a square tool, and a circular tool, and other tools for cutting?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* But the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of the tool?

*Al.* Of course not.

*Soc.* And in the same way the instrument of the harper is to be distinguished from the harper himself?

*Al.* It is.

*Soc.* Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive the user to be always different from that which he uses?

*Al.* I do.

*Soc.* Then what shall we say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his tools only or with his hands?

*Al.* With his hands as well.

*Soc.* He uses his hands too?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And does he use his eyes in cutting leather?

*Al.* He does.

*Soc.* And we admit that the user is not the same with the things which he uses?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished from the hands and feet which they use?

*Al.* That is clear.

*Soc.* And does not a man use the whole body?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And that which uses is different from that which is used?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* Then a man is not the same as his own body?

*Al.* That is the inference.

*Soc.* What is he, then?

*Al.* I cannot say.

*Soc.* Nay, you can say that he is the user of the body.

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the user of the body is the soul?

*Al.* Yes, the soul.

*Soc.* And the soul rules?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Let me make an assertion which will, I think, be universally admitted.

*Al.* What is that?

*Soc.* That man is one of three things.

*Al.* What are they?

*Soc.* Soul, body, or the union of the two.

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the body is man?

*Al.* Yes, we did.

*Soc.* And does the body rule over itself?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* It is subject, as we were saying?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then that is not the principle which we are seeking?

*Al.* It would seem not.

*Soc.* But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body, and consequently that this is man?

*Al.* Very likely.

*Soc.* The most unlikely of all things; for if one of the members is subject, the two united cannot possibly rule.

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man, either man has no real existence, or the soul is man?

*Al.* Just so.

*Soc.* Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man?

*Al.* No; I think that the proof is sufficient.

*Soc.* If the proof, although not quite precise, is fair, we may be satisfied;—more precise proof will be supplied when we have discovered that which we were led to omit, from a fear that the enquiry would be too much protracted.

*Al.* What was that?

*Soc.* What I meant, when I said that absolute existence must be first considered; but now, instead of absolute existence, we have been considering the nature of individual existence, and this may, perhaps, be sufficient; for surely there is nothing belonging to us which may be more properly said to exist than the soul?

*Al.* There is nothing.

*Soc.* Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with one another, soul to soul?

*Al.* Very true.

*Soc.* And that is just what I was saying before—that I Socrates, am not arguing or talking with the face of Alcibiades, but with the real Alcibiades; or in other words, with his soul.

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his soul?

*Al.* That appears to be true.

131 *Soc.* He, then, whose knowledge only extends to the body, knows the things of a man, and not the man himself?

*Al.* That is true.

*Soc.* Then neither the physician regarded as a physician, nor the trainer regarded as a trainer, knows himself?

*Al.* He does not.

*Soc.* Then the husbandmen and the other craftsmen are very far from knowing themselves, for they would seem not even to know their own belongings? When regarded in relation to the arts which they practise they are even further removed, for they only know the belongings of the body, which minister to the body.

*Al.* That is true.

*Soc.* Then if temperance is the knowledge of self, in respect of his art, none of them is temperate?

*Al.* I agree.

*Soc.* And this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar, and are not such as a good man would practise?

*Al.* Quite true.

*Soc.* Again, he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself, but what belongs to him?

*Al.* That is true.

*Soc.* But he who cherishes his money, cherishes neither himself nor his belongings, but is in a stage yet further removed from himself?

*Al.* I agree.

*Soc.* Then the money-maker has really ceased to be occupied with his own concerns?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* And if any one has fallen in love with the person of Alcibiades, he loves not Alcibiades, but the belongings of Alcibiades?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* But he who loves your soul is the true lover?

*Al.* That is the necessary inference.

*Soc.* The lover of the body goes away when the flower of youth fades?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* But he who loves the soul goes not away, as long as the soul follows after virtue?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And I am the lover who goes not away, but remains with you, when you are no longer young and the rest are gone?

*Al.* Yes, Socrates; and in that you do well, and I hope that you will remain.

*Soc.* Then you must try to look your best.

*Al.* I will.

*Soc.* The fact is, that there is only one lover of Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias; there neither is nor ever has been seemingly any other; and this only darling in whom he rejoices is Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete.

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* And did you not say, that if I had not spoken first, you were on the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained?

*Al.* That is true.

*Soc.* The reason was that I only love you, whereas other men love what belongs to you; and your beauty, which is not you, is fading away, just as your true self is beginning to bloom. And 132 I will never desert you, if you are not spoiled and deformed by the Athenian people; for the danger which I most fear is that you will become a lover of the people and will be spoiled by them. Many a noble Athenian has been ruined in this way. For the demus of the great-hearted Erechtheus is of a fair countenance, but you should see him naked; wherefore observe the caution which I give you.

*Al.* What caution?

*Soc.* Practise yourself, sweet friend, in learning what you ought to know, before you enter on politics; and then you will have an antidote which will keep you harmless.

*Al.* Good advice, Socrates, but I wish that you would explain to me in what way I am to take care of myself.

*Soc.* Have we not made an advance? for we are at any rate tolerably well agreed as to what we are, and there is no longer

any danger, as we once feared, that we might be taking care not of ourselves, but of something which is not ourselves.

*Al.* That is true.

*Soc.* And our first duty will be to take care of the soul, and look to that?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to others?

*Al.* Very good.

*Soc.* But how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of the soul?—For if we know them, the inference is that we shall know ourselves. Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian inscription, of which we were just now speaking?

*Al.* What have you in your thoughts, Socrates?

*Soc.* I will tell you what I suspect to be the meaning and lesson of that inscription. Let me take an illustration from sight, which I imagine to be the only one suitable to my purpose.

*Al.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* Consider; if some one were to say to the eye, 'See thyself,' as you might say to a man, 'Know thyself,' what is the nature and meaning of this precept? Would not his meaning be:—That the eye should look at that in which it would see itself?

*Al.* Clearly.

*Soc.* And what is the object in looking at which, we see ourselves?

*Al.* Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like.

*Soc.* Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a mirror in our own eyes?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Did you ever observe that the face of the person looking into the eye of another is reflected as in a mirror in the visual organ which is over against him, and which is called the pupil—there is a sort of image of the person looking?

*Al.* That is quite true.

*Soc.* Then the eye, looking at another eye, and at that in the eye which is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will there see itself?

*Al.* That is evident.

*Soc.* But looking at anything else either in man or in the world, and not to what resembles this, it will not see itself?

*Al.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself, must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul in which her virtue resides, and which is like herself?

*Al.* I agree, Socrates.

*Soc.* And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that which has to do with wisdom and knowledge?

*Al.* There is none.

*Soc.* Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine, and he who by looking at this knows all that is divine, will be most likely to know himself?

*Al.* That is plain.

*Soc.* And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever know our own good and evil?

*Al.* How is that possible, Socrates?

*Soc.* You mean, that if you did not know Alcibiades, there would be no possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Alcibiades was really his?

*Al.* That would indeed be impossible.

*Soc.* Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything belonged, if we did not know ourselves?

*Al.* How could we?

*Soc.* And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we know the belongings of our belongings?

*Al.* Clearly not.

*Soc.* Then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just now that a man may know what belongs to him and yet not know himself; nay, rather he cannot even know the belongings of his belongings; for the discernment of the things of self, and of the things which belong to the things of self,

appear all to be the business of the same man, and of the same art.

*Al.* That is to be supposed.

*Soc.* And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will in like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others?

*Al.* Very true.

*Soc.* And if he knows not the affairs of others, he will not know the affairs of states?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Then such a man can never be a statesman?

*Al.* He cannot.

*Soc.* Nor an economist?

*Al.* He cannot.

134 *Soc.* He will not know what he is doing?

*Al.* He will not.

*Soc.* And will not he who is ignorant fall into error?

*Al.* Assuredly.

*Soc.* And if he errs, he will fail both in his public and private capacity?

*Al.* Yes, indeed.

*Soc.* And failing, will he not be miserable?

*Al.* Very.

*Soc.* And what will become of those for whom he is acting?

*Al.* They will be miserable also.

*Soc.* Then he who is not wise and good cannot be happy?

*Al.* He cannot.

*Soc.* The bad, then, are miserable?

*Al.* Yes, very.

*Soc.* And not he who has riches, but he who has wisdom, is delivered from his misery?

*Al.* Clearly.

*Soc.* Cities, then, if they are to be happy, do not want walls, or triremes, or docks, or numbers, or size, Alcibiades, without virtue?

*Al.* Indeed they do not.

*Soc.* And you must give the citizens virtue, if you mean to administer their affairs rightly or nobly?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But can a man give that which he has not?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Then you or any one who means to govern and superintend, not only himself and the things of himself, but the state and the things of the state, must in the first place acquire virtue.

*Al.* That is true.

*Soc.* You have not therefore to obtain power or authority, in order to enable you to do what you wish for yourself and the state, but justice and wisdom.

*Al.* That is true.

*Soc.* You and the state, if you act wisely and justly, will act according to the will of God?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* As I was saying before, you will look only at what is bright and divine, and act with a view to them?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* In that mirror you will see and know yourselves and your own good?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And so you will act rightly and well?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* In which case, I will be security for your happiness.

*Al.* I accept the security.

*Soc.* But if you act unrighteously, your eye will turn to the dark and godless, and being in darkness and ignorance of yourselves, you will probably do deeds of darkness.

*Al.* Very possibly.

*Soc.* For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, has the power to do what he likes, but has no understanding, what is likely to be the result, either to him as an individual or to the state—for 135 example, if he be sick and is able to do what he likes, not having the mind of a physician—having moreover tyrannical power, and no one daring to reprove him, what will happen to him? Will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined?

*Al.* That is true.

*Soc.* Or again, in a ship, if a man having the power to do what he likes, has no intelligence or skill in navigation, do you see what will happen to him and to his fellow-sailors?

*Al.* Yes; I see that they will all perish.

*Soc.* And in like manner, in a state, and where there is any power and authority which is wanting in virtue, will not the result be the same?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Not royal power, then, my good Alcibiades, should be the aim either of individuals or states, if they would be happy, but virtue.

*Al.* That is true.

*Soc.* And before they have virtue, to be commanded by their betters, is better for men as well as for children?

*Al.* That is evident.

*Soc.* And that which is better is also nobler?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* And what is nobler is more becoming?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then to the bad man slavery is more becoming, because better?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* Then vice is slavish?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And virtue is the attribute of a freeman?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And, O my friend, is not slavery to be avoided?

*Al.* Certainly, Socrates.

*Soc.* And are you now conscious of your own state? And do you know whether you are a freeman or not?

*Al.* I think that I am very conscious indeed of my own state.

*Soc.* And do you know how to escape out of a state which I do not even like to name to my beauty?

*Al.* Yes, I do.

*Soc.* How?

*Al.* By your help, Socrates.

*Soc.* That is not well said, Alcibiades.

*Al.* What ought I to have said?

*Soc.* By the help of God.

*Al.* I agree; and I further say, that our relations are likely to be reversed. From this day forward, I must and will follow you

as you have followed me; I will be the disciple, and you shall be my master.

*Ser.* O that is rare! My love breeds another love: and so like the stork I shall be cherished by the bird whom I have hatched.

*M.* Strange, but true; and henceforward I shall begin to think about justice.

*Ser.* And I hope that you will persist; although I have fears, not because I doubt you; but I see the power of the state, which may be too much for both of us.

# MENEXENUS.



## INTRODUCTION.

THE Menexenus has more the character of a rhetorical exercise than any other of the Platonic works. The writer seem to have wished to emulate Thucydides, and the far slighter work of Lysias. In his rivalry with the latter, to whom in the Phaedrus Plato shows a strong antipathy, he is entirely successful, but he is not equal to Thucydides. The Menexenus, though not without real Hellenic interest, falls very far short of the rugged grandeur and political insight of the great historian. The fiction of the speech having been invented by Aspasia, is well sustained, and is in the manner of Plato; notwithstanding the anachronism which puts into her mouth an allusion to the peace of Antalcidas, an event occurring forty years after the date of the supposed oration. But Plato, like Shakespeare, is careless of such anachronisms, which are not supposed to strike the mind of the reader. The effect produced by these grandiloquent orations on Socrates, who does not recover after having heard one of them for three days and more, is truly Platonic.

Such discourses, if we may form a judgment from the three which are extant (for the so-called Funeral Oration of Demosthenes is a bad and spurious imitation of Thucydides and Lysias), conformed to a regular type. They began with Gods and ancestors, and the legendary history of Athens, to which succeeded an almost equally fictitious account of later times. The Persian war usually formed the centre of the narrative; in the age of Isocrates and Demosthenes the Athenians were still living on the glories of Marathon and Salamis. The Menexenus casts a veil over the weak places of Athenian history. The war of Athens and Boeotia is a war of liberation; the Athenians gave back the Spartans taken at Sphacteria out of kindness—indeed, the only fault of the city

was too great kindness — their enemies were more honoured than the friends of others (cp. Thucyd. ii. 41, which seems to contain the germ of the idea); we democrats are the true aristocracy of virtue. These are the platitudes and falsehoods in which Athenian history is disguised.

The author of the Menexenus, whether Plato or not, is evidently intending to ridicule the practice, and at the same time to show that he can beat the rhetoricians in their own line, as in the Phaedrus he may be supposed to offer an example of what Lysias might have said, and of how much better he might have written in his own style. The orators had recourse to their favourite *lai et hymns*, one of which, as we find in Lysias, was the shortness of the time allowed them for preparation. But Socrates points out that they had them always ready for delivery, and that there was no difficulty in improvising any number of such orations. To praise the Athenians among the Athenians was easy,—to praise them among the Lacedaemonians would have been a much more difficult task. Socrates himself has turned rhetorician, having learned of a woman, Aspasia, the mistress of Pericles; and any one who had had far inferior teachers to him, — say, one who had learned from Antiphon the Rhamnusian—would be quite equal to the task of praising men to themselves. When we remember that Antiphon is described by Thucydides as the best pleader of his day, the satire on him and on the whole tribe of rhetoricians is transparent.

The ironical assumption of Socrates, that he must be a good orator because he had learnt of Aspasia, is not coarse, as Schleiermacher supposes, but is rather to be regarded as fanciful. Nor can we say that the offer of Socrates to dance naked out of love for Menexenus, is any more unPlatonic than the threat of physical force which Phaedrus uses towards Socrates (280 C). Nor is there any real vulgarity in the fear which Socrates expresses that he will get a beating from his mistress, Aspasia: this is the natural exaggeration of what might be expected from an imperious woman. Socrates is not to be taken seriously in all that he says, and Plato, both in the Symposium and elsewhere, is not slow to admit a sort of Aristophanic humour. How a great original genius like Plato might or might not have written, what was his conception of humour, or what limits he would have prescribed to himself, if any, in drawing the picture of the Silenus Socrates, are problems which no critical instinct can determine.

On the other hand, the dialogue has several Platonic traits, whether original or imitated may be uncertain. Socrates, when he departs from his character of a 'know nothing' and delivers a speech, generally pretends that what he is speaking is not his own composition. Thus in the Cratylus he is run away with (410 E); in the Phaedrus he has heard somebody say something (235 C)—is inspired by the *genius loci* (238 D), and the like. But he does not impose on Menexenus by his dissimulation. Without violating the character of Socrates, Plato, who knows so well how to give a hint, or some one writing in his name, intimates clearly enough that the speech in the Menexenus like that in the Phaedrus is to be attributed to Socrates. The address of the dead to the living at the end of the oration may also be compared to the numerous addresses of the same kind which occur in Plato, in whom the dramatic element is always tending to prevail over the rhetorical. The remark has been often made, that in the Funeral Oration of Thucydides there is no allusion to the existence of the dead. But in the Menexenus a future state is clearly, although not strongly, asserted.

Whether the Menexenus is a mere imitation of Plato or an original work, remains uncertain; in either case, the thoughts appear to be partly borrowed from the Funeral Oration of Thucydides. Internal evidence seems to leave the question of authorship in doubt. There are merits and there are defects which might lead to either conclusion. The form of the greater part of the work makes the enquiry difficult; the introduction and the finale certainly wear the look either of Plato or of a skilful imitator of Plato. In this uncertainty the express testimony of Aristotle, who quotes, in the Rhetic <sup>1</sup>, the well-known words, 'It is easy to praise the Athenians among the Athenians,' from the Funeral Oration, may perhaps turn the balance in its favour. It must be remembered also that the work was famous in antiquity, and is included in the Alexandrian catalogues of Platonic writings.

<sup>1</sup> i. 9, 30; iii. 14, 11.



## MENEXENUS.

### PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES and MENEXENUS.

Steph. *Socrates*. Whence come you, Menexenus? Are you from the  
234 Agora?

*Menexenus*. Yes, Socrates; I have been at the council.

*Soc.* And what might you be doing at the council? And yet I need hardly ask, for I see that you, believing yourself to have arrived at the end of education and of philosophy, having had enough of them, and, being now grown up, are going higher, and intend to govern us old men like the rest of your family, which has always provided some one who kindly took care of us.

*Men.* Yes, Socrates, I shall be ready to hold office, if you allow and advise that I should, but not if you think otherwise. I went to the council chamber because I heard that the council was about to choose some one who was to speak over the dead. For you know that there is to be a public funeral?

*Soc.* Yes, I know. And whom did they choose?

*Men.* No one; they delayed the election until to-morrow, but I believe that either Aeschines or Dion will be chosen.

*Soc.* O Menexenus! death in battle is certainly in many respects a noble thing. The dead man gets a fine and costly funeral, although he may have been poor, and an elaborate speech is made over him by a wise man who has long ago prepared what he has to say, although he who is praised may not have been good for much. The speakers praise him for what he has done and for what he has not done—that is the beauty of them—and they steal away our souls with their

embellished words ; in every conceivable form they praise the <sup>235</sup> city ; and they praise those who died in war, and all our ancestors who went before us ; and they praise ourselves also who are still alive, until I feel quite elevated by their laudations, and I stand listening to their words, Menexenus, and become enchanted by them, and all of a sudden I imagine myself to have grown up into a greater and nobler and finer man than I was before. And if, as often happens, there are any foreigners who accompany me to the speech, I become suddenly conscious of having a sort of triumph over them, and they seem to experience a corresponding feeling of admiration at me, and at the greatness of the city, which appears to them, when they are under the influence of the speaker, more wonderful than ever. This consciousness of dignity lasts me more than three days, and not until the fourth or fifth day do I come to my senses and know where I am ; in the meantime I have been living in the Islands of the Blest. Such is the art of our rhetoricians, and in such manner does the sound of their words keep ringing in our ears.

*Men.* You are always making fun of the rhetoricians, Socrates ; this time, however, I am inclined to think that the speaker who is chosen will not have much to say, for he has been called upon to speak at a moment's notice, and he will be compelled almost to improvise.

*Soc.* But why, my friend, should he not have plenty to say ? Every rhetorician has speeches ready made ; nor is there any difficulty in improvising that sort of stuff. Had the orator to praise Athenians among Peloponnesians, or Peloponnesians among Athenians, he must be a good rhetorician who could succeed and gain credit. But there is no difficulty in a man's winning applause when he is contending for fame among the persons who are being praised.

*Men.* Do you think not, Socrates ?

*Soc.* Certainly 'not.'

*Men.* Do you think that you could speak yourself if there should be a necessity, and if the council were to choose you ?

*Soc.* That I should be able to speak is no great wonder, Menexenus, considering that I have an excellent mistress in the art of rhetoric,—she who made so many good speakers, and one

who was the best among all the Hellenes—Pericles, the son of Xanthippus.

*Men.* And who is she? I suppose that you mean Aspasia.

*Soc.* Yes, I do; and besides her I had Connus, the son of Metrobius, as a master, and he was my master in music, as she was in rhetoric. No wonder that a man who has received such an education should be a finished speaker; even the pupil of very inferior masters, say, for example, one who had learned music of Lamprus, and rhetoric of Antiphon the Rhamnusian, might make a figure if he were to praise the Athenians among the Athenians.

*Men.* And what would you be able to say if you had to speak?

*Soc.* Of my own wit, most likely nothing; but yesterday I heard Aspasia composing a funeral oration about these very dead. For she had been told, as you were saying, that the Athenians were going to choose a speaker, and she repeated to me the sort of speech which he should deliver, partly improvising and partly from previous thought, putting together fragments of the funeral oration which Pericles spoke, and, I believe, she composed.

*Men.* And can you remember what Aspasia said?

*Soc.* I ought to be able, for she taught me, and she was ready to strike me because I was always forgetting.

*Men.* Then why will you not rehearse what she said?

*Soc.* Because I am afraid that my mistress may be angry with me if I publish her speech.

*Men.* Nay, Socrates, let us have the speech, whether Aspasia's or any one else's, no matter about that. I hope that you will oblige me.

*Soc.* But I am afraid that you will laugh at me if I continue the games of youth in old age.

*Men.* Far otherwise, Socrates; let us by all means have the speech.

*Soc.* Truly I have such a disposition to oblige you, that if you bid me dance naked I should not like to refuse, since we are alone. Listen then. If I remember rightly, she began as follows, with the mention of the dead:—

There is a tribute of deeds and of words. The departed have

already had the first, when going forth on their destined journey they were attended on their way by the state and by their friends ; the tribute of words remains to be given to them, as is meet and by law ordained. For noble words are a memorial and a crown of noble actions, which are given to the doers of them by the hearers. A word is needed which will duly praise the dead and gently admonish the living, exhorting the brethren and descendants of the departed to imitate their virtue, and consoling their fathers and mothers and the survivors, if any, who may chance to be alive of the previous generation. What <sup>237</sup> sort of a word will this be, and how shall we rightly begin the praises of these brave men ? In their life they rejoiced their own friends with their virtue, and their death they gave in exchange for the salvation of the living. And I think that we should praise them in the order in which nature made them good, for they were good because they were sprung from good fathers. Wherefore let us first of all. praise the goodness of their birth ; secondly, their nurture and education ; and then let us set forth how noble their actions were, and how worthy of the education which they had received.

And first as to their birth. Their ancestors were not strangers, nor are these their descendants sojourners only, whose fathers have come from another country ; but they are the children of the soil, dwelling and living in their own land. And the country which brought them up is not like other countries, a stepmother to her children, but their own true mother ; she bore them and nourished them and received them, and in her bosom they now repose. It is meet and right, therefore, that we should begin by praising the land which is their mother, and that will be a way of praising their noble birth.

The country is worthy to be praised, not only by us, but by all mankind ; first, and above all, as being dear to the Gods. This is proved by the strife and contention of the Gods respecting her. And ought not the country which the Gods praise to be praised by all mankind ? The second praise which may be fairly claimed by her, is that at the time when the whole earth was sending forth and creating diverse animals, tame and wild, she our mother was free and pure from savage monsters, and out of all animals selected and brought forth man, who is

superior to the rest in understanding, and alone has justice and religion. And a great proof that she was the mother of us and of our ancestors, is that she provided the means of support for her offspring. For as a woman proves her motherhood by giving milk to her young ones (and she who has no fountain of milk is not a mother), so did this our land prove that she was going to be the mother of men, for in those days she alone and first of all brought forth wheat and barley for human food, which  
238 is the best and noblest sustenance for man, whom she regarded as her true offspring. And these are truer proofs of motherhood in a country than in a woman, for the woman in her conception and generation is but the imitation of the earth, and not the earth of the woman. And of the fruit of the earth she gave a plenteous supply, not only to her own, but to others also; and after that she made the olive to spring up to be a boon to her children, and to help them in their toils. And when she had herself nursed them and brought them up to manhood, she gave them Gods to be their rulers and teachers, whose names are well known, and need not now be repeated. They are the Gods who first ordered our lives, and gave us arts to supply our daily needs, and taught us the possession and use of arms for the guardianship of the country.

Thus born into the world and thus educated, the ancestors of the departed lived and made themselves a government, which I ought briefly to commemorate. For government is the nurture of man, and the government of good men is good, and of bad men bad. And I must show that our ancestors were trained under a good government, and for this reason they were good, and our contemporaries are also good, among whom our departed friends are to be reckoned. Then as now, and indeed always, from that time to this, speaking generally, our government was an aristocracy—a form of government which receives various names, according to the fancies of men, and is sometimes called democracy, being really an aristocracy of the many who love virtue. For kings we have always had, first hereditary and then elected, and authority is mostly in the hands of the people, who dispense offices and power to those who appear to be most deserving of them. Neither is a man rejected from weakness or poverty or obscurity of origin, nor honoured by reason of the

opposite, as in other states, but there is one principle—he who appears to be wise and good is a governor and ruler. The basis of this our government is equality of birth; for other states are made up of all sorts and unequal conditions of men, and therefore their governments are unequal; there are tyrannies and there are oligarchies, in which the one party are slaves and the others masters. But we and our citizens are brethren, the children all of one mother, and we do not claim to be one another's masters or servants; but the natural equality of birth compels us to seek for legal equality, and to recognize no superiority except in the reputation of virtue and wisdom.

And so their and our fathers, and these, too, our brethren, having been brought up in all freedom, and nobly born, did both in their public and private capacity many noble deeds famous over the whole world. They were the deeds of men who thought that they ought to fight both against Hellenes for the sake of Hellenes on behalf of freedom, and against barbarians in the common interest of Hellas. The time would fail me to tell of their defence of their country against the invasion of Eumolpus and the Amazons, or of their defence of the Argives against the Cadmeians, or of the Heracleids against the Argives; besides, the poets have already declared in song their glory to all mankind, and therefore any commemoration of them in prose which we might attempt would hold a second place. They have their reward of them, and I say no more; but there are other worthy deeds of which no poet has worthily sung, and which are still wooing the poet's favour. Of these I am bound to make honourable mention, and shall invoke others to sing of them also in lyric and other strains, in a manner becoming the actors. And first I will tell how the Persians, lords of Asia, were enslaving Europe, and how the children of this land, who were our fathers, held them back. Of these I will speak first, and praise their valour, as is meet and fitting. He who would rightly estimate them should place himself in thought at that time, when the whole of Asia was subject to the third king of Persia. The first king, Cyrus, by his valour freed the Persians, who were his countrymen, and subjected the Medes, who were their lords, and he ruled over the rest of Asia, as far as Egypt; and after him came his son, who ruled all the accessible part of Egypt

and Libya ; the third king was Darius, who extended the land boundaries of the empire to Scythia, and with his fleet held the  
240 sea and the islands. None presumed to be his equal ; the minds of all men were enthralled by him—so many and mighty and warlike nations had the power of Persia subdued. Now Darius had a quarrel against us and the Eretrians, because, as he said, we had conspired against Sardis, and he sent 500,000 men in transports and vessels of war, and 300 ships, and Datis as commander, telling him to bring the Eretrians and Athenians to the king, if he wished to keep his head on his shoulders. He sailed against the Eretrians, who were reputed to be amongst the noblest and most warlike of the Hellenes of that day, and they were numerous, but he conquered them all in three days ; and when he had conquered them, in order that no one might escape, he searched the whole country after this manner : his soldiers, coming to the borders of Eretria and spreading from sea to sea, joined hands and passed through the whole country, in order that they might be able to tell the king that no one had escaped them. And from Eretria they went to Marathon, expecting to bind the Athenians in the same yoke of necessity in which they had bound the Eretrians. Having effected one-half of their purpose, they were in the act of attempting the other, and none of the Hellenes dared to assist either the Eretrians or the Athenians, except the Lacedaemonians, and they only came the day after the battle ; but the rest were panic-stricken and remained quiet, happy that they had escaped for a time. He who has present to him that conflict will know what manner of men they were who received the onset of the barbarians at Marathon, and chastened the pride of the whole of Asia, and by the victory which they gained over the barbarians first taught other men that the power of the Persians was not invincible, but that hosts of men and the multitude of riches alike yield to virtue. And I assert that those men are the fathers not only of ourselves, but of our liberties and of the liberties of all who are on the continent, for that was the action to which the Hellenes looked back when they ventured to fight for their own safety in the battles which followed : they became disciples of the men of Marathon. To them, therefore, I assign in  
241 my speech the first place, and the second to those who fought

and conquered in the sea fights at Salamis and Artemisium, for of them, too, one might have many things to say ; of the assaults which they endured by sea and land, and how they repelled them. But I will mention only that act of theirs which appears to me to be the noblest, and which was next in order of succession to Marathon, for the men of Marathon only showed the Hellenes that it was possible to ward off the barbarians by land, the many by the few ; but there was no proof that they could be defeated by ships, and at sea the Persians retained the reputation of being invincible in numbers and wealth and skill and strength. This is the glory of the men who fought at sea, that they dispelled the second fear which had hitherto possessed the Hellenes, and so made the fear of numbers, whether of ships or men, to cease among them. This was the effect, and thus the soldiers of Marathon and the sailors of Salamis became the schoolmasters of Hellas ; the one teaching and habituating the Hellenes not to fear the barbarians at sea, and the others not to fear them by land. Third in order, for the number and valour of the combatants, and third in the salvation of Hellas, I place the battle of Plataea. And now the Athenians and Lacedaemonians shared in the struggle ; they were all united in this greatest and most terrible conflict of all, and for this their virtue will be celebrated in times to come, as they are now celebrated by us. But at a later period many Hellenic tribes were still on the side of the barbarians, and there was a report that the great king was going to make a new attempt upon the Hellenes, and therefore justice requires that we should also make mention of those who crowned the previous work of our salvation, and drove and purged away all barbarians from the sea. These were the men who fought by sea at the river Eurymedon, and who went on the expedition to Cyprus, and who sailed to Egypt and divers other places ; and they should be gratefully remembered by us, because they compelled the king to look at home instead of plotting the destruction of Hellas.

And so the war against the barbarians was fought out to the 242 end by the whole city on their own behalf, and on behalf of their countrymen. There was peace, and our city was held in honour ; and then, as prosperity makes men jealous, there succeeded a jealousy of her, and jealousy begat envy, and so she became

engaged against her will in a war with the Hellenes. On the breaking out of war, our citizens met the Lacedaemonians at Tanagra, and fought for the freedom of the Boeotians ; the issue was doubtful, and was decided by the engagement which followed. For when the Lacedaemonians had gone on their way, leaving the Boeotians, whom they were aiding, on the third day after the battle of Tanagra, our countrymen conquered at Oenophyta, and righteously restored those who had been unrighteously exiled. And they were the first after the Persian war who fought on behalf of liberty in aid of Hellenes against Hellenes ; they were brave men, and freed those whom they aided, and were the first too who were honourably interred in this sepulchre by the state. Afterwards there was a mighty war, in which all the Hellenes joined, and devastated our country, which was very ungrateful of them ; and our countrymen, after defeating them in a naval engagement and taking their leaders, the Spartans, at Sphagia, when they might have destroyed them, spared their lives, and gave them back, and made peace, considering that they should war with their fellow-countrymen only until they gained a victory over them, and not because of the private anger of the state destroy the common interest of Hellas ; but that with barbarians they should war to the death. Worthy of praise are they also, who waged this war, and are here interred, for they proved, if any one doubted the superior prowess of the Athenians in the former war with the barbarians, that their doubts had no foundation—showing by their victory in the civil war with Hellas, in which they subdued the other chief state of the Hellenes, that they could conquer single-handed those with whom they had been allied in the war against the barbarians. After the peace there followed a third war, which was of a terrible and desperate nature, and in this many brave men who are here interred lost their lives—many of them

243 who had conquered Sicily, whither they had gone over the seas to fight for the liberties of the Leontines, to whom they were bound by oaths, and on whose behalf many trophies were raised by them ; but, owing to the distance, the city was unable to help them, and they lost heart and came to misfortune, their very enemies and opponents winning more renown for virtue and temperance than the friends of others. Many also fell in naval

engagements at the Hellespont, after having in one day taken all the ships of the enemy, and defeated them in other naval engagements: And what I call the terrible and desperate nature of the war, is that the other Hellenes, in their extreme animosity towards the city, should have entered into negotiations with their bitterest enemy, the king of Persia, whom they, together with us, had expelled ;—him, without us, they again brought back, barbarian against Hellenes, and all the hosts, both of Hellenes and barbarians, were united against Athens. And then shone forth the power and value of our city. Her enemies had supposed that she was exhausted by the war, and her ships were blockaded at Mitylene. But the citizens themselves embarked, and came to the rescue with sixty other ships, and their valour was confessed of all men, for they conquered their enemies and delivered their friends. And yet by some evil fortune they were left to perish at sea, and therefore are<sup>1</sup> not interred here. Ever to be remembered and honoured are they, for by their valour not only that sea-fight was won for us, but the entire war was decided by them, and through them the city gained the reputation of being invincible, even though attacked by all mankind. And that reputation was a true one, for the defeat which came upon us was our own doing. We were never conquered by others, and to this day we are still unconquered by them ; but we were our own conquerors, and received defeat at our own hands. Afterwards there was quiet and peace abroad, but there sprang up war at home ; and, if men are destined to have civil war, no one could have desired that his city should take the disorder in a milder form. How joyful and natural was the reconciliation of those who came from the Piraeus and those who came from the city ; with what moderation did they order the war against the tyrants in Eleusis, and how differently from what the other Hellenes expected ! And the reason of this 244 gentleness was the veritable tie of blood, which created among them a friendship as of kinsmen, faithful not in word only, but in deed. And we ought also to remember those who then fell by one another's hands, and on such occasions as these to reconcile them with sacrifices and prayers, praying to those who have power over them, that they may be reconciled even as we are

<sup>1</sup> Reading *οὐ κείνται*.

reconciled. For they did not assail one another out of malice or enmity, but they were unfortunate. And that such was the fact we ourselves are witnesses, who are of the same race with them, and have mutually received and granted forgiveness of what we have done and suffered. After this there was perfect peace, and the city had rest; and her feeling was that she forgave the barbarians, who had severely suffered at her hands and severely retaliated, but that she was indignant at the ingratitude of the Hellenes, when she remembered how they had received good from her and returned evil, having made common cause with the barbarians, depriving her of the ships which had once been their salvation, and dismantling our walls, when we had prevented their walls from falling. She thought that she would no longer defend the Hellenes, when enslaved either by one another or by the barbarians, and did accordingly. This was our feeling, while the Lacedaemonians were thinking that the champions of liberty had fallen, and that their business was to subject the remaining Hellenes. And why should I say more? for the events of which I am speaking happened not long ago and we can all of us remember how the chief peoples of Hellas, Argives and Boeotians and Corinthians, came to feel the need of us, and, what is the greatest miracle of all, the Persian king himself was driven to such extremity as to come round to the opinion, that from this city, of which he was the destroyer, and from no other, his salvation would proceed.

And if a person desired to bring a deserved accusation against our city, he would find only one charge which he could justly urge—that she was too compassionate and too much inclined to favour the weak. And in this instance she was not able to hold out or keep her resolution of refusing aid to her injurers when 245 they were being enslaved, but she was softened, and did in fact send out aid, and delivered the Hellenes from slavery, and they were free until they afterwards enslaved themselves. Whereas, to the great king she refused to give the assistance of the state, for she could not forget the trophies of Marathon and Salamis and Plataea; but she allowed exiles and volunteers to assist him, and they were his salvation. And she herself, when she was compelled, entered into the war, and built walls and ships, and fought with the Lacedaemonians on behalf of the Parians. Now

the king fearing this city, when he saw the Lacedaemonians giving up the war at sea, asked, as the price of his alliance with us and the other allies, the Hellenes on the continent, whom the Lacedaemonians had already given up to him, he thinking that we should refuse, and that then he might have a pretence for being quit of us. About the other allies he was mistaken, for the Corinthians and Argives and Boeotians, and the other states, were quite willing to give them up, and swore and covenanted, that, if he would give them money, they would leave the Hellenes of the continent in his hands, and we alone refused to give them up and swear. Such was the noble disposition of this city, so sound and healthy was the spirit of freedom among us, which is the natural enemy of the barbarian, because we are pure Hellenes, having no mixture of barbarians. For we are not like many others, descendants of Pelops or Cadmus or Egyptus or Danaus, who are by nature barbarians, and yet pass for Hellenes, and dwell among us; but we are pure Hellenes, having no admixture of foreigners, and therefore the hatred of the foreigner has passed unadulterated into the life-blood of the city. The result of our refusal was that we were again isolated, because we were unwilling to be guilty of the base and unholy act of giving up Hellenes to barbarians. And so we were in the same case as when we were subdued before; but, by the favour of Heaven, we managed better, for we ended the war without the loss of our ships or walls or colonies; the enemy was only too glad to be quit of us. Yet in this war we lost many brave men, such as were those who fell owing to the ruggedness of the ground at the battle of Corinth, or by treason at Lechaeum. Brave men, too, were those who delivered the Persian king, and drove the Lacedaemonians from the sea. I remind you of them, and you must <sup>246</sup> celebrate them together with me, and do honour to their memories.

Such were the actions of the men who are here interred, and of others who have died on behalf of their country; many and glorious things I have told you of them, and there are yet many more and more glorious things remaining to be told, which many days and nights would not suffice to tell. Let them not be forgotten, and let every man remind their descendants that

they also are soldiers who must not desert the ranks of their ancestors, or fall behind from cowardice. Even as I exhort you this day, and in all future time and on every occasion on which I meet with any of you shall continue to remind and exhort you, O ye sons of heroes, that you strive to be the bravest of men. And I think that I ought now to repeat to you what your fathers desired to have said to you who are their survivors, when they went out to battle, in case anything happened to them. I will tell you what I heard them say, and what, if they had only speech, they would fain be saying, judging from what they then said. And you must imagine that you hear them saying what I now repeat to you :—

Sons, the event proves that your fathers were brave men ; for we might have lived dishonourably, but have preferred to die honourably rather than bring you and your children into disgrace, and rather than dishonour our own fathers and forefathers ; considering that life is not life to one who is a dishonour to his race, and that to such an one neither men nor Gods are friendly, either while he is on the earth or after death in the world below. Remember our words, then, and whatever is your aim let virtue be the condition of the attainment of your aim, and know that without this all possessions and pursuits are dishonourable and evil. For neither does wealth bring honour to the owner, if he be a coward ; of such an one the wealth belongs to another, and not to himself. Nor does beauty and strength of body, when dwelling in a base and cowardly man, appear comely, but the reverse of comely, making the possessor more conspicuous, and manifesting forth his cowardice. And all knowledge, when separated from justice and virtue, is seen to be cunning and not wisdom ; wherefore make this your first and last and only and 247 everlasting desire, that if possible you may exceed not only us but all your ancestors in virtue ; and know that to excel you in virtue only brings us shame, but that to be excelled by you is a source of joy to us. And we shall most likely be defeated, and you will most likely be victors in the contest, if you learn so to order your lives as not to misuse or waste the reputation of your ancestors, knowing that to a man who has any self-respect, nothing is more dishonourable than to be honoured, not for his own sake, but on account of the reputation of his ancestors.

The honour of parents is a fair and noble treasure to their posterity, but to have the use of a treasure of wealth and honour, and to leave none to your successors, because you have neither money nor reputation of your own, is alike base and dishonourable. And if you follow our precepts you will be received by us as friends, when the hour of destiny brings you hither; but if you neglect our words and are disgraced in your lives, no one will welcome or receive you. This is the message which is to be delivered to our children.

Some of us have fathers and mothers still living, and we would urge them, if, as is likely, we shall die, to bear the calamity as lightly as possible, and not to condole with one another; for they have sorrows enough, and will not need any one to stimulate them. While we gently heal their wounds, let us remind them that the Gods have heard the chief part of their prayers; for they prayed, not that their children might live for ever, but that they might be famous and brave. And this, which is the greatest good, they have attained. A mortal man cannot expect to have everything in his own life turning out according to his will; and they, if they bear their misfortunes bravely, will be truly deemed brave fathers of the brave. But if they give way to their sorrows, either they will be suspected of not being our parents, or we of not being such as our panegyrists declare. Let not either of the two alternatives happen, but rather let them be our chief and true panegyrists, who show in their lives that they are true men, and had men for their sons. The ancient saying, ‘never too much,’ appears to be, and really is, well said. For he whose happiness rests with himself, if possible, wholly, and if not, as far as is possible,—who is not 248 hanging in suspense on other men, or changing with the vicissitude of their fortune,—has his life ordered for the best. He is the temperate and valiant and wise; and when his riches come and go, when his children are given and taken away, he will remember the proverb—‘neither rejoicing overmuch nor grieving overmuch,’ for he relies upon himself. And such we would have our parents to be—that is our word and wish, and as such we now offer ourselves, neither lamenting overmuch, nor fearing overmuch, if we are to die at this instant. And we entreat our fathers and mothers to retain these feelings throughout their

future life, and to be assured that they will not please us by sorrowing and lamenting over us. But, if the dead have any knowledge of the living, they will displease us most by making themselves miserable and by taking their misfortunes to heart, and they will please us best if they bear their loss lightly and temperately. For our life will have the noblest end which is vouchsafed to man, and should be glorified rather than lamented. And if they will direct their minds to the care and nurture of our wives and children, they will soonest forget their misfortunes, and live more honourably and uprightly, and in a way that is more agreeable to us.

This is all that we have to say to our families: and to the state we would say—Let her take care of our parents and sons, educating the one in principles of order, and worthily cherishing the old age of the other. But we know that she will of her own accord take care of them, and does not need exhortation from us.

These, O ye children and parents of the dead, are the words which they bid us proclaim to you, and which I do proclaim to you with the utmost good will. And on their behalf I beseech you, the children, to imitate your fathers, and you, parents, to be of good cheer about yourselves; for we will nourish your age, and take care of you both publicly and privately in any place in which one of us may meet one of you who are the parents of the dead. And the care which the city shows you yourselves know; for she has made provision by law concerning the parents

249 and children of those who die in war; and the highest authority is specially entrusted with the duty of watching over them above all other citizens, in order to see that there is no wrong done to them. She herself takes part in the nurture of the children, desiring as far as it is possible that their orphanhood may not be felt by them; she is a parent to them while they are children, and when they arrive at the age of manhood she sends them to their several duties, clothing them in armour; she displays to them and recalls to their minds the pursuits of their fathers, and puts into their hands the instruments of their fathers' virtues; for the sake of the omen, she would have them begin and go to rule over their own houses arrayed in the strength and arms of their fathers. And she never ceases honour-

ing the dead every year, celebrating in public the rites which are proper to each and all; and in addition to this, holding gymnastic and equestrian festivals, and musical festivals of every sort. She is to the dead in the place of a son and heir, and to their sons in the place of a father, and to their parents and elder kindred in the place of a protector—ever and always caring for them. Considering this, you ought to bear your calamity the more gently; for thus you will be most endeared to the dead and to the living, and your sorrows will heal and be healed. And now do you and all, having lamented the dead together in the usual manner, go your ways.

Such, Menexenus, was the oration of Aspasia the Milesian.

*Men.* Truly, Socrates, I marvel that Aspasia, who is only a woman, should be able to compose such a speech; she must be a rare one.

*Soc.* Well, if you are incredulous, you may come with me and hear her.

*Men.* I have often met Aspasia, Socrates, and know what she is like.

*Soc.* Well, and do you not admire her, and are you not grateful for her speech?

*Men.* Yes, Socrates, I am very grateful to her or to him who told you, and still more to you who have told me.

*Soc.* Very good. But you must take care not to tell of me, and then at some other time I will repeat to you many more excellent political speeches of hers.

*Men.* Fear not; only let me hear them, and I will keep the secret.

*Soc.* Then I will keep my promise.



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